Development of Parties and Party Systems in ... - lah@sam.sdu.dk

The economic recession and the grave social problems fundamentally changed Solidarity’s position.Under the then prevailing extraordinary politics it was difficult to formulate consistent attitudes tothe most pressing policy problems, also programmes for the future and links to important socialinterests in society were needed. The plans for the transition from plan to market were both vagueand inconsistent. Most important was to keep the communists out. As put by Voytek Zubek 44 ,Solidarity indirectly supported the old communist view that the (new) system is basically ”healthy”and ”historically progressive” and ”the leaders (i.e. the Solidarity-leaders) always right”. Solidarityacted as it was enough to “convince” the opponents and push the (post)communists in the defensive.From the outset Solidarity lacked well educated and professional people especially on meso levelwho could fill out the vacuum left after the demise of the old nomenklatura, and thus create a newand better administrative apparatus. Should Solidarity gain governmental power, still the oldnomenklatura would have a considerable political influence because of the administrative control.Also mechanisms for conflict solution in society were missing. Because of weak interest groupsdissatisfaction was in many cases expressed on the streets, i.e. through protest strikes anddemonstrations, sometimes in violent forms. The lack of political visions was politicallydemobilising, so evidence showed that under social and economic recession political programmesand visions for the future were strongly needed. On the way down in the “valley of tears” it wasalmost impossible to mobilise the voters politically and bring them new hope and inspiration for thefuture.2.4. The new social environmentIn the new post-communist social environment tensions erupted between the old abstract goals forthe future and the day-to-day politics. Wnuk-Lipinski rightly argues that the market orientedreforms introduced after 1989 weakened the common interests inside the social groups which untilthen had supported Solidarity, e.g. workers on big state enterprises, farmers and state-employed inthe education and health sector. In the fight to take care of these groups’ demands and interestsSolidarity had to compete with demands from other interest groups and parties, e.g. OPZZ, SLD,PSL, KPN and UP. To accomplish that aim some in Solidarity wanted to speed up transition tomarket economy, almost at every cost. Other groups spoke about a specific ”third way” for Polandbased on catholic religious ethics and moral economics. After the founding elections Solidarityfailed to formulate concrete programmes which could work as alternatives to Rakowski’s economicreforms.From the outset, the question whether Solidarity (”NSZZ Solidarnosc”) may constitute a politicalmovement or a trade union was difficult to answer. Compared with ”first Solidarity” after 1989 thesecond Solidarity became more ”exclusive”, and acted in a more restrictive way refusing tocooperate with most other political parties and movements. The second Solidarity constituted abroad catch-all anti-communist movement. However, after 1989 more attention had to be paid to therealisation of concrete policy goals. Values and interests had to converge, if the attempt to create afunctional party identity and culture should succeed. But on that point Solidarity faced bigproblems.As already said, the greatest support was obtained from conservatively minded workers on thebiggest state enterprises, i.e. the “dinosaurs” from the Stalinist period. Support for Solidarity has44 Voytek Zubek, ”The Phoenix Out of the Ashes: The Rise To Power of Poland’s Post-Communist SdRP”, Communistand Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 28, No. 3, 1995:275-306.52