Development of Parties and Party Systems in ... - lah@sam.sdu.dk

maneuvre was great due to political capital. However, the common enemy and personal networksplayed a much greater role than common ideologies and political programmes. The politicaldisagreeements and “wars in the top” gave rise to serious legitimacy problems. Evidence showedthat in the new post-communist system a dissident background did not necessarily constitute apolitical ressource. Nevertheless, some dissidents, Havel, Göncz and (in the first stage) Walesa,became popular presidents. In several countries, the presidents gained greater popular support thanprime ministers and party leaders. In case of Hungary and the Czech Republic the presidents aimedto move “above politics”.As the transformations moved to more ordinary politics, the political elites should be moreinclusive, and the negative sume game be replaced by a positive sum game, for to move in thatdirection better education and a neutral and well educated bureaucracy were badly needed. Thepower vacuum just after 1989 gave top bureaucrats and economists and financial experts aconsiderable influence. Most crucial was to enhance the social and political dialogue and weakenthe position of the new-old clientura by installing younger, neutral and better educated people in themost important jobs.The reformminded part of the nomenklatura had good opportunities to “twist oneself” in the newchaotic system. Some moved to other political parties, even right-wing parties, others aimed toconvert political power to economic power. This strategy of survival was especially important incase of privatisations.Political radicalisation and extrication had been an admission card to the new post-communist elite(Marshalek (ed.), 1992:78), but from the mid 1990’s the first elite generation revolutionary had togive place for the second generation liberal minded reformers. In other words, the first generationof “elite break through” was replaced by the second generation post-transitional “elite ofconsolidation” (Frentzel-Zagórgska, i Wasilewski (ed), 2001:11). A more professional politicalclass emerged. Many from the second generation elite were well educated having constitued “lowernoble class” under the late communism. As noted by Ákos Róna-Tas those people had made apolitical career also in case the old state socialist systems had not collapsed 26 . These people wereambitious and in most cases able to adapt themselves to new and fast changing postcommunistsystem.The polical learning proces became more painful than first extpected. Some problems had to dowith difficulties when moving from working “underground” to work “above the surface”, i.e.legally. With political freedom new coalition and networks emerged between the political partiesand the new cultural and economic elites, including technocrats. Under those new circumstances thecivil societies played an unobtrusive role. A great part of the efforts was aimed at promoting thesufficiently high loyalty and cohesion on the elite level and demobilise the civil societies andmaking it responsible and accountable.For simple reasons the the political leaders were not elected democratically. In stead they were“appointed”, i.e. accepted by most people because of the underground work and the widespreadsupport from the West. Some became charismatic leaders, e.g. Lech Walesa and Václav Havel, butafter some time a depersonalisation (Havel) or erosion of charisma (Walesa, Meciar) set in. Thefreedom of maneuvre for the new elites was to a great extent due to the big political capital, the26 Ákos Róna-Tas, “Path Dependence and Capital Theory: Sociology of the Post-Communist Transition”, EastEuropean politics and Societies, Vol. 12, No. 1, Winther 1998:113.35