analyses <strong>of</strong> party <strong>in</strong>stitutionalization. As he po<strong>in</strong>ts out, until now rather low attention has been givento the <strong>in</strong>ternal party dynamics, as these subjects are relatively difficult to analyse due to the limitedaccess to data.The party <strong>in</strong>stitutionalisation is closely connected with those mechanisms that distribute politicalpower between each section <strong>of</strong> the party, e.g. the parliamentary group <strong>and</strong> the party apparatus.Institutionalisation can take place <strong>in</strong>ternally by <strong>in</strong>troduc<strong>in</strong>g more regular decision procedures, orexternally by stronger l<strong>in</strong>kages to the society. In other words, <strong>in</strong>stitutionalization can take placewithout closer l<strong>in</strong>ks to socual <strong>in</strong>terests. Nevertheless, <strong>in</strong>stututional structures playes a still strongerrole when mov<strong>in</strong>g to more <strong>in</strong>terest based “ord<strong>in</strong>ary politics”. Does <strong>in</strong>stitutionalization become asuccess, more strict rules will be established <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternalized for distribution <strong>of</strong> political power, atthe same time a rout<strong>in</strong>isation <strong>and</strong> legalisation <strong>of</strong> political enterprise can be observed.Institutionalisation tend to foster detailled <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternalised rules <strong>and</strong> norms as regards cooperationon leadership level, mechanisms <strong>of</strong> conflict resolution <strong>and</strong> control. Political demobilisation <strong>and</strong>lower political participation will mostly be the result <strong>of</strong>, not the reason for higher<strong>in</strong>stitutionalisation.Legitimation is an important factor here, as legitimacy br<strong>in</strong>gs to <strong>in</strong>stitutions more freedom <strong>of</strong> action.Institutionalisation <strong>in</strong>evitably was most difficult to obta<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> the first stage <strong>of</strong> postcommunismcharacterised by high voter volatility, functional <strong>and</strong> government overload, antipolitical attitudes <strong>in</strong>population <strong>and</strong> overparliamentarisation. In other words, <strong>in</strong>stitutionalisation took place underunsecurity <strong>and</strong> widespread transition anomie. An <strong>in</strong>stitutional vakuum could be observed, <strong>and</strong> thepolitical parties were not able to fill out that vacuum.L<strong>in</strong>kages to social cleavages <strong>and</strong> the prevail<strong>in</strong>g policy preferences <strong>in</strong> society are not <strong>in</strong> themselvessufficient to promote consolidation <strong>of</strong> democracy. <strong>Parties</strong> also have to be sufficiently strongorganisatorically to br<strong>in</strong>g the political messages to the electorate. Insufficient organisationalcapacity <strong>and</strong> bad party f<strong>in</strong>ances have been characteristic result<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternal splits <strong>and</strong> weak policy<strong>and</strong>programme formulation. Formally the <strong>in</strong>stitutions were <strong>in</strong> place, but the attitudes forstrengthen<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>and</strong> make them functional, did not exist. Under those circumstances thepolitical agenda to a great extent was decided by other <strong>in</strong>stitutions, such as the presidency, foreign<strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>and</strong> doners, crim<strong>in</strong>al structures <strong>and</strong> other <strong>in</strong>stitutions outside democratic control(“shadow <strong>in</strong>stitutionalization”). The democratically elected <strong>in</strong>stitutions simply do not fill out thevacuum. Shadow <strong>in</strong>stitutionalisation was most strik<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the CIS countries <strong>and</strong> on Balkan, but notlimited to those countries. The worst case scenario is a long-term weaken<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> marg<strong>in</strong>alisation <strong>of</strong>the political parties. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to most op<strong>in</strong>ion polls the political parties <strong>and</strong> the parliament are lowestimated. Moreover, low <strong>in</strong>stitutionalization had as a result that elections could not be won because<strong>of</strong> close l<strong>in</strong>ks to the most important sections <strong>of</strong> society. For that reason better access to <strong>and</strong>unfortunately also more party control over the media became an obvious strategy for parties <strong>in</strong>power.Som esome extent all the CEEC’swere signified by <strong>in</strong>stitutional hybridization as some importantchanges <strong>and</strong> “open<strong>in</strong>gs” <strong>of</strong> the fomer authoriatarian systems took place, however, at the same timemany from the old elites were still <strong>in</strong> power, <strong>and</strong> post-communist <strong>in</strong>stitutions did not changefundamentally. In Pol<strong>and</strong> well organised <strong>in</strong>stitutions such as the church <strong>and</strong> some trade unions wereable to penetrate the political process <strong>and</strong> the parties due to strong organisation <strong>and</strong> close l<strong>in</strong>ks thecerta<strong>in</strong> parties.38
In Hungary the national bank, the constitutional court <strong>and</strong> the ombudsman <strong>in</strong>stitution placedrestrictions on the law mak<strong>in</strong>g process (“fragmentated democracy”). In fact we were deal<strong>in</strong>g with atoo early <strong>and</strong> too sifistcated <strong>in</strong>stitutionalisation. In Russia <strong>and</strong> Ukra<strong>in</strong>e strong f<strong>in</strong>ancial oligarchs,network<strong>in</strong>g, clientura’s <strong>and</strong> other structures outside democratic control arrogated to themselves amenac<strong>in</strong>gly strong position, thus weaken<strong>in</strong>g the freedom <strong>of</strong> action <strong>of</strong> the political parties <strong>and</strong> thel<strong>in</strong>ks <strong>of</strong> parties to civil societies. To some extent those non democratic structures orig<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>in</strong> theold state socialist system.To obta<strong>in</strong> a mean<strong>in</strong>g for the populations <strong>in</strong>stitutions have to be strong enough to <strong>in</strong>ternalise thenorms necessary for the survival <strong>and</strong> futher consolidation 29 . For that to happen the <strong>in</strong>stitutions shallbe capable to adapt themselves to the political environment, shape the optimal congitive frames <strong>of</strong>references <strong>and</strong> make complex realities more simple for the citis<strong>in</strong>s. Only thereby the sufficientloyalty <strong>and</strong> legitimacy can be obta<strong>in</strong>ed. The new won democray can only be consolidated, if thedemocratically elected <strong>in</strong>stitutions are sufficiently strong to live up to their responsibilities <strong>and</strong>ensure rule <strong>of</strong> law. In other words, party organisations has to be considered as an important<strong>in</strong>terven<strong>in</strong>g variable. Neither political ideologies can be rooted <strong>in</strong> society without the sufficient<strong>in</strong>stitututionalisation 30 . However, the question has been raised, whether high <strong>in</strong>stitutionalizationnecessarily is the most appropriate <strong>in</strong> young democracies, subject to fast changes, <strong>in</strong> which mostimportant is ability <strong>of</strong> adaption <strong>and</strong> flexibility 31 . Opposite, weak <strong>in</strong>stitutionalization may foster antipartyattitudes. In the longer term, however, the parties have to promote more <strong>in</strong>stitutionalization,but <strong>in</strong>stitutionalisation is <strong>of</strong>ten more the result <strong>of</strong>, not the precondition for consolidation <strong>of</strong>democracy.The question has been raised, whether <strong>in</strong> the early stage political <strong>in</strong>stitutions constituted an<strong>in</strong>dependent variable <strong>and</strong> thus became decisive for the formation <strong>and</strong> the development <strong>of</strong> politicalparties, or <strong>in</strong>stitutions alternately can better be regarded as a mechanic reflection <strong>of</strong> the division <strong>of</strong>power between the parties <strong>and</strong> the most important cleavages <strong>in</strong> the societies concerned (Ware,1996:197). Inside the parties top-down constructions <strong>and</strong> centralisation <strong>of</strong> power around a smallgroup <strong>of</strong> persons has been observed. Under some circumstances the party structure has become“stratarchial”, <strong>in</strong> which case elements <strong>in</strong> the party organisation become more authonomous aim<strong>in</strong>gat the highest as possible freedom <strong>of</strong> action. That has mostly been seen <strong>in</strong>side party federations suchas AWS <strong>in</strong> Pol<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> SDK <strong>in</strong> Slovakia characterized by dysfunctional decision mak<strong>in</strong>g structures<strong>and</strong> splits.As agued by Paul G. Lewis <strong>and</strong> Radzislawa Gortat also west-European parties have moved awayfrom maximation <strong>of</strong> the number <strong>of</strong> party members <strong>and</strong> high <strong>in</strong>stitutionalization towardspriotitisation <strong>of</strong> election success, i.e. maximation <strong>of</strong> votes 32 . In general the political parties morerem<strong>in</strong>ds us about Kirchheimers “catch-all, Panebianco’s “electoral- pr<strong>of</strong>essional” <strong>and</strong> Katz <strong>and</strong>Mairs “cartel parties” than about Duvergers mass parties (Szczerbiak, 2001:101). In l<strong>in</strong>e with thatDavid M. Olson argues that evidence from the first 10 years <strong>of</strong> transition shows that partyorganisations develops on the basis <strong>of</strong> small groups <strong>of</strong> activists <strong>and</strong> broadly formulated <strong>and</strong> vague29 See Claus Offe, “design<strong>in</strong>g Institutions for East European Transition”, <strong>in</strong> Jerzy Hausner, Bob Jessop <strong>and</strong> KlausNielsen (eds), 1995.30 Underl<strong>in</strong>ed e.g. by Giovanni Sartori, e.g. <strong>in</strong> the article “The Sociology <strong>of</strong> parties:A critical Review”, <strong>in</strong> Mair (ed),1990:169.31 That question has been rased e.g. by Radoslaw Markowski <strong>in</strong> “<strong>Party</strong> System Institutionalisation <strong>and</strong> DemocraticConsolidation: On Ideosyncracies <strong>in</strong> the Polish Case”, <strong>in</strong> Frenzel-Zagórska <strong>and</strong> Wasilewski, 2000:65-89.32 Paul G. Lewis <strong>and</strong> Radzislawa Gortat, Models <strong>of</strong> <strong>Party</strong> <strong>Development</strong> <strong>and</strong> Questions <strong>of</strong> State Dependence <strong>in</strong> Pol<strong>and</strong>”,<strong>Party</strong> Politics, Vol. 4, 1995:599-608.39
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the falling popular support for pri
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Has the Left any freedom of manoeuv
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medicine, changes in the labour cod
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Nevertheless, before that had taken