Development of Parties and Party Systems in ... - lah@sam.sdu.dk

In Hungary the national bank, the constitutional court and the ombudsman institution placedrestrictions on the law making process (“fragmentated democracy”). In fact we were dealing with atoo early and too sifistcated institutionalisation. In Russia and Ukraine strong financial oligarchs,networking, clientura’s and other structures outside democratic control arrogated to themselves amenacingly strong position, thus weakening the freedom of action of the political parties and thelinks of parties to civil societies. To some extent those non democratic structures originated in theold state socialist system.To obtain a meaning for the populations institutions have to be strong enough to internalise thenorms necessary for the survival and futher consolidation 29 . For that to happen the institutions shallbe capable to adapt themselves to the political environment, shape the optimal congitive frames ofreferences and make complex realities more simple for the citisins. Only thereby the sufficientloyalty and legitimacy can be obtained. The new won democray can only be consolidated, if thedemocratically elected institutions are sufficiently strong to live up to their responsibilities andensure rule of law. In other words, party organisations has to be considered as an importantintervening variable. Neither political ideologies can be rooted in society without the sufficientinstitututionalisation 30 . However, the question has been raised, whether high institutionalizationnecessarily is the most appropriate in young democracies, subject to fast changes, in which mostimportant is ability of adaption and flexibility 31 . Opposite, weak institutionalization may foster antipartyattitudes. In the longer term, however, the parties have to promote more institutionalization,but institutionalisation is often more the result of, not the precondition for consolidation ofdemocracy.The question has been raised, whether in the early stage political institutions constituted anindependent variable and thus became decisive for the formation and the development of politicalparties, or institutions alternately can better be regarded as a mechanic reflection of the division ofpower between the parties and the most important cleavages in the societies concerned (Ware,1996:197). Inside the parties top-down constructions and centralisation of power around a smallgroup of persons has been observed. Under some circumstances the party structure has become“stratarchial”, in which case elements in the party organisation become more authonomous aimingat the highest as possible freedom of action. That has mostly been seen inside party federations suchas AWS in Poland and SDK in Slovakia characterized by dysfunctional decision making structuresand splits.As agued by Paul G. Lewis and Radzislawa Gortat also west-European parties have moved awayfrom maximation of the number of party members and high institutionalization towardspriotitisation of election success, i.e. maximation of votes 32 . In general the political parties morereminds us about Kirchheimers “catch-all, Panebianco’s “electoral- professional” and Katz andMairs “cartel parties” than about Duvergers mass parties (Szczerbiak, 2001:101). In line with thatDavid M. Olson argues that evidence from the first 10 years of transition shows that partyorganisations develops on the basis of small groups of activists and broadly formulated and vague29 See Claus Offe, “designing Institutions for East European Transition”, in Jerzy Hausner, Bob Jessop and KlausNielsen (eds), 1995.30 Underlined e.g. by Giovanni Sartori, e.g. in the article “The Sociology of parties:A critical Review”, in Mair (ed),1990:169.31 That question has been rased e.g. by Radoslaw Markowski in “Party System Institutionalisation and DemocraticConsolidation: On Ideosyncracies in the Polish Case”, in Frenzel-Zagórska and Wasilewski, 2000:65-89.32 Paul G. Lewis and Radzislawa Gortat, Models of Party Development and Questions of State Dependence in Poland”,Party Politics, Vol. 4, 1995:599-608.39