Development of Parties and Party Systems in ... - lah@sam.sdu.dk

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and workers voted ZChN. At the 1993-election, ZChN constituted the strongest party in the newparty-coalition (”Ojczyzna”), but that coalition did not have the sufficient strength to pass thetreshold requirements. At that election ZChN lost many votes from pensioners, self-employed andworkers.Many voters distanced themselves from interference of the Catholic Church in election campaignsand the demands for harsher decomunization (”dekomunizacja”) laws, the uncritical support to thechurch leadership and the resistance against abortion frightened many voters. After the electiondefeat in 1993 ZChN aimed to regain lost representation in parliament as quickly as possible. Thefact that ZChN joined Election Action Solidarity (AWS) from the beginning has to be seen in thatlight.After the 1997-election the ZChN acquired a rather strong representation in parliament and for thatreason a key position inside the AWS faction in parliament (Knuzewski 1998:153). In JerzyBuzek’s government ZChN had to contend itself with two ministerial posts and no posts at all atvoivod level, but as a compensation important administrative posts. In Buzek’s government ZChNconstituted the anti-pole of the Freedom Union (UW) 59 . The Freedom Union (UW) rejected almostall ZChNs policy demands, e.g. about stricter religious celebration of Sundays, extension ofmaternity leave, changes in the tax system benefiting the families, tightening of sentences for saleof narcotic, limits on the number of new supermarkets and a tougher line in negotiations with theEU.Several personal divisions came up. Thus Jerzy Kropiwnicki from ZChN, the leader of the Centrefor Strategic Studies, had several clashes and conflicts with finance minister Leszek Balcerowiczconcerning the economic policy. The Freedom Union (UW) was also behind the dismissal of theeurosceptical Ryszard Czarnecki from ZChN. In some cases division between UW and ZChN evenparalysed the government. Compromises were only entered after lengthy negotiations. That thegovernment did not resign was primarily due to fear of a new election. In case of a new electionZChN in all probability would loose its representation in parliament like at the previous 1993-election.ZChN did, however, not obtain a monopoly of Christian political representation. In the late 1999rumours about a merger of the Centre alliance (PC) and the Christian Democratic Party (PCD) werecirculating. After the inclusion of the Christian association PPChD in the AWS a new Christian”leg” emerged. Also former president Lech Walesa formed his own new Christian party, TheRepublic of Poland’s Christian Party (ChD III RP), however, without gaining the sufficientelectoral support.In spite of the disagreements with Freedom Union (UW) ZChN followed a pragmatic andcompromise-seeking policy-line. For fundamentalist political groups like ”Poruzumienie Polski”(PP) politics was a question about “life and dead” and “truth and lie”. According to ZChN politics isprimarily a question about ”give and take”, i.e. about negotiations, bargaining and compromises.Opposite, PP followed a harder line in particular when dealing with questions related to the periodbefore 1989, i.e. the III Republic. According to PP ”traitors” were not only the ”post-communists”,but all neoliberal and secular currents and not least the liberal Finance Minister LeszekBalcerowicz.59 The conflict between ZChN and UW is analysed in e.g. Filip Gawrys, Martin Dominik Zdort, ”Straznicy isprzedawcy swietego ognia”, Rzeczpospolita 4.2., 2000:A4.68
PP expected that the election alliance AWS sooner or later would break down because of internaldisagreements and after that had happened a new and more authentic and ”real” political right inPoland would come forward on the ruins of the old AWS. That in fact took place at the 2001election in the shape of The Liga of Polish Families (LPR). Furthermore, PP argued fiercely againstPolish membership of the European Union and against joining a federal Europe. In more“pragmatic” ways than PP the ZChN talked about a Europe consisting of nation states underliningPolish interests in the negotiations with the EU. PP defected from AWS, while mainly for tacticalreasons ZChN remained in the alliance, also after the defeat of Marian Krzaklewski at the 2000presidential election. The election in 1993 made clear that parliamentary representation could not beobtained by going alone.Confronting other important policy issues PP followed a uncompromising line and several timesbroke the party discipline at voting in the parliament, while ZChN aimed to maintain the partydiscipline and the influence on the law-making process. While PP primarily focused on the fightagainst the liberal Freedom Union (UW), ZChN “bombarded” the parliament with policy proposalslike a ban on pornography and sale of narcotics, tax release for families with more children and alonger maternity leave. Thus, inside AWS PP acted like a veto-group, ZChN like a policy-creatingfaction. In addition, ZChN behaved like a relevant party and a party able to take governmentalpositions. Nonetheless ZChN clearly generated more polarization in Polish politics by (re)activatingstate versus church cleavages. At the 2001 election ZChN lost representation in Sejm. At thenational congress in March 2002 unemployment, the bad implementation of the four big reforms,internal disagreements and splits was brought forward when explaining the election defeat to thepublic.After the electio defeat the eurosceptical line was sharpened. Thus, the new SLD-UP-PSLgovernment was crititized for “servility” against Bruxelles, the fast growing unemploymentespecially among young people and the liquidation of the pro-family policy of the formergovernment. According to the chairman Jerzy Kropiwnicki the party had left “pessimism” and“frustrations” behind. At the 2002 local elections ZChN was ready to enter party coalitions pointingto the fact that the election law mostly benefited the bigger political parties and also party alliances.The League of Polish Families (LPR) obtained 38 seats in Sejm at the 2001 national election. Thehistory of LPR goes back the years leading up to the “break-through” back in 1989 and has takenpart in the elections under different names. Those who formed the League expected that AWSbefore long would compromise itself polically because of the responsibilities in government and thecooperation with the liberal Freedom Union (UW). Back in 1997 several among the laterparlamentarians from LPR were elected on the lists of AWS due to the fact that those people beforethe election had been supported by Radio Maryja and the director Tadeusz Rydzyk who behind thescene was the “real” leader of the Leage of Polish Families (LPR). From the outset Tadeusz Rydzykplayed a outmost controversiel and contradictory role. Some months before the 2001 election noopinion polls gave the party any chance of representation in the new Sejm at the forthcomingelection. In order to avoid to go to the election in the shape of an election alliance and forced to passthe treshold of 8 pct. of the votes, the new party chose the party name from one of the 10 politicalgroupings that were represented in the coalition and thus formally appeared as a “standard politicalparty”.69
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“This provisional situation chara
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marketisation and privatisationshor
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purposes, are channels for “expre
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the significance of strategic choic
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presidentialism gave rise to “flo
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antipolitics and reinforcement of a
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In the late 1990’s elections most
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Page 24 and 25: Anti-communism has been defined in
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Page 28 and 29: Cartel agreementsbetter representat
Page 30 and 31: Basically the absence of clear cons
Page 32 and 33: After 1989 different types of polit
Page 34 and 35: complex project for transition unde
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Page 38 and 39: analyses of party institutionalizat
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Page 44 and 45: expected, much due to the many spli
Page 46 and 47: Furthermore, the polarisation on el
Page 48 and 49: Finally, Solidarity can also be con
Page 50 and 51: whole, on the one side an authorita
Page 52 and 53: The economic recession and the grav
Page 54 and 55: election defeat more cooperation an
Page 56 and 57: The formation of AWS can be conside
Page 58 and 59: group. RS AWS constituted the Chris
Page 60 and 61: According to the original plans the
Page 62 and 63: values. According to Rybicki, as so
Page 64 and 65: AWS should fight against all types
Page 66 and 67: 2001 parliamentary election, howeve
Page 70 and 71: The League has been considered as a
Page 72 and 73: establishment like than LPR’s. Th
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Page 78 and 79: pressurizing the government to give
Page 80 and 81: democrats, thereby locating itself
Page 82 and 83: To conclude, the Freedom Union (UW)
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Page 86 and 87: such as KSCM and KSS in The Czech R
Page 88 and 89: The SLD leaders were mainly recruit
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Page 96 and 97: Has the Left any freedom of manoeuv
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Page 100 and 101: The Labour Union (UP), Democratic U
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