well established party culture may re<strong>in</strong>force cohesiveness <strong>and</strong> foster a more lively <strong>and</strong> democraticparty debate.The party culture shall be seen as a part <strong>of</strong> the culture <strong>in</strong> society <strong>in</strong> general. In case <strong>of</strong> the CzechRepublic some observers have called attention to the lack <strong>of</strong> ability to organise, the low solidarity <strong>in</strong>society <strong>and</strong> the widespread opportunism. Furthermore, the low political participation <strong>and</strong> thetradition <strong>of</strong> antipolitics had a negative impact on membership <strong>of</strong> political parties <strong>and</strong> the <strong>in</strong>ternalparty life.The experiences from the dissident period, i.e. the work<strong>in</strong>g “underground” created a certa<strong>in</strong> style <strong>of</strong>political action. Some new parties, e.g. Solidarity <strong>in</strong> Pol<strong>and</strong> was <strong>in</strong> posession <strong>of</strong> a strong liberationmyth. Opposite, <strong>in</strong> Pol<strong>and</strong> the liberation myth was less strik<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the Czech Republic, <strong>in</strong> whichcase the break through was very short. Before 1989 the opposition had been weakly organized, butthe anti-political attitudes were strongly represented.after 1989 thereby foster<strong>in</strong>g elite parties withweak l<strong>in</strong>kages to the civil societies. Like the civil societies <strong>in</strong> the broad sense the <strong>in</strong>ternal party lifewas not assigned an important role.In the case <strong>of</strong> Hungary the party culture was to a m<strong>in</strong>or extent l<strong>in</strong>ked to the fight aga<strong>in</strong>st the oldregime, as the former regime had been rather liberal <strong>and</strong> national accomodative <strong>and</strong> the marketeconomy already partly tested. The Czech peoples perception <strong>of</strong> democracy <strong>and</strong> democratic valueswas rather <strong>in</strong>dividualistic 36 <strong>and</strong> the programmatic <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutional shortcom<strong>in</strong>gs tended to makepolitics almost “issueless” (Thomas, 1999:9). In Pol<strong>and</strong> the political culture has been morecollectivistic than <strong>in</strong> the Czech Republic, <strong>in</strong>spired by the tenets from the Catholic church. Thehistoric memories have been a significant ressource, especially at the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> the case <strong>of</strong>Solidarity.The feel<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> solidarity <strong>in</strong> the fight aga<strong>in</strong>st the state socialist regime have been strong, go<strong>in</strong>g backto upris<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> 1956 <strong>and</strong> Solidarity <strong>in</strong> 1980-1981. Be<strong>in</strong>g member <strong>of</strong> Solidarity you became a part <strong>of</strong> abigger community (“Us” oppsosite “Them”). The many different party rituals reflected a deeplyrooted party culture, e.g. by group participation <strong>in</strong> services <strong>in</strong> churches <strong>and</strong> to carry party emblems.After the state <strong>of</strong> emergency <strong>in</strong> December 1981 many carried the “pornik”, the opposition badge.The 3 <strong>of</strong> May, the anniversary <strong>of</strong> the 1791 constitution <strong>and</strong> the anniversaries <strong>of</strong> the upris<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong>1830, 1863 <strong>and</strong> 1944 (the Warsaw upris<strong>in</strong>g) <strong>and</strong> the murder on the priest Popiluski have also beenmarked. The colours <strong>of</strong> the Polish flag was also the colours <strong>of</strong> the Solidarity banner. Thus patriotic<strong>and</strong> religious rituals were l<strong>in</strong>ked to the memories about the fight aga<strong>in</strong>st communist suppression <strong>and</strong>became therefore re-activized dur<strong>in</strong>g election campaigns 37 . Or to conclude, Solidarity was strong onthe symbolic level, but unfortunately too weak <strong>and</strong> divided organizatorically <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutionally.For the (ex)communist parties the years work<strong>in</strong>g underground before <strong>and</strong> under the second worldwar had a special mean<strong>in</strong>g, also the first years after the World War II when tak<strong>in</strong>g political power.In the Stal<strong>in</strong> years the political activities were focus<strong>in</strong>g on the fight aga<strong>in</strong>st “contrarevolutionary”activities <strong>in</strong>side as weel as outside the rul<strong>in</strong>g communist parties. The friendship with the SovietUnion, the showdown between the communist leaders <strong>and</strong> the class enemies <strong>and</strong>contrarevolutionaries fostered an <strong>in</strong>ternal solidarity <strong>and</strong> cohesion, but also a considerable fear <strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>security. Todays friends might become the enemies <strong>of</strong> tomorrow. Also special festive days <strong>and</strong>36 See e.g. <strong>in</strong>terview with Jiri Musil <strong>in</strong> Gazeta Sro<strong>dk</strong>owoeuropejska, <strong>in</strong> Gazeta Wyborcza 19 February, 1995:13.37 Wlodzimierz Modzelewski (1989), “Symbolika “Solidarnosci””, <strong>in</strong> “Studia nad ruchami spolecznymi tom. II”,Uniwersistet Warszawski, Institut Socjologii, Warszawa.42
evolutionary songs became a part <strong>of</strong> the party culture. After 1989, the fight for recognition <strong>and</strong> thepressure from non-communist groups <strong>and</strong> parties fostered <strong>in</strong>ternal cohesion <strong>and</strong> thereby enhanc<strong>in</strong>gparty <strong>in</strong>stitutionalisation.Opposite, the new non-communist parties had to establish a party culture almost from scratch.Opposite the (post)communist they could do that with “clean h<strong>and</strong>s” <strong>and</strong> without “dead bodies <strong>in</strong>the cargo”. New broad anti-communist civic movements had their roots <strong>in</strong> the fight aga<strong>in</strong>st the oldsystem. Unlike historic non-communist parties they could not survive only by references tomemories about the time before the communist take over. Thus party history <strong>and</strong> the resistanceaga<strong>in</strong>st the state socialist system occupied an important place, but did note ensure the necessary<strong>in</strong>ternal cohesion <strong>and</strong> consensus on the elite level.The revived social democratic parties did their best to l<strong>in</strong>k themselves to the party traditions go<strong>in</strong>gback to the time before the forced unification with the communist parties after WW II, howeverwithout great success. The historic social democratic parties suffered because they had not playedany lead<strong>in</strong>g role <strong>in</strong> opposition the communists <strong>and</strong> under foreign occupation. Thus the commonpantheon <strong>and</strong> collective memories was less developed. Furthermore, <strong>in</strong>ternal fragmentation due togeneration gaps <strong>and</strong> disagreements about the most proper policy l<strong>in</strong>e had as the result that at thefirst free eelections the historical social democratic parties were surpassed by the reformedcommunist parties, which more quickly than expected were able to carry through their own <strong>in</strong>ternaltransformations.For historic reasons conspiration theories were widespread also <strong>in</strong>side the parties, therebyhamper<strong>in</strong>g the development <strong>of</strong> a productive <strong>and</strong> democratic party life. In a way the new partieswere fac<strong>in</strong>g battles on two fronts, aga<strong>in</strong>s enemies <strong>in</strong> their own camps (“the wars <strong>in</strong> the top”) <strong>and</strong>aga<strong>in</strong>st external enemies (“<strong>in</strong>sider-outsider differentials”). Often the political language has beenaggressive <strong>and</strong> not only directed aga<strong>in</strong>st the representatives <strong>of</strong> the old regimes, but also aga<strong>in</strong>stpeople shar<strong>in</strong>g divergent op<strong>in</strong>ions on important policies. By the leaders opponents <strong>of</strong> the party l<strong>in</strong>ehas been called “agents”, “traitors”, “thieves <strong>of</strong> public properties” <strong>and</strong> “foreigners” <strong>and</strong> anti-semiticstatements have not been totally absent. Thus, the political debates <strong>and</strong> the political languagebetween <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>side parties tended to be signified by a “language <strong>of</strong> aggression” <strong>and</strong> a “language <strong>of</strong>attacks” 38 .II. About parties <strong>and</strong> party-systems <strong>in</strong> Pol<strong>and</strong>2.1. Path-dependency <strong>and</strong> the parties <strong>and</strong> party-systems <strong>in</strong> Pol<strong>and</strong>In a path dependency perspective the Polish transition shall be seen <strong>in</strong> the context <strong>of</strong> “thephilosophy” <strong>of</strong> the round table discussions (“Magdalenka”) 1988-89, <strong>and</strong> “the Balcerowicz plan I”,for no gevernmental parties have been able to liberate themselves from the legacy <strong>of</strong> the round tablenegotiations (“Magdalenka”) <strong>and</strong> the Balcerowicz plan despite proclamations about do<strong>in</strong>g so.Furthermore, the political capital, i.e. the spontaneous popular support, faded out before than first38 Jan<strong>in</strong>a Fras, “Political discourse <strong>in</strong> post-Communist Pol<strong>and</strong>”, <strong>in</strong> Andrzej W. Jablonski, Gerd Meyer (1996):155-159.43
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Nevertheless, before that had taken