Anti-communism has been def<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> different ways. Right-liberal parties have primarily paidattention to economic subjects, e.g. the the transition from plan to market, <strong>and</strong> therefore not placedquestions about “lustrace” (“purification”) <strong>and</strong> “dekomunizacji” high on the polical agenda. Thoseparties simply do not recognize their post-communist competitors as legitimate. Opposite, forsocialliberals like Tadeusz Mazowiecki <strong>in</strong> Pol<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Jiri Dienstbier <strong>in</strong> the Czech Republic thereckon<strong>in</strong>g with the past should be structural, not a question about revenge. Opposite, theconservative-traditionalists talked <strong>in</strong> favour <strong>of</strong> “speed<strong>in</strong>g up” <strong>of</strong> the purification <strong>of</strong> the new wonpost-communist system. In other words, the different op<strong>in</strong>ions about the past were tranfereed to thefuture. In Pol<strong>and</strong> disagreements about the role <strong>of</strong> the Catholic Church seemed to divide the politicalparties more than questions about the economic <strong>and</strong> social policy. The conservative-liberals <strong>and</strong> theconservative traditionalists were deeply divided as regards qustions about state regulation <strong>and</strong> freemarket economy.The conservative-traditionalists can be placed on the political right because <strong>of</strong> nationalistic <strong>and</strong>patriotic slogans <strong>and</strong> semi-authoritharian <strong>and</strong> anti-modernistic attitudes. The political l<strong>in</strong>e wascharacterized by “pragmatization without de-idelogization”. At he same time the conservativetraditionalistsspoke <strong>in</strong> favour <strong>of</strong> more state <strong>in</strong>tervention, a more pro-family policy, more socialjustice <strong>and</strong> expressed a considerable euroscepticism. For the conservative-traditionalists the enemywas not only the “post-communists”, but also so-called “traitors” <strong>in</strong>side their own camp, ma<strong>in</strong>ly theneoliberals <strong>and</strong> EU-federalists. The many “wars <strong>in</strong> the top” <strong>in</strong>side rhe right w<strong>in</strong>g camp <strong>in</strong>evitablyenhanced radicalisation <strong>and</strong> polarisation, especially on the symbolic <strong>and</strong> personal level.Among the national-populists the anti-elite, anti-urban <strong>and</strong> anti-cosmopolitic attitudes were strik<strong>in</strong>g.Inside that group the notion “the people” also had a social mean<strong>in</strong>g, lead<strong>in</strong>g back to the archaicagrarian societys old loyalty to the conservative rul<strong>in</strong>g class. For many national-populists politicswas considered as a “dirty bus<strong>in</strong>ess” based on specific antipolitical feel<strong>in</strong>gs. The support todemocracy was conditional as subjects l<strong>in</strong>ked to moral <strong>and</strong> etics, e.g. questions about abortion, wereplaced “above politics”. Under communism they fought as dissidents for political freedom, but afterthe victory, they did not necessarily love the new won freedom. As politicians many behaved like“amateurs”. However, <strong>in</strong> the longer term the political arena could not be stabilised primarily byidentity based symbolic politics. The fate <strong>of</strong> the governments were determ<strong>in</strong>ed by good or badgovernance <strong>and</strong> the elections became retrospective, not like at the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g referenda for or aga<strong>in</strong>stthe new versus the old system.The right-traditionalist parties soon became divided <strong>in</strong> a moderate Christian conservative versus amore uncompromis<strong>in</strong>g fundamentalis w<strong>in</strong>g. The fight between Jozsef Antall <strong>and</strong> Istvan Csurka<strong>in</strong>side the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) <strong>and</strong> the split <strong>in</strong>dside Sajudis <strong>in</strong> Lithuania <strong>and</strong> theUnion <strong>of</strong> Democratic Forces (UDF) <strong>in</strong> Bulgaria can be taken as examples. The black <strong>and</strong> whitejudgments were strik<strong>in</strong>g, not only aga<strong>in</strong>st the “postcommunists”; the “enemy” they found also<strong>in</strong>side own camp. Neoliberalism mostly constituted a political reaction aga<strong>in</strong>st the one party rule<strong>and</strong> the old plan system, transmitted to the CEEC’s from the West <strong>and</strong> only to a small extent rooted<strong>in</strong> the society.1.8. The dilemmas <strong>of</strong> the LeftJust after 1989 the socialist ideology was brought <strong>in</strong> a deep miscredit. The demise <strong>of</strong> communismhad discredited socialism <strong>in</strong> all its variants, that be as a discourse, as an utopia, as a revolution or as24
an <strong>in</strong>spiration for personal emancipation (Schöpfl<strong>in</strong>, 2000:66). The then prevail<strong>in</strong>g neoliberaldiscourse was not seriously challenged. As menioned <strong>in</strong> a round table discussion <strong>in</strong> the Polish daily“Gazeta Wyborcza” the Left simply lacked a new “great vision” for the future post-communistsystem 18 . It was primarily the failures on the Right, that gave the “successor parties” election theelection victories <strong>in</strong> the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the 1990’s. The polical scene had been left over to formerdissidents, right-w<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>tellectuals, parts <strong>of</strong> the former nomenklatura <strong>and</strong> a empoverished middleclass.Later, hav<strong>in</strong>g passed the “tears <strong>of</strong> valleys” a “retrospective utopia” <strong>and</strong> a “transformation fatigue”emerged, for by many citizens the economic transformation was more felt as a “shock” than a“therapy”. The new order did not as expected necessarily signify law <strong>and</strong> order, economicdevelopment, “catch<strong>in</strong>g up”, better governance, more honesty <strong>in</strong> politics <strong>and</strong>- not to forget- moresocial justice. We must not forget that parties with roots <strong>in</strong> the old system despite a consideraleflight <strong>of</strong> party members ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed old-new networks, more party members than the newmovement parties, higher <strong>in</strong>stitutionalisation <strong>and</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ancial means. However, the postcommunistsuccessor parties had to fight energetically to be recognized home <strong>and</strong> abroad e.g. <strong>in</strong> the socialdemocratic Socialist International (SI).After 1989 the communist successor parties as well as the historical social democratic parties wereforced carefully to th<strong>in</strong>k out the new situation <strong>and</strong> reach new <strong>and</strong> different <strong>and</strong> more feasible“common sense socialism”,. In fact, they did succeed to do that earlier <strong>and</strong> quicker than firstexpected. The ma<strong>in</strong> tast was to free themselves from the “beton” communists <strong>and</strong> appear to theelectorate like authentic, pragmatic, pr<strong>of</strong>essional <strong>and</strong> reformm<strong>in</strong>ded st<strong>and</strong>ard political parties,speak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> favour <strong>of</strong> a more socially just <strong>and</strong> more regulated market economy. The formercommunist parties, the reformm<strong>in</strong>ded part <strong>of</strong> the old nomenklatura, chose an expressivelytechnocratic centristic pathway. From the conservative-traditionalistic side, the turn to the leftbasically signified a move towards political economy, nomenklatura capitalism <strong>and</strong> whitewash<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> black money.The Left has been divided <strong>in</strong> two different groups <strong>of</strong> parties, on the one side traditionalist postcommunistparties stubbornly adher<strong>in</strong>g to the marxist-len<strong>in</strong>ist <strong>and</strong> trade unionist pr<strong>in</strong>cples, <strong>and</strong> onthe other side “modern” social democratic parties stick<strong>in</strong>g to West-European socialliberal values.Follow<strong>in</strong>g the same l<strong>in</strong>e, Krzystyna Skarzynska calls attention to on the one h<strong>and</strong> the economicallyorientated versus the modern identity orientated Left 19 . The first group<strong>in</strong>g has been trade unionistunderl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g classical well-fare state values, social justice, economic regulation <strong>and</strong> slowprivatisation. The “modern”, technocratic, socialliberal <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational orientated group<strong>in</strong>gappealed primarily to the younger <strong>and</strong> better educated liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the bigger towns. In other words, themotivation for vot<strong>in</strong>g Left might be based on social or cultural values. Both groups mentionedabove rejected lustrace <strong>and</strong> decomunization. The “modern” left groups first <strong>of</strong> all aimed to br<strong>in</strong>g theproject for modernisation that was <strong>in</strong>troduced by reformm<strong>in</strong>ded communists <strong>in</strong> the late 1980’s tothe end. As we shall see <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g sections, the two different l<strong>in</strong>es could be found also <strong>in</strong>sidethe parties themselves. The unreformed communist parties failed at the elections if we don’t take<strong>in</strong>to account the rather stable performance <strong>of</strong> the Czech communists (KSCM) at all post-198918 29-30 November, 1997.19 Used by Krzyst<strong>of</strong> Pankowski, <strong>in</strong> “Od lewicowosci zawstydzonej do prawicowosci zagrozonej- zmiany wdeklaracjach politycznych polakow i ciagu ostatnich peiciu lat”, Politicus, no. 1-2(7), Warszawa:Biulet<strong>in</strong> InstitutuStudiów Politycznych PAN, 1995:55.25
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jobs in rural areas, especially sma
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industrial policy. According to the
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pressurizing the government to give
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democrats, thereby locating itself
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To conclude, the Freedom Union (UW)
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Polish middle class. Thus, in Janua
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such as KSCM and KSS in The Czech R
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The SLD leaders were mainly recruit
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the falling popular support for pri
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innovation was formation of the pol
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place after talks with each applica
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Has the Left any freedom of manoeuv
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medicine, changes in the labour cod
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The Labour Union (UP), Democratic U
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Nevertheless, before that had taken