Development of Parties and Party Systems in ... - lah@sam.sdu.dk

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values. According to Rybicki, as soon as possible AWS should be reshaped and constitute afunctional party federation with three different ”legs”, a trade union, a Christian-National and aliberal. However, evidence showed that it was difficult to reach an agreement on the most importantorganisational questions, especially those concerning each political group's representation andinfluence.Coming to power AWS moved towards a cartel party of the clientelist type persistently underliningthe possession of power and the technology of power and with close links to the economic sphere(“political economy”). According to Antoni Dudek like AWS also RS AWS was unable to assumethe leadership role in view of the low level of professionalism, the reluctance to pursue a consistentprogramme and the increased expectations of the electorate. The ongoing professionalisation of thePolish political scene made the future of the RS AWS look rather bleak (Dudek, in Bächer etc,2001:168).The party leader denied that the situation looked so bad, however, it was recognized that RS AWSshould be better able to gain members from different social groups in society, so that the partybehaviour disproved the argument put forward by many observers that AWS acted as a powerorientated party and not much more. Several times Jacek Rybicki 50 underlined that AWS was forcedto transform itself to a functional association, either in the shape of a unitary party, a federation ofparties or a ”energetic” political association (”porozumienie”). Time had run out for AWS as just an“election coalition”. Functional leadership and more flexible decision-making procedures werebadly needed.Also Wojciech Arkuszewski 51 , MP for AWS-SKL, expressed the opinion that AWS had to moveaway from an organisation consisting primarily of veto group factions. In order to survive AWS hadto transform itself and after that constitute a more functional association. In order to acquire asufficient cohesion and obtain the sufficient ”energy” in decision-making AWS was in need of asecretariat that could take the necessary but also unpopular decisions and make sure that they wereimplemented. The present decision-making procedures were far too complex and time-consuming.The need of institutionalisation was reflected in several breaches of the party discipline, e.g. byvoting in parliament. As a result of that it was decided that future “deviationists” would not be renominatedat the forthcoming election. Several times Marian Krzaklewski talked about the need ofmore discipline. Unfortunately, most political groupings considered the party alliance as purelytactical and temporary. Because of that not much was changed regarding the daily political practice.Thus, more than 70 members of AWS supported the vote of no confidence against the then ministerfor state property Emil Walacz, in addition the party discipline was broken several times at votingin parliament on the budget.In fact, the inevitable result of the organisational changes adopted in January 2000 was moreconfusion. The day-to-day leadership (”G-7”) was reconstructed and the presidium (”kolegium”)increased its membership from 19 to 25. These changes weakened the position of SKL and ZChN.In its efforts to streamline the organisation AWS had a “close eye” to its main adversary, the leftwing SLD, in which part the transformation from a party alliance to a unitary political party was runrather successfully.50 Interview with Jaciek Rybicki, ”Samooczszenie”, Wprost, 14 June, 1998:19-20.51 Interview in Rzeczpospolita, 22.9. 1999:A4.62
AWS never acquired the sufficient strong leadership and flexible decision-making procedures. Thepolitical disagreements were too many and the party discipline too low. Under those circumstancesthe decision about transforming the party “alliance” to a unitary ”standard party” or still be a looseinstitutionalised alliance was never taken. Several times Jerzy Buzek was forced to act as amediator, trying to agree with all important groups before important policy decisions. In thegovernment Buzek had to fight with the Freedom Union’s (UW) and the powerful finance ministerand vice Prime Minister Leszek Balcerowicz. In other words, Jerzy Buzek became a “man ofreconciliation”, not like a man of “decision and action”. It was simply impossible to act – and think- long-term and strategic.As a result, the policy aspect was clearly neglected by the AWS leaders. With the fall in votersupport AWS was forced to present solutions of those problems which were “close to people”, e.g.to improve the health reform. A new ”pact for the agriculture” should limit competition frompopulist and extremist parties such as Leppers ”Samoobrona”. The need to improve the quality ofthe laws and the law-making process as a whole was recognised from all sides. Nevertheless MarianKrzaklewski declared that AWS’ crisis was mostly a question about discipline and “the rightattitudes”. The Solidarity elite simply tried to avoid discussions about issues linked to the policyprocess, i.e. the bad quality of decision-making procedures, the bad implementation of the four bigreforms and the many issues concerning the formation of a new ”post-communist nomenklatura”.The plans about foundation of a new unitary standard party were met with strong opposition. Theaim to put ones own interests before the interests of society have been widespread in the rightnationalcamp. As noted above, for many political groups the decision about joining the AWS hadprimarily been a tactical move. In opposition to the AWS-led government SLD was able to profitfrom the ongoing split inside AWS and the low quality of law making. In the official declarationsthe significance of institutionalisation and professionalisation was repeatedly underlined. Severalproposals about more efficient and flexible institutional structures were put forward, but too muchtime was wasted on discussions about the distribution of power and how many ”legs” there shouldbe presented in AWS. The final solution was never found. The strong focus on organizational andinternal personal questions damaged the programme and policy-formulation and as a result of thatalso the electoral support.AWS became still more power-oriented, focusing too much on the “technology of power”. Thepolicy aspects were neglected, as much emphasis was laid on appointments to strategic posts insociety. Thus the concrete day-to-day policy problems were pushed on the sideline. By manyobservers the sharp fall in the voter-support was explained by the advance of a new post-communistnomenklatura.At the same time criticism became stronger also from inside AWS. The then member of parliamentand the former powerful chairman of trade union Solidarity’s Mazowsze section MaciejJankowski 52 emphasized that the fall in electoral support was caused by the fact that the interests ofthe party were put ahead the interests of society and that the political style was in need of selflimitation.The appearance of a new ruling class might signify the end of AWS as such. AlexanderHall 53 expressed the opinion that appointments to important jobs in the public sector should not takeplace according to political criteria, but qualifications (”meritorycznosc”). The best of its ability52 Gazeta Wyborcza 18-19 September, 1999:8.53 Interview in Rzeczpospolita 20.9. 1999:A3.63
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“This provisional situation chara
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marketisation and privatisationshor
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purposes, are channels for “expre
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the significance of strategic choic
Page 12 and 13: presidentialism gave rise to “flo
Page 14 and 15: antipolitics and reinforcement of a
Page 16 and 17: In the late 1990’s elections most
Page 18 and 19: determined primarily by “politica
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Page 22 and 23: which attitudes to state regulation
Page 24 and 25: Anti-communism has been defined in
Page 26 and 27: elections and the Slovak communists
Page 28 and 29: Cartel agreementsbetter representat
Page 30 and 31: Basically the absence of clear cons
Page 32 and 33: After 1989 different types of polit
Page 34 and 35: complex project for transition unde
Page 36 and 37: window of opportunity in spite of s
Page 38 and 39: analyses of party institutionalizat
Page 40 and 41: political messages and slogans. Thu
Page 42 and 43: well established party culture may
Page 44 and 45: expected, much due to the many spli
Page 46 and 47: Furthermore, the polarisation on el
Page 48 and 49: Finally, Solidarity can also be con
Page 50 and 51: whole, on the one side an authorita
Page 52 and 53: The economic recession and the grav
Page 54 and 55: election defeat more cooperation an
Page 56 and 57: The formation of AWS can be conside
Page 58 and 59: group. RS AWS constituted the Chris
Page 60 and 61: According to the original plans the
Page 64 and 65: AWS should fight against all types
Page 66 and 67: 2001 parliamentary election, howeve
Page 68 and 69: and workers voted ZChN. At the 1993
Page 70 and 71: The League has been considered as a
Page 72 and 73: establishment like than LPR’s. Th
Page 74 and 75: jobs in rural areas, especially sma
Page 76 and 77: industrial policy. According to the
Page 78 and 79: pressurizing the government to give
Page 80 and 81: democrats, thereby locating itself
Page 82 and 83: To conclude, the Freedom Union (UW)
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Page 86 and 87: such as KSCM and KSS in The Czech R
Page 88 and 89: The SLD leaders were mainly recruit
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Page 100 and 101: The Labour Union (UP), Democratic U
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