Development of Parties and Party Systems in ... - lah@sam.sdu.dk

“This provisional situation characterized by a rich dynamic of social problems, together with anunbalanced and chaning distribution of gains and losses. The resulting conflicts become- insuccessful cases- part of the universe myth. In thus universe of myth these conflicts are seen as aseries of crisis/tests, which push the society indirectly from the old order to the new. This originallyopen transition comes to a close when the participants cease to see the current events asprovisional ”(Kabele, 1999).In the words of George Schöpflin (Schöpflin, 1993), the first stage was marked by weakinstitutionalisation, lack of confidence among people, atomization of civil society, a desire forideologisation of all in society and a widespread resistance against politics as such (“antipolitics”).The new politicians were forced to take far-reaching decisions under high insecurity and timepressure. In such unsettled times social preferences and visions of the new society were impreciseand vague. Under those circumstances the characteristics of identity politics and moral politics werestriking.Later, moving towards “ordinary” interest based politics the political life became more predictable,and the prospects of membership of the EU became realistic and not only considered as publicgoods but public necessities as well, thereby constituting a “valens issue”, i.e. issues on which allthe relevant and responsible parties, the post-communist parties included, declare the sameobjective but dispute each other’s competence in achieving the desired policy” (Innes, 2002:90).The tabula rasa account that accentuates the uniqueness and fluidity and chaotic environment of thefirst stage of post-communism, seems to be most appropriate to use when studying the first“extraordinary” stage of post-communism. New concepts had to be developed to capture the newpost-communist situation, as the parties and party-systems in the first years under post-communismshowed qualitatively specific “extraordinary”characteristics that distinguished them from the West-European. At the outset the situation was historically unique and “extraordinary”. As can be seen inthe list of concepts and dynamics (figure ) new concepts, reflecting the unique historical situationhad to be used.Figure : Stages of post-communism. ..... “something else”.Late stage of …… the “break-through” …. Extraordinary ......real socialism politics ……….. ordinary politicstransition anomie......... consolidation of democracy3

”refolution”partial revolutionsevolution1989-1990: Transition anomie/ekstraordinary politik/ ”unsetteled times”:new anticommunist party movements, historical parties and post-communist partiesfragmentation, fission and fusion of partiesemergence of ”party non systems”democatic/government overload and functional overloadoutput-articulation”over-parliamentarization”“overparticitation”institutionalisation under systemic vacuumpolitical craftingemergence of retrospective utopiasdepolitisation and demobilisationgovernance without alternatives (”path-dependency”)the aim of ”speeding up” of transformation (”przyspieszenie”)symbol-politics versus programme-politicsdecommunisation (”lustrace”)elite-circulation and/or elite-reproductionpolitical crafting and entrepreneurshipinclusionary civic nationalism versus exclusionary ethnic nationalismshadow institutionalisation5

marketisation and privatisationshort term strategies of survivalpolitical learning1991- : ordinary politics, moving towards:a. ”petrification”formalistic demokratimajority rulefocusing on technology of power (“cartellisation”)emergence of clientelism and clienturadelegative demokracydemocracy by designfreezing of cleavagespolarisered pluralismadversary politicsdemocratisation by designdemocary by defaultpostcommunist cartel partiesauthoritarian democracynon-party pluralismpluralist stagnationneither plan nor markedor6

. consolidationthe ”two turn over testen” passedfair and free electionsfair play between government and oppositionformation of stronger civile societiesrule by lawsdepersonalization, rutinization and erosion of charismakonsensualism and consocietalismde-ideologisation and pragmatisationfreezing and de-freezing of cleavagesinstitutionalisationfunctional market economy1.2. Political parties and party systemsPolitical parties can be defined in minimalistic ways, in which case they may be considered as “anypolitical group that presents at elections and is capable of placering through elections candidates forpublic office” (Sartori, 1976:64), in opposition to the more maximalistic and demandingformulations, used by Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson (Lane and Ersson, 1999:132), who say that“political parties are organized collectivities orientated towards the pursuit of some combinationof the goal of electoral success and in the end of political effectiveness, i.e. the capacity of parties tohave an impact upon government policy-making. Differences in strategy and tactics between partiesmay help explain the variation in the capacity of parties to cope with a changing if not turbulentenvironment”.Using a more maximalist definition the demand of a more robust party organisation can beincluded. Seen in a functionalistic perspective the parties must be able to recruit people to importantposts in society, control and coordinate and secure more quality and stability in publicadministration. Moreover, parties are considered as political associations which by competing withother parties take part in election campaigns with the aim to gain governmental power and takingresponsibility for the state 1 . Parties may also be seen as functional agencies, as they serve specific1 Inka Slodkowska,”Partie i ugrupowania polityczne polskiej transformacji”, in: Jacek Wasilewski (ed), 1997.7

purposes, are channels for “expressions”, fulfill specific roles and solve specific tasks in relation tothe political system.Studies of political parties lay focus on size, ideological characteristics, social links, membership,organisation and leadership, that means the problems related to party institutionalisation. As far asparty systems are concerned emphasis has been laid on the number of parties, i.e. the party systemformat, the structure of the ideological spectrum, types of polarisation and the characteristics ofvoter support 2 . In the post-communist context, besides the distinctions known from studies ofpolitical parties in West-Europe, i.e. between mass parties, cadre parties, catch-all parties, cartelparties, distinctions between programmatic parties, clientelistic parties and charismatic led parties,seem fruitful (Fiala etc, 2003:191).Thus party systems constitute one of the political systems most important subsystems based oninteraction between parties. Functional party systems are characterized by competition and at thesame time a willingness to enter political compromises between the parties involved. As Sartori putit, a “party system is precisely the system of interactions resulting from interparty competition”;therefore party systems consist of “patterned interactions of its component parts, thereby implyingthat such interactions provide the boundaries, or at least the boundedness, of the system” (Sartori,1976:43-44). Looking at the way parties connect society and government, three party systemfunctions can be observed. Basically the party system can aggregate social cleavages, translatesocial cleavages into political cleavages, or block the politicization of social clavages. As noted byMatthis Bogaards the one-party state seem to maximize blocking; the two party state seems to bebest in achieving aggregation; and the multiparty system most suited to translation (Mungiu-Pippidi, Krastev, 2004:250).In addition, Sartori distinguishes between the classical two-party systems like in Britain and US,moderate plural systems characterized by limited fragmentation and moderate centrpetalcompetition, party systems characterized by polarized pluralism, highly fragmentated andideologically polarised party systems, and finally the “predominant” party systems, in which caseone party is in the position of a majority in parliament long time. The crucial factor is the way theparties interact, like “working multi-party systems”, “non-working multiparty systems” or“immobilist” multiparty systems.The system concept is meaningless unless the system has characteristics that go beyond thecomponent parts, i.e. beyond a seperate consideration of its component elements. In other words,the parties are functions of the interaction with other parties and to a great extent react and act in acompetitive interplay with other parties. In case the interaction does not take place or fails party nonsystems or weak party systems (Almond and Powell, 1996:237) may emerge. In those casesconflicts (and interactions) inside the parties become stronger than between the parties. In addition,party systems might be high or low polarised, depending on the intensity of polarisation, and theymay be fragmented or segmented in case of multipartiism and long ideological distance between theparties.Strong polarisation may tend to generate adversary politics, in which case the relations between thebigger parties are characterized by confrontation. In those cases the political life is marked by apermanent election campaign. New great utopia’s were rejected, even the Prague Spring inCzechoslovakia, as the new elites preferred the already tested like the market economies and liberal2 See e.g. Jean Blondel, “Types of Party System”, in Mair, 1990:302.8

democracies known in the West. The political debate has been polemic and personal, nonethelsessantisystem parties i general did not well at the elections. Thus parties which aimed at destroying thenew postcommunist system did not necessarily have a great electoral support. Adversary politics onthe actor level sometimes took place between parties ideologically and programmatically close toeach other.In the later stage of post-communism, moving from extraordinary to more ordinary politics, partiesand party systems can to a great extent be studied by using concepts and cognitive instrumentsknown from studies of the more well institutionalised parties and party systems in the West, e.g. byincluding the well known distinctions between types of political parties and party systems, putforward by Duverger, Sartori, Kirchheimer, Mair etc., e.g. as mass parties, catch-all parties andcartel parties, the different types and forms of polarization and changes over time of the partysystem format.1.3. The formation of political partiesAs noted above, can political parties be considered as a necessary, but not as a sufficient conditionfor consolidation of democracy. That argument can also be used as regards the Central Europeancountries. Most of the new political parties in the CEEC’s were established top-down, suppliedfrom above more than demanded from below and established almost over night as ”sofa-parties andmostly by intellectuals. Some parties - like historic parties - were ”re-invented” or “reborn”. Somewere post-communist, wehich aimed to find a new post-communist identity, some were authentichistorical parties, e.g. social democratic and agrarian parties, other new parties were anticommunistcatch-all movement-parties, i.e. negative alliances appealing to all anti-communist minded sectionsof society.Parties and politicians, pretending to be “above politics”, were successful at the first elections butmostly due to the wide spread resistance against party politics. In the first phase the prevailingpolitical culture was not favourable for the development of functional and standard type politicalparties and party federations and the emergence of professional and responsive politicians.Characteristics from the former system such as extrication, total articulation, output-articulation,anti-politics, overparliamentarization and adversary politics turned out to be be impossible toeliminate over night.Furthermore, several country specific features have been observed. Some have mostly been due tostructural factors, including the legacy of the past, some to the country specific circumstances at thetime of the demise of the old systems and some to the chosen strategies for transformation, i.e. thesubjective factors. Like in Western countries studies of the internal party dynamics has been ratherlimited and difficult to carry through 3 .As noted above the development of political parties and party systems in the CEECs has beenclosely connected with the questions about consolidation of democracy and can therefore beexplained on the same levels, i.e. the actor, structural, institutional and policy-programmatic.Country wide democratic polities cannot be sustained without the organizing and mediating role ofpolitical parties. Parties reinforce identification with the democratic process by taking account of,aggregating the different interests in society and counteracting an excessive particularism (Brown,ed.:211, 213). Actor type explanations have been prominent in case of transitions by emphasizing3 More about that subject, see Szczerbiak, 2001:94.9

the significance of strategic choices and leadership processes (“political crafting” and “politicalentrepreneurship”). The structural factors have a subjective side in case economic growth and socialmobility are declining such as in the first years after the break-through. When the economic growthand social mobility decline, group consciousness tends to increase and challenge the politicalsystem.At the beginning the political parties tended to have weak organizations with only little presenceoutside the big towns and tenuous ties to the civil societies. Tehy have to be boradly definedincluding well organized mass parties as well as pro-parties, loose political associations and clubs,political factions and movements. Furthermore, in several cases the parties tended to be cadreconfigurations, not mass organizations such as had been the case in the West. As already said, mostparties were established spontaneously in the wake of the demise and collapse of the old systems.Only in Janos Kadar’s Hungary the foundation of political parties took place over one-two years,for that reason we did not find broadly based anti-communist movement parties such as in theCzech Republic (The Civic Forum), Slovakia (Public Against Violence), Poland (Solidarity) orBulgaria (SDS). The political capital, i.e. the spontaneous support from the society, was high, butmore short-term than first expected. As noted by Abby Innes (Innes, 2002), at the same time theEastern European parties had to satisfy two constituencies, one internal, the other external, i.e. IMFand the EU, sometimes with the very existence of the latter inhibiting the development of theformer.Opposite in Western Europe political parties in the East were established as mass parties, and theyhad to find their social base by “looking after their voters”. ”). The weak links to the voters impliedthat the parties often miscalculated the voter preferences. That took place at the first free elections,at which the postcommunist successor partiets overestemated electoral support, at in tha case of thePolish 1993 election, when the “post-communist” parties did surprisingly well. Wek linkages to thesocial gropups and low party institutionalization made the parties more dependent on the media,what might be a danger to the freedom of the press. In addition, the boundaries between parties andinterest groups tended to be porous. In general, the legacy of the communist past seemed to had an“anti-political” bearing on the nascent party systems and party types. To the extent the label”political parties” can be used, it has to be used in the ”minimalist” sense and parties have to beseen as political units that put forward candidates on common lists at the national elections- and notmuch more.The political parties are only able to decide the political agenda if a majority of the electorate feel atleast as well represented through the political parties as through the different interest groups, e.g.trade unions, the church, the military or, in the worst case, mafia-type economic organizations orother kinds of illegal networks 4 . Shadow institutionalisation was not limited to countries on Balkanand in the CIS. Specific for Poland has been the strong position of the church and to some extentalso the trade unions (Solidarnost and OPZZ). If that does not take place, a shadowinstitutionalisation will be the result, giving the church, the military or mafia-like institutions astrong position at the expense of democratic elected institutions such as parties and governments. Inthe CEEC’s the new parties never became mass parties, rather post-communist catch-all parties,later they were transformed to electoral-professional cartel parties.4 In the minimal sense political parties can be defined as ”any group that presents at elections and is capable of placingthrough elections candidates for public office” (Sartori, 1976:64).10

The party fragmentarization was high, especially in the first phase. Party fission and party fusions,often in the shape of party federations and umberella parties were frequent. Furthermore, high focuson identity politics and symbol politics and weak links to society gave the new parties specialcharacteristics. The institutionalisation was sporadic, at best. The “reinvention of politics” tookplace in a political and ideological vacuum without clear links to the most important social groups,and the collapse of the old systems quickly gave space for an almost unlimited fight between protodemocraticactors (”total articulation”), between spokesmen for the old system and the opposition(”we versus them”) and, not to forget, between groups inside the two opposite camps “betweenus”). Without the common enemy the former dissidents found their “enemies” also inside their owncamp.Both the old communist parties and the new movement parties laid claim to ”represent the people”,thereby acting in a catch-all way. Conservative-traditionalistic, e.g. Solidarity in Poland, andneoliberal parties, e.g. ODS in the Czech Republic, behaved like premature catch-all partiesappealing to voters from all social strata. Opposite, medium-sized parties seemed to act like interestbased and class orientated parties, to a large extent relying on ”automatic” votes of their directconstituencies (Ágh, 1998:115).It has been argued that new anti-communist movement parties resembled the old communist partiesas regards the political discourses, institutions and policy style. For many not only reformCommunists, but also former dissidents became the “other”- i.e. bound up in communist party typeintrigues, not representing the normal electorate and therefore becoming inappriopriaterepresentatives of the people (Innes, 2001:87). Paul G. Lewis argued that the new anti-communistparties were disposed to:”mirror the inclusive, monolithic communist organization; their antagonism to state authority; theirinclination to strive in political action for broad symbolic expression rather than grouprepresentation all seemed in some ways to point as much back to the practices and structures of thetraditional Soviet style communism as forward to the practices and structures of the traditionalSoviet-style communism as forward to the processes of modern democracy and structures ofWestern pluralism” (Lewis, 1994:264).The political parties can be formed either in an exogenous way, i.e. under the influence of voters’preferences and other ways of influence from outside, or in an endogeneous way, i.e. according thedynamics inside the existing parties or between the parties on the national level. Often theclientelistic characteristics have been striking, in some cases involving the economic sector. On theone side the party identities were created by interplay between the past and the present, on the otherside between the national and the international level or between the national and regional level. Theweight on the past, the present and the future has been different. The movement parties may have apredominantly historically derived identity, thanks to a strong “foundation myth”, or apredominantly presently derived identity, i.e. related to the day-to-day politics. In the last case theparty identity is shaped primarily according to what Sartori has described as contemporary politicalappeals.In the former Yugoslavia and Russia, elections on republican level took place before the electionson the national level. The parties were chiefly regionally based, thereby undermining the legitimacyof the central authorities and those parties that were reaching the whole country. Strong11

presidentialism gave rise to “floating parties”, i.e. “parties of power” linked to the oligarchy andwith easy access to the media and established shortly before elections. In the case of the CEECs theparties were created top-down, only rarely from voters’ preferences, as these were at best vaguelyformulated. Furthermore, parties were mostly established spontaneously without much knowledgeabout the exact demand for political parties. The programmes and policy statements were mostlyvague and abstract. The absence of clear-cut social interests in society shall be seen in the light ofthe complex triple transformations and the rapidly changing political and economic structures on alllevels of society.Despite weak linkages to civil societies the parties captured a central position after the second freeelections. The political parties remained badly institutionalized, but by no means insignificant.Gradually we were witnessing a professionalization and cartellization of the political scene.Because of party-ist properties they felt tempted to misuse the new won power. Until then, nonpoliticalactors have played an important role and thus to a large extent captured the role otendedfor political parties (”shadow institutionalisation”). In specific “extraordinary crisis situations”, e.g.Hungary in 1995 and the Czech Republic after the 1996 election, a de-democratisation, party-ismand reinforcement of old antidemocratic discourses and anti-politics has been be observed,detrimental to further consolidation of democracy.Contrary to South European countries such as Greece, Spain and Portugal, before 1989 the partiesin the CEECs had neither been able to establish institutionalised structures internally nor inexternally, i.e. in exile. Throughout the region the parties have been marked by the communist past,especially by the last stage of real socialism and the demise of the old system. It has to be taken inconsideration that state socialism developed differently in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.Notions such as ”mature post-totalitarian” and ”national accommodative” have been used about thestate socialist systems in Poland and Hungary, and ”centralist-bureaucratic” and ”frozen posttotalitarian”about the regimes in Czechoslovakia and DDR (Kitschelt et.al., 1999, Linz and Stepan,1996).Furthermore, the “break-through” in Poland in the late 1990s has been named ”pacted transition” or”przemieszczenie” (”common reconstruction”), in Czechoslovakia and DDR the notion ”implosion”has been widespread and in Hungary there has been talked about a ”simple exchange”(“rendszerváltás”) af systems, about gradualism and an almost consensual “evolution” away fromthe old system.At the beginning the work as a politician was often considered as a ”call” or a ”mission”. The newbroad catch-all movement-parties such as Solidarity in Poland and Civic Forum (OF) in the CzechRepublic legitimised themselves by references to the fight against the old system presentingthemselves as broad catch-all parties. A greatest problem was that the day-to-day needs of thepeople became downgraded. The absence of close links to social interests in society was evenconsidered as a virtue, as parties should place themselves above group interests. In the new postcommunistdiscourse the label ”party” was negatively loaded as “parties” for many citizins wereconnected with the former one-party state. Therefore many new “parties” called themselves”movements”, ”centre”, ”forum”, ”alliance”, ”agreement” or ”union”. Thus, the slogan of CivicForum (OF) in the Czech Republic was simply: ”Parties are for the party-people, Civic Forum is forall”.12

In the first stage we were mostly dealing with ”political clubs” and ”intellectual milieus”. At thattime party programmes and government responsibilities were not necessarily the most important.Thus opinion polls in January 2000 showed that 80 pct. of Czechs and Slovaks believed thatpolitical parties’ interest in the electorate was limited to the aim of winning their support inelections, and that this attitude was unlikely to change. Basically they shared the opinion ofpresident Vaclav Havel that the post-communist state effectively “belonged” to the political parties,as the state was perceived as their own property- a legacy of the communist past (Innes, 2001:208).The low priority given to peoples “day-to-day problems” had as a result that several identity basedparties suffered major elections defeats at elections in the beginning of the 1990s, thus paving theway for political “come-back’s” for the ”post-communist” parties. The post-communist partiesachieved electoral success primarily due to relatively strong party institutionalisation andprogramme-crystallization. As we shall see, that conclusion can also be drawn comparing the twoparty-alliances SLD and AWS in Poland.At an early point of time Vaclav Klaus in The Czech Republic took account of the fact that mostvoters preferred political parties with high institutionalization and clear-cut political programmesappealing to broad sections of the people. For that reason Klaus took the decision to use the label“Civic Democratic Party” (ODS). The position of Vaclav Klaus is one example of political craftingand “political entrepreneurship and the significance of the actor-level in the first stage of postcommunism.In established and consensual type democracies voters’ behaviour to a great extent reflected themost important social interests in society. If the political parties divide themselves differently fromthe societies that they represent, inevitably a crisis will develop, unless the parties involved are ableto attract the sufficient number of voters by using non-class symbolic political appeals in whichcase identity politics, not interest-based politics determine the voter behaviour at the elections.In the longer run most voters seemed to prefer parties with concrete forward-looking programmeswith a strong organization behind and a clear political profile. Programmatic characteristics becamemore striking, idenitty and moral politics receded, and a rutinization and erosion of charismaticbased politics took place. Identity parties with low institutionalization adhering to symbolic andidentity politics were simply not able to meet those challenges that are most significant whenmoving toward more “ordinary politics”. The experience from the first twelve years of postcommunismshowed us that instutionalization in fact does matter. Those parties which were wellorganized and had sufficient resources, may suffer election defeat and in spite of that obtain apolitical come-back at a later election. Opposite, badly institutionalized “forum parties” might winelections, but, on the other hand, they had a weak “immune defence” in case of internal crisis orincreased party competition. Moving to more “normal politics” democracy has been named “inputdemocracy” which as characterized by retrospective elections, neo-corporatism and interest basedpolitics.In conclusion, in spite of the rather weak the links to civil societies and socio-economic cleavagesand low institutionalisation the political parties came to play an important role. Unfortunately, dueto the party-ist characteristics and too weak civil societies misuse of new won political powerbecame a normal practice. Sometimes non-political actors becam functional equivalent and tookover the role of political parties (”shadow institutionalisation”). In specific situations, for instance inHungary in 1995 and in the Czech Republic in 1996-1997, de-democratisation, party-ism,13

antipolitics and reinforcement of antidemocratic discourses could be observed, detrimental forconsolidation of the polical arena and the new-won democracy.1.4. Stages of party and party system developmentThat leads us to mapping out the different stages of party development. As noted above, parties inthe CEECs were established in communist one-party-systems in crisis and decay. The first stage ofpost-communism was marked by extraordinary politics, extrication, political crafting and transitionanomie and functional as well as government overload. The parliaments almost became “lawmaking machines”. The new political parties were embryonic ”sofa-parties” and proto-partiesmarked by internal splits and several veto-group factions. The main problem was to find newconstituencies and political issues on which to compete. Political strategists simply did not knowwhat the electorate would tolerate be way of hardship (Innes, 2002:88). Thus the demand ofpolitical parties were difficult to dertermine. As noted by Edmund Mokrzycki the new politicalleaders tended to base their calculations on simplified holistic and radical constructions andneoliberal utopia believing in a harmonic and natural order after in four decades having beenharassed by marxist-leninist propaganda 5 .Under the then prevailing extraordinary politics and transition anomie the party systems, that meansinteraction between parties, were not sufficiently developed as interaction mostly took place insidethe party movements. Due to low party institutionalisation political entrepreneurship and politicalcrafting played a prominent role. Most parties were forced to “look inwards”, secure higherinstitutionalization and elite-cohesion. There tended to be few striking differences between the partyprogrammes. The historical parties had to to organize themselves almost from scratch and wereforced to find a new identity and reach a ”compromise” between the past and the present, certainlyno easy tasks.Figure 2: Stages of party developmentYear1989 new movement so-calledcatch all movement proto-parties“re-invention” of old historical partiespost-communist successor parties1990 “wars in the top”5 Edmund Mokrzycki, “Kapitalizm Oswojony”, Gazeta Wyborcza 11-12 August, 2001:10.14

party-“fission”non-party system, non-party pluralism1992-1994: post-communist parties’ first “come-back”1996-1998: formation of new right-wing party-alliances (“party-fusion”)move toward triangular party systems (Poland)1998-2001 Standard parties side by side with non-standard partiesIn some countries: the post-communist parties “second come-back”realignment of party-systems(Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria)Some even spoke about “early freezing” or partial consolidation of the party systems (Ágh,1998:103). A de-freezing of some of the old cleavages could be observed, at least the distinctionbetween ”we” and ”them” lost some of its former significance. Furthermore, the cohesion inside theheterogeneous opposition circles was undermined soon after the fight against the old system hadbeen won. Instead several ”wars in the top” of the parties erupted. Thus before long the distinction”we against us” replaced the old and well known distinction “we versus them” from the late 1980s.At the beginning, also a democratic party culture was missing. Internal debate and critique were notconsidered as a party resource, rather as a dangerous “conspiration” against the party leadership andan almost ”contra-revolutionary” enterprise. Short term factors, not long-term visions andideologies and questions about the past became decisive determining the ourcome of the second andthird round of free elections. Most political programmes were vaguely formulated, emotionallysupported and often connected with certain actions such as mass demonstrations and strikes onlabour maket. The “wars in the top” in the new fourm parties tended to weaken interaction betweenthe political parties and crystallization of the party systems. The elections became retrospective and“moral politics” replaced by ”output democracy”.15

In the late 1990’s elections mostly expressed ”politically motivated government blame”, no longerthey were referenda for or against the old systems, more expressing ”politically motivated systemblame”.In the second stage, moving to more ”ordinary politics”, the political parties acquired more powerwithout necessarily becoming more legitimate. The elections in the late 1990s evidenced thatinstitutional design, campaign strategies, organizational resources, and the mood of the electoratesubstantially matter regarding the final outcome of national electionsA relatively unimportant rolewas played by party membership. Instead, the crucial role has been played by party leaders. Thusthe new parties were more likely to resemble Kirchheimer’s catch-all, Panebianco’s electoralprofessionaland Katz and Mair’s cartel party than Duverger’s mass party model (Szczerbiak,2001:101).In the third and fourth stage the political parties were forced to pay more attention to the externalframes focusing more on long-term policies and strategies. A polical learning took place and moreattention had to be paid to formulation of the rigt strategies and programmatic work. The freedomof maneuvre in the economic and social policy was still limited, but the politicians seemed to havelearned how to compete over operating styles, tactically modulated principles, postmodern issuesrather than programmatic substance (Innes, 2002:88). The true constraints, under which the partieshad to operate, became more apparent. If that happens, separation of parties from civil societiesmight be less striking. However, not all the political parties were able to move that optimal laterstage.The parties and party systems were still marked by transition anomie, too weak partyinstitutionalization and lack of a system opholding and a stabilizing middle class (“the missingmiddle”), but the attention of most voters moved more explicitly from the political to the economicsphere. The freedom of manoeuvre in the economic policy was narrow due to externalconditionalities and lack of economic ressources. Also misuse of political power (“party-ism”) wasstriking due to short-term political horizons and path-dependency. In the third and fourth stage thepolitical parties might become better institutionalised, but in most cases in the shape of theestablishment of centralised top-down led professional electoral cartel parties and fragile electionalliances forced upon the parties due to high thesholds for getting seats in parliament. This suggeststhat the changes over time have been non-linear, at different times signifying unification of forces,fragmentarisation, in some cases formation of a common identity and in several cases “wars in thetop”.In most cases the party-coalitions, e.g. AWS in Poland and SDK in Slovakia were fragileconstructions, neither sufficiently institutionalised nor based on a common identity and partyculturebecause each party inside the alliance cared about its own identity. Thus we were mostlydealing with negative election alliances, only kept together by the common enemy (i.e.”postcommunists”).In some cases party alliances were purely tactical aiming at minimizing the waste ofvotes at the elections. The ultimate goal was to establish a new common right wing governmentafter election victory and transform the election alliances to new standard parties or functionalparty-federations. Opposite the Polish Right, after 10 years the left wing party alliance SLD inPoland succeeded in transforming itself into a disciplined standard party having until thenconstituted an alliance of 20-30 different groups on the left side of the political spectrum. As weshall see in the following, the right wing election alliance AWS in Poland was not able to solve the16

most important institutional and policy and programme problems and had to pay a heavy price forthat at the 2001 election.In the later stages the social links between the state and the parties were reinforced. Thus mostparties and party federations tended to become post-communist catch all and cartel parties. As carteltype parties they were primarily focusing on state power, aiming to appeal to so broad sections ofsociety as possible. At the same time bad governance, misuse of power, clietelism, politicalcapitalism and corruption tended to weaken the position of political parties in general, not leastparties in government position.Gradually the Central European party systems moved closer to the classical European party systemmodels consisting of a centre-left versus centre-right bipolar system, in some cases a tripolar multipartysystem mainly based on socio-economic cleavages (Ágh, 1998:111). The neoliberal discourselost its original appeal. Elections became more retrospective and only few government passed thetest. The embryonic characteristics became less striking, but the intake of new party membersremained low. Furthermore, from the mid 1990s the election campaigns tended to be conducted inmore professionally in spite of the fact that the links between political parties and civil societiesremained rather weak. Nevertheless, the parties became more “outward-looking”. Interest groupsgained more influence, in some cases delaying political and economic reforms, e.g. privatizationand restructuring of public finances. Some political groups tried to adhere to the old movement line,but in the longer run the majority of the electorate seemed to prefer parties characterized by strongleadership, professionalism, clear, long-term and consistent political programmes and goodperformance in the media. Thus party institutionalisation seemed to matter also in the case of theCEEC’s.The economic recession brought the parties of power under heavy pressure. However, neithermacroeconomic progress was any guarantee of success. Socialist led governments in Poland andHungary lost elections in spite of good macroeconomic performance. The establishment of partyalliancewas most obvious for “outsider parties” without prospects for parliamentary representationby “going alone”. Later the access to the political scene became more difficult as the cost ofentrance for new parties became higher due to the financial constraints and the modest access to themedia. A defreezing of the old “we-them” polarization took place, but to a different extent og withdifferent speed. From the outset the political culture seemmed to be the most consensual in case ofHungary.In conclusion, we can say that party and party system development can partly be explained by thelegacy of the past and social and economic i.e. structural factors, and partly by the dynamics of thetransitions themselves, e.g. the political style of the political leaders, the way of governance, thepolitical crafting, the institutional set-up and the changes on policy and programme level. Thesignificance of each variable has varied from country to country and over time. Political craftingand entrepreneurship made a strong impact in the first stage of extraordinary politics due to thepower vacuum and the great political capital.Short term factors, not great visions and political utopia’s tended to determine the outcomes of thefelections. The parties were changing, marked several “fissions” and “fusions”, but the voterpreferences seemed to be rather stabile and long-term. The quality of governance seemed to becomedecisive determining the outcome of the elections. The judgments from the voters over the partiesremained merciless, even after moving away from “the valleys of tear”. The elections wwere17

determined primarily by “political motivated policy blame”, not like at the first elections by“political motivated system blame”.1.5. Consolidation of democracyWhen dealing with post-communism most observers focuse on questions about stabilization andconsolidation of democracy.Explanations can be clustered about three sets of variables 6 :• Structural, e.g. level of socio-economic development, patterns of modernization andindustrialization, and prevailing cultural patterns, all of which can be linked to themodernization paradigm• Institutional, such as designs of executive-legislative relations and electoral systems and theshape of parties and party systems• And actor-behavioural, such as the power constellation of elites or even very particular andcontingent policy decisions. In other words, in this case emphasis is laid on the policy-content.• Finally the policy and programme level has to be included, by that twe mean the ability ofparties to solve the “day to day” problems and formulate long-term consistent politicalprogrammes.As put by Andreas Schedler, consolidation has been an outmost ambiguous concept and a “movingtarget” due to the fact that in fact consolidation “never ends”. The concept does not have a coremeaning, for many it has been treated as a catch-all concept and for that reason used in differentmeanings. Furthermore, dealing with the different types of democracy Andreas Schedlerdistinguishes between authoritarian, electoral, liberal and advanced democracies, and in that contexthe argues in favour of a “peaceful coexistence” between the different interpretations and meaningsof the concept.Moreover, Schedler argues that institutional insecurity and blurred and temporary boundaries ofdemocratic transition must be considered as a defining feature of democratization, therebyrecognizing structural fuzziness of transition and consolidation. If uncertainty is taken seriously,regime transition and consolidation can not be regarded as discrete stages with neat starting pointsand endpoints. Rather they have to be conceived as vague periods of institutional fluidity whoseouter boundaries are indeterminate 7 .Lucan A. Ways’ notion “pluralism by default” focus on the political competition specific to weakstates, e.g. Moldova and to a large extent Ukraine and Belorussia. Pluralism by default describescountries in which institutionalized political competition survives not because leaders are especially6 See Petr Kopecký and Cas Mudde, ”Explaining Different Paths of Democratization: The Czech and SlovakRepublics”, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 16, No. 3, September 2000:69-70.7 Andreas Schedler, “What is Democratic Consolidation?”, Journal of Democracy, volume 9, No. 2, April 1998:91-107,and “Taking Uncertainty Seriously: The Blurred Boundaries of Democratic Transition and Consolidation”,Democratization, Vol. 8, No. 4, Winter 2001:17-19 and “To take Uncertainty Seriously: The Blurred Boundaries ofDemocratic Transition and Consolidation, Democratization, Vol.8, No.4, Winther 2001:1-22..18

democratic or because societal actors particularly strong, but because the government is toofragmented and the state at the same time too weak to impose authoritarian rule 8 . Moreover, FraneAdam and Matej Makarovic argue that some new post-communist democracies may be labelled“deficient” 9 . The institutional structures, the cultural patterns, and the prevailing attitudes within thepublic sphere and among the political elites are basically democratic. But deficiencies likeinstrumental understanding of democracy, lack of efficiency in democratic institutions and lack oftrust in the system, limited elite circulation and media pluralism, etc., are still present, however, to adifferent extent in each country. Those deficiencies can be found on all democratic arenasmentioned below.In the case of democracy by design”, known from presidential rule and delegative democracy inRussia, those in control of the state machinery attempt to and may succed in shaping the institutionsand procedures of a competitive election in ways that ensure an outcome favorable to the designersthemselves 10 .Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (Linz, Stepan, 1996:7) underline that democratic consolidationrequires much more than just elections and markets. Consolidated democracies requires a state, i.e.that stateness problems have been solved, that five interacting arenas have to be in place in order forconsolidation to exist, first a free and lively civil society, second a relatively autonomous andvalued political society, third a rule of law, fourth a state bureaucracy that is usable and fifth, aninstitutionalized economic society. Reform of public administration has been a crucial element inbuilding a democratic state. The problems connected to weak administrative structures have beencompounded by the absence of an effective (and honest) civil service and professional central andlocal administrators (Sakwa, 2002:123).Linz and Stepan argue (Linz, Stepan, 1996:3) that transition to democracy has gone towardcompletion“when sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an electedgovernment, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote,when this government de facto has the authority to generate new politics, and when the executive,legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power withother bodies de jute”In the first stage of post-communism the institutions vital for a consolidated democracy e.g.political parties, elected parliaments and independent courts, have been established, but they do notfunction in optimal ways seen in the context of consolidation of democracy. As regardsconsolidation of democracy, all the Central European countries have passed the ”two-turn over test”as the political power has been handed over to the opposition peacefully in the case of electiondefeat for the ruling parties, but the democracy in the CEEC's can hardly be considered asconsolidated in more “advanced” sense. Democratic consolidation require e self-limitation by thepower holders as well as by the opposition. Political fundamentalism, political capitalism, identity8 Lucan A. Way, “Pluralism by Default in Moldova”, Journal of Democracy, Volume 13, Number 4, October 2002:127-141.9 Frane Adam and Matej Makarovic, “Postcommunist Transition and Social Science:The Case of Slovenia”, EastEuropean Quarterly, XXXVI, No. 3, September 2002.10 Michael Urban, “December 1993 as a Replication of Late-Soviet Electorale Practices”, Post-Soviet Affaires, Vol. 10,No. 2 (April-June 1994):128.19

politics and antipolitics, all signifying at the late stage of real socialism and the first stage of postcommunist,have to be overcome as quickly as possible. Therefore a de-freezing of old cleavages,e.g. the old “we versus them” distinction, must occur, but probably unevenly from country tocountry 11 .Negative type consolidation was achieved shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991as a return to the old system has been considered as impossible after the break down of communismand Soviet Union. In other words, consolidation of democracy has been closely connected withregime survival, i.e. prevention of regress to the old state socialist system. However, as argued byO’Donell and Schmitter (O’Donnell & Schmitter (1986:3), transition away from the oldauthoritarian system might well be a transition to “something else”, not necessarily a democraticsystem.The transformations in the CEEC’s were anti-communist, but not necessarily democratic(Przeworski, 1991). Evidence has shown that democracy may be secure against erosion and breakdowneven if party system is not fully developed, and democracy may erode and break down also incase parties and party systems are well institutionalised. Basically the transition to the new systempromoted to types of conflicts, one between those resisting the old system and those defending it,and second conflicts between the different “proto-democratic actors”, mainly former dissidentsaiming to secure for themselves the best possible opportunities in the new post-communist system(Przeworski, 1991). In other words, from the outset many options were open, including alsotransition to non-democratic regimes, e.g. autocratic, electoral, procedural or other forms of nonconsolidateddemocracies.From the experience from the first post-1989 years Attila Ágh concludes that new democracies inmost cases constitute semi-democracies or even pseudodemocracies. Later he became moreoptimistic (Ágh, 1998:17), when describing democratic transition as “the mixture of two systems ina creative chaos, with complicated and painful process of democratic institutionalisation and socioeconomictransformation” and democratic consolidation as “the coherent emergence of the newsystem in all social sub-systems, with the establishment of a democratic political culture- theinvention of democratic traditions”. Transition and consolidation constitute a complex sociationalprocesses including institutionalisation, social integration, participation and formation of a newpolitical culture after 40 year under stalinism, neostalinism and different forms of post-totalitarianreal socialism. Furthermore, Ágh, distinguish between external and internal consolidation, whereexternal consolidation constitute the social links of the parties and establishment of lines ofcommunication in society. The internal dimension deals with institutionalisation inside the partiesthemselves, including lines of communication between the differenct centres of decision making,e.g. the party leadership, the parliamentary group and the party member local organisations (Ágh,1998:110).In some cases democracy may be consolidated when a democratic regional hegemon, e.g.. the EUby using meaningful incentives and disincentives promotes and implants democracy. The EU factor11 As mentioned by Gábor Toka, there can be talk about cleavages in a party context ”if an enduring organizational formis given to a politically mobilized opposition between such members of relatively closed groups who have distinctvalues, beliefs and identity”, see Gábor Tóka, ”Party Appeals and Voter Loyalty in New Democracies”, PoliticalStudies (1998), XLVI: 596, Tóka refers to Bartolini and Mair, Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability, O.Knutsen and E. Scarbrough, ”Cleavage Politics”, in J. van Deth and E. Scarbrough (eds.) (1995), The Impact of Values,Oxford:Oxford University Press: 492-523.20

played an important role e.g. in the case of Spain’s and Portugal’s transition to democracy, and thiseexperiences have played a certain role also in the case of crafting democracy in the CEEC’s.However, some differences between the South European and the East European ways ofconsolidation have been striking. For example the economic consolidation and market economy inSpain and Portugal was more advanced at the time for democratic break through and the subsequentconsolidation. Therefore the way down in the “valley of tears” was more short term and less painfulthan in the CEEC’s.Nonetheless, in the end democracy became “the only game in town” in most CEECs. The “two-turnover test” has been passed, as presidential power as well as governmental power have peacefullytranferered to the opposition in case of election defeat for the parties in power. However, withoutgreater civic participation and further institutionalisation the transition to more advanced democracywill not take place and “democratic government” will not constitute a “democratic regime 12 . Also“authoritarian situations” are well known in the CEEC’s, e.g. in Hungary under Viktor Orban, inwhich case the dominant political agents exclude other agents from the political process therebysecuring for themselves direct or indirect control over the political life including mass media 13 . Insuch casesthe democratic institutions are in place, but democratic rules are “hollowed out” due tothe winner parties’ strong focus on keeping political power according to the classical principleabout the winners, “that takes it all”. In other words, consolidation of democracy demands aconsiderable “self-limitation” on behalf of the parties in governments as well the parties theopposition.To conclude, concerning consolidation of democracy in the CEEC’s we still can use ZoltanBarany’s formulation:“What we currently have in Eastern Europe are imperfect, and in some places (e.g. Albania,Romania, Slovakia) fragile but, most importantly, functioning, working, democratic polities”(Braun and Barany, 1999:107).1.6. The left-right divide and post-communist cleavagesMany notions have been used when characterizing political parties. In the operating style, mostparties shared the competitive logic of western catch-all parties, but lacked their ideological andorganisational anchors. The left-right divide known from already established political party systemscannot be used. However, instead of disappearing, the left and right divide exist in peoples mind,but differently in each East Central European country. The different patterns of ideologicalstructuring shall be seen in the context of the main cleavages and each country's experiences at thetime of leaving socialism 14 . Thus the party systems emerging in the Czech Republic after 1989,already in the first stages came close to the left-right division in the more classic sense, according to12 Wlodzimierz Weselowski distinguishes referring to O´Donnald (1994) between “democratic government” and“democratic regime” in “Political Actors and Democracy: Poland 1990-1997”, Polish Sociological Review, 3 (119),Warsaw, 1997:227.13 A term used e.g. by Juan Linz, “The Future of the Authoritarian Situation or Institutionalization of an AuthoritarianRegime: The Case of Brazil”, in Alfred Stepan (ed.) (1973), Authoritarian Brazil. Origins, Policies and Future, NewHaven, CT, and London, Yale University Press:233-254.14 Attila Ágh, ”Party Formation Process and the 1998 Elections in Hungary”, East European Politics and Societies, Vol.14, No.2, Spring 2000:292, and Radoslaw Markowski, ”Political Parties and Ideological Spaces in East CentralEurope”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies 30:3 (1997):122.21

which attitudes to state regulation and the welfare state are the most decisive single factorsseparating the parties involved in elections.In the case of Poland the left-right axis has been closely linked to the socio-cultural dimension, inparticular questions about the proper role of the church in society and attitudes to the communistpast. Parties with a strong anti-communist and market- and euro-sceptical characteristics has beendescribed as right-traditionalistic. On social issues and state regulation the Polish right wing partieshave behaved more ”social democratic” than the post-communist parties, including the democraticleft alliance SLD and the Peasants Party (PSL). Symbolic politics and low programme crystalizationwas striking, at least compared with conservative-liberal parties and most parties on the politicalLeft.On the other end of the scale we find conservative-liberal parties. These parties are strongsupporters of free market economy. Furthermore they are pro-European and against restitution tothe church and church interference in politics, e.g. in questions about religious instruction in schoolsand abortion. The Freedom Union (UW) in Poland, the ODS and ODA in the Czech Republic andthe Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) in Hungary belong to parties of the conservative-liberaltype.The political left can be divided in orthodox communist parties, left wing social democratic postcommunistparties with roots in reform minded sections of the communist parties and the “modern”nomenklaturea and finally authentic historical social democratic parties with roots back to theperiod before the communist take-over and the forced unifications of social democratic andcommunist parties.The parties in the CECC’s have been divided according to partly overlapping criteria. Neoliberalpro-market and pro-western parties have been contrasted to neo-traditionalistic particularistic andsocialdemocratic type political parties. The parties have alternately been considered as progressive,traditionalist, liberal and authoritarian. On that basis there has been distinguished betweenmodern/rational versus neotraditional/nationalist parties. Furthermore, pro-market and pro-westernparties have been contrasted to market sceptical religious, agrarian or populist socialist (Thomas,1999:8).As noted above, also the division between mass parties, cadre parties, catch-all parties and cartelparties may be relevant also in the post-communist context. The parties in the CEEC’s seemed tomove towards the catch-all electoral-professional type party models, built up hierarchially andcentralitically governed and with tenuous links to the social groups. In other words, the partiesseems to have concentrated on “a wider clientele of voters ... rather than opt for the well-definedsegments of society” 15 . Only agrarian parties, e.g. the PSL in Poland and the IndependentHusmands Party (FKGP) in Hungary were equivalent to distinct class parties. The modern promarketparties suffered at the elections due to absence of a strong and prosperous middle class (“themissing midle”). Thus, the emergence of rather strong right-traditionalist political parties have beenconsidered as a result of the civilisational “backwardness” and the unfinished and distortedmodernisation.15 Peter Kopecky, “Developing Party Organisations in East-Central Europe: What Type of Party is likely to emerge?”,Party Politics, 4, 1995:515-534.22

Before 1989 “postcommunist” parties had cooperated closely with the communist parties inside thenational fronts, other “historic” parties had been outlawed under the communist rule and were“reborn” after the demise of communism. We also find parties established almost spontaneouslyand maybe therefore hardly can be placed on a right-left scale 16 . In some cases, the memories aboutthe uprisings against the communist regimes and the circumstances and the ways of demise of theold regime had created specific “foundation myths”, leading to “early freezing” of old socio-culturalcleavages.The agrarian parties can not easily be placed on the right-left axis. In Poland the peasants party PSLhave constituted a centre-left party because of the historic background in the communist period andthe cooperation with left alliance SLD after 1990. The Christian-Democratic KDU-CSL took part inthe ODS-led governments in the Czech Republic, after the 2002 election in Vladimir Spidlas socialdemocratic led government. In Hungary, the Smallholders Party (FKGP) has appeared as an classparty only entering coalitions with the centre-right Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) andFIDESZ.The right-leftPost-communist conflicts and cleavagesdimension deviatedfrom those known• (post)communism versus anticommunism (all countries)from alreadyestablished partysystems in the• state versus church (e.g. Poland)West. Cleavages inthe post-communist• liberalism versus cosmopolitism (e.g. Hungary)CEECs tended tobe• National ethnic conflicts (e.g. in Slovakia)multidimensionaland as rightlyagued by Mikos• Free market versus regulated market the Czech Republic) Haraszti to aextent alsoculturally andpolically(communist-anticommunist) based 17 . There has therefore rightly been talked about specific“cleavages and conflict lines of transformation” (Hlousek etc, 2004:48). In the first stage the partiesand individual participants became representatives of the (post) communism versus anticommunismconflict. In the later stages of post-communism the socio-economic cleavages, e.g. the conflictabout the free market versus regulated market conflict, became more striking and not only in theCzech Republic. Cultural cleavages, including national ethnic conflicts have especially beenstriking in the “deviating case” of Slovakia, maybe due to the late and complex nation building, thatbrought the parties and party systems unstable, “immature” and “non standard” characteristics.Opposite, socio-economic cleavages have been rather weak in the case of Slovakia1.7. Anti-communism and the Right16 Michal Klima, “Consolidation and Stablization of the Party System in the Czech Republic”, Political Studies(1998):496.17 Miklos Haraszti, “Young Bloods, Hungary’s election results promise a new taste of political salami”, Transitions,July 1998:48-52.23

Anti-communism has been defined in different ways. Right-liberal parties have primarily paidattention to economic subjects, e.g. the the transition from plan to market, and therefore not placedquestions about “lustrace” (“purification”) and “dekomunizacji” high on the polical agenda. Thoseparties simply do not recognize their post-communist competitors as legitimate. Opposite, forsocialliberals like Tadeusz Mazowiecki in Poland and Jiri Dienstbier in the Czech Republic thereckoning with the past should be structural, not a question about revenge. Opposite, theconservative-traditionalists talked in favour of “speeding up” of the purification of the new wonpost-communist system. In other words, the different opinions about the past were tranfereed to thefuture. In Poland disagreements about the role of the Catholic Church seemed to divide the politicalparties more than questions about the economic and social policy. The conservative-liberals and theconservative traditionalists were deeply divided as regards qustions about state regulation and freemarket economy.The conservative-traditionalists can be placed on the political right because of nationalistic andpatriotic slogans and semi-authoritharian and anti-modernistic attitudes. The political line wascharacterized by “pragmatization without de-idelogization”. At he same time the conservativetraditionalistsspoke in favour of more state intervention, a more pro-family policy, more socialjustice and expressed a considerable euroscepticism. For the conservative-traditionalists the enemywas not only the “post-communists”, but also so-called “traitors” inside their own camp, mainly theneoliberals and EU-federalists. The many “wars in the top” inside rhe right wing camp inevitablyenhanced radicalisation and polarisation, especially on the symbolic and personal level.Among the national-populists the anti-elite, anti-urban and anti-cosmopolitic attitudes were striking.Inside that group the notion “the people” also had a social meaning, leading back to the archaicagrarian societys old loyalty to the conservative ruling class. For many national-populists politicswas considered as a “dirty business” based on specific antipolitical feelings. The support todemocracy was conditional as subjects linked to moral and etics, e.g. questions about abortion, wereplaced “above politics”. Under communism they fought as dissidents for political freedom, but afterthe victory, they did not necessarily love the new won freedom. As politicians many behaved like“amateurs”. However, in the longer term the political arena could not be stabilised primarily byidentity based symbolic politics. The fate of the governments were determined by good or badgovernance and the elections became retrospective, not like at the beginning referenda for or againstthe new versus the old system.The right-traditionalist parties soon became divided in a moderate Christian conservative versus amore uncompromising fundamentalis wing. The fight between Jozsef Antall and Istvan Csurkainside the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) and the split indside Sajudis in Lithuania and theUnion of Democratic Forces (UDF) in Bulgaria can be taken as examples. The black and whitejudgments were striking, not only against the “postcommunists”; the “enemy” they found alsoinside own camp. Neoliberalism mostly constituted a political reaction against the one party ruleand the old plan system, transmitted to the CEEC’s from the West and only to a small extent rootedin the society.1.8. The dilemmas of the LeftJust after 1989 the socialist ideology was brought in a deep miscredit. The demise of communismhad discredited socialism in all its variants, that be as a discourse, as an utopia, as a revolution or as24

an inspiration for personal emancipation (Schöpflin, 2000:66). The then prevailing neoliberaldiscourse was not seriously challenged. As menioned in a round table discussion in the Polish daily“Gazeta Wyborcza” the Left simply lacked a new “great vision” for the future post-communistsystem 18 . It was primarily the failures on the Right, that gave the “successor parties” election theelection victories in the beginning of the 1990’s. The polical scene had been left over to formerdissidents, right-wing intellectuals, parts of the former nomenklatura and a empoverished middleclass.Later, having passed the “tears of valleys” a “retrospective utopia” and a “transformation fatigue”emerged, for by many citizens the economic transformation was more felt as a “shock” than a“therapy”. The new order did not as expected necessarily signify law and order, economicdevelopment, “catching up”, better governance, more honesty in politics and- not to forget- moresocial justice. We must not forget that parties with roots in the old system despite a consideraleflight of party members maintained old-new networks, more party members than the newmovement parties, higher institutionalisation and financial means. However, the postcommunistsuccessor parties had to fight energetically to be recognized home and abroad e.g. in the socialdemocratic Socialist International (SI).After 1989 the communist successor parties as well as the historical social democratic parties wereforced carefully to think out the new situation and reach new and different and more feasible“common sense socialism”,. In fact, they did succeed to do that earlier and quicker than firstexpected. The main tast was to free themselves from the “beton” communists and appear to theelectorate like authentic, pragmatic, professional and reformminded standard political parties,speaking in favour of a more socially just and more regulated market economy. The formercommunist parties, the reformminded part of the old nomenklatura, chose an expressivelytechnocratic centristic pathway. From the conservative-traditionalistic side, the turn to the leftbasically signified a move towards political economy, nomenklatura capitalism and whitewashingof black money.The Left has been divided in two different groups of parties, on the one side traditionalist postcommunistparties stubbornly adhering to the marxist-leninist and trade unionist princples, and onthe other side “modern” social democratic parties sticking to West-European socialliberal values.Following the same line, Krzystyna Skarzynska calls attention to on the one hand the economicallyorientated versus the modern identity orientated Left 19 . The first grouping has been trade unionistunderlining classical well-fare state values, social justice, economic regulation and slowprivatisation. The “modern”, technocratic, socialliberal and international orientated groupingappealed primarily to the younger and better educated living in the bigger towns. In other words, themotivation for voting Left might be based on social or cultural values. Both groups mentionedabove rejected lustrace and decomunization. The “modern” left groups first of all aimed to bring theproject for modernisation that was introduced by reformminded communists in the late 1980’s tothe end. As we shall see in the following sections, the two different lines could be found also insidethe parties themselves. The unreformed communist parties failed at the elections if we don’t takeinto account the rather stable performance of the Czech communists (KSCM) at all post-198918 29-30 November, 1997.19 Used by Krzystof Pankowski, in “Od lewicowosci zawstydzonej do prawicowosci zagrozonej- zmiany wdeklaracjach politycznych polakow i ciagu ostatnich peiciu lat”, Politicus, no. 1-2(7), Warszawa:Biuletin InstitutuStudiów Politycznych PAN, 1995:55.25

elections and the Slovak communists who surprisingly were represented in parlament at the 2002election.Political strategies were to a large extent determined by aims of recognition and survival. As notedby John Ishiyama and András Bozóki the communist successor parties have passed their owninternal transformations. The post-communist parties adopted various strategies of adaption to thepost-communist environment, and strategies were changing over time. Seen in that perspective,party change can be considered as a rational and purposeful moves by the partis involved, inresponse to internal or external stimuli. Major changes have often been precipitated by poorelectoral performance.The take-over of governmental responsibilities came earlier than first expected. The participation ingovernment made a deideologizing, pragmatizing impact. As noticed above, the limited freedom ofmaneuvre in the economic and social policy turned the political Left closer to the political middle,however, at the same time removing those parties away from the voters and the civil societies. Atthe national elections in 1996 and 1997 in Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania and Poland transformationloosers and socially marginalised felt themselves deceived by the “postcommunists”. Many decidedto be “sofa-voters” or alternately vote on the right-traditionalist market sceptical populist parties.The electoral support for the neoliberals remained modest, mostly encompassing the “transitionwinners”.Being in government the policy of the Left was determined by the low freedom of maneuvre in theeconomic and social policy, marked by a specific postcommunist pathdependency. Opposite, afterthe fall of communism, the ruling socialist parties in the South European countries had to movesocieties from plan to market under extremely difficult conditions internally as well as externally,thus without carrying through the social dimension promised during the election campaigns. Alsothe left governments had to pass the “valley of tears” before – slowly – moving to economicgrowth.Ishiyama and Bozóki identify four different adaption strategies among left-wing post-communistparties: the national/populist, the orthodox communist, the modernization/reformist and the nationalcommunist. Ishiyama and Bozóki distinguish between four different types of post-communiststrategies:• Leftist-retreat involves the successor party embracing its Marxist traditions (rejecting thefree market), repudiating western influence, and adopting the status of an anti-systemopposition party. This pattern is a long way exemplified by PDS in Germany and KSCM inthe Czech Republic.• The strategy of pragmatic reform attempts to distance itself from “dogmatic Marxism” andredefining the party involved as a “European” social democratic party consisting of“experts”, “technocrats” and “pragmatists”.• The national-patriotic strategy, which unlike the pragmatic reform strategy does not involvean attempt to redefine the party as a “European” social democratic party. Rather this strategyseeks to associate the party with nationalism, a modern ideological alternative tocommunism. This strategy often involves the formation of “red and brown” coalitions or so-26

called “nationalist-patriotic” and “fatherland” fronts such as has been the case in e.g. Russiaand Romania.1.9. Coalition buildingSeveral election party alliances have merged, often with the explicit aim to pass the tresholdrequirements stated in the lection laws, only rarely the explanation as an approximation on theelitelevel or the policy and programme level. As we shall se in the cases of Solidarity in Polandandthe Quadre Coalition (4K) the obstacles for establishing functional party federations became almostinsurmountable. The main problem was to create the sufficient loyalty on actor level and thenecessary cohesion on the policy and programme level. A common “federal” party identity wasalmost impossible to establish. On macro level, the change of party identity can be explained asmuch by factors internal to the parties involved in the federation as by external factors, i.e. factorsfrom the outside 20 .In several cases only loosely institutionalized party-alliances and umbrella-parties wereestablished. As noticed above, in several cases we have been dealing with negative party alliancesthat were focusing on a common enemy such as SDK in Slovakia (Meciar), AWS in Poland (”postcommunists”)and the Four Coalition (4K) in the Czech Republic (Klaus and Zeman). These partyalliances were not able to obtain sufficiently stable and definitive party memberships, rather wehave been dealing with ”participants in their actions” (Ágh, 1998:103). In general, the cohesion andloyalty on the elite level has been low. The movement parties tried to express the ”original” and”ideal” unity of society and party. However, they were organizationally fragile, mostly transitorypolitical phenomena, never constituting functional political parties like we find them in “standard”competitive multi-party systems. The cult of spontaneity and the movement line may overcome thedivision between everyday life and politics considered in the broader sense, but only in the shortterm.Figure : types of cooperation and alliances among parties in the CEESTypes of cooperation/alliances Characteristics ExamplesTransitory governmentsNormally formed just after the demiseof the old system and until the firstfree election, often set up according toa compromise between representativesfrom the old and new system, i.e. theoppositionNegative party alliancesTactical alliancesCooperation between parties primarilybased on a common enemy, i.e. the(post)communists and in spite ofdisagreements on both policy andactor levelParty cooperation with the primaryaim to secure the parties involved aThe first non-communist governmentin Poland, the government inCzechoslovakia after the velvetrevolution until the first free electionMay-June 1990Election Alliance AWS and the AWS-UW government in Poland, the SDKledgovernment in Slovakia after the1998 election, Democratic Conventionin Bulgaria, and (partly) the 4K in theCzech RepublicThe first stage of the four partycooperation (4K) in the Czech20 John Ishiyama and András Bozóki, “Adaption and Change:Characterizing the Survival Strategies of the CommunistSuccessor Parties, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.17, No.3, September 2001:32-51.27

Cartel agreementsbetter representation in parliament byminimizing the waste of votes atelectionsPower sharing agreements, in whichcase the policy-content is neglected,the aim is to keep other parties out, themajority principle, “the winners take itall”Imposed agreements Cooperation between partiesestablished after heavy pressure fromthe international society, i.e. the West,e.g. the EUFree “self chosen” alliancesSeveral coalition alternatives exist,only few historical structural obstaclesand no pressure from the internationalsociety. Agreement on policy level isthe most important, old cleavageswhich may be barriers for coalitionbuilding are de-freezed or nonexistingHistorical compromise Cooperation overcoming deephistorical, i.e. structural cleavages.Reflect de-freezing of old e.g. “Weversus Them” cleavagesRepublic, “Przymierze Polski” inPoland at the municipal and regionalelections in 1998.The agreements between ODS andCSSD in the Czech Republic after the1998 election, especially the first“opposition agreement” just after the1998 electionDifficult to find in the “pure” form,however the government establishedafter the 1998 and the 2002 election inSlovakia can be taken as examples.The governmental coalitionestablished after the 1998 in Hungarybetween FIDESZ and agrarian partyFKGP. FIDESZ could haveestablished a broad coalition with e.g.the Socialist Party (MSZP). After the2002 Czech election the CSSD couldhave continued cooperation with ODS,but took the Coalition (K) as partner ingovernmentThe governmental coalition betweenthe Socialist Party (MSZP) and theliberal Alliance (SZDSZ) after the1994 election in HungaryThe rise of umbrella type parties has been caused by the fragmentation and party splits after the firstfree elections. The umbrella parties have an hegemonic core that dominates smaller parties. Smallparties, that might loose the parliamentary representation at a forthcoming elections, may survive ifthey enter coalitions with stronger (”hegemonic”) parties in order to pass tresholds requirementsand obtain seats in parliament. Most important is to minimize waste of votes caused e.g. by highelection threshold requirements. Umbrella type inter-party cooperation have been seen on both thepolitical right and left side of the political spectrum. Thus, the cooperation between MDF andFIDESZ in Hungary and between the Works Union (UP) and SLD in Poland are examples of such“hegemonic” party-alliances. Before the 2002 election in Slovakia several new election alliancesemerged. Some were transformed to “parties” because of changes in the election rules, decided bythe Meciar led government.The umbrella parties and party alliances may change role and later constitute party federations witha stronger decision centre and even become unified standard parties. The question, however, is towhat extent the parties involved are willing to give up their own party identity. Unification andstandardization has been especially difficult for parties with a long historic tradition and a wellestablished party culture.A third model was establishment of pure tactical alliancse (see figure ... ). In that case the partiesinvolved are capable to cooperate programmatically and put forward common lists at the elections,but they limit themselves to coordination on the policy-level without transforming themselves intoparty federations that include “shadow cabinets” and common long-term political programmes suchas in the case of AWS in Poland and SDK in Slovakia. In other words, the parties maintain theirown party identities and their own party institutions. For that reason the day to day policy problems28

are often discussed in “relaxed” and “practical” ways. From the outset The Four-Coalition (4K) inthe Czech Republic and ”Przymierze Polski” in Poland constituted such ”pure” tactical partyformationsas they were not distinct negative alliances and party federations such as in case of AWSand SDK. However, before the 2002 election 4K tried to be transformed itself into a party alliancewith a common election program and a “shadow cabinet”. However, after the victory at the firstnational elections and after the transformation into party federations, several “wars in the top”erupted.Inside dysfunctional party alliances are not kept together primarily be references to the common”enemy”, e.g. ”post-communists” (e.g. SLD in Poland) or “nationalists” (e.g. Meciar in Slovakia).In most cases lack of loyalty and cohesion on actor level has been striking. On the Polish Rightseveral policians changed party four or five times. In the case of SLD in Poland the transformationto a party-alliance and later unified ”standard party” became the expressed goal, in other cases nofinal decision was taken, e.g. in case of the Czech ”Four Coalition” (4K) and ”Przymierze Polski”in Poland. To conclude, the ultimate aim of functional party alliances tends to be to establishfunctional party federations and in the longer term to be transformed into unified “standard” parties.However, most political groups tend to regard party alliances as only tactical and thereforetemporary. Thus, from the outset the lack of loyalty and cohesion on the elite level has beenstriking.1.10. Parties and party systems under presidentialismParties and party systems tend to develop differently in presidential and parliamentary systems.Party non-systems and weak party systems seem to create presidential or semi-presidential systems,as strong presidents, who are acting “above politics”, may “compensate” for absence of strong andlegitimate parties. In order to strengthen their own position presidents sometimes strived to set upbarriers for development of new parties such as was the case e.g. in Russia, Ukraine and Poland atthe beginning of the 1990’s.Thus, evidence show that presidential systems tend to weaken the political parties and thedemocratic process. Presidential systems seem rigid, as it is almost impossible to change thepresident in mid-term without bringing down the regime itself (Sakwa, 2002:104). The presidentialveto and the reference of laws to the constitutional courts have hampered or often delayed thedecision processes. The problem has been the greatest, when elected governments were deniedfinancial laws and tax laws already adopted by a majority in parliament. The disagreements amongparties and “wars in the top” inside parties before presidential elections suggest that direct electionof presidents reinforce party fragmentation and impair further stabilization and crystallization ofparty systems.In Slovakia the realisation and disagreements between President Michal Kovac and Prime MinisterVladimir Meciar clearly undermined the democratic process and gave rise to a heavily polarizedpolitical system. Both president Vaclav Havel in the Czech Republic and president Lech Walesa inPoland criticized the behaviour of the political parties in general and thereby raised questions aboutthe role of the political parties for the further consolidation of the new won democracy(”antipolitics”). The election of Vaclav Klaus as new president of the Czech Republic signified amove away from the “anti-politics” civic based, altlanctic and pro-European line of formerpresident Vaclav Havel.29

Basically the absence of clear constitutional rules and the difficult cohabitation between presidentsand governments were sometimes due to weak democratic culture and strong party systempolarisation. In several cases the president and the Prime Minister belonged to different parties.Thus cohabitation “in the French sense” took place in Poland under the post-communistgovernment (Walesa versus the SLD-PSL government), and later under the AWS-UW government(Kwasniewski versus AWS-UW government).In some cases the intervention of presidents nullified a governmental crisis and a “deadlocked”situations. That took place in 1993 when president Lech Walesa dissolved the parliament after voteof non-confidence against the Hanna Suchocka government, and larer when Walesa intervenedagainst Jan Olszewski’s government. President Vaclav Havel’s intervention in late 1996 thatremoved Vaclav Klaus from the post as Prime Minister, was controversial from a constitutionalpoint of view, but the final outcome, the establishment of a caretaker government and new un-timeelections in summer 1998, looked like the best solution in the then prevailing almost “deadlocked”political situation.Formation of new parties some times follow after successful presidential campaigns. The rise of theMovement for the Construction of Poland (ROP) was initiated by Jan Olszewski, one of thesuccesful candidates at the 1995 presidential election. Just before the 1995 election Lech Walesaestablished the presidential party (BBWR), and after the 2000 presidential election the presidentialcandidate, Andrzej Olechowski, together with defectors from the Freedom Union (UW) and AWSestablished the liberal platform (PO). Normally such “spontaneously” created party formations arebadly institutionalised and thus vulnerable to internal splits on policy, programme as well as actorlevel. Actor rivalisation (“wars in the top”) and political crafting has been striking because of theweak party institutionalization. In the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary characterized byparliamentary political systems no distinct presidential parties have ever been represented inparliament.1.11. The new political elitesThe establishment of political parties was closely connected with the emergence of new politicalelites. At the time of the demise of the old systems individual politicians had good opportunitiesforleave one’s mark on the political agenda (“political crafting” and “political entrepreneurship”).James Tool (Toole, 2003) and Jon Elster, Calus Offe and Ulrich K. Preuss (Elster etc., 1998)belongs to those, who argue that the devlopment of political parties in the new democracies in anuntil then unseen extent was pushed forward by the new political elites and the significance ofpolitical elites for further consolidation af democracy (“institutional agency”). Prime Ministers,presidents and some other ministers, especially the ministers of finance, obtained an importantposition due to the chaotic situation and the weak party institutionalisation. As we have seen, theparties were mostly established top-down and became elitedriven. After the demise of the oldsystems new elite structures emerged. Special interest was attached to the new non-communistelites and the fate of the old nomenklatura. In addition, many seeked an answer on the the crucialquestion, wo had become the “winners” and who the “loosers” in the new post-communist system.Political elites can shortly be defined as individuals and groups who by occupying strategicpositions in society are able regularly and substantially to make an effect on the political decisions.By “substantial” we mean that without the impact of elites the political outcomes would have been30

considerably different. The question inevitably arises, who in the society occupy the most powerfulposts in society and who to the greatest extent are capable to influence and control those in power.As the point of departure research of political elites has often taken theories about elitereproduction,in which case systemic changes do not lead to renewal on the personal level, or withelite-circulation, in which case focus is laid upon the instalment of new people. In case changes onelite level are modest or cosmetic we have to do with “within-private” regimes (Braun and Barany,1999:8). Russia under Jeltsin is one example of within-private regimes, as the new elites to a greatextent were recruited from the old nomenklatura. However, within-regimes are not unknown in theCEEC’s.Many, including A. Lijphart have underlined the significance of political elites for stablisationinpluralistic societies., where the etnic and social divisions are deep and foster more polarisationand political conflicts 21 . In this respect,Yugoslavia has been an important case. High elitefragmentation inevitably deepens polarisation and foster party competition of the centrfugal type.Therefore, it is important to limit political conflicts and install a consociational type of democracy.Thus, elite consensus is considered as important for enhancing political stability and consolidationof democracy.From the mid 1980s influenced by changes taking place in the Soviet Union the old elites wereforced to concentrate on pure strategies of survival. On the one side, since 1989 the oldnomenklatura has been accused of usurp political power, on the other side there have been warningsagainst “demonising” the role of the nomenklatura due to the argument, that a great part of the oldnomenklatura contributed to the almost smooth transition from plan to market and consolidation ofthe new won democracy.John Highley distinguishes between consensually united and ideocratically united elites 22 .Consensually united elites share basically the same views on development of society, which meansthat the different networks and elite groups co-exist rather harmoniously. In contrast, ideocraticallyunited elites adhere to common attitueds and belief systems. The conservative-traditionalistictypically have been ideocratically united, but only as long as the common enemy, the(post)communists were alive. Normally ideocratically united tend to behave intolerant and inclinedto secure for themselves the necessary support by non-democratic procedures, even by use of meansof force 23 .Before 1989, the old elites were forced to act under constantly growing insecurity in the SovietUnion. After the demise of the then existing one-party systems and the modernising oldnomenklaturas attemt to exchange political power with economic power. The party loyalty steadily,also the cohesion inside the nomenklatura. In Hungary a part of the nomenklatura was in front inundermining the old system, as many were more listening to the advises from the IMF and WorldBank than to the communist parties. Others adopted a “new-old” attitude. The attitude tointroduction of democracy and market economy was positive, but they did not reject all in the oldsystem.21 A. Lijphart (1977), Democracy in Plural Societies: Acomparative Exploration”, Berkly, California:University ofCalifornia Press.22 John Highley, in Braun and Barany, 1999:52-53.23 John Highley, in Braun and Barany, 1999:52-53.31

After 1989 different types of political leaders emerged. Thus, the Hungarian Attila Ághdistinguishes between four groups:• “Politicians of morals”, who played a significant role in the first stage. They mostlyappealed to patriotic and national values.with references to their own “heroic past”. Aspoliticians they acted reserved, improvised, morally, non-professionally and almostaristocratically, captured by a specific “liberation myth”. Poland’s Jan Olszewski and theCzech Republic’s Vaclav Benda have been included in that first group.• “Politicians of historical vision”. Politicians from that group often left the political sceneafter the demise of the old system. Before 1989 they had not been active dissidents. Aspoliticians they often based their arguments on idelogies and discourses going back to precommunisttimes. Before 1989, they had often entered compromises with the power holders.The political style was arrogant, not compromise seeking and unprofessional. Former primeminister in Hungary Józef Antall and the christian democrat Jan carnogursky in Slovakiabelonged to that group. Also many politicians in the Baltic countries shared a feeling offullfilling a historical mission reestablishing independence after 50 years under communistrule. Nonetheless, many from that group had at some time been leading politicians under theold system., sometimes they explelled from the communist parties due to lack of partydiscipline.• “Politicians by chance”, i.e. persons who became “carried” into politics because of the thenprevailing extraordinary politics and transition anomie. Several times people from that groupbecame embarassment for further consolidation of democracy due to their agressive selfpromotingstyle and onesided aiming at political career. Several from that group wereinvolved in political scandals, and many absurd, often populist and xenofobic policalslogans. Stanislaw Tyminski, Lech Walesa’s rival candidate at the 1990 presidentialelection, Miroslav Sladek, the leader of the right wing populistic repubican party in theCzech Republic, Istvan Czurka, the ringht wing nationalist in Hungary, and VladimirZjirinovski, the leader of the populist Liberal Democratic Party in Russia, belonged to thatgroup.• The old nomenklatura, which to a great extent has survived. Especially the modern part ofthe nomenklatura made a good showing. The conservative “beton-heads” either resignedfrom politics or turned themselves into nationalists. Poland’s president e and former leaderof the left wing SLD Aleksander Kwasniewski and Hungary’s former foreign minister,prime minister Guyla Horn belonged to the “modern” and accomodate part of thenomaneklatura.• Finally Attila Ágh mentiones the new professionals, a mixture of old and new, mostlyconsisting of experts and professionals from the old regime or yungsters without any linksback in time. To the first generation of professionals, people from the “second tier” of theold system, belonged Vaclav Klaus, the party leader of the liberal party ODS and later thepresident of the Czech Republic, and Leszek Balcerowicz, the former Minister of Finance,leader of the liberal Freedom Union (UW), later the Polsh national bank governor.In agreement with Atilla Ágh, András Bozóki from the Central European University in Budapest,breaks down of the new elite in this way:32

• To the first group belong the professionals, who so to say were “born” into politics, whorecognised that, were in possession of a good ability to adapt themselves to new situationsand find their bearings in new unpredictable situations. Many reformminded communistsbelonged tho that group.• The next group was the those doing “missionary work”, i.e. persons, who felt to perform ahistorical mission. Often we were dealing with writers and other cultural personalities,almost “carried” into politics. For those people politics was not a goal in itself, the goalswere rather metapolitical.• To the third group belonged the “divided”, i.e. people who were not power orientated andwith an unclear vision about heir own role in politics and the political future. Many fromthat resigned from politics with the professionalisation or bureaucratisation of politics.• Finally there were people who soon after the break through in 1989 resigned from politics,some returned to their former work, others moved to the new private sector and becamepolitical advisors.Furthermore, it is important, how many ressources and how great a “capital” that belongs to the thedifferent elite groups (Szelelyi e.a., 1995). According to “capital” we can differentiate between fourdifferent types:• Economic capital, i.e. the possession of property and ccess to financiation, state subsidiesetc.• Cultural capital, e.g. education.• Societal capital, e.g. close networks horsontally and vertically.• The ability to convert capital by using the already established networks to exchangepolitical by economic capital.In some studies a distinction has been made between “laissez faire”, “transactional and“transformational” political leadership (Heywood, 1998:334). In the case of laissez-faire leadershipwe have to do with a considerable delegation of political power to lower levels of decision making;in case of transactional leadership were are dealing with a “hands-on” leadership emphasizingpragmatic goals and underlining party unity and party cohesion; and in case of transformativeleadership main emphasis has been laid on visions, inspiration and carismatic leadership. In case oftransformative leadership the weight has been laid on the closest as possible contact between elitesand voters by means of political mobilisation with the aim to carry through the most necessaryreforms of society.As noted above, the parties were established top-down and for that reason they also to a great extentbecame elite governed. In most cases the new elites were in short of strategic visions andinstitutional capacity to translate visions and strategies into action. In the first stage of postcommunismthe leadership in most cases was “hand on” as the new elites had to formulate a new33

complex project for transition under high insecurity. After some time the leadership became moretransactional, but still the political decisions were taken without any close contact to the voters andparty members. As far as the CEEC’s are concerned “agency of leadership” and “political crafting”played an important role in the first stage of post-communism. Opposite, institutional structures aremore important moving to more “settled times” and more “ordinary politics” (Innes, 2001:112).It is difficult to say, which of the above mentioned elite groups that became winners and loosers inthe new post-communist system. So much can be said that the old, but at the same time modern partof the nomenklatura all together has done well. The former communists belong to the fourth groupin Ágh’s classification and the first group in Bozóki’s. Before 1989 many former communists hadgained a considerable political experience, and after 1989 they were brought in the defensive. The“moral politicians” lost influence after the political come-back of the post-communists, but somecame back after the political pendulum agains moved to the right. However, moral politicians andnationalistic minded intellectuals had to give way to pragmatists. The new pragmatists and postcommunisttechnocrats were recruited from the second rank, i.e. outside the old nomenklatura, butalso outside the dissident circles. Only rarely the former dissidents belonged to the transitionwinners.Some have regretted, others with satisfation observed the “moralisers’” loss of influence in politics.In all the countries involved intellectuals have played an important, an even “mythical” role, asregards the Czech Republic people like Palacký, Jungmann, Masaryk and Havel. On the conferenceheld in Budapest in 1996 on “Intellectuals between moral and politics”, the mayor of Budapest, theliberal Gabór Demszky said, that in Hungary several former dissidents and nationalistic mindedintellectuals had left politics, for the new Hungary was no longer in need of “educators” and“parents”. Adam Michnik shared that view and criticised former dissidents for not being able toadapt themselves to the new times 24 . “Our heroes fighted for freedom, but they did not learn to loveit”.The peaceful “revolutions” were governed by releatively small counter elites and intellectuals. LikeBalcerowicz in Poland and Klaus in the Czech Republic some had been economists and technocrats.In Slovakia under Meciar and Bulgaria under socialist rule clientelistic structures played asignificant role, binding together the economic and political spehere. Thus, two things the new noncommunistleaders had in common: the possession of political power and a extensively lack ofpolitical experience and professionalism. In the words of Edmund Wnuk-Lipinski, the new leaderswere the alert of “elite conspiracy” that might threaten the new won political power, that be fromrepresentatives of the old system or people inside their own political camp 25 . The first generationnon-communist leaders were mostly ideocratically united, and personal networks and new-oldcoalitions played a big role. As said, people like Vaclav Klaus and Leszek Balcerowicz were ableon own hand to leave their stamps on the polical agenda and the policy, in other words to act like“political entrepreneurs”.Before 1989 many among the new leaders many had been dissidents and been long away from “reallife”. They had not been elected democratically, but “appointed” due to the extraordinary situation,and because of that they obtained a considerable political support from the West. The room of24 Demszkys and Michniks views are mentioned in Tismaneanu in Antohi and Tismaneanu, 1999:153-154.25 Gerd Meyer (Tübingen), “Towards a Political Sociology of Postcommunism: The political Cultures of East CentralEurope on the Way to Democracy”, in: Andrzej W. Jablonski, Gerd Meyer (eds), 19996:22-25. The subject is alsomentioned by Edmund Wnuk-Lipinski in an interwiew in the weekly Wprost 7 February 1999 (“Dolina Lez”):19-20.34

maneuvre was great due to political capital. However, the common enemy and personal networksplayed a much greater role than common ideologies and political programmes. The politicaldisagreeements and “wars in the top” gave rise to serious legitimacy problems. Evidence showedthat in the new post-communist system a dissident background did not necessarily constitute apolitical ressource. Nevertheless, some dissidents, Havel, Göncz and (in the first stage) Walesa,became popular presidents. In several countries, the presidents gained greater popular support thanprime ministers and party leaders. In case of Hungary and the Czech Republic the presidents aimedto move “above politics”.As the transformations moved to more ordinary politics, the political elites should be moreinclusive, and the negative sume game be replaced by a positive sum game, for to move in thatdirection better education and a neutral and well educated bureaucracy were badly needed. Thepower vacuum just after 1989 gave top bureaucrats and economists and financial experts aconsiderable influence. Most crucial was to enhance the social and political dialogue and weakenthe position of the new-old clientura by installing younger, neutral and better educated people in themost important jobs.The reformminded part of the nomenklatura had good opportunities to “twist oneself” in the newchaotic system. Some moved to other political parties, even right-wing parties, others aimed toconvert political power to economic power. This strategy of survival was especially important incase of privatisations.Political radicalisation and extrication had been an admission card to the new post-communist elite(Marshalek (ed.), 1992:78), but from the mid 1990’s the first elite generation revolutionary had togive place for the second generation liberal minded reformers. In other words, the first generationof “elite break through” was replaced by the second generation post-transitional “elite ofconsolidation” (Frentzel-Zagórgska, i Wasilewski (ed), 2001:11). A more professional politicalclass emerged. Many from the second generation elite were well educated having constitued “lowernoble class” under the late communism. As noted by Ákos Róna-Tas those people had made apolitical career also in case the old state socialist systems had not collapsed 26 . These people wereambitious and in most cases able to adapt themselves to new and fast changing postcommunistsystem.The polical learning proces became more painful than first extpected. Some problems had to dowith difficulties when moving from working “underground” to work “above the surface”, i.e.legally. With political freedom new coalition and networks emerged between the political partiesand the new cultural and economic elites, including technocrats. Under those new circumstances thecivil societies played an unobtrusive role. A great part of the efforts was aimed at promoting thesufficiently high loyalty and cohesion on the elite level and demobilise the civil societies andmaking it responsible and accountable.For simple reasons the the political leaders were not elected democratically. In stead they were“appointed”, i.e. accepted by most people because of the underground work and the widespreadsupport from the West. Some became charismatic leaders, e.g. Lech Walesa and Václav Havel, butafter some time a depersonalisation (Havel) or erosion of charisma (Walesa, Meciar) set in. Thefreedom of maneuvre for the new elites was to a great extent due to the big political capital, the26 Ákos Róna-Tas, “Path Dependence and Capital Theory: Sociology of the Post-Communist Transition”, EastEuropean politics and Societies, Vol. 12, No. 1, Winther 1998:113.35

window of opportunity in spite of some constitutional and institutional limitations, all confirmed atthe first free elections. However, the political capital was more short-term than first expected, andfor many citisins the new political leaders riminded about the former communist, at least as far aspolitical style and communication was concerned. The new power structures were signified by closepersonal contacts, i.e. several interlinked elite networks. Also the lack of political experience amongthe new leaders was striking. At the same time the majority of the electorate preferred disciplinedand professional politicians, even people with a background in the reform-minded part of the oldnomenklatura.Thus the cohesion among former dissidents did not last long. In stead of elite consensus andcohesion power struggles and “wars in the top” emerged, bringing democratisation as well asstability in danger. The split and fragmentation took place at an unfortunate point of time, for underthe prevailing transition anomie and and economic recession political truce and concensus wasbadly needed.Many new parties were lead by a narrow circle of mainly intolerant elites. In other words,censensually united elites soon became dysunified. Overideologization and unconstructive politicalinfighting were aimed at accumulation of political power. Differences of opinion and politicaldebate were not considered as a political ressource, but rather as an attack on the nation and theunity of the party and on the party leader himself. Communication failed not only inside the partiesand the political elites fail, but also between the political elites and the citizens. 27 Lack of contactsand responsiveness to the civil societies appeared to be one main obstacles for further consolidationof democracy.Even countries which were considered as the “forerunners”, e.g. the Czech Republic experiencedseveral setbacks. The new elites remained too long away from the civil societies, lived too closedand mainly focusing on the work in parliament (“overparliamentarization”). The first stage wasmarked by the growing economic and social problems and the too big need of reforms, and thecapture of the state apparatus and the reckoning with the pas took too many ressources. As aconsequence of that the policy and programme development and the quality of the law makingprocess itself was neglected.The weak linkages to the civil societies had as a consequence a striking fall in politicalparticipation. Because of the low institutionalisation the political parties’ contacts to the electorateand party members were modest, mostly mediated through the media. Thus, a party press andjournal for party members was badly needed. The party life remained strongly downgraded in themind of the elites. Neither between the elections nor during the election campaigns the parties werecapable to bring the political messages sufficiently to the voters and the party members. In addition,the party candidates and even the leaders themselves had not been sufficiently subject to thepolitical training and learning 28 .Under those circumstances, to improve the quality of governance, not only qualified leaders, butalso more competent, politically neutral and uncorrupt civil servants was needed. The problems ofgovernance were increasing because of the low wages in the public sector and the delay ofadministrative reforms. The high elite-circulation was followed by a enhanced politisation and close27 See e.g. Jiri Pehe, “Ceske demokraticky system postrada nekretere dimenze”, Hospodarske Noviny 20 January,1998:6.28 See e.g. Martin Potucek, “Ze Sredni Europy na Balkán?”, Ekonom, 1997, Praha:84.36

links between the civil servants and the new political elites. Several times parties in governmentwere accused of politication and clientelism. In Hungary there was even talk about “italianization”of the transformation, due to fragmented party system, corruption, black economy and widespreadclientelism and well organised mafia-like clientura, i.e. “politcal machines” reminding us about theoligarchic system that we find in Russia and other CIS countries. Slovakia under the rule ofVladimir Meciar has been considered as an illustrative case of a clientura based political economicsystem.From 1993-1994, new opportunities emerged for the “modern”, pragmatic and accomodating part ofthe old nomenklatura. Many from that group were recruited from reform-minded socialist parties,which won the elections in countries as Lithuania, Poland and Hungary. Many were technocratswho wanted to finish the modernization project, which they had been able to start but not finish inthe 1980’s. Some had been rather young without strong links to the top echelons of the old statesocialist systems. The political socialization they had obtained in socialist systems in decay,working in the “second echelon” until the opportunities for political career arised. Often therelations between those groups were based on elite settlements going back to the procedures anddiscoursive practices in the years leading to the break through in 1988-89. The main problem for thethe new “post-communist” leaders was the low freedom of maneuvre in the economic and socialpolicy.1.12. Party institutionalizationBy distinguishing between between mass parties and cadre parties and underling the impact of thecircumstances leading to the formation of parties Maurice Duverger (Duverger, 1954) belonges tothose, who emphasized the significance of party institutionalisation and party organisation.Normally it is assumed that changes in the relative strength of the parties are minor in case theparties are in possion of a relatively strong organisation and close bonds exist between the party andits voters. Opposite, in case the parties are weakly institutionalised, they may be taken over fromoutside by relatively small elite groups. Due to institutionalisation the parties are better able tomobilize their corel voters. Close links between parties and voters foster more party loyalty andbring better election results for the parties involved. In some cases the voters even identified theparties by party institutions. In case the institutions are strong, the voters are in possession ofstructures, to which they are able to make references and orient themselvs “ (Mair (ed), 1990-72).From the outset, the historical parties with roots in the old system were in possession of a relativelystrong organisation and closer bonds to the voters. However, we must not foreget that many newnon-communist parties achieved a higher party institutionalisering and better political training ofthe leaders because of a consideral financial support from funds and sister parties in West-Europeand US.The subject has been included in several analysis of political parties. The Polish Ewa Nalawejkobelonges to those who at an early point of time underlined those processes that make an impact onthe party institutionalisation (Nalewejko, 1997). Special emphasis is laid on the internal dynamics.Institutionalisation, she argues, roughly speaking involves those processes which that is reflected inwell known practised and recognisable patterns of behaviour. Furthermore, institutionalizationcontrols behavioural patterns supported by formal and unformal rules and norms. After some timethe patterns of behaviour become more internalised due to increasing bureaucratization androutinisation of behaviour. Institutionalization gives better opportunities to “produce” and reinforceand not only reflect social cleavages. Aleks Szczerbiak (Szczerbiak, 2001) has presented concrete37

analyses of party institutionalization. As he points out, until now rather low attention has been givento the internal party dynamics, as these subjects are relatively difficult to analyse due to the limitedaccess to data.The party institutionalisation is closely connected with those mechanisms that distribute politicalpower between each section of the party, e.g. the parliamentary group and the party apparatus.Institutionalisation can take place internally by introducing more regular decision procedures, orexternally by stronger linkages to the society. In other words, institutionalization can take placewithout closer links to socual interests. Nevertheless, instututional structures playes a still strongerrole when moving to more interest based “ordinary politics”. Does institutionalization become asuccess, more strict rules will be established and internalized for distribution of political power, atthe same time a routinisation and legalisation of political enterprise can be observed.Institutionalisation tend to foster detailled and internalised rules and norms as regards cooperationon leadership level, mechanisms of conflict resolution and control. Political demobilisation andlower political participation will mostly be the result of, not the reason for higherinstitutionalisation.Legitimation is an important factor here, as legitimacy brings to institutions more freedom of action.Institutionalisation inevitably was most difficult to obtain in the first stage of postcommunismcharacterised by high voter volatility, functional and government overload, antipolitical attitudes inpopulation and overparliamentarisation. In other words, institutionalisation took place underunsecurity and widespread transition anomie. An institutional vakuum could be observed, and thepolitical parties were not able to fill out that vacuum.Linkages to social cleavages and the prevailing policy preferences in society are not in themselvessufficient to promote consolidation of democracy. Parties also have to be sufficiently strongorganisatorically to bring the political messages to the electorate. Insufficient organisationalcapacity and bad party finances have been characteristic resulting in internal splits and weak policyandprogramme formulation. Formally the institutions were in place, but the attitudes forstrengthening institutions and make them functional, did not exist. Under those circumstances thepolitical agenda to a great extent was decided by other institutions, such as the presidency, foreigninstitutions and doners, criminal structures and other institutions outside democratic control(“shadow institutionalization”). The democratically elected institutions simply do not fill out thevacuum. Shadow institutionalisation was most striking in the CIS countries and on Balkan, but notlimited to those countries. The worst case scenario is a long-term weakening and marginalisation ofthe political parties. According to most opinion polls the political parties and the parliament are lowestimated. Moreover, low institutionalization had as a result that elections could not be won becauseof close links to the most important sections of society. For that reason better access to andunfortunately also more party control over the media became an obvious strategy for parties inpower.Som esome extent all the CEEC’swere signified by institutional hybridization as some importantchanges and “openings” of the fomer authoriatarian systems took place, however, at the same timemany from the old elites were still in power, and post-communist institutions did not changefundamentally. In Poland well organised institutions such as the church and some trade unions wereable to penetrate the political process and the parties due to strong organisation and close links thecertain parties.38

In Hungary the national bank, the constitutional court and the ombudsman institution placedrestrictions on the law making process (“fragmentated democracy”). In fact we were dealing with atoo early and too sifistcated institutionalisation. In Russia and Ukraine strong financial oligarchs,networking, clientura’s and other structures outside democratic control arrogated to themselves amenacingly strong position, thus weakening the freedom of action of the political parties and thelinks of parties to civil societies. To some extent those non democratic structures originated in theold state socialist system.To obtain a meaning for the populations institutions have to be strong enough to internalise thenorms necessary for the survival and futher consolidation 29 . For that to happen the institutions shallbe capable to adapt themselves to the political environment, shape the optimal congitive frames ofreferences and make complex realities more simple for the citisins. Only thereby the sufficientloyalty and legitimacy can be obtained. The new won democray can only be consolidated, if thedemocratically elected institutions are sufficiently strong to live up to their responsibilities andensure rule of law. In other words, party organisations has to be considered as an importantintervening variable. Neither political ideologies can be rooted in society without the sufficientinstitututionalisation 30 . However, the question has been raised, whether high institutionalizationnecessarily is the most appropriate in young democracies, subject to fast changes, in which mostimportant is ability of adaption and flexibility 31 . Opposite, weak institutionalization may foster antipartyattitudes. In the longer term, however, the parties have to promote more institutionalization,but institutionalisation is often more the result of, not the precondition for consolidation ofdemocracy.The question has been raised, whether in the early stage political institutions constituted anindependent variable and thus became decisive for the formation and the development of politicalparties, or institutions alternately can better be regarded as a mechanic reflection of the division ofpower between the parties and the most important cleavages in the societies concerned (Ware,1996:197). Inside the parties top-down constructions and centralisation of power around a smallgroup of persons has been observed. Under some circumstances the party structure has become“stratarchial”, in which case elements in the party organisation become more authonomous aimingat the highest as possible freedom of action. That has mostly been seen inside party federations suchas AWS in Poland and SDK in Slovakia characterized by dysfunctional decision making structuresand splits.As agued by Paul G. Lewis and Radzislawa Gortat also west-European parties have moved awayfrom maximation of the number of party members and high institutionalization towardspriotitisation of election success, i.e. maximation of votes 32 . In general the political parties morereminds us about Kirchheimers “catch-all, Panebianco’s “electoral- professional” and Katz andMairs “cartel parties” than about Duvergers mass parties (Szczerbiak, 2001:101). In line with thatDavid M. Olson argues that evidence from the first 10 years of transition shows that partyorganisations develops on the basis of small groups of activists and broadly formulated and vague29 See Claus Offe, “designing Institutions for East European Transition”, in Jerzy Hausner, Bob Jessop and KlausNielsen (eds), 1995.30 Underlined e.g. by Giovanni Sartori, e.g. in the article “The Sociology of parties:A critical Review”, in Mair (ed),1990:169.31 That question has been rased e.g. by Radoslaw Markowski in “Party System Institutionalisation and DemocraticConsolidation: On Ideosyncracies in the Polish Case”, in Frenzel-Zagórska and Wasilewski, 2000:65-89.32 Paul G. Lewis and Radzislawa Gortat, Models of Party Development and Questions of State Dependence in Poland”,Party Politics, Vol. 4, 1995:599-608.39

political messages and slogans. Thus, institutionally the parties reminds us about the US type catchallelite or cadre parties.The heavy law making burden moved parties towards post-communist type cartel parties. Withhigher institutionalisation more power was left over to the party apparatus, in this case smallprofessional elite groups. Also political strategies and policy-making were decided top-down.Unlike in the first stage, the parliamentary groups were not longer the most crucial decision makingand agenda-setting institutions. Under changing elite-voter linkages institutionalisation tends to beweak and most non-communist parties aimed to appear as broadly based catch-all parties. Oppositeon the postcommunist Left. Thus after the departure of the “beton communists” the Polish left wingalliance SLD gained a more functional organisation and at the same time a broader voter profile.Like in western countries most parties preferred to appeal directly to the voters via the media andtherby overlook the party structures and the party members 33 . The party congresses seemed toconcentrate the efforts on the internal elections to leading posts and personal matters, and the localparti organisations mostly constituted passive tools for top down decisions. However, the localparty organisations tended to gain a certain authonomy at least in local affairs, especially after theadministrative reforms and direct elections to local assemblies. In several countries, e.g. “localbarons” emerged. However, the central party apparatus were in possition of some means ofintervention, e.g. at appointment of candidates at elections and “screening” of the party members.Normally the organisational structure was at the same time vertical and horizontal with a three orfour levels of party organisation (municpial, district, regional and national). Unfortunately the wishto be a party member was modest, so most political parties did not constitute functional linkagesbetween the political and the civil society arenas.The impact of low party institutionalization to some extent was reduced by polical learning. Mostparties established some special commitees or party annexes dealing with subjects such as youthquestions, women and environment. Such as in most mass partiets. The Polish, Slovak andHungarian political Right recognized that election could not be won primarily by use of symbolicpolitics and fragmentation. At the 1997 and 1998 parliamentary elections party alliances andembrella party constructions (AWS, SDK and FIDESZ-MDF) was set up in order to unite the forcesand minimize waste of votes. Most anticommunist alliances, e.g. AWS and SDK constitutednegative alliances without sufficient unity on policy and programme level and the necessarycohesion and loyalty on elite level.The low number of party members was not caused by the lack of incentives to become a partymember, the political parties themselves were not always intested in maximizing the number ofparty members. In addition, the parties secured for themselves favourable financial ressources dueto increasing subsidies from the state, thereby at least to some extent making fees from partymembers insignificant. Many members may also mean more conflicts inside the parties, which werenot kept together thanks to a common party history and common ideologies and party programmes.In a new TV and IT world party members do not longer play a crucial role as the mean ofcommunication with the voters (Wightman, in White, Batt and Lewis (eds), 1998:163) in electioncampaigns.33 Miroslawa Grabowska, “Political Parties: Social Representative or Agent of Change”, Polish Sociological Review 4(116), 1996:307-322.40

The assumption that a better parti organisation in itself leads to better election results, has not beenconfirmed. Thus, at the 1994 election in Hungary the post-communist Socialist Party (MSZP)gained more than half of seats in parliament in spite of a fall in number of party members to 40.000.At the 1993 election in Poland the left wing alliance SLD did well in spite of the fact that thenumber af members in the peasant party PSL, the junior party in government, was three timeshigher than in SLD. Nevertheless, on the longer term political parties with a small membership basemay face insurmountable difficulties in times of crisis and decay and making it impossible torecover.Several parties have aimed to compensate for low institutionalisation by high level activities inmacroeconomic level, e.g. in the parliament. The high activity in parliament, however, led to moredisagreements on leadership level, reinforced the “elititisation”, and fostered lower party discipline.In the end, lack of discipline and too many “wars in the top”drained the political parties of energy.High institutionalisation inevitably foster more input-articulation. Which means that the politicaldemands are put forward in the decision making stage. In the first stage the input-side was grosslydowngraded, thereby enhancing the development towards total articulation, outputarticulation anddemocratic overload (Heywood, 1998:80). Contributing to that were the almost hermetically closeddecision making procedures 34 . The centralisation of decision making was due to the many problemsconnected with abosrbation of demands from outside, the aggregation of demands and convertion ofdemands to political decisions. Low institutionalization was not only af party phenomenon, butalso signified interest organisations, including the post-communist trade unions. In general theparties were notin the position to “sell themselves” to the electorate because of a bad party press, abad profile in media, too few party members and a low administrative capacity. Under thosecircumstances the political debates became zero sum plays and political life an almost permanentelection campaign. Between parties as well as inside parties the aim to provide more consultativeforms of articulation did not succeed.1.13. The party culture and party lifeThe party culture is often closely connected with collective memories, in the case of the CEEC’sprevious political battles before and under the communist rule. Collective memories may constitutea specific “pantheon” and “demonology”, sometimes a “foundation myth” involving the formationof the party, previous leaders and their contribution to the frther development of the parties andsometimes even former enemies of the party and “cowards”, who betrayed the party and evadedunpleasant situations. That might be the persecutions under the communist rule or as in the case ofthe communist parties the persecutions back in the 1930’s and under the nazi rule. In short,memories about “traitors” and enemies of the party at some time had left the party and scoffed atthe party, may foster more solidarity and cohesion, a more distinct “we versus them” basedfoundation 35 .To the party culture in the broader sense belong party symbols suchs as songs, flags, logo’s andnarratives about the past, in short a party tradition. The party institutionalization itself provide theparty with symbols, a party press and norms and rules for decision making and behaviour andcustoms more broadly speaking. That together constitute the cement that keeps the party together. A34 Bohdan Szklarski (1997):Semi-Public Democracy, articulation of interests and system transformation,Warszawa:Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, PAN ISP:65-6635 Michal Waller, “Party inheritance and party identities”, in Pridham and Lewis (eds) (1996:25.41

well established party culture may reinforce cohesiveness and foster a more lively and democraticparty debate.The party culture shall be seen as a part of the culture in society in general. In case of the CzechRepublic some observers have called attention to the lack of ability to organise, the low solidarity insociety and the widespread opportunism. Furthermore, the low political participation and thetradition of antipolitics had a negative impact on membership of political parties and the internalparty life.The experiences from the dissident period, i.e. the working “underground” created a certain style ofpolitical action. Some new parties, e.g. Solidarity in Poland was in posession of a strong liberationmyth. Opposite, in Poland the liberation myth was less striking in the Czech Republic, in whichcase the break through was very short. Before 1989 the opposition had been weakly organized, butthe anti-political attitudes were strongly represented.after 1989 thereby fostering elite parties withweak linkages to the civil societies. Like the civil societies in the broad sense the internal party lifewas not assigned an important role.In the case of Hungary the party culture was to a minor extent linked to the fight against the oldregime, as the former regime had been rather liberal and national accomodative and the marketeconomy already partly tested. The Czech peoples perception of democracy and democratic valueswas rather individualistic 36 and the programmatic and institutional shortcomings tended to makepolitics almost “issueless” (Thomas, 1999:9). In Poland the political culture has been morecollectivistic than in the Czech Republic, inspired by the tenets from the Catholic church. Thehistoric memories have been a significant ressource, especially at the beginning and in the case ofSolidarity.The feelings of solidarity in the fight against the state socialist regime have been strong, going backto uprising in 1956 and Solidarity in 1980-1981. Being member of Solidarity you became a part of abigger community (“Us” oppsosite “Them”). The many different party rituals reflected a deeplyrooted party culture, e.g. by group participation in services in churches and to carry party emblems.After the state of emergency in December 1981 many carried the “pornik”, the opposition badge.The 3 of May, the anniversary of the 1791 constitution and the anniversaries of the uprisings in1830, 1863 and 1944 (the Warsaw uprising) and the murder on the priest Popiluski have also beenmarked. The colours of the Polish flag was also the colours of the Solidarity banner. Thus patrioticand religious rituals were linked to the memories about the fight against communist suppression andbecame therefore re-activized during election campaigns 37 . Or to conclude, Solidarity was strong onthe symbolic level, but unfortunately too weak and divided organizatorically and institutionally.For the (ex)communist parties the years working underground before and under the second worldwar had a special meaning, also the first years after the World War II when taking political power.In the Stalin years the political activities were focusing on the fight against “contrarevolutionary”activities inside as weel as outside the ruling communist parties. The friendship with the SovietUnion, the showdown between the communist leaders and the class enemies andcontrarevolutionaries fostered an internal solidarity and cohesion, but also a considerable fear andinsecurity. Todays friends might become the enemies of tomorrow. Also special festive days and36 See e.g. interview with Jiri Musil in Gazeta Srodkowoeuropejska, in Gazeta Wyborcza 19 February, 1995:13.37 Wlodzimierz Modzelewski (1989), “Symbolika “Solidarnosci””, in “Studia nad ruchami spolecznymi tom. II”,Uniwersistet Warszawski, Institut Socjologii, Warszawa.42

evolutionary songs became a part of the party culture. After 1989, the fight for recognition and thepressure from non-communist groups and parties fostered internal cohesion and thereby enhancingparty institutionalisation.Opposite, the new non-communist parties had to establish a party culture almost from scratch.Opposite the (post)communist they could do that with “clean hands” and without “dead bodies inthe cargo”. New broad anti-communist civic movements had their roots in the fight against the oldsystem. Unlike historic non-communist parties they could not survive only by references tomemories about the time before the communist take over. Thus party history and the resistanceagainst the state socialist system occupied an important place, but did note ensure the necessaryinternal cohesion and consensus on the elite level.The revived social democratic parties did their best to link themselves to the party traditions goingback to the time before the forced unification with the communist parties after WW II, howeverwithout great success. The historic social democratic parties suffered because they had not playedany leading role in opposition the communists and under foreign occupation. Thus the commonpantheon and collective memories was less developed. Furthermore, internal fragmentation due togeneration gaps and disagreements about the most proper policy line had as the result that at thefirst free eelections the historical social democratic parties were surpassed by the reformedcommunist parties, which more quickly than expected were able to carry through their own internaltransformations.For historic reasons conspiration theories were widespread also inside the parties, therebyhampering the development of a productive and democratic party life. In a way the new partieswere facing battles on two fronts, agains enemies in their own camps (“the wars in the top”) andagainst external enemies (“insider-outsider differentials”). Often the political language has beenaggressive and not only directed against the representatives of the old regimes, but also againstpeople sharing divergent opinions on important policies. By the leaders opponents of the party linehas been called “agents”, “traitors”, “thieves of public properties” and “foreigners” and anti-semiticstatements have not been totally absent. Thus, the political debates and the political languagebetween and inside parties tended to be signified by a “language of aggression” and a “language ofattacks” 38 .II. About parties and party-systems in Poland2.1. Path-dependency and the parties and party-systems in PolandIn a path dependency perspective the Polish transition shall be seen in the context of “thephilosophy” of the round table discussions (“Magdalenka”) 1988-89, and “the Balcerowicz plan I”,for no gevernmental parties have been able to liberate themselves from the legacy of the round tablenegotiations (“Magdalenka”) and the Balcerowicz plan despite proclamations about doing so.Furthermore, the political capital, i.e. the spontaneous popular support, faded out before than first38 Janina Fras, “Political discourse in post-Communist Poland”, in Andrzej W. Jablonski, Gerd Meyer (1996):155-159.43

expected, much due to the many splits and “wars in the top” on the Polish Right. The experiencefrom being activists in opposition to the old system, phrases like “civil society against the state” andthe image of a united society fighting against the authorities and their imperial supporters, i.e. theSoviet Union, were no longer a decisive factor after the fight against the old system had been won.Furthermore, transformation and democratisation in Poland has been influenced by agents andstructures external to the Polish state constituting important structural causes for the collapse of theold system and the formation of the new. The influence of external agencies such as internationalfinancial organisations and human right movements was mediated through domestic social andpolitical institutions 39 . As far as the first years are concerned we mostly had to do with a political”muddling through”. The “party’ist” type of democracy has been less pronounced in Poland than inthe Czech Republic and Hungary because of low party institutionalization, fragile multiparty systemand party fragmentation. Parties in all CEEC’s tended to be cadre configurations, not massorganisations. Under those circumstances non-democratically elected institutions like trade unionsand church and national banks may obtain a stronger political position, thereby limiting theautonomy and the consolidation in the political sphere, and the significance of political parties andparty systems.From the outset the polarisation of Polish politics followed four lines:• between Solidarity and post-communists, i.e. on the structural level• inside the Solidarity movement (“the wars in the top”), i.e. on institutional level• for or against the president (Walesa), i.e. on actor level• for or against the Balcerowicz plan I, i.e. the economic chock-therapy, i.e. on policy-levelThe first type of polarisation was dominant just at the time of the “break through” in 1989 and hasnever been de-freezed. The dominant model underlying Solidarity, that of civil society againsttotalitarianism, undermined Solidaritys own struggle as Solidarity was not able to go beyond theculture and the history going back to 1980-81 and identify new conflicts and alternative futuresunder post-communism. Later in the 1990s, i.e. after the formation of the formation of the SLD-PSL government in 1993, a new political divide, “for and against the president” (Walesa) gainedmomentum. The “cohabitation” between AWS led government and post-communist president hasbeen difficult and never found the optimal form. However, the later president AleksanderKwasniewski did not make the same serious mistakes as Lech Walesa. In short, structural factors,i.e. the legacy of the past, soon obtained a distinct subjective side. To better understand the meaningof Solidarity, we also have to include the internal constitution of the movement itself, i.e.institutional factor.At the 1991 election an extreme multiparty system emerged with no less than 27 different politicalgroups represented in parliament. The non-party system characteristics were striking until the 1993election. Adversary politics, governmental overload, overparliamentarization, party’ism, party splits39 F. Steves, “Poland and the international system: external influences on democratic consolidation”, Communist andPost-Communist Studies 34 (2001):339-352.44

and creation of new parties and party alliances were impressive. In the first years many aimed tomarginalise and even exclude the “post-communist” SdRP and the left party alliance SLD from theparty political scene. At the same time SLD tried its best to be accepted as a relevant standardpolitical party and as soon as possible become a member of the social democratic SocialistInternational (SI).The cleavages inherited from the period before 1989 were reactivated at the presidential election in1995 and during discussions about the new constitution in 1995 and 1996. The early freezing of theold “We” versus “Them” discourse became an insurmountable obstacle for the establishment of ahistorical compromise between the “postcommunist” SLD and the social liberal Democratic Union(UD), the later Freedom Union (UW)). The national-accommodative system in Poland had beenless suppressive than in most other CEECs, nonetheless, on the discoursive level the “We-Them”distinction remained striking. As a result, at the mid 1990s Poland moved closer to polarizedpluralism, in which case many relevant parties are present, i.e. parties with a big coalition potentialor an effective veto power, at the same time the ideological distances between the parties wereconsiderable.From the outset the formation of political parties and party systems followed the same line as in theother Central European countries; first the creation of broad movement parties, e.g. Solidarity, andthe reconstruction and later the creation of “post-communist parties”, e.g. SLD and PSL. The 1989election was followed by party-fragmentation and destructive ”wars in the top” in the Solidaritymovement between pragmatists and fundamentalists, in part caused by the new electoral law, whichhad no threshold requirement for representation in parliament. No consistent strategies for copingwith such conflicts (the conflict “between us”) were developed. Also the alliance betweenintellectuals and workers soon disappeared. To sum up, the first stage of post-communism wasmarked by electoral volatility, party fragmentation and protest voting. Only the agrarian party PSLwas signified by mass party characteristics and several core voters. Furthermore, the boundariesbetween parties and interest groups remained porous, among others due to weak partyinstitutionalisation.Poland has been rich on polarisation of the reactive type, e.g. in the shape of a “for or against theBalcerowicz plans”. The reactive polarisation was repeated in the case of privatisations, the wageregulation, the administrative reform and the health reform etc. The explanation shall be found inthe legacy of “output-articulation” going back to the “communist time”. The “wars in the top” wereharmful for the law making process because the “wars in the top” were followed by “wars of laws”.As noted by Wlodzimierz Weselowski, the re-activization of cleavages expressed a plannedpolarisation of the political life from the Solidarity side 40 . As the economic growth and socialmobility declined, group consciousness increased and even tended to challenge the new postcommunistsystem. The refusal of cooperation with “post-communists” was mainly tactical asreferences to the common enemy and the common Christian values might suppress internaldisagreements and reduce popular dissatisfaction with the chosen economic and social policy. Likein most other CEEC’s a change was observed towards majoritarian democracy based on theprinciple that “the winner takes it all”.The 1993 election brought the ”post-communists” (SLD, PSL) in power mainly due to the lowparticipation at the elections and the decline of confidence in parliaments and polical parties.40 Wlodzimierz Weselowski, ”Aktorzy politycznej i demokracja”, in Grabowski and Mocek, 1997:67.45

Furthermore, the polarisation on elite level do not necessarily reflect the dominant cleavages insociety. After three year with post-communism almost half of the Polish population was dissatisfiedwith the way Polish democracy was conducted and a majority also disagreed with the interferenceof church in politics. In most cases the protests were expressed as demands about replacement ofindividual politicians, not as a rejection of the principle about democracy as the “best possiblesolution”. In other words, the specific support to democracy and democratic institutions was low,but the diffuse support relatively high.At the beginning party members, party leaders and local structures did not play a significant role inthe parties’ communication strategies. The political leaders in general considered the mass media asmore effective means of contacting voters than relying on party members (Szczerbiak, 2001:114).Institutionally there was small evidence that the new Polish parties were attempting to encapsulatetheir supporters by developing networks of ancillary structures directly linked to their partyorganisations, e.g. youth, women's and ecological sections (Szczerbiak, 2001:111). New Polishparties seemed to be strongest at the level of state institutions and also appeared capable of fulfillingtheir role in terms of structuring elections, institutions and recruiting elites (Szczerbiak, 2001:126).The Pasants Party (PSL) has been the only party with a rural base and left wing SdRP the only partywith an organizational network in big as well as small towns. The new parties such as. the FreedomUnion (UW) and AWS seemed to bear a closer resemblance to the catch-all, electoral-professionaland cartel parties than traditional mass parties. The new movement parties in the CEECs had notinherited the initial membership, organisational base and level of party identification that Westernparties had accumulated having operated in a competitive electoral environment in many years(Szczerbiak, 2001:124).As noted above, in the late 1990s numerous ad hoc coalitions and electoral alliances have emerged,e.g. AWS and ”Przymierze Polski”. A change toward a more bipolar and moderate multipartysystem with stronger linkages to social cleavages in society could be observed with the centre-leftparty federation (SLD) and the centre-right party federation (AWS) constituting the two main poles.The situation changed strikingly in 2000-2001, i.e. after the 2000 presidential election and, notleast, after the parliamentary election in September 2001. In the same decade, only three parties ranfor election under the same party label. Party leaders moved to “neighbour parties”, often severaltimes and mostly for personal career. The voters preferences tended to be rather stable, but not theparties. Thus, parties, that obtained about 30 pct of the votes at the 2001 election, simply did notexist in 2000, i.e. inly one to two years back in time. After the 2001 election we were basically backin the situation before the 1993 election, however, with an even stronger populist and xenophobicparty representation in the Sejm. More than 20 parties in opposition to SLD at the 1991 election, didnot exist 10 years later.After the 2001 election the SLD-UP-PSL government did obtain the majority in the Sejm due to themove toward a strict proportional election system more favourable for small parties, thereby makingthe establishment of government with a majority behind in parliament more complicated comparedwith the situation after the previous election. In return, there was support from a “post-communist”president (Aleksander Kwasniewski) and a majority of SLD-UP and PSL in the upper house(Senate). However, in general Polish politics became clearly more unstable due to the strongerrepresensation in parliament of “anti-system” parties like Samoobrona and the Leage of PolishFamilies (LPR)46

The persistent fall in electoral support due to bad governance, growing economic and socialproblems and lack of cohesion on government and party level led to the resignation of LeszekMiller as SLD party chairman and premier, internal division of SLD and establishment of atransitory government led by Marek Belka, which in June 2004 won a vote of confidence by anarrow margin (236 against 215)2.2. Solidarity and AWSOver 20 years, from 1980 to 1989 Solidarity had been the leading in the fight against the old statestocilist system (“we” versus “them”) based “soft” as well as “hard” Catholic ideology. Pragmaticattitudes and self-limitation went hand in hand with active resistance against the communists, butthe “internalisation of limits” from the late 1989 due to the “Gorbachev factor” faded away soonafter the demise of the old system and the crisis and subsequent systemic collapse of the SovietUnion.The phenomenon Solidarity was unique. The dominant model underlying Solidarity in manyrespects resembled the social-democratic. Several mutually competing myths and contra-mythsextisted inside Solidarity movement, all aiming to make more sense and predictability in a chaoticextraordinary situation. In other words, new mutually comteting symbols, utopia and myths forcedout communist ideology 41 . From its working class base to the struggle to realize greater control overenterprises, Solidarity resembled a socialist type movement in all but name. Hardly any other tradeunion in the world has at the same time been in government and constituting a political party and aninterest organisation in the classical sense. Moreover, during its 21 years’ history Solidarity hadalternately a social protest with a built-in self-limitation, a trade union focusing on short-termeconomic interests and a catch-all movement in a society undergoing deep and fast changes. Itstarted in 1979-80 as a trade union, a democratic movement and a force of national independence.Later Solidarity appeared as a political party in the more classical sense, even becoming a party ofgovernment trying to change a socially, economically and culturally backward and socially dividedsociety.In addition, Solidarity has alternately been a trade union, a political mass movement and a reflexivemovement (”pozycji refleksji”) representing a specific “anti-political third way” of thinking. At theoutset Solidarity constituted as a political mass movement, which took trade union shape. Before1989 the defence of working class short-term interests was brought in the background as a defenceof workers interests provided a fundamental change of the state socialist system. In stead,extrication and blackmailing were striking. Concrete plans and strategies for transforming Polishsociety were postponed until the victory over the “post-communists” had been achieved (Morawski1998:74).Before 1989 the fight against the old system constituted a zero-sum play, almost a “win-loosergame”, and the disagreement inside the movement was suppressed in the name of collectivestrength. The principle of ”strength through unity” was reflected in the territorial and regionalstructures. The political declarations were kept in abstract and symbolic value forms, in most casesincluding slogans about social justice, democracy, truth, rule of law, human rights and nationalcommunity.41 Leszek Koczanowicz, ”Cztery mity ”Solidarnosci”, Gazeta Wyborcza 21-22 August 2004:15-16.47

Finally, Solidarity can also be considered as a peaceful resistant movement, pressing for changeswhose goals was primarily delineated by the intelligentsia. As noted by Solidarity’s leader MarianKrzaklewski 42 , Solidarity has mostly been ”against” (the old system) and called upon universalChristian values and traditions going back in Polish history. In the late 1980’s the old trade unionSolidarity speeded up the “chain reaction” ending with the fall of the old system and the round tabletalks, the semi-free election in June 1989, followed by the formation of the first non-communistgovernment, the shock-therapy, the economic recession and the specific hybrid political capitalism.To conclude, we have to differentiate between• The trade union Solidarity (”S”)• The party movement Solidarity (RS AWS)• The party-coalition Solidarity i.e. AWS, later AWSP, at the foundation in 1996 consisting ofmere than 30 different political groups.Thus we find at least four different “Solidarity's”, the first from 1980-81, the second undergroundSolidarity from 1981-1989, a third in 1988-89 with Solidarity taking parti in the round tablenegotiations followed by the wars in the top and the first Solidarity led government, and the fourthSolidarity acting as an opposition party under the post-communist government and after the 1997election as the party in power. A fifth stage followed after the defeat at the 2000 presidential and2001 parliamentary election.From the 1990s Solidarity had to adapt itself to the new, post-crisis situation, with the uncertaintiesof the post-industrial society and “extraordinary politics”. As pointed out by KzrysztofKwasniewicz, Polish experience was a unique and exceptional in Central East Europe, and as such itnot subject to linear-type regularities. The experience of Solidarity can be given a double reading:either in terms of the regularities underlying its inception, development and mechanisms(intelligible to the world), or in terms of the regularities in the history of the struggle forindependence and uprisings (intelligible to the Polish nation) (Kwasniewicz, in Bäcker etc,2001:172). Before 1989 no observable contradiction existed between the two functions mentionedabove.After the demise of the old system Solidarity did not need to “hide itself” behind a trade unionfacade. The political fight (now against the “post-communists”) remained an important part ofSolidarity’s activities, however, the policy and programme side were neglected. A de-freezing andde-radicalisation took place, but only partly and mostly on policy-level. Solidarity leaders soonrecognized that political enemies could be found also inside its own camp. In the first stage thepolitical fight took place inside Solidarity’s civic committees (”Komitety obywateski ”S””). Thusthe struggle became not only directed against the ”post-communists” and the trade union OPZZ, butalso between us.42 Interview with Krzaklewski in Tygodnik Solidarnosc, 36 (572), 1999:448

The first (semi) free election was most of all a referendum for or against the old system, not achoice between different political programmes. “Normal” elections were impossible under the firststage of extraordinary politics and transition anomie. Personalities, not the political orientations andideologies, decided the policy-line and those chosen as ministers in the first non-communist ledgovernment.2.3. The first yearsJust after the round table negotiations the civic committees (”Vomited Obywatelski”, OKP) led byLech Walesa was established, including representatives from cultural and scientific life and severalactive dissidents. Under the umbrella of OKP 15 different sub-commissions were establisheddealing with different important socio-economic questions and policy formulation. In addition,special commissions were set up dealing with subjects such as trade union pluralism, freedom oforganisations and with political and economic reforms. OKP’s organisational structure reminded usof a proto- party consisting of a shadow cabinet and with a broadly formulated political programmethat should make Solidarity ready to take over the government responsibilities when possible andfeasible.The first Solidarity parliamentary group (OKP) consisted of nine different political groups.Formally OKPs organisation worked independently from the trade union Solidarity. Furthermore,OKP was organized around small groups of persons, mostly intellectuals who aimed to create theirown parties.Before the 1989 election Lech Walesa had paved the way for a “systemic shift” proposing agovernment that included the two minor post-communist parties, ZSL and SD. This self-limitingstrategy would not provoke the leaders in Kreml. A humiliation of the communists, it was argued,might strengthen the hardliners inside the ruling party (PZPR). Furthermore, the problem about lackof comptetent administrative leaders recruited from Solidarity was ”solved”, as Solidarity acceptedthat key ministries, such as the Ministries of Home Affairs and Defence, so far were taken over bythe communists.The disagreements inside the Solidarity movement were kept down before the first semi-freeelection in summer 1989 and in the first months of the rule of the Mazowiecki government.Unfortunately, according to a big part of the electorate, many new Solidarity-leaders showed”euphoric arrogance”. Most new non-communist leaders expected that the people almost withoutreservations would accept the radical changes in society – based on the argument that the policy is”good” and ”self-evident”. This implied that the significance of political and economic learning and”socialist mind” was underestimated. Old subjects such as workers’ self-government, workers’councils, co-ownership, strikes and demonstrations, all known in 1980-81, disappeared from thepolitical agenda and was not even discussed after the struggle against the old system had been won.It soon became a hot issue, whether Solidarity’s parliamentary group should support the newSolidarity-led government or alternatively be the driving force in a reinforced and uncompromisingconfrontation with the old system (”przyspieszenie”). During the election campaign in 1990 LechWalesa supported the argument that the whole philosophy behind the round table agreementsshould be abandoned as quickly as possible. He openly supported Solidarity’s privatisation schemebased on “give away schemes” in the shape of shares given to the whole adult population. However,he still had to strike a balance between the different political groups inside the movement as a49

whole, on the one side an authoritarian tendency characterised by the deep rooted, historically basedhate to communism, on the other side a more liberal self-limiting tendency characterised bypolitical tolerance, willingness to enter compromises and political openness and referring to pro-European values.On the basis of Solidarity and the OKPs new political parties were established, but those parties hada short existence. The normal procedure was the creation of a parliamentary group, later thecreation of election committees, at the beginning they were aiming to secure Walesa's victory to theforth-coming presidential election. ”Solidarnosc Pracy” was established on the basis of the OKPfaction”Solidarnos Pracy”. ”Solidarnosc Pracy” took part in the election in 1991 and was alsorepresented in the new parliament. The changes in the election law including a new five percentthreshold for parliamentary representation had as the result that representatives from ”SolidarnoscPracy” and reform-minded communists joined the new party “Union of Work” (UP) in order toregain seats in parliament.NSZZ Solidarnosc (“S”) year 2000Approximately 1,1 mill. Members, including 100,000 pensioners and rentists. Before the congressesthe local organisations sometimes reports on more members in order to obtain more delegates.The organisational structure: 37 regions and 16 branch secretariats, consisting of 90 kraj-sections.The biggest branches in “S” are: mining, energy, metal, health, teachers and railways. The greatestregions inside “S”: Slasko-Dabrowski, Mazowsze, Malopolska, Dolny Slask, Gdansk.The daily work in “S” has been led by a Komission (“Komisja Krajowa”) consisting of more than100 persons. The day-to-day problems are to be solved by a 15-person presidium KK that meetsonce a week. Chairman of “S” until 2002 was Marian Krzaklewski, in 2000 supported by threevice-chairmen, Janus Sniadek, Józef Niemec and Jerzy Langer.“S” has been a member of three international trade union associations, The European Confederationof Trade Unions, The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and The WorldConfederation of Work.The working members of ”S” pay a fee that corresponds to one percent of the wages. 60 pct. of themoney paid remain in the local organisations, 25 go to the regions, 10 pct. to KK and 5 pct. to strikefunds.Polityka no. 49 (2274), 2 December 2000:26.To conclude, at the time of the June 1989 election Solidarity can be considered as a broadly basedmovement party, i.e. a proto-party organized on the basis of the civic committees (OKP) and theSolidarity trade union, constituting a negative alliance without many concrete plans for the future.50

Moreover, Solidarity signified an embryonic political party composed of many different factions,thus only constituting a party in the minimal sense, however, with deep roots in Polish people andPolish history and culture.2.3. The foundation mythBecause of the fight against the old system Solidarity had a specific party culture (”ethos”) and afoundation myth. The fight against the old system had been more than just a question about incomeand work conditions. As noted by Witold Morawski (Morawski, 1998:71), at the same time thepolitical ethos was Christian and social democratic including slogans about freedom and equality insociety. Furthermore, Solidarity was a patriotic movement, underlining the important historical taskto create a free and independent Poland. Among the parties in opposition to the (post)communistsonly a minority, e.g. the right-nationalistic KPN and the catholic ZChN rejected to negotiate withthe communist authorities and remained faithful to fundamentalist catholic values and politicalslogans.Thus before 1989 Solidarity mostly behaved like a movement for moral renewal. The ”we versus”them” discourses, the manichean division in good and evil and the tendency to speak on behalf ofthe whole nation did not offer much space for moderate policy choices. After the democratic “breakthrough” it was difficult for Solidarity to keep the lead. In the eyes of the majority the old ethos andthe foundation myth going back to 1979-1980 did not play any crucial role after the demise of theold system.According to Edmund Inuk Lipinski 43 this can best be explained primarily by structural factors. Oneimportant consequence of the victory over the old system was that Solidarity lost its classicalmobilising role. Solidarity still obtained the greatest support on big state enterprises, i.e. the“dinosaurs” from the time of planned economy. In the first stage of post-communism theorganisation of work was primarily a political, not economic and including a spill over on theattitudes of workers to the political authorities. Extrication and output-articulation were stillconsidered as the best ways of influencing the political system. Engagement in the private sectorwas not only aimed at creating a market economy, but was considered also a political enterprise.Mainly for that reason Solidarity criticised ”theft” of public ownership through the nomenclatureprivatisation. Solidarity also tried to block privatisation, should privatisation of state enterpriseslead to more unemployment.Due to the structural factors the victims of the introduction of market economy were thoseemployed on the big state enterprises, i.e. the old strongholds of the Solidarity trade union. Thus therevolution once again “ate its own children”. Tension erupted between the historic fundament forSolidarity, i.e. the fight against the old system, and those interests, which had to be defended duringthe transition to market economy, first of all employment and better living standard. After thecollapse of the old system Solidarity was split up in several ideological groups and factions. Afterthe break through in 1989 Solidarity was joined by people who had not taken part in the fightagainst the old system in the 1980s. Many from that group rejected the “thick line” policy ofTadeusz Mazowiecki. As noted above, until then the disagreements inside Solidarity had beenartificially repressed in order to keep alive the fight against the old system (Morawski, 1998:178).43 Interview with Wnuk-Lipinski, Zycie Gospodarcze, no.26, 28 June 1992:1 and 4, ”Demokracja nie jest ideologia”.51

The economic recession and the grave social problems fundamentally changed Solidarity’s position.Under the then prevailing extraordinary politics it was difficult to formulate consistent attitudes tothe most pressing policy problems, also programmes for the future and links to important socialinterests in society were needed. The plans for the transition from plan to market were both vagueand inconsistent. Most important was to keep the communists out. As put by Voytek Zubek 44 ,Solidarity indirectly supported the old communist view that the (new) system is basically ”healthy”and ”historically progressive” and ”the leaders (i.e. the Solidarity-leaders) always right”. Solidarityacted as it was enough to “convince” the opponents and push the (post)communists in the defensive.From the outset Solidarity lacked well educated and professional people especially on meso levelwho could fill out the vacuum left after the demise of the old nomenklatura, and thus create a newand better administrative apparatus. Should Solidarity gain governmental power, still the oldnomenklatura would have a considerable political influence because of the administrative control.Also mechanisms for conflict solution in society were missing. Because of weak interest groupsdissatisfaction was in many cases expressed on the streets, i.e. through protest strikes anddemonstrations, sometimes in violent forms. The lack of political visions was politicallydemobilising, so evidence showed that under social and economic recession political programmesand visions for the future were strongly needed. On the way down in the “valley of tears” it wasalmost impossible to mobilise the voters politically and bring them new hope and inspiration for thefuture.2.4. The new social environmentIn the new post-communist social environment tensions erupted between the old abstract goals forthe future and the day-to-day politics. Wnuk-Lipinski rightly argues that the market orientedreforms introduced after 1989 weakened the common interests inside the social groups which untilthen had supported Solidarity, e.g. workers on big state enterprises, farmers and state-employed inthe education and health sector. In the fight to take care of these groups’ demands and interestsSolidarity had to compete with demands from other interest groups and parties, e.g. OPZZ, SLD,PSL, KPN and UP. To accomplish that aim some in Solidarity wanted to speed up transition tomarket economy, almost at every cost. Other groups spoke about a specific ”third way” for Polandbased on catholic religious ethics and moral economics. After the founding elections Solidarityfailed to formulate concrete programmes which could work as alternatives to Rakowski’s economicreforms.From the outset, the question whether Solidarity (”NSZZ Solidarnosc”) may constitute a politicalmovement or a trade union was difficult to answer. Compared with ”first Solidarity” after 1989 thesecond Solidarity became more ”exclusive”, and acted in a more restrictive way refusing tocooperate with most other political parties and movements. The second Solidarity constituted abroad catch-all anti-communist movement. However, after 1989 more attention had to be paid to therealisation of concrete policy goals. Values and interests had to converge, if the attempt to create afunctional party identity and culture should succeed. But on that point Solidarity faced bigproblems.As already said, the greatest support was obtained from conservatively minded workers on thebiggest state enterprises, i.e. the “dinosaurs” from the Stalinist period. Support for Solidarity has44 Voytek Zubek, ”The Phoenix Out of the Ashes: The Rise To Power of Poland’s Post-Communist SdRP”, Communistand Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 28, No. 3, 1995:275-306.52

also been fairly high on bigger private enterprises, while the influence has been low on the newminor private firms, where the attitudes to market economy have been more positive. Furthermore,resistance from employers side against the establishment of trade unions has been the strongest onnew small enterprises. In order to get more support and new members the trade union Solidarityhad to secure for itself a better representation on new private enterprises; if that did not happen, thenumber of trade union members might fall to under one million, i.e. less than half of themembership of the “post-communist” OPZZ. The regional structures also had to be adapted to thenew administrative division consisting of 16 regions (“voivods”), however, for historical reasonsstrong resistance against such regionalisation existed in almost all regions of the country - includingthe biggest one, Mazowsze.Thus we can say that the norms from 1980-81 did not fit with the construction of a new functionaldemocracy and market economy, neither inside the Solidarity movement nor in Poland as a whole.Furthermore, we can conclude that in the first stage the goals for the future were broadly formulatedas abstract symbols and discourses including demands for self-organisation and "”spolecznienie"”of the state, i.e. transition to a morally based economy. Lech Walesa’s demands of”przyspieszenie”, i.e. “speeding up” the fight against the old system, were pushed forward, and later“democratic socialist ideology” was included with demands for a participatory democracy and amoral type political economy.2.5. The first big crisis and the political come-back in 1997The 1993 election was a shock for the Solidarity movement. In the new parliament elected in 1993Solidarity did not parliamentary representation at all. According to Mariusz Muskat (Bäcker etc,2001:167) the fundamental error was the premature assumption of power back in 1989. The Unionfailed to recognize the importance of formulating strategies for coping with the most importantproblems in society. Moreover, the links with the nation were weakening and the old Solidarityethos waning.In 1993 Solidarity went on the barricades and put forward a vote of non-confidence to HannaSuchocka’s Solidarity-led government, later, after the defeat at the 1993 election, Solidarity rejectedthe ”godless” “post-communist” proposal for a new constitution. Acting outside parliamentSolidarity tried to regain the lost influence by organising strikes and demonstrations against the“post-communist” government. Among the more spectacular initiatives we find the collection of500,000 subscriptions supporting Solidarity’s proposal for a new Solidarity inspired constitution 45 .In the commission which prepared the proposal for a new constitution also representatives from thecommon secretariat of the centre-right groups were represented. The 500,000 subscriptions gaveSolidarity the right to be represented in the constitutional commission set up by the parliament, butthe aim to bring its own proposal to a national referendum at the same time as the proposal from thegovernment failed because of resistance against the constitutional proposal from the ruling “postcommunist”parties SLD and PSL.At that time the prospects for creating a common front against the ”post-communists” were notbright. To a great extent the disagreements on the Right concerned the role of trade unions on stateand regional level, e.g. policy related questions such as privatisation and economic reforms. Thetrade union Solidarity’s strong position were mostly due to the organisational vacuum on thepolitical Right. No other political groups could act as a “unifier” (Knuzewski, 1998:157). After the45 ”Obywatelski Project Konstitucji Rzeczpospolitei”.53

election defeat more cooperation and unification was needed. The victory of SLD and PSL at the1993 election had primarily been due to the deep split among right-wing parties at both actor andpolicy level.Due to the formation of the election alliance AWS the trade union Solidarity again becamerepresented in parliament and in the government at the 1997 election. Most leading personalitiesfrom Solidarity were elected to the parliament; some became ministers in the Buzek-government.Marian Krzaklewski was elected as the chairman for AWS’ parliamentary group. Soon after theelection the characteristics of political movement disappeared. In the trade union Solidarity theposition of Krzaklewski was stronger than in the case of Walesa, for opposite Marian Krzaklewski,former chairman Lech Walesa had to fight energetically to keep his post as chairman of Solidarity.Just opposite, under Krzaklewskis rule the elections and decisions took place top-down according towell-prepared plans. Having taken over government responsibilities Solidarity appealed to”responsibility” and “self-limitation” among the trade union members and had to defend itselfagainst critique of the cooperation with the liberal and more secular Freedom Union (UW).The trade union Solidarity year 2000-2001 was different from the broad social movement in the1980’s. The catch-all character was maintained, but at the same time also a move in the direction ofa post-communist cartel party formation has been observed. According to many observers ofSolidarity the congress in autumn 1998 was evident of the petrification and bureaucratisationprocess and concentration of power to a narrow circle of the chairman (Krzaklewski) with too muchfocus on the “technology of power”. The congress in 1998 took place shortly after the victory overthe ”post-communists”, for that reason the enthusiasm among the delegates was great. LechWalesa's critical remarks directed against the new government were not accepted by a majority ofthe delegates.The situation before the next 1999 congress had changed. The fact that the 1999 congress tookplace at the time when the support of AWS and the government was decreasing gave rise to sharpcritique directed against the policy of the AWS-UW government, e.g. the privatisation policy, thetax policy and the postponement of the law about 40 hours working week with Saturday as workfree day. Nonetheless, this time in his speech to the 1999 congress former president Lech Walesakept a low profile. His proposal about letting the first round of the forthcoming presidential electionbecame an American type primary election with himself as one of the candidates was not acceptedby the majority of the delegates. With the negative experience from the presidential election in 1995in mind, the majority expressed the opinion that the political right should be presented by onecommon candidate with the aim to place the common candidate in the strongest possible position inthe struggle against the post-communist candidate, the then acting president AlexanderKwasniewski.2.6. The foundation of AWSThis section will elaborate on the formation, stabilization and demise of the electoral alliance AWS.The initiative to establish the election alliance AWS shall be seen in the context of the defeat at the1993 election and the presidential election in 1995. At the presidential election 1995 the right wingparties were divided in several small parties, thereby contributing to the ”post-communist”Alexander Kwasniewski's victory at the presidential election. At the presidential election in 1995Solidarity supported Lech Walesa. However, other right wing groups took the decision to supportcandidates from their own political groups. Thus PC (”Porozumienie Centrum”) supported Lech54

Kaczynski, ROP Jan Olszewski and ZChN Hanna Gronkiewicz-Walz. In Solidarity a group led byZbigniew Wrzodak broke the party line and supported Jan Olszewski. Thus, evidence showed thatwithout greater unity on the Right the “power monopoly” of the post-communist would not bebroken.22 different parties and organizations subscribed the declaration of the creation of Election ActionSolidarnosc (AWS), at the 1997 election AWS was composed of no less than 38 different partiesand organisations. As noted earlier, AWS can best be considered as a negative alliance, first as anembryonic, later as a proto-political party with trade union Solidarity as the organizational core.During the election campaign the attempt to mobilise the old Solidarity ethos succeeded to a largeextent, and, most important, the waste of votes was substantially reduced. At the 1993 electionthose groups, which later formed AWS, had obtained 29 pct. of the votes, only 4 pct. less than at the1997 election, but at the 1997 election enough for the Right to obtain the majority in parliament. Asthe right wing “The Movement for Building UP Polan” (ROP) lost votes to AWS the real swing tothe Right was rather modest.The liberal Freedom Union (UW), still working outside AWS, constituted the social liberal parts ofthe Solidarity movement The Workers Union (UP), the centre-left orientated part of Solidarity hasbeen supported by reform-minded former communists. Nevertheless at the 1997 election AWSbecame the greatest single party with support from about one third of the electorate, more thanpredicted in the opinion polls before the election which showed almost “dead heat” between left andright.Thus, from the outset AWS can be considered as a broad right wing negative election alliance, withstrong elements of anti-politics, without the old “self-limitation” and with close links to thepresident (Walesa) and with strong support from the army and the church hierarchy.2.7. The organisational structure of AWSFrom the outset AWS’ different political groups and ”legs” watched zealously over their ownidentity. Several acted as veto-groups even obstructing even already adopted decisions and preventpassage of new. The prospects to form one united right wing party with a high institutionalisationand a common party culture were dark. Plans circulating in the spring 1995 to create an”independent trade union party” – only based on the trade union Solidarity - were impossible tocarry through. The experience from the 1993 election, where the trade union Solidarity lost all theseats in parliament, was frightening. The right wing parties were simply ”doomed to cooperate”.As noted above, the trade union Solidarity was AWS’ organisational nucleus and MarianKrzaklewski the political front figure. Tactical considerations, not ideological unity, were mostdecisive. The different political groups on the Right could easily agree on the anti-communistorientation with the aim to remove the ”post-communists” from power. Many in AWS expressedthe opinion that the round table decisions gave the ”post-communists” too much political influence.Also the support to the church was strong, e.g. in questions about abortion and religious instructionin schools. The close links to the church not only separated Solidarity from the ”post-communists”,but also Solidarity from its coalition partners, e.g. liberals and moderates in the Freedom Union”(UW).55

The formation of AWS can be considered as an attempt to institutionalize the trade unionSolidarity’s control over the right spectre on the political scene. Krzaklewski's proposal that allpolitical groups inside AWS should dissolve themselves before the 1997 election and after that be aunified political party, did not obtain the sufficient support. If such plans had been carried out,many of AWS’ later organisational problems may have been avoided. But from the very beginningAWS was divided both politically and institutionally. Several right wing groups had tried to obtainparliamentary representation at the 1993 election, but in vain. These parties did not accept loosingtheir identity. The support for AWS was tactical, not value, policy or programmatically based. Forthat reason disagreement on the actor level became striking. In short, AWS can best be consideredas a negative political alliance, established with the explicit aim to join forces against the ”postcommunists”and limit the waste of votes, however, without a common political platform and acommon vision of the future and without the necessary cohesion and loyalty on the leadership level.As regards party institutionalisation the election alliance AWS appeared as almost copying ”postcommunist”party alliance SLD, at least formally. The Republic of Poland’s Social democraticParty (SdRP) constituted the organisational kernel in SLD, just as the trade union Solidarity insideAWS. At the time of the creation of AWS the trade union Solidarity had 1.5 mill members, a figureno other right wing party or organisation was able to match. All other attempts to build up acommon front on the Right against the “post-communists” and President Aleksander Kwasniewskifailed. As a result of that the trade union Solidarity obtained an almost hegemonic position insideAWS, but mainly because of the lack of sustainable alternatives.At the foundation the three main decision centres were• The trade union Solidarity’s leadership, i.e. the ”Komisja Krajowa” and the ”Rada Krajowa”• AWS’ political leadership, the coordination group• AWS’ representation in parliamentIn the National Council (”Rada Krajowa”) the votes were weighted equally between the trade unionSolidarity and the other groups. The daily work was conducted by a coordinating group (”ZespolKoordynacyjny”). Furthermore, the principle about parity between the trade union and the 30 othergroups was applied. The day to day leadership was composed by the chairman of the NationalCouncil.The chairman of the AWS council was the trade union Solidarity’s leader, i.e. Marian Krzaklewski,thus reflecting the trade union’s strong position. Marian Krzaklewski was both the chairman ofAWS parliamentary group and the trade union Solidarity. The trade union had the decisive word byappointment of candidates for election in 1997. The strong trade union position could only beupheld until the election in 1997. The defeat of Krzaklewski at the presidential election in October2000 changed the situation. The danger of more decentralisation was obvious; the likely outcome ofmore decentralisation was even more factionalisation inside the alliance and slower decisionmakingprocedures.Not only the trade union Solidarity, also the party movement AWS (RS AWS) moved away fromold ideals going back to 1980-1981. Like in the trade union Solidarity a centralisation of power took56

place, yet without the introduction of more efficient decision-making procedures. Almost allimportant decisions were first taken after long and complicated negotiations. Several decisionscould not be implemented due to resistance from one or more political groups inside AWS.After the electoral victory in 1997 several new decision making procedures were introduced. Inspite of that AWS remained a faction divided party. The anarchistic political culture on the rightspectre of the political scene was impossible to change from the one day to the other. Theexperience from the time of Hanna Suchocka’s Solidarity led government showed that the splitwithin the right wing camp may become greater than that existing between government and theopposition.Former president Lech Walesa supported the foundation of AWS but he kept his hands away fromday-to-day politics. Later he established his own party, The Republic of Poland’s Republican Party,and put himself forward as a candidate at the 2000 presidential election. That election the formerpresident would not be able to win, as most opinion polls gave him only few percent of the votes 46 .He was, however, still able to destabilise the political scene in Poland. Because of the low electoralsupport AWS did not dare to take an open confrontation with former president Lech Walesa and hisnew party.On the ideological and programme level AWS covered a wide spectrum, unfortunately too wide.The political declarations were vague and non-committal, almost a-political. Most of them talkedabout ”authenticable” decentralization, de-communisation, construction of a market economy with a“built-in” dialogue between the employers and the employed, a family friendly tax system andvoucher-based privatization-schemes with some syndicalist and social characteristics. Also abstractdiscoursive formulations and declarations and vague national and Christian values were striking.Summarizing, we can say that from the outset AWS was an embodiment of a vision of the futurePolish society, a striving towards more justice, in some cases the wish of revenge. As said, this gaverise to a distinctly negative type political alliance, primarily directed against the ”post-communists”,and composed of several different ideological trends and political groups with the common aim toreturn to the political scene after the humiliating defeat to the post-communists at the election in1993, however without a common programme and with a low degree of cohesion on actor level.2.8. The different “legs”From the beginning AWS contained different trends:• A Christian national (”narodowo-katolickie”)• A conservative liberal (”konserwatywno-liberalne”)• A leg attached to the trade union Solidarity (”zwiazkowe”)In the parliament year 2000 the “trade union orientated leg” was lead by Jacek Rybicki, theconservative-liberal leg by Aleksander Hall, and the Christian-National with ZChN as the strongest46 The end result was even more modest, only 1.1 pct.57

group. RS AWS constituted the Christian-democratic line, ZChN the Christian-national and SKLthe liberal-conservative.From the beginning the organisational structure was heavily debated. Thus Aleksander Hall arguedthat AWS’ organisational structure was at the same time too odd and amorphous, because AWS wascomposed of too different and ”fictitious” organisations, resulting in several less successfulattempts to centralize decision-making. The close cooperation between workers and intellectualsthat in the 1980s gave Solidarity considerable political strength, ceased to exist both inside the tradeunion Solidarity and the electoral alliance (RS AWS). Soon after the democratic break-through,most intellectuals took the decision to join the liberal Democratic Union (UD), the later FreedomUnion (UW).At the beginning it was difficult to estimate, to what extent AWS could be reshaped and after thatconstitute a functional and disciplined party, but that was not likely to happen. Inside so broad amovement like AWS it was important, but difficult to determine the political influence of eachgroup and to single out the main political decision centres, the political core (”nurt”). After thewithdrawal of the right wing KPN from AWS the fundamentalist conservative-traditionalist factionsbecame weaker. Nonetheless, most decisions could only be taken on the central level and afterprotracted negotiations. In most cases decisions were taken according to the slogan ”the higher (inthe organisation), the more politics”, but far from all decisions were implemented at the local leveland inside each political group and “leg”. At least formally, the decision making procedures weretop-down, but this did not mean that AWS constituted a homogeneous and functional partyfederation.The political rhetorique became still more anti-communist. From the outset AWS appeared as anidentity party without consistent political programme and sufficient institutionalisation aiming tocome to power as fast as possible. The mobilization of the old Solidarity-ideals was re-activatedbefore the 1997 election. The election campaigns were moral-ideological and marked by symbolicpolitics. The strong resistance against liberal abortion rules has repeatedly been put forward, alsodemands of more support for families and approval by the parliament of the concordat with thechurch, and ”decommunisation” (”dekomunizacji”) including a purge of collaborators from the oldsystem.AWS concentrated its efforts on three policy levels: the break with the communist past, the creationof a new ”healthy” (”zdrowy”) state separating state from economy and supported by profoundpolitical, social and economic reforms. As said, subjects such as appointments of new people toimportant posts in society, abortion, decommunisation, the concordat with the church, privatisationand a new constitution were all placed high on the political agenda. Thus, the ”we versus them”distinction was still given high priority. Solidarity put forward its own proposal during thediscussions about the new constitution, that once again reflected the classical religious and“syndicalist” values. A revision of the constitution, however, was not a part of the agreement,leading to the formation of the AWS and The Freedom Union (UW) government after the 1997-election.Considering the big social and economic problems in society too little attention was paid to socialissues. Moving to more ordinary politics to dissociate oneself from the (”post-) communists” wasno guarantee of electoral success. Should Solidarity survive in the shape of a functional politicalparty federation, more “down-to-earth” political questions had to be included. The majority of the58

electorate asked for more honesty in politics, a policy-orientated line with clear marking on politicalissues appealing to the “average voter”, e.g. ways of collective bargaining, working conditions,employment service, social assistance, legal support to the members and influence onrestructuration of enterprises. For most Poles the years under state socialism belonged to the past. Inthe long run Solidarity could not survive only on the foundation myth, the memories and feelingsgoing back to the fight against the old system, but old discourses from the 1980’s were never “defreezed”.Nevertheless, the presidential election 2000 showed that the old anti-communist politicalslogans appealed to a small part of the electorate, between 10 and 15 pct. of the voters. The lack ofde-freezing of the old “we-them” discourse on elite level turned out to be most beneficial to theLeft.The attitudes to the communist past divided the right wing camp. Different opinions existed on howseverely former communist and agents of the old system should be treated by the authorities.Mazowiecki’s wish to draw a ”thick line” (between the past and present) was met with the greatestsupport in the Freedom Union (UW). Only few in AWS shared the opinion that “reckoning withthe past” should be structural, not based on the demand of revenge. The “soft line” to the past wasexpressed in the Polish daily ”Gazeta Wyborcza” and not least by its editor-in-chief Adam Michnik.Some problems were policy-related. Thus the health reform was both badly introduced andimplemented. The citizens were not adequately informed about the consequences of the reform, e.g.which parts of health services that would be cut down after introduction of the reform. Furthermore,no answer was given on the crucial question, who would win and who loose because of the reform.As a consequence of that, no suitable analysis of the impact of the reform for different social groupswas conducted. Thus, according to public opinion polls conducted two years after introduction ofthe reform the majority of the Polish people shared the opinion that the health reform taken as awhole constituted a big step backwards.The development of AWS confirms the hypothesis that broadly based negative election alliancesare hardly able to transform themselves into homogeneous and functional party-federations. Only awell- developed party culture and institutionalisation and sufficient loyalty and cohesion on actorlevel can “keep a parties together” and provide them with a sufficient ”immune defence” in case ofpolitical crisis and set-backs. Both factors, institutionalization and elite cohesion, were absent in thecase of AWS. This implied that the risk of new splits on the Right existed ever since the foundationof AWS in 1996.To conclude, AWS expressed a return to the polarised historical division of Polish society,expressing, as put by Michal Wenzel, ”a return with considerable differences” 47 . The values, onwhich Solidarity was established, were not those championed in the late 1990’s. Neither in theshape of a trade union nor a political party Solidarity reflected the consensus seeking and at thesame time combating Solidarity 20 years back. As said, the old distinction, civil society againsttotalitarianism, the lack of ability to go beyond culture and history and and solve problems onprogramme and policy level, undermined the position of Solidarity’ in its struggle to identify thenew post-communist conflicts and alternative futures appealing to the majority of the electorate.2.9. RS AWS47 Michal Wenzel, ”Solidarity and Akcja Wyborcza ”Solidarnosc”, an Attempt at Reviving the Legend”, Communistand Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2, 1998:139-156.59

According to the original plans the federalisation of AWS should ensure that AWS would be able toexpress broad appeals. Therefore, in order to speed up the process AWS’ member organisation, theSocial Movement-Solidarity Electoral Action ( ”Ruch Spoleczny AWS” (”RS AWS”)), wasestablished 8 January 1997. However, RS AWS had a difficult start. The first congress waspostponed due to the lack of agreement on AWS’ future structure. Moreover, from the beginning itwas unclear whether RS AWS should constitute an extension of the trade union Solidarity or just anindependent policy-creating unity inside AWS. Formally RS AWS declared itself ”independent”,but the political practice became different. In the statutes of RS AWS there was talk aboutcooperation with NSZZ Solidarnosc, i.e. the trade union Solidarity. It was no easy task to find theoptimal compromise between so many different opinions about the policy line and institutionalconcepts.Some problems were institutional, to a great extent due to the low number of party members. Notmany from the trade union Solidarity joined RS AWS. At the time of the foundation politicalleaders there was talk about creating a mass party consisting of 200 to 300.000 members. However,those plans soon had to be revised. In 1999 35,000 persons were registrated as members of RSAWS, and among them only one quarter came from the trade union Solidarity. In Selesia the tradeunion Solidarity consisted of 200,000 members, but only 2,000 took the decision to join RS AWS.RS AWS constituted the greatest group in AWS with 138 members of the Sejm and the Senate afterthe election in 1997. The aim was to foster more cohesiveness, mediate between the liberal groups,e.g. SKL and the Christian-national ZChN and maintain the position as the strongest “leg” in AWStaken as a whole.Before long, RS AWS became an elite driven party, a caucus party according to Duverger’sterminology and a cartel party in Kirschheimer’s. The chairman of RS AWS, Jerzy Buzek,recognized some of the problems. According to him better party organization on powiat-level andbetter programmatic work might secure a greater influx of new members from differebt socialstrata. On the voivod-level RS AWS seemed to be better organized, and inside the parliament RSAWS constituted the greatest single group in the AWS group in parliament after the 1997 election.The most important was to find the policy-deciding centre. At the congress held in January 1999 inGdánsk, Jacek Rybicki was elected as the new chairman of RS AWS’ political council. Hisprincipal duty was to foster the necessary compromises between the different factions inside thealliance and work out a common political programme, thereby reaching a common politicaldenominator for the AWS as a whole.Some other political groups took the decision to join RS AWS, including minor ones such as”Porozumienie Ludowe”, ”Ruch dla Rzeczpospolita”, ”Nowa Polska”, ”Liga Krajowa” and”Stowarzyszenie Rodzin Katolitickich”. These groups had no big influence due to lowinstitutionalisation, too few members and modest voter-appeal, but by joining RS AWS the politicalinfluence might be increased. By admitting these groups into the alliance RS AWS may better beable to compete with well-organized groups and ”legs” such as the Christian-national party ZChNand the conservative-liberal group SKL. Several times SKL and ZChN, both members of AWS,criticized the centralisation of decision making both inside the trade union Solidarity as well as RSAWS 48 .48 ”Stronnictwo Konserwatywno-Ludowe”.60

After several delays and postponements the first congress of RS AWS opened in February 1999,two years after the foundation. Before the congress Marian Krzaklewski tried to bring RS AWSunder his control thereby avoiding a power struggle by recommending Prime Minister Jerzy Buzekas the new chairman of RS AWS. At that congress Jerzy Buzek was elected as the new chairman,deputy Prime Minister Janusz Tomaszewski became the new general secretary, his primary task wasto take care of the day-to-day work. A seven-man group (”G-7”) should take care of the mostimportant day-to-day problems. The four political groups (”legs”) and the chairman MarianKrzaklewski were represented in the “G-7 group”. At the 1999 congress Marian Krzaklewski wasre-elected as both chairman of the AWS parliamentary group and the trade union Solidarity. Almostall elections were taken unanimously without many previous discussions. Later Tomaszewski, thegeneral secretary, was forced to leave his post because of suspicion of cooperation with the secretepolice before 1989.Like the trade union Solidarity the party movement (RS AWS) did not remind us about the oldtrade union Solidarity. RS AWS also failed to decouple trade union Solidarity from politicalinfluence. As noted by Jaroslav Kurski 49 , also RS AWS acted like a political entity that aimed toacquire (”zdobyc”) and keep ("”trzymac") power. Therefore both RS AWS and AWS reminds us ofVladimir Meciars The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS). As we shall see in thefollowing section, to a great extent RS AWS’ problems shall be seen as a part of the problemsinside the AWS taken as a whole, including the ongoing debates about how to create a “functionalfederation”2.10. More about the debate about establishing a functional party federationAfter all the aim to establish a functional party federation failed. The first breaches of partydiscipline took place soon after the 1997-election. According to almost all observes, the dissolutionof AWS and the demise of the AWS-UW government, would change the political pathways, whichPoland had followed until then. Not only left parties, also extremist parties such as Leppers”Samoobrona” or Tyminskis ”Party X” might benefit from a new split among the right wing parties,also stronger scepticism against political parties (“anti-politics”) in general might be the end result.Before long Adam Slomka from KPN-OP and Janusz Lopuszanski from ZChN were excluded fromAWS because of lack of party discipline; after that they formed their own right wing politicalassociation ”Poruzomienie Polski” (PP). In a common declaration they criticised the servility ofAWS toward the EU and the lack of a family-friendly tax policy. Furthermore, sharp criticism wasturned against the then finance minister Leszek Balcerowicz, e.g. his proposal about a new taxsystem with a linear, non-progressive tax scale. At the 1997-election the more fundamentalistChristian National groups became well represented in the new parliament. Many were elected to theparliament from the Christian-National groups in spite the fact that they were placed long down onthe candidate lists. The liberal-conservative faction SKL unceasingly talked about the need of morediscipline and better policy-creation. However, the demand for better party discipline, more partycohesiveness and a centristic policy line recommended by SKL were impossible to carry through.The vice-chairman of the AWS’ group in parliament, Jacek Rybicki, expressed himself in the waythat AWS should constitute a federation consisting of different political groupings, and after thattransforming itself to a unitary political party or party-federation. Like the Republican Party in USthere should be place for different ideological “clubs” inside AWS, all supporting the basic catholic49 Jaroslaw Kurski, ”Czterdziestolatki”, Gazeta Wyrborcza, 18.1. 1999:1761

values. According to Rybicki, as soon as possible AWS should be reshaped and constitute afunctional party federation with three different ”legs”, a trade union, a Christian-National and aliberal. However, evidence showed that it was difficult to reach an agreement on the most importantorganisational questions, especially those concerning each political group's representation andinfluence.Coming to power AWS moved towards a cartel party of the clientelist type persistently underliningthe possession of power and the technology of power and with close links to the economic sphere(“political economy”). According to Antoni Dudek like AWS also RS AWS was unable to assumethe leadership role in view of the low level of professionalism, the reluctance to pursue a consistentprogramme and the increased expectations of the electorate. The ongoing professionalisation of thePolish political scene made the future of the RS AWS look rather bleak (Dudek, in Bächer etc,2001:168).The party leader denied that the situation looked so bad, however, it was recognized that RS AWSshould be better able to gain members from different social groups in society, so that the partybehaviour disproved the argument put forward by many observers that AWS acted as a powerorientated party and not much more. Several times Jacek Rybicki 50 underlined that AWS was forcedto transform itself to a functional association, either in the shape of a unitary party, a federation ofparties or a ”energetic” political association (”porozumienie”). Time had run out for AWS as just an“election coalition”. Functional leadership and more flexible decision-making procedures werebadly needed.Also Wojciech Arkuszewski 51 , MP for AWS-SKL, expressed the opinion that AWS had to moveaway from an organisation consisting primarily of veto group factions. In order to survive AWS hadto transform itself and after that constitute a more functional association. In order to acquire asufficient cohesion and obtain the sufficient ”energy” in decision-making AWS was in need of asecretariat that could take the necessary but also unpopular decisions and make sure that they wereimplemented. The present decision-making procedures were far too complex and time-consuming.The need of institutionalisation was reflected in several breaches of the party discipline, e.g. byvoting in parliament. As a result of that it was decided that future “deviationists” would not be renominatedat the forthcoming election. Several times Marian Krzaklewski talked about the need ofmore discipline. Unfortunately, most political groupings considered the party alliance as purelytactical and temporary. Because of that not much was changed regarding the daily political practice.Thus, more than 70 members of AWS supported the vote of no confidence against the then ministerfor state property Emil Walacz, in addition the party discipline was broken several times at votingin parliament on the budget.In fact, the inevitable result of the organisational changes adopted in January 2000 was moreconfusion. The day-to-day leadership (”G-7”) was reconstructed and the presidium (”kolegium”)increased its membership from 19 to 25. These changes weakened the position of SKL and ZChN.In its efforts to streamline the organisation AWS had a “close eye” to its main adversary, the leftwing SLD, in which part the transformation from a party alliance to a unitary political party was runrather successfully.50 Interview with Jaciek Rybicki, ”Samooczszenie”, Wprost, 14 June, 1998:19-20.51 Interview in Rzeczpospolita, 22.9. 1999:A4.62

AWS never acquired the sufficient strong leadership and flexible decision-making procedures. Thepolitical disagreements were too many and the party discipline too low. Under those circumstancesthe decision about transforming the party “alliance” to a unitary ”standard party” or still be a looseinstitutionalised alliance was never taken. Several times Jerzy Buzek was forced to act as amediator, trying to agree with all important groups before important policy decisions. In thegovernment Buzek had to fight with the Freedom Union’s (UW) and the powerful finance ministerand vice Prime Minister Leszek Balcerowicz. In other words, Jerzy Buzek became a “man ofreconciliation”, not like a man of “decision and action”. It was simply impossible to act – and think- long-term and strategic.As a result, the policy aspect was clearly neglected by the AWS leaders. With the fall in votersupport AWS was forced to present solutions of those problems which were “close to people”, e.g.to improve the health reform. A new ”pact for the agriculture” should limit competition frompopulist and extremist parties such as Leppers ”Samoobrona”. The need to improve the quality ofthe laws and the law-making process as a whole was recognised from all sides. Nevertheless MarianKrzaklewski declared that AWS’ crisis was mostly a question about discipline and “the rightattitudes”. The Solidarity elite simply tried to avoid discussions about issues linked to the policyprocess, i.e. the bad quality of decision-making procedures, the bad implementation of the four bigreforms and the many issues concerning the formation of a new ”post-communist nomenklatura”.The plans about foundation of a new unitary standard party were met with strong opposition. Theaim to put ones own interests before the interests of society have been widespread in the rightnationalcamp. As noted above, for many political groups the decision about joining the AWS hadprimarily been a tactical move. In opposition to the AWS-led government SLD was able to profitfrom the ongoing split inside AWS and the low quality of law making. In the official declarationsthe significance of institutionalisation and professionalisation was repeatedly underlined. Severalproposals about more efficient and flexible institutional structures were put forward, but too muchtime was wasted on discussions about the distribution of power and how many ”legs” there shouldbe presented in AWS. The final solution was never found. The strong focus on organizational andinternal personal questions damaged the programme and policy-formulation and as a result of thatalso the electoral support.AWS became still more power-oriented, focusing too much on the “technology of power”. Thepolicy aspects were neglected, as much emphasis was laid on appointments to strategic posts insociety. Thus the concrete day-to-day policy problems were pushed on the sideline. By manyobservers the sharp fall in the voter-support was explained by the advance of a new post-communistnomenklatura.At the same time criticism became stronger also from inside AWS. The then member of parliamentand the former powerful chairman of trade union Solidarity’s Mazowsze section MaciejJankowski 52 emphasized that the fall in electoral support was caused by the fact that the interests ofthe party were put ahead the interests of society and that the political style was in need of selflimitation.The appearance of a new ruling class might signify the end of AWS as such. AlexanderHall 53 expressed the opinion that appointments to important jobs in the public sector should not takeplace according to political criteria, but qualifications (”meritorycznosc”). The best of its ability52 Gazeta Wyborcza 18-19 September, 1999:8.53 Interview in Rzeczpospolita 20.9. 1999:A3.63

AWS should fight against all types of political capitalism. Jan Parys 54 argued that AWS’ problemswere caused by the bad leadership and treachery against its original inspired election-programmesand anti-communist and anti-liberal discourses.Former Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki 55 expressed the opinion that the foundation of AWS assuch was a success. Now the main task was to create a sufficiently strong Christian-Democraticidentity, and a more viable party organization culture. That task has not yet been solved. Anotherbig problem was the lack of ability to take a rational position to political power, to use the politicalpower to modernise the economy with due respect to the feelings and long-term interests of thePolish people. Organisational cohesion and de-freezing of old ideological cleavages should befollowed by pragmatization on policy-level. In order to survive AWS should be transformed to a“standard” political party or at least a functional federation consisting of different political groups,but nothing of that kind happened. Most groups inside AWS acted as veto-groups, not as policycreatingentities such as has been the case in the “post-communist” SLD. More policy-creation wasnecessary, should AWS be transformed to a functional federation and in the longer run a unitarypolitical party.It may seem paradoxical that only the Freedom Union (UW), the most secularized among theChristian parties, were represented in the all-European Association of Christian parties. Thatmonopoly was not accidental. The political profile of UW was consistent with the dominant trend inEuropean politics based on moderate pro-European and pro-market secular attitudes to society andpolitics.Former leader of The Works Union (UP), Rychard Bugaj 56 , expressed himself on the same line asMazowiecki. AWS had won the election in 1998, he said, primarily because many Poles expectedmore honesty in politics and looked after new political ideas and projects. Instead AWS became atactical alliance of power. Contrary to AWS’ own propaganda, no “breakthrough” took place on thepolicy level, we have only been observing a passive follow-up on reform plans introduced byprevious the SLD-PSL-government. In fact, AWS behaved as a movement without leadership andvisions. The result was a drastic fall in voter support, in the end an internal dissolution or demise ofthe alliance.Part of the problems has been due to the fact that AWS was a young party formation with theuncertainty that inevitably follows from that as regards policy-formulation, party organisation andcreation of solidarity and loyalty among the different groups inside the alliance. Liberal utopia andmyths clashed with traditionalist national- and Christian 57 . Disagreements inside the allianceincreased when concrete policy initiatives were put on the agenda. Functional strategies for copingwith concrete policies were badly needed. Many inside the new political elite can best be consideredas “moral-politicians” and politicians believing in a ”historical mission”. The political culture of thepast, the view that politics was mostly a question about “life and dead”, was difficult to eliminate, atleast in the short term. After the take-over of governmental responsibilities more partyinstitutionalisation and professionalisation was needed, nonetheless still personal interests were stillplaced in the front. Unfortunately, only so long as AWS was able promote itself on the symbol-levelfacing a common enemy (e.g. the “(post)communists), a façade of unity could be maintained.54 Tygodnik Solidarnosc 45 (581), 1999:12.55 Interview in Polityka no. 37 (2210), 11.9. 1999:21-22 and in Gazeta Wyborcza 29.-30.2. 2000.56 Rychard Bugaj, ”Co przed Akcja”, Gazeta Wyborcza, 2.2. 2000.57 See e.g. Leszek Koczanowski, “Cztery mity “Solidarnosci”, Gazeta Wybrocza 22-22 August 2004:15-16.64

Since the 1997-election by most obervers AWS has been considered as the “party of power”, i.e.with striking cartel characteristics. ”Catch-all” appeals were still pushed forward, at least formally,but the stamp of a movement party disappeared. Thus, the hypothesis that the new parties movetowards catch-all cartel parties can be confirmed as far as AWS is concerned. At least until the late1990’s AWS occupied several important posts in society, e.g. the Prime Minister and vice-primeminister, one third of the ministers, more than 100 members of Sejm and the Senate, three chairmenon voivod-level and 3-4,000 members of town and regional councils and mayors.According to official declarations AWS should express the collective interests of the majority of thePolish people, acting inclusively and catch. In “practical life”, however, it was governed top-downand bureaucratically. Party cohesion and lyalty on elite level were almost absent inside RS AWSand the party federation AWS as well as between AWS’ different ”legs”. The problems onprogramme- and policy-level reinforced the cartel-profile and the focus on “technology of power”.Political economy (and “moral economy”) remained an integral part of AWS’ political practise.Also managers of big enterprises, on which the Polish state was holding majority stakes werenominated by the AWS; one example was Tomasz Tywonek, a member of the executive board ofTPSA (Telecom), also strong ties between the AWS and managers in PKN Orlen (Polish OilCompany) have been observed.A culture of debate was badly needed on both the macro political level and in the local partyorganizations. Almost no discussions took place before appointments to the most important jobs insociety and important policy-decisions. It was even not discussed what the party should fight for.First on the last day of the 1999 congress- and without much discussion - the first programme wasadopted, mainly consisting of abstract symbolic declarations. Future Poland, it was said, should be”free and modern” consisting of ”strong families”, based on solidarity and market economy andregulated according to Christian moral and ethics. That programme could hardly appeal to theaverage voter, e.g. young people who paid most attention to social wellfare and solution of day-todayproblems. According to ”Pentor”, in late 1999 no less than 74 pct of the Polish peopleexpressed dissatisfaction with the prime minister and 82 pct. with the work of the government as awhole.“The End”In the end, the decline in voter support and lack of institutionalisation had as the logical finale areconstruction of AWS ending with the dissolution of the “old AWS”. In December 2000 andJanuary 2001 the Civic Platform (PO) was created on the initiative of Maciej Plazynski, DonaldTusk and Andrzej Olechowski, later AWS’ liberal “leg”, SKL with a narrow margin took thedecision to leave AWS and in stead cooperate closer with the Platform (OP). Later, in theSeptember 2001 the collapse of AWS came closer as also the trade union Solidarity (NSZZ“Solidarnosc”) defected, from AWS and the Kaczynski brothers created their own platform called“Right and Justice” (“Prawo i Sprawedliwosc”, PiS). PiS was cooperating with Kazimiers M.Ujazdowskis (former member of ZChN) ”Przymierze Prawicy”. From summer 2001, due to thecooperating with the right-traditionalist “Movement for Building Poland” (ROP) AWS transformeditself to “AWSP” (“Prawo”, Right), an electoral alliance with three different “legs”, i.e. the old RSAWS and the two Christian “legs”, PPChD and ZChN. In July 2001 ROP cancelled its cooperationwith AWS, also some groups inside the Christian ZChN took the decision to leave AWSP. Thus thePolish Right was deeply transformed in the months between the 2000 presidential election and the65

2001 parliamentary election, however, without undermining SLD-UP’s then strong electoralposition.At the September 2001 election AWSP lost parliamentary representation, obtaining only 5.5 pct. ofthe votes, less than demanded for party alliances to be represented in the parliament. The Polishright became represented by nationalist The League of Families (LPR) and Kaczynskis “Law andJustice Party” ( PiS). The liberal side of the political spectrum was represented by the CitizenPlatform (OP), in the beginning of 2001 it was joined by the SKL, until then a AWS faction. Boththe Freedom Union (UW) and the AWS (Solidarnosc), two founding parties with a background inthe Solidarity movement and occupying several governmental posts in the years since 1989, did notpass the treshold requirements.The question has been raised, why the party alliance AWS failed while the left wing SLDsucceeded. As argued by Michael D. Kennedy (Kennedy, 1991:180), it may be useful to distinguishbetween different types of party alliances, some have been based on economic interaction, i.e. oncommon socio-economic interests and networks, others based on self-identification, i.e. held up byreference to a common enemy (“We” versus “Them”), i.e. the (post)communists. Focus on thecommon “enemy” inevitably reinforce moral policy positions with a narrow space for politicalnegotiations as negotiations signify moral compromise. Inside the “identity” type of alliancesprogrammatic, policy and institutional questions and the economic goal function are neglected.Most voters seem prefer programme and well institutionalised or- alternatively- extreme populistparties, however, until the 2001 election that type of parties could not be found on the Polish Right.Furthermore, many problems have been policy-related bound to the low quality of publicgovernance. As noted by Lena Kolarska-Bobinska 58 , a precondition for a political success is that thepolicy content is communicated to the people properly. Time had passed when parliamentaryelections can be won only by using vague and broad political appeals based on abstract andsymbolic politics. More important than a cabinet reshuffles and institutional infightings is toimprove the whole philosophy of public governance and the mode of decision-making (”filozofiarzadzenia”) and policy implementation. Unfortunately, from the outset the party alliance AWS (andRS AWS) used too much energy to initiate destructive wars against itself (”walka AWS z AWS”).Summarizing, we can say that AWS’ problems can be found on different levels of analysis, onhistorical level in the shape of a reactivation of old “We-Them” contradictions in society with thebuilt-in tendency towards "over-ideologisation" and symbolic politics, on institutional level in theshape of inefficient party organisation and bad institutionalisation, on actor-behavioural level in theshape of too many “wars in the top” characterised by extremely low party loyalty and cohesion, andfinally on policy-level in the shape of several disagreements as regards the concrete “day to day”policy.2.11. AWS’ other ”legs”In this concluding section AWS’ other ”legs” will be examined in more details. As noted above, thefaction SKL has represented the conservative-liberal line. SKL was founded December 1997, and20 persons from SKL were elected to parliament at the 1997 election. SKL was badly organized atleast compared with the Christian-National factions inside AWS. Prominent politicians from SKL,e.g. Jan Maria Rokita and Aleksander Hall, had been former members of Democratic Union (UD),58 Lena Kolarska-Bobinska, ”Kapitalizm nie taki, jaki mial byc”, Gazeta Wyborcza 6.-7. 11. 1999:2-3.66

the later Freedom Union (UW), but defected from Democratic Union (UD) and joined AWS. At thebeginning SKL had 2,000 members, increasing to almost 20,000 according to official statements.From the outset SKL did not exclude a future break with AWS, should cooperation with the otherpolitical groups in AWS become meaningless. Until the late 2000 the liberal SKL constituted one ofAWS’ three ”legs.The competition between the parties appealing to the new middle class was intensified especiallyafter successful performance of the independent liberal candidate Andrzej Olechewski at thepresidential election in November 2000. At that election Andrzej Olechowski gained more votesthan the trade union Solidarity leader Marian Krzaklewski and chairman of AWS. January 2001,after some hesitation a majority of SKL delegates took the decision to join the Civic Platform (PO).Soon after the 2001 election some parliamentarians from SKL who were elected to parliament onthe Civic Platform’s (PO’s) lists at the 2001 election defected from PO and established a new partycalled SKL-NP (“SKL-Nowei Polski”). Thus the reconstruction of the Polish Right seemed almostendless.From the outset AWS adhered to the Christian values, inevitably bringing the Christian-NationalZach in a key position after the 1997 election. ZChN was established at a rather early time, alreadyin October 1989. At the time of the foundation by most observers ZChN was considered as a post-Solidarity political formation. Like many other political groupings also ZChN based its ideology onSolidarity’s “ethos” with close links to the Catholic Church. The party supported the introduction ofmarket economy, but the market should be regulated by a strong state and supported by a Christianinspired constitution. The party expressed certain reservations about AWS’ liberal policy line,instead underlining the social dimension. Furthermore, a sharp policy line was demanded as regardsadoption of laws limiting the policial influence of former communists and their collaborators(”dekomunizacja”).Like the Centre Alliance (PC) ZChN shared the opinion that the moderate policy line expressed bythe first non-communist Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki was a mistake. According to ZChNthe reconciliatory line towards the “post-communists” should have been cancelled soon after thecollapse of the old system, i.e. after the fall of the Berlin wall and the demise of the Soviet Union.Because of the too “soft” line most Poles, it was said, were not able to distinguish between lack offreedom, i.e. the old system, and real freedom, i.e. the new system, because the old communistnomenklatura maintained a considerable political and economic influence in the post-communistPoland.Some groups in ZChN expressed nationalistic and even xenophobic attitudes. The party has beensceptically inclined towards further European integration supporting the soft eurosceptical almostgaullistic principle about “a Europe of homelands”. From the beginning the coalition potential ofZChN was great, for that reason ZChN decided to join Olszewskis and Suchocka's centre rightgovernments. Having introduced itself as catholic fundamentalistic ZChN became a morepragmatically orientated party. In accordance with that policy line ZChN voted against the nonconfidencemotion put forward by the trade union Solidarity against the Hanna Suchcka's Solidarityled government.Before the 1991 election ZChN took part in the election alliance WAK with ZChN as the coreparty. At the 1993 election many pensioners, private entrepreneurs and workers voted ZChN. Alsothe share among housewives has been relatively high. Opposite only few students, self-employed67

and workers voted ZChN. At the 1993-election, ZChN constituted the strongest party in the newparty-coalition (”Ojczyzna”), but that coalition did not have the sufficient strength to pass thetreshold requirements. At that election ZChN lost many votes from pensioners, self-employed andworkers.Many voters distanced themselves from interference of the Catholic Church in election campaignsand the demands for harsher decomunization (”dekomunizacja”) laws, the uncritical support to thechurch leadership and the resistance against abortion frightened many voters. After the electiondefeat in 1993 ZChN aimed to regain lost representation in parliament as quickly as possible. Thefact that ZChN joined Election Action Solidarity (AWS) from the beginning has to be seen in thatlight.After the 1997-election the ZChN acquired a rather strong representation in parliament and for thatreason a key position inside the AWS faction in parliament (Knuzewski 1998:153). In JerzyBuzek’s government ZChN had to contend itself with two ministerial posts and no posts at all atvoivod level, but as a compensation important administrative posts. In Buzek’s government ZChNconstituted the anti-pole of the Freedom Union (UW) 59 . The Freedom Union (UW) rejected almostall ZChNs policy demands, e.g. about stricter religious celebration of Sundays, extension ofmaternity leave, changes in the tax system benefiting the families, tightening of sentences for saleof narcotic, limits on the number of new supermarkets and a tougher line in negotiations with theEU.Several personal divisions came up. Thus Jerzy Kropiwnicki from ZChN, the leader of the Centrefor Strategic Studies, had several clashes and conflicts with finance minister Leszek Balcerowiczconcerning the economic policy. The Freedom Union (UW) was also behind the dismissal of theeurosceptical Ryszard Czarnecki from ZChN. In some cases division between UW and ZChN evenparalysed the government. Compromises were only entered after lengthy negotiations. That thegovernment did not resign was primarily due to fear of a new election. In case of a new electionZChN in all probability would loose its representation in parliament like at the previous 1993-election.ZChN did, however, not obtain a monopoly of Christian political representation. In the late 1999rumours about a merger of the Centre alliance (PC) and the Christian Democratic Party (PCD) werecirculating. After the inclusion of the Christian association PPChD in the AWS a new Christian”leg” emerged. Also former president Lech Walesa formed his own new Christian party, TheRepublic of Poland’s Christian Party (ChD III RP), however, without gaining the sufficientelectoral support.In spite of the disagreements with Freedom Union (UW) ZChN followed a pragmatic andcompromise-seeking policy-line. For fundamentalist political groups like ”Poruzumienie Polski”(PP) politics was a question about “life and dead” and “truth and lie”. According to ZChN politics isprimarily a question about ”give and take”, i.e. about negotiations, bargaining and compromises.Opposite, PP followed a harder line in particular when dealing with questions related to the periodbefore 1989, i.e. the III Republic. According to PP ”traitors” were not only the ”post-communists”,but all neoliberal and secular currents and not least the liberal Finance Minister LeszekBalcerowicz.59 The conflict between ZChN and UW is analysed in e.g. Filip Gawrys, Martin Dominik Zdort, ”Straznicy isprzedawcy swietego ognia”, Rzeczpospolita 4.2., 2000:A4.68

PP expected that the election alliance AWS sooner or later would break down because of internaldisagreements and after that had happened a new and more authentic and ”real” political right inPoland would come forward on the ruins of the old AWS. That in fact took place at the 2001election in the shape of The Liga of Polish Families (LPR). Furthermore, PP argued fiercely againstPolish membership of the European Union and against joining a federal Europe. In more“pragmatic” ways than PP the ZChN talked about a Europe consisting of nation states underliningPolish interests in the negotiations with the EU. PP defected from AWS, while mainly for tacticalreasons ZChN remained in the alliance, also after the defeat of Marian Krzaklewski at the 2000presidential election. The election in 1993 made clear that parliamentary representation could not beobtained by going alone.Confronting other important policy issues PP followed a uncompromising line and several timesbroke the party discipline at voting in the parliament, while ZChN aimed to maintain the partydiscipline and the influence on the law-making process. While PP primarily focused on the fightagainst the liberal Freedom Union (UW), ZChN “bombarded” the parliament with policy proposalslike a ban on pornography and sale of narcotics, tax release for families with more children and alonger maternity leave. Thus, inside AWS PP acted like a veto-group, ZChN like a policy-creatingfaction. In addition, ZChN behaved like a relevant party and a party able to take governmentalpositions. Nonetheless ZChN clearly generated more polarization in Polish politics by (re)activatingstate versus church cleavages. At the 2001 election ZChN lost representation in Sejm. At thenational congress in March 2002 unemployment, the bad implementation of the four big reforms,internal disagreements and splits was brought forward when explaining the election defeat to thepublic.After the electio defeat the eurosceptical line was sharpened. Thus, the new SLD-UP-PSLgovernment was crititized for “servility” against Bruxelles, the fast growing unemploymentespecially among young people and the liquidation of the pro-family policy of the formergovernment. According to the chairman Jerzy Kropiwnicki the party had left “pessimism” and“frustrations” behind. At the 2002 local elections ZChN was ready to enter party coalitions pointingto the fact that the election law mostly benefited the bigger political parties and also party alliances.The League of Polish Families (LPR) obtained 38 seats in Sejm at the 2001 national election. Thehistory of LPR goes back the years leading up to the “break-through” back in 1989 and has takenpart in the elections under different names. Those who formed the League expected that AWSbefore long would compromise itself polically because of the responsibilities in government and thecooperation with the liberal Freedom Union (UW). Back in 1997 several among the laterparlamentarians from LPR were elected on the lists of AWS due to the fact that those people beforethe election had been supported by Radio Maryja and the director Tadeusz Rydzyk who behind thescene was the “real” leader of the Leage of Polish Families (LPR). From the outset Tadeusz Rydzykplayed a outmost controversiel and contradictory role. Some months before the 2001 election noopinion polls gave the party any chance of representation in the new Sejm at the forthcomingelection. In order to avoid to go to the election in the shape of an election alliance and forced to passthe treshold of 8 pct. of the votes, the new party chose the party name from one of the 10 politicalgroupings that were represented in the coalition and thus formally appeared as a “standard politicalparty”.69

The League has been considered as a desperate attempt to stop the liberal “megatendency” in Polisheconomy that had been manifested in the shape off the Balcerowicz plans and rapprochement withthe EU. Ideologically the party has declared to be neither Left or Right. “We are a catholic andnational formation, for us the point of departure the catholic learning about the organisation of thesociety”, as formulated by the former spokesman for LPR Antoni Macierewicz shortly after the2001 election.On policy level most important for LPR has been the resistance against EU-membership, in thatcapacity has been named the “Polish talibans”, and in general the persistent defence of the“Polish’ness”. LPR denied to be antisemitic, arguing that enemies of the party are all, not only jews,who do not defend “Polish’nes”. The fight against the EU and globalization almost overshadowedthe fight against “postcommunism” and especially the left alliance SLD. The party has been infavour of single mandate system elections, decommunization and ban on sale of Polsh firms toforeigners. It has been extremely difficult to establish a daily leadership of the party and elect arespected leader in the parliament and not least to secure a democratic culture of debate inside theparty. Thus, before long the first splits and veto factions emerged and several resignations ofmembers followed.Most voters have been low eductated, women and people living in the minor towns and rural areas.According to informations from the party itself, in 2001 there were 15.000 party members, and theparty leadership included the inveterate EU opponent Jan Loposzanski. Basically the party can beconsidered as a broadly based conglomerate of different right-nationalist groups lead by politicianswho in several cases have represented three or four different parties on the Right. Party loyalty andparty cohesion have been rare in Polish politics and not least on the right. A rather moderate and“argumentating” line represented by Antoni Macierewicz have faced a more radical (“awanuty”)one represented by Gabriel Janowski. The personal infightings were reinforced due to the fact thatthe League has not, due to the demand from the “shadow leader” Tadeusz Rydzyk, found a strongleader and common spokesman.Most strikting have been the many disagreements between Antoni Macierewicz and ZygmuntWrzodak. Wrzodak was a key person in the LPR parliamentary group. On policy level Wrzodakwas close to Lupaszanski and at the same time defending closer cooperation with the populist partymovement “Selfdefence”(Samoobrona). The fight between Jan Lupaszanski and AntoniMacierewicz goes back to the early 1990’s when both were members of the Christian politicalassociation ZChN. Lupaszanski and Wrzodak were talking against the membership of EU, NATOand the US led war in Iraq while Macierewicz spoke about an “gaullistic” EU consisting of nationalstates. In the end, the group around Macierewicz decided to resign from the League. Thus, the manyconflicts in LPR have been personal and mostly taking place on the policy and especially the actorlevel.As noted above, in September 1999 AWS acquired its ”fourth leg”, called ”Porozumienie PolskichChrzescijanskich Demokratów” (PPChD). This new Christian association was composed of no lessthan three different Christian-National groups, ”Porozumienie Centrum” (PC), ”Ruch dlaRzeczpospolita” (RdR) and ”Porozumienie Polskich Chrzescijanskich Demokratów” (PChD) 60 .PPChD strived to transform AWS into a unified party or at least a functionally working federalstructure. The leader, Antonin Tokarczuk, argued that the trade union Solidarity should play a minorrole when dealing with the day-to-day politics. The best solution, he said, was the creation of a60 The three other ”legs” are ”RS AWS”, ZChN and SKL.70

functional party federation without participation of the trade union Solidarity at all. Also moreconsistent decision-making procedures had to be introduced in order to stop the decrease in votersupport. Furthermore, the four ”big reforms” introduced by AWS had to be adjusted and betterimplemented.The Centre Alliance (PC), also an important political group in AWS, was created in the beginningof the 1990’s with the aim to prevent the election of Wojciech Jaruzelski to president, thussupporting the election of Lech Walesa. Like Lech Walesa PC wanted a speeding up(”przyspieszenie”), i.e. a radical break with the old system. The initiative to form the CentreAlliance (PC) was taken by Jan Kaczynski, at that time a member of Solidarity’s citizens’committees (OKP). PC presented itself as a Christian party, but in spite of that it took a criticalstand in church related questions and therefore cannot be considered as a “fundamentalist” catholicgrouping. However, the cooperation with president Lech Walesa was cancelled soon after theelection in 1991. Later the party took part in Jan Olszewski’s government and distanced itself moreand more from the policy of president Lech Walesa. In the end the government was overturned dueto interference by Walesa.The demands of more fierce purification of former communists and collaboraters(“dekomunikacja”) intensified the polarization of the political scene, at the same time enhancingcooperation among left wing groups. Internal division inside the Solidarity camp was growing.Social liberals supporting Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki faced neo-traditionalists, who weresupported by Lech Walesa and the Kaczynski brothers. The Centre Alliance (PC) spoke in favour ofprivatization of state enterprises and transition to market economy, but at the same time arguing thatformer communists were offered too favourable conditions thereby enabling them convert politicalpower to economic power.PC tried to present itself as a Christian party of the western type with a clear political and powerorientatedprofile. From the outset PC has behaved more like a veto-type political faction and not asa standard party. At the 1993 election PC lost the representation in Sejm due to a high electionthreshold (5 pct.). For that reason also the Center alliance (PC) decided to join the Election ActionSolidarity (AWS).As said, at the 2001 national election several former supports of the AWS took the decision onKaczynskys new parti for Right and Justice (PiS), a “one-leg party”, that mostly raised its profile onthe question about law and order and demands about protection against “degeneration” of thetransformation. Furthermore, PiS has expressed reservations concerning globalization and EUmembership.In the end, after first a no to EU-membership, the party took the decision torecommend a yes at the EU referendum at an extraordinary party congress in January 2003, laterresisting the proposal about a new EU treaty. Furthermore, the party critisized the support from thegovernment to the US led war and later occupation of Iraq. The party appeared as less “unmodern”compared with the League of Polish Families (LPR), most important for LPR was to secure morelaw and orderin society and more discipline. For that reason, PiS obtained much support fromyoung well-educated in the big towns. The party can not clearly be placed on the Right or centre-Left. Opposite right fundamentalist groups PiS has not rejected all what had happened since 1989.Since the 2001 election the electoral support has increased, however, the support has been unstable.The new party formation could benefit from the popularity of the then minister of justice JaroslawKaczynski. As said, the profile of the party has been less catholic-fundamentalist and anti-71

establishment like than LPR’s. The party has in some cases cooperated closely with the liberal CivicPlatform (PO) in parliament and at the municipal and regional elections in 2002, paving the wayfor close cooperation at the next national election. Jaroslaw Kaczynsky was elected as then newmayor of the capital Warsaw, maybe the first step to become the nex president after AleksanderKwasniewski. However, cooperation between Civic Platform (PO) and PiS on local and regionallevel did not make progress.Presidential parties has not been widespread in Central- and Eastern Europe. The Non-party Blockfor support of Reforms (BBWR), established just before the 1993 election as president “LechWalesa’s party”, was an exeption from that rule. From the outset, there was a striking similaritybetween BBWR and Jozef Pilsudski’s Non-party Block for Cooperation with the Government,founded in 1927 with the aim to strengthen Jozef Pilsudski’s authoritarian rule. Walesa’s intentionwas to mobilize the part of the Polish people that normally is politically inactive, especially peopleliving in the rural areas. If that happened many conflicts on the Right, he argued, could be avoided.The ultimate aim was to prevent a ”post-communists” political come-back and thereby secureWalesa's re-election as president. At the presidential election in 1991 PC supported Lech Walesa,later the cooperation was cancelled due to political rivalization and conflicting personal ambitions.When cooperation between PC and the president ceased, BBWR took over. Thus the right wingparties took different opinions both regarding president Lech Walesa’s policy and on questionsabout a new polish constitution. In fact BBWR created more conflicts than cooperation on theRight. Thus, the Democratic Union (UD) criticized the confrontational behaviour of the president(Lech Walesa) and decided to cooperate with SLD, PSL and UP on preparation of the new Polishconstitution.The BBWR was weakened due tothe defeat of Lech Walesa at the 1995 presidential election andafter that ceased to constitute any integrative force on the Right. From the beginning BBWRsinfluence in parliament was limited and other parties’ attitudes to BBWR sceptical. Most partiessimply saw the BBWR as a “presidential party”. After some time BBWR became almost invisiblein parliament.Like other parties on the Right also BBWR spoke about transition to market economy with manyreferences to Christian values. Its vision of the future Polish state was distinctly solidariccorporatistic(Knuzewski 1998:142). Democratic values were accepted in principle, but at the sametime the need of a stronger executive power and more law and order was underlined. More liberalabortion laws were refused and more cooperation with the church underlined, also proposals aboutmore financial support for loss-making enterprises and agriculture was put forward. Opposite manyother right-wing parties, BBWR passed the treshold requirement at the 1993 election won by the”post-communists”.At the beginning BBWR received some support among the new entrepreneurs and the anticommunistand anti-Russian part of the Polish population, but few votes from intellectuals. Mostvoter support was obtained in the Gdansk region and in the southern regions of the country.Recognizing that the chances of re-election to parliament were non-existing when “going alone”,also BBWR decided to join AWS. Before that decision was taken BBWR had taken part in otherassociations and discussion fora, e.g. ”Obóz Patriotyczny” and ”Konwent sw. Katarzny”, aiming togenerate cooperation among the too many mutually competing political groupings on the right.72

In the late 1990’s it was almost fashionable to use the party label ”Christian”. However, in the midwaryears Christian parties had not played an important role in Polish politics and undercommunism such parties were forced to work underground. After 1989 Christian parties werereborn and re-activated. Like the notion ”social democratic”, the name ”Christian” signalled pro-European and pro-capitalistic attitudes. As we have seen, Christian parties covered a broad politicalspectre, representing extremist fundamentalist catholic party types and institutions like RadioMaryja and KPB-OP, at the 2001 election the League of Polish Families (LPR) as well as centreorientedpro-market political formations like the Freedom Union (UW) and the Centre Alliance(PC).2.12. Peasant Parties: PSL and “Selfdefence” (Samoobrona)Since 1989 class based parties with a broad appeal to rural areas have existed in almost all Centraland East European countries. In the Central European countries the most important have been theIndependent Smallholders Party (FKGP) in Hungary, the Polish peasants party PSL and the populistSammoobrona (“Self-Defence”), in the Czech Republic the centrist Christian, social-liberal andmoderate rural party KDU-CSL. Peasant parties have entered different party coalitions in Slovakia,never gaining seats in parliament when going alone. In the following sections we shall focus on thePolish PSL and Samoobrona (“Selfdefence”) and in a final section the Czech Christian DemocraticKDU-CSL.The Polish Peasants Party (PSL) emerged in November 1989 as a successor party of the UnitedPeoples Party (ZSL) that had been represented in parliament before 1989 and cooperated with thethen ruling communist party (PZPR). Support for Polish agriculture and the rural areas has beencrucial political question for the party. The basis for a rural class party is great in Poland as aboutone third of the Polish population is closelylinked with agriculture. The parties had to act as a ruralcatch-all party. However, soon different factions emerged. One faction supported Christian values,reminding us about in Christian-National parties like PL and ZChN, another faction was moresecular and pragmatic basing itself on the traditions from before 1989, first of all the then procommunistZSL.Polish agriculture can be divided in different social groups. The first group includes the bigger andmore efficient agricultural units that produce enough to sell their products to the market and bringthe farmer a yearly income comparable to other social groups. Another group only produce for ownconsume, and a third group consist of small inefficient units, on which the owners will be forced tofind new jobs because of merger of small units. If we take in consideration that about 100.000 jobsin mining had to be closed down and new great influx of young people to the labour market about2.5 to 3 mio. new jobs have to be created outside agriculture just to maintain the same level ofunemployment. To day about 60 percent of Poland’s poor live in the rural areas.Thus to cover all farmers in Poland by one party was no easy task. As a party the Peasants Party(PSL) reflected the structure of Polish agriculture. Factions representing the bigger units have beenconfronted those representing the small units. Nonetheless in some years the party succeeded tokeep a united facade, at least publicly. The disagreements, however, were growing before the 1997election. The minister of agriculture in the SLD-PSL government Roman Jagielski behaved like aspokesman of the greater agricultural units and expressed more pro-EU attitudes. His opponent wasthe then party leader Waldemar Pawlak who expressed the more traditionalist agrarian attitudes anddefended the smaller agricultural units. According to Jagielski most important was to create new73

jobs in rural areas, especially small enterprises in the service sector and trades in stead of givingmore state support to small inefficient farmers.The peasant parties were strongly represented after the re-emergence of the Polish state after WorldWar I. At the first election in 1919 the three peasant parties, PSL, “Wyswolenie” PSL “Piast” andPSL “Lewica” together gained 130, at the 1922 election 115 seats in parliament. After thecommunist take-over after WW II the United Peasants Party (ZSL) was established. That partyexisted in the whole communist period, cooperating with the ruling communist party (PZPR). Soonafter the demise of real socialism, in May 1990, post-communist PSL “Odrodzenie” took thedecision to merge with PSL “Wilanowski”and form a new common party (PSL). PSL“Wilanowski’s” roots go back to Mikolajczyks peasant party, that after WW III dared to defy thecommunists and as a consequence of that was persecuted and in the end forbidden by theauthorities.Roman Bartoszcz, one of the founders of green Solidarity in 1980, was elected as leader of the newunited peasant party (PSL). At the outset the party was well institutionalised with a cemented partyorganisation and, according to the party’s own calculations about 200.000 party members. After thedefeat at the 1990 presidential election Roman Bartoszcz resigned as the leader of the party and wasreplaced by the younger Waldemar Pawlak. At the 1991 election PSL won 8.67 percent of thevotes, at the 1993 election the share of the votes increased to 15.5 pct. After the 1993 election PSLtook the decision to join the SLD led majority government. The majority was won because of thenew election law that raised the treshold requirement and was beneficial especially for big parties.At that election the Polish Right lost many seats in parliament due to the lack of election alliances.After the defeat at the 1997 Waldemar Pawlak resigned as the chairman of the party, but thedisagreements between the different factions inside the party were not eliminated because of thechange in party leadership.Seen from the SLD the peasants party (PSL) better than other possible coalition partners may securea stable relationship to the church and the president (Walesa). In spite of the post-communist pastLech Walesa was less dismissive of cooperating with PSL than SLD. In addition, the inclusion ofPSL in the government was considered a condition for obtaining the sufficient support from thePolish farmers. Opinion polls from CBOS placed Waldemar Pawlak and PSL as a whole left to thepolical middle 61 . PSL establish strong clientelist networks in the rural areas and on voivod-level. Inthe first years the PSL members of parliament several times behaved differently at voting in theparliament, nonetheless until the 1993 PSL appeared like an opposition party to all the thenSolidarity led governments.The Peasants Party (PSL) has been a spokesman for going a “third way”. It supported the transitionto market economy, at least in words, but was at the same time underling the neccessity of morestate intervention. More state intervention may foster economic growth, secure more investmentsand structural reforms in education, pension systems, improve living conditions in rural areas andstrengthen local self-government. Unfortunately, old ideals and values, unelastic party programmes,irrational behaviour, veto party factions and internal disagreements about the policy line have beenbeen striking.PSL persistently acted as a lobbyist for agricultural interests and has for that reason taken a criticalposition to the EU. The old municipal and regional structure that gave the party a considerable61 Spotkania 28 January-3 February 1993:13 in a special section about the Polish Left (”Lewa w marszu”.74

influence on the local level, should be maintained according to the party. The strongholds of theparty has been the small towns and thinly populated areas. For those reasons PSL could not assistthe government as regards the plans about reducing the number of regions (voivods) and introduce anew administrative middle level (the powiaty’s).The attitudes among the electorate living in rural areas have been interventionist and egalitarian.The farmers have typically been conservative minded and only rarely satisfied with the policyconducted by the governments, be they right or left. Many farmers felt that their jobs have lostprestige after 1989 and therefore expressed some “nostalgia” for the period before 1989, especiallythe “good 1970s” under Edward Gierek (“the retrospective utopia”).At the 1993 election PSL obtained some support from those farmers who before 1989 had beenemployed on the state own farms (PRG). The electoral success of PSL took place at the expense ofthose rural parties that had their origin in the Solidarity movement. Thus at the 1993 election PSLgained about 40 percent of the votes among farmers, however, among less educated only 17 percent(Knuzewski, 1998:151). On the other hand, at the1997-election many former PSL voters voted SLDand, as regards right-traditionalist minded people, Election Alliance Solidarity (AWS). At the 1997election AWS’ share of the farmers vote was 33 percent or almost the same share that voted SLDand first on the third place we find PSL.Thus the 1997 election- and later the 2001 election- punctured the myth that the farmers and theelectorate in rural areas constitute a well disciplined and stable voter group at every nationalelection bringing PSL in a key position. The 26 seats in the parliament elected in 1997 were not initself impressing, but enough to keep the party over the water surface. Most important was that theparty was a well organised unity and that representation in the municipial and regional councils keptintact. In other words, the PSL had gained an ”immune defence” in case of a temporary politicalsetback.The power struggle between Jagielski and Pawlak intensified after the 1997 election, but theresignation of Pawlak as the party chairman did not usher a policy-change. Jagielski took thedecision to form his own peasant party, but without any success. Working in opposition PSL triedto regain the voters the party lost to AWS at the 1997 election based on the calculation that it waseasier to recapture dissatisfied AWS votes than gain votes from left wing parties. At that time alsoSLD was in opposition to the government and like AWS not responsible for unpopular laws andpolicy initiatives.After the 1997 election PSL accused AWS of giving in to the liberal and pro-EU Freedom Union(UW). Especially the minister of finance Leszek Balcerowic was accused of conducting an asocialneo-liberal policy damaging for the rural areas and the employment in general 62 . According to PSLthe AWS-UW government’s policy onesidedly focused on combating inflation 63 . For that reasonseveral times PSL put forward votes of non-confidence to the minister of finance in the parliament.In short, to a great extent the policy demands of PSL have focused on limitations on sale of realproperty to foreigners, rejection of the new municipal and regional reform and more state support tothe family holdings, also in case of negotiations about a revised constitution. According to the party,the alternative to the AWS-UW economic policy was an active export orientated investment and62 See e.g. Jaroslaw Kalinowski, ”Proponujeme tzecia droge”, Rzeczpospolita, 16 January 1999.63 Interview with Kalinowski in Gazeta Wyborcza 11 February 1999:14.75

industrial policy. According to the party the import of investment goods took up too little space.Foreign investments were to a too large extent been concentrated on retail trade and simpleproduction. The party also argued in favour of a more efficiently working system of tax and customadministration and collection. According to calculations of the party itself the Polish state wasdeprived more than 3 bio. zl. in tax and custom revenues, more than the state support to polishagriculture pr. year. Due to these factors Polen was in a weakened position in the internationalcompetition. In case of Polish membership of the EU Poland might one-sidedly become a marketfor sale of products produced in the present EU countries and other more competitive marketeconomies.Thus, aiming to protect Polish places of work the PSL maintained a rather EU-sceptical line,especially as regards import of EU-subsidized food products. In addition, the party has aimed atincreasing the export to the traditional markets in the East, especially to Russia in return for moreRussian oil and gas. Furthermore, the party has put forwards fincially expensive proposals, e.g.writing off the debt for students after five years employment. In general economic populism hasbeen striking, but not xenophobic and anti-semitic. Finally, among the PSL voters the majorityconsists of men. Opposite, the League of Polish Families (LPR) mostly appealed to the femalevoters.The defeat at the 1997 election led to “soul-searching” inside the party. As said, the election wasfollowed by an internal split. However, at the 1998 municipal and regional elections PSL obtainedmore political strength due to the electoral cooperation with the Labour Union (UP) in the shape ofthe election alliance “Prymierze Spoleczne”. In the case of “Przymierze Polski” were not dealingwith a permanent alliance such as was at least the intention in the case of SLD and AWS. As notedearlier, the alliance between PSL and UP can be regarded as tactical, aiming at gaining the bestpossible representation in local and regional councils and the greatest possible political influence.Inside the alliance PSL gained the strongest position due to greater party institutionalisation andmore political experience amon its leaders.The decision about joining the election alliance with UP (and KPEiR, a pensioners party) was takenalmost unanimously, however, without support from the former party chairman Waldemar Pawlak.According to Pawlak, by joining the alliance the Peasants Party (PSL) may loose its identity.According to the majority of the party leadership that argument was based on the wrong assumptionthat PSL still was a party in government and strong enough to do everything it wanted. Pawlakbecame rather polically isolated inside the party, both inside the party leadership and theparliamentary group. Some observers expressed the opinion that Pawlaks uncompromising lineconcerning coalition building shall be seen as a wish about a fast political come-back. However, therelatively good election result for the coalition at the 1998 local and regional election weakenedPawlak’s position.The decision to cooperate with the Labour Union (UP) was strategical 64 . The alternative tocooperate with the Labour Union (UP) and KPEiR was the establishment of a “national front”(“blok narodowy”) in cooperation with ROP, KPN and the people around “Radio Maryja”. Thatsolution was not attractive. Seen from PSL the Labour Union (UP) was in possession of a strongerorganisation at elections and also a more reliable partner than the parties and groups on the Rightsuch as ROP, KPN and “Radio Maryja”. Opposite the neo-traditionalistic parties UP and KPEiRappealed to broad voter groups, mostly workers and pensioners. For the same reasons, after the64 Ewa K. Czaczkowska, ”Teraz z lewica”, Rzeczpospolita 8 July, 1998:5.76

local and regional elections in autumn 1998 UP became the favourite partner for the SLD. Mostimportant was to balance the political strength of AWS-UW because of the possession ofgovernmental power by those parties. PSL’s cooperation with AWS has been modest on all levels,in parliament, in regions as well as on local level. The Freedom Union (UW) and minister offinance Leszek Balcerowicz was considered as the main enemy of the party. Therefore AWS’cooperation with the liberal Freedom Union (UW) was heavily critisised. At the 1997 election AWShad “stolen” many votes from PSL, now the main task was to bring those votes back to the party.In the end PSL overcame the crisis. Once more, the slogan that “institutions do matter” wasconfirmed. Just after the election defeat in 1997 there was also talk about focusing more on theelectorate living in the bigger towns. The risk was a loss of votes in rural areas. That argumentspoke in favour of keeping the old policy line, maybe in close cooperation with ideologicallysimilar parties. After the 1997 election defeat also the party organisation was tightened. Thus, seenover the whole period since 1989 PSL has been well represented both regionally and locally, hasobtained a solid membership basis with a fairly good schooling of deputies and candidates. Theparty leadership succeeded in professional ways to conduct election campaigns, e.g. timing thepress conferences and preparing the election strategies 65 . Unlike under the Pawlak leadership PSLwas no longer governed by a small group of experts and advisers. In the late 1990’s the partychairman was assisted by more than 20 political and economic experts working much moreprofessionally than before.However, after the election defeat in 2001 PSL lost several of its party members. At the same timethe split between “pragmatists” and “nationally orientated” people in the party and increasingcompetition from Samoobrona to weakened the cohesion on both the leadership and parliamentarylevel.As noted above, after the 2001 election the party took the decision to join the SLD led government,but first after a nine hours long meeting and heated debate, where about one fourth of the delegatesvoted against taking governmental responsibilities. The majority referred to the too manyconcessions on important policy issues, e.g. PSL’s demands about low VAT on food products andproduction machinery, lower influence to the monetary political council of the National Bank,financial support to debt hidden Polish banks (PKO, BP, BGK, BGZ) and the lower interest rates ingeneral. Furthermore, according to the critique from PSL, more income to the state fromprivatizations should be used as support for job creation and not to cover the deficit on the statebudget. In March 2003 the PSL had to to leave the government due to low voting discipline inparliament. Being in opposition, a new split emerged inside the party concerning the attitude toLeszek Millar’s minority government and entering alternative anti-governmental coalitions, i.e.cooperation with the Civic Platform (PO), PiS, maybe even “Selfdefence” (Samoobrona). Somemembers of the PSL parliamentary group also called for the resignation of the then rather pro-SLDparty chairman (Kalinowski), rejecting the “flirt with liberalsm”. The plan came to reality at the2004 party congress, at wchich Janusz Wojciechowski was elected to the new party Chairman, thusmarking a more “activist” and “populist” policy line, according to his opponents signifying the“death of the party”. .As noted above, after the 2002 election PSL was to a great extent threatened by Andrzej Lepperspopulist political association Samooobrona (“Selfdefence”), etablished in 1993. In the years beforeSamoobrona had organized several road blockades and violent protest demonstrations aimed at65 Krzystyna Naszkowska, “Ludowe muskuly”, Polityka no. 12, 20. marts, 1999:27-28.77

pressurizing the government to give more financial support for farmers. In the beginning of the1990’s Lepper himself had taken loans in banks and thereby bringing him in an almost insolubledebt situation. Thus Samoobrona mostly appealed to the medium size farms, the new classconsisting of rather well-off farmers who had run in debt in order to expand the farm or lease moreland and these well-off farmers were well represented in the party leadership and in the deputygroup in parliament 66 . Thus, most leaders of Sammobrona belonged to the group of rather well-offdebat-ridden farmers. Before 1989 many in the leadership of Samoobrona had even been membersof PZPR. Institutionally Samoobrona has been distinctly centralist with almost dictatorial power tochairman Andrej Lepper. The top-down deciscion making procedures evoked protest among localelected Samoobrona people and also inside the parliament group. Several defections from the partytook place in 2003.In the beginning of 2002 Lepper withdraw from the post as chairman, but only formally. Before the2001 election Andrzej Lepper had already run for the presidential election two times, at the 1995election only gaining1.3 pct of the votes, increasing the figure to 3 pct. in 2000. At the 1997election the share of the votes had been only 0.1 pct. At the elections in the 1990’s violent roaddemonstrations organized by Samoobrona became a barrier for election success. Opposite, at the2001 election those actions became an advantage for the party due to increasing social frustrationsin the Polish population.Opposite PSL Samoobrona obtained many votes in the bigger towns, in the last stage of the electioncampaign even gaining votes from former SLD supporters. The blackmail potential was great,opposite the coalition potential extremely low. As regards the EU membership Samoobrona hasfollowed an euro sceptic, but not totally negative policy line, also arguing for closer commercialrelations to Russia, including financial support for export of foodstuffs to Russia. The leadership ofSamoobrona included Tadeusz Mazanek, the leader of the association “No to the European Union”.Unlike Samoobrona, PSL followed a more euro-realistic line, and in the SLD-PSL governmentestablished after the 2001 election, the party persistently opposed concessions on sale of farm landto foreigners. Furthermore, the party has demanded minor independence for the National Bank, thatwas accused of a conducting a too restrictive monetary policy. The party put forward proposalsexpensive for the state budget, e.g. that debt of students at universities should be reduced andforgiven after five years in job in Poland. Economic populism has been striking, but not xenophobiaand anti-Semitism such as in the case of the extreme Right. Among those voting PSL a majorityconsists of men, opposite the voters of the Liga of Polish Families (LPR) that most appeals to femalvoters.Where Samoobrona literally worked extra-parliamentary, i.e. on the roads, PSL to a greater extent,and much due to higher party institutionalization, worked “through words”, being willing to enterpolitical compromises, working on regional and municipal levels and by putting forward proposalsin parliament. After the local and regional elections autumn 2002 Samooobrona in some casesdecided to cooperate with SLD. Later that cooperation was cancelled due to decisions taken in theSamoobrona leadership and in spite of protests from several Samoobrona local activists. In summer2003 17 Samoobrona deputies left the party. At least until the 2001 election PSL could benefit fromits greater organisational strength. To a great extent the differences on policy level between PSLand Samoobrona reminds us about the differences between the two right-traditionalist parties ZChN66 Barbara Fedyszak-Radziejowska, “Wies polska po wyborach:radikalizacja wyborów”, in: “Przyslosc polskiej scenypolitycznej po wyborach 2001”, Institut Spraw Publicznych, Warszawa 2002:62.:78

and PP. Those supporting Samoobrona neither trusted PSL or SLD and had to a great extent been“sofa-voters” at previous elections.Thus, support for PSL was rather low in the smaller towns. To some extent Samoobrona succeededin activating former “sofa-voters”. Opposite PSL Samoobrona at the 2001 election managed topenetrate the bigger towns, getting the votes from many unemployed and socially marginalized. Assaid, due to the participation of Samoobrona in the election the differences in voting behaviourbetween town and land became smaller. The support for Samoobrona has to be regarded as anactivization of the town-land contradictions that until the 2001 election had not been decisive. Onpolicy level Lepper talked about a “third way” for Poland that should be neither socialist norcapitalist.Seen over the period as a whole PSL has belonged to the rather successful class parties in theCEEC`s. That about one third of the Polish population lives in rural areas has clearly been anadvantage. The challenges posed by Polish agriculture has almost been of the same reach asovercoming the legacy of totalitarianism and real socialism. Before 1989 the farmers had been infront fighting against the old regime, after 1989 they became an obstacle for the modernization ofthe land districts and the reorganization of Polish society and thereby also a serious problem for theadoption to the EU.The cooperation in government with SLD-UP inevitably sharpened the conflicts betweenpragmatistis and fundamentalists. The results of taking part in government has not been appreciatedby the majority of the Polish farmers, a few months after the 2001 election about 75 pct. of thefarmers expressed the opinion that the new SLD-PSL government had not kept what it promised. Inother words it may be meaningful to distinguish between the “PSL” in government and the “activist(“roszczeniowe”)” PSL working outside the parliament and the official structures. The strongercompetition from Andrzej Leppers populist party movement Sammoobrona made an impact on thepolicy line 67 .2.14. Democratic Union (UD), the Freedom Union (UW) and the Civic Platform (PO)On the conservative-liberal end we find the Polish Freedom Union (UW), a sister party and modelfor the Czech Freedom Union (US). The Freedom Union (UW) was established in 1994 after amerger between the Liberal-Democratic Congress (KL-D) and Democratic Union (DU). Beforethat, ROAD, the greatest single group inside the Solidarity-movement and the forerunner ofDemcratic Union (UD) had itself been established as a amalgamation of different political clubs. Atthe outset Aleksander Halls Forum for the Democratic Right constituted the greatest single groupinside the Democratic Union (UD). After some time Aleksander Hall left Democratic Union (UD),in stead joining Election Action Solidarity (AWS), in which he became the leader of the liberalfaction SKL.From the beginning UD was divided in different non-veto policy creating factions. The presidentialcandidate for UD at the 1995 presidential election, Jacek Kuron, argued that the party did not needto concentrate its attention on the middle class that at that time was almost non-existing, but moreon what he called the “worker elite”. In stead , he said, the Democratic Union (UD) should bring theworkers on the big state enterprises a perspective and hope for the future. At the outset theDemocratic Union (UD) constituted a loose coalition of conservatives, liberals and social67 Se e.g. interview with Janusz Piechocinski, Gazeta Wyborcza 12 February 2002:12, “Dla kogo spiewa PSL”.79

democrats, thereby locating itself in the political middle with a big coalition potential, at least aslong as the majority in the Sejmen belonged to the parties with a background in the Solidaritymovement.In June 1990 Democratic Union’s (UD) the founding congress took place in Warszawa, at whichoccasion the ongoing “wars in the top” inside the Solidarity movement between the Walesa wing”and the “Mazowiecki wing” was clearly reflected. Nevertheless, questions about the readiness tocooperate closely with the trade union Solidarity and president Lech Walesa was not evendiscussed. Only one delegate raised the question about the need of “speeding up” of the fightagainst the old system and lustration of former communists and their agents, but according to theminutes from the meetings the speech was met by ironical remarks that the speaker might havemistaked the UD-congress for the congress of the Center Alliance (PC), another Solidarity faction 68 .The support of the round table negotiations and the aim to “cross out” the time before 1989 ( “grubakreska”), outlined by prime minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, was maintained.The Liberal-Democratic Congress (KL-D), the Freedom Unions (UW) other leg, originated in theliberal groups in Gdansk in the 1980’s. In the first elected contractual parliament the Liberal-Democratic Club (KL-D) was established as an independent party with a clear neoliberal profile.KL-D belonged to those parties established by an interplay between a faction in the parliament andliberal groups outside the parliament, especially among intellectuals in the bigger towns. In otherwords, the party was at the same time formed externally and internally. The power of penetrationwas relatively weak, even among Polish intellectuals living in the big towns. Thus the voter appealwas too narrow. In spite of a active “'American” type election campaign and financial support fromoutside the party did not pass the threshold requirements and lost its representation in parliament atthe 1993-election.KL-D’s election defeat gave rise to plans about a merger of the Democratic Union (UD) and theLiberal-Democratic Congress (KL-D). However, the merger of the two parties did not give the newFreedom Union (UW) a broader electoral basis, because of the distinct liberal profile of the partychairman Leszek Balcerowicz. The new Freedom Union (UW) strived to combine liberal ideologywith pragmatism, political moral with political realities and social ethics, and at least until year2000 Solidarity type of “wars in the top” camp were avoided. In the first ten years after 1989ROAD, UD and UW had a great impact on Polish politics, for since the democratic break-throughROAD, UD and UW have produced no less than three prime ministers, Tadeusz Mazowiecki,Krzysztof Bielecki and Hanna Suchocka and, not to forget, minister of finance, LeszekBalcerowicz. Despite of that, at the 1995 presidential election the candidate of UD, Jacek Kuron,who according to the opinion polls was one of the most popular politicians in Poland, gained only 9pct. of the votes.From start the Freedom Union (UW) was composed of different non-veto political platforms. Thosegroups did not, like inside AWS, and behave like veto-groups, rather as policy-formulating fractionsor fractions of the band-wagon type. The division inside UW goes back to the merger between UDand KL-D, dseparating social liberals from “staunch” neo-liberals 69 . Other observers distinguishbetween “ideologists” (“ideowców”), the “old hyenas” “(stare hieny”) and the “young wolves”. Inother words, the Freedom Union (UW) included a group that supported Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s68 See minutes from the DU founding congress in Tygodnik Solidarnosc 17 May, 1991:8, ”Wezmy slub, jakos tobedzie”.69 Jan Król, ”Polityka Arystotelesa”, Wprost, 24 January, 1999:24-25.80

“soft social liberal line and another group that supported Leszek Balcerowicz’ neoliberal policyline.At he 1997 election did surprisingly well, gaing between 10 and 14 pct. of the votes, supported byan increase in the number of party members from 9.500 to 23.000. At all elections the party didespecially well in the bigger towns and among intellectuals. Opposite, the share of the votes wasalmost extremely low in the rural areas. The Freedom Union (UW) aimed to establish a pro-reformalliance consisting of those groups in society, which had made a good showing socially andtherefore were satisfied with their new social position. Here we were mostly dealing with welleducated, people working in the cultural sector, entrepreneurs and well off people in the biggertowns. The majority of those voting on the party has supported the establishment of new enterprisesand the introduction of market reforms and has been strongly in favour of the membership of theEU.After the 1997 election UW obtained a rather strong position in parliament. The UW party leaderLeszek Balcerowicz was nominated as minister of finance and vice-prime minister in the AWS-UWmajority government. Economic policy subjects captured a central position during the Balcerowiczleadership. The party has literally considered as the “defender of the budget”. Not without reason,the party was accused of “neoliberal boschevism”, especially after the merger of Democratic Union(UD) and the Liberal Congress (KL-D). The internal decision making process was distinctly topdownwith great power to the party leader (Balcerowicz). In January 1997, shortly before thenational election seven MP’s from the Freedom Union (UW) left the party and joined the liberalwing (SKL) of Election Alliance Solidarity (AWS). According to the opinion polls, because of thedefections the party lost some electoral support, but the party overcame the “mini-crisis” and didsurprisingly well at the election later in 1997. Before that happened, the defeat of the socialliberalpresidential candidate Jacek Kuron at the 1995 presidential election had given the neoliberal wingof the party even more impetus. Thus, after the 1997 election Balcerowicz presented a new“Balcerowic plan II” for speeding up the transformation of Polish economy toward market economyand adaption to the EU.The loss of votes at the regional and municipial elections in 1998 gave raise to some “soulsearching”.Many critisized that Balcerowicz was not only the party chairman, but at the same timealso Minister of Finance and vice-Prime Minister. Furthermore, to many Balcerowicz behaved tooarrogant and authoritarian. He did not like party discussions, tended to be impatient, preferred topdowndecision making, and was in general against sharing political power with other persons in theparty 70 .As noted above, the government cooperation between AWS and Freedom Union (UW) did not lastthe whole election period. In the beginning of 2000 the disagreements inside the government wasgrowing, e.g. as regards the introduction and later implementation of the four “big reforms” ofPolish society. Thus, during the governmental crisis in the winther 1999-2000 the UW leadersdemanded that AWS withdraw financially expensive proposal in parliament and its “syndicalistist”proposal about privatisation (“powszechny uwlaszczenie”). Furthermore, UW rejected proposalsput forward by AWS increase in import duties on foodstuffs, forbid retail trade on Sundays andshorten the working week to 40 hours over two years. In addition, AWS insisted to bring the illprepared reforms of the public administration and in the pension systems, education and health theend.70 Underlined e.g. by Waldemar Kuczynski in interview in the weekly Wprost no 42, 16 october, 1999:20-22.81

To conclude, the Freedom Union (UW) was mostly concerned about the macroeconomic reformsand simplication of the tax system, adaption to the EU and promotion of financial discipline. Theaim was the fast as possible transition to market economy and liberal democracy of the westerntype. The SLD led governments were mostly critisized for alleged mistakes in the economic policywithout laying much emphasis on the SLD’s and PSL’s common background in the old statesocialist system.Thus the Democratic Union (UD) mainly appealed to the moderate groups indside the opposition tothe communist former regime. Several leaders had taken part in the round table negotiations anddefended the agreements, that were entered during those negotiations. One of the spokesmen thechief redactor of “Gazeta Wyborcza” Adam Michnik argued that the round table negotations was themost clever political decision ever taken in the 20 century’s Poland 71 . Identity and moral politicswere at a discount and the attitudes to communisation and and the role of church was clearlydeviating. The Democractic Union (UD) and the Freedom Union (UW) spoke in favour of astructural, not a personal reckoning with the communist past and rejected the principle aboutcollective guilt. The lack of legal garantees in the proposals put forward about decommunisation bythe right-tradionalist parties was heavily critisized and several among the law proposals put forwardin the parliament were voted down by votes from non only “post-communists”, but also theFreedom Union (UW), even in times when the UW was in the government together with the AWS.The Freedom Union (UW) suffered from the low developed middle class. Thus, the liberal slogansappealed to rather few people, mostly “winners” of the transformation. The UW gained 14 pct. ofthe votes at the 1997 election, but the fight of gaining the middle class votes remained intense. Themajority of the new entrepreneurs did not vote the Freedom Union (UW), rather the left wing SLD,because new entrepreneurs were dependent on the state. The Freedom Union (UW) appealed to theupper strata of the middle class, but that group remained rather small. Furthermore, it became aproblem that UW was not able to present its own candidate at the 2000 presidential election. Thebreak with the AWS and the withdrawal from government did not mean an improvement in thevoter appeal. In fact, the decline in the share of the votes continued according to most opinionpolls 72 .The pressure against Balcerowicz increased after the presidential election autumn 2000, where theindependent liberal president candidate Andrzej Olechowski obtained about two third of thetraditionally UW votes. The final result was the resignation of Balcerowicz as party chairman. Theformer foreign minister and more social liberal inclined Bronislaw Gemerek was put forward as thenew chairman. In the end, Gemerek was elected as the new chairman, but first after contestedelection with the more neoliberal Donald Tusk. Donald Tusk spoke in favour of establishing amodern right wing party, democratic, pro-market and independent of the church. With the electionof Bronislaw Gemerek a more social liberal and centristic policy line was followed, but the electionof a new chairman (Gemerek) did not secure the renewal, that many voters and party membersdemanded.The change of party leader reinforced the competition about gaining support from the middle classvoters. The liberal president candidate Andrzej Olechowski put forward plans about closer71 Adam Michnik, “Independence Reborn and the Demons of the Velvet Revolution”, in Antohi and Tismaneauni,1999:83.72 Base on the analyse presented by Doreta Macieja, “Zakladnicy etosu”, Wprost, 3, September, 2000.82

cooperation between the liberal parties with SKL and Freedom Union (UW) as the key parties. Theleadership of the Freedom Union (UW) was not willing to give people from Olechowski’s campaccess to the party lists at the 2001 election as Olechowski put forward tough conditions for furthercooperation. Fullfilment of the conditions in reality would mean the closing down of the party andthe establishment of a new one. The messages from the chairman of parliament Maciej Plazynski tothe UW congress in December 2000 was more conciliatory than that given by AndrzejOlechowski 73 .In 2001 the looser in the fight for the post as UW chairman, Donald Tusk left the party and becameone of the originators of the new liberal platform, the Civic Platform (PO). After the election defeatin 2001 and the loss of parliamentary representation the chairmanship of the Freedom Union (UW)was taken over by Wladislaw Frasuniuk. Donald Tusk, together with other centrally placed peopleinside and ooutside the Freedom Union (UW) joined the new liberal party, The Civic Platform(PO). The leadership of the new party included the “three tenors”, besides Tonald Tusk, the thenchairman of the Sejm and memer of AWS, Maciej Plazynski, and the former liberal candidate forpresident, Andrzej Olechewski. The Platform (PO) mostly appealed to well educated and newentrepreneurs in the big towns, often without any links to the Solidarity movement and dissidentgroups from the time of communism. The electoral support was particularly great in the better offtowns and regions like Gdansk-Sopot-Gdynia in the North. In conformity with the liberal basicprinciples the Civic Platform (PO) demanded a limitation of the influence of the trade unions, directelection of mayers, simplification and lowering of taxes including flat linear taxation and a hard lineagainst corruption and dominance of parties in the public sector. PO also talked in favour of a“simplification” of the constitution including a reduction in tthe number of MP’s and limitiation ofimmunity.Thus, the new part became a spokesman for “modern” secular European values in contrast to theconservative-traditionalistic and xenophobic values from PiS and in particular by the League ofPolish Families (LPR). Much critique was raised against the trade union Solidarity and not least thechairman Marian Krzaklewski. The political biography of the PO-leaders was different from thethose of the Freedom Union (UW). Opposite, UW, the Civic Platform (PO) appealed to the youngergeneration, who wanted new people in the front, not the old guys” from the beginning of the 1990’s.In other words, The Freedom Union (UW) had been hit by the well known political “metal fatigue”.In princple, the Civic Platform (PO) could have entered a historical compromise with the “postcommunists”,i.e. SLD, as the new party does not have roots in the dissident milieus and thedifferences on the policy level between the liberals and the SLD are rather modest. At leastunformal cooperation with the SLD could not be excluded, should the government cooperationbetween SLD-UP and the peasant party PSL fail 74 . In fact such “tacit cooperation” took place afterthe resignation of Leszek Miller as premier and the establishment of Marek Belka’s transitorygovernment.At the beginning the new platform gained surprisingly favourable figures in the opinion polls,mostly as a protest against the already established parties, and with strong support from the new73 Janina Paradowska, “Bronislaw Gemerek przewodniczacym UW, Unia do skladania”, Polityka no. 52 (2277), 23December 2000.74 Underlined e.g. by Jadwiga Staniszkis, see interview in Rzeczpospolita 22 May 2001 (“Polska potrzebuje rzadu SLDz Platforma Obywatelska”), in which she talkes about a SLD-OP government, at the same time exluding a SLD-UWgovernment for historical reasons.83

Polish middle class. Thus, in January 2001 the platform (PO) gained between 17 and 20 pct. of thevotes; the question, however, was, whether the high electoral support might be sustained also at theforthcoming elections. Some other parties and factions joined the PO. After some time of hesitationthe liberal AWS faction SKL took the decision to join the Civic Platform (PO). At the 2001 nationalelection PO gained 12 pct. of the votes. Nonetheless, the left wing SLD-UP was able to establish anew majority government together med the PSL. Thus, the votes of PO did not become decisive atthe formation of the new government. As noted above, the Freedom Union (UW) lost representationin parliament. The new middle class and entrepreneurs tended to prefer the platform (PO) due tofear of waste of votes. A great part of the intelligentsia liked PO’s “economic language”, subjectslike macoeconomic stabilization, lower taxes and a new labour market policy and labour codex 75 .The Civic Platform (PO) aimed to be transformed into a political party in the proper sense of theword, yet with a more “light” almost American cadre type institutional structure. The applicationabout being registrated as a political party was handed over in November 2001 and accepted by theauthorities in March under the slightly revised name The Republic of Polands Civic Platform 76 . Theparty convent became the center of decision making. PO’s organizational kernel, however, was theparliamentary group. The aim was to avoid as much party bureaucratization as possible. Somegroups, e.g. the conservative faction SKL, rejected that type of party institutionalization 77 . Onregional level, that person, who obtained the greatest number of votes, should be the regionalleader.Soon after the 2001 election some of the new parliamentarians, such as the former minister ArturBalacz, left the platform refusing to subscribe the declaration about joining the new party CivicPlatform (PO). Later, one of the “tenors”, Andrzej Olechowski, resigned from the leadership,however, without much political “noice” and without leaving the party. Artur Balazs set up a newpolitical formation (“SKL-Ruch Polski”), which included some centre-right groupings, mostly fromthe former SKL and the Christian-Democratic PPChD, in other words, one more attempt to “unitethe Right”. It seemed that Olechowski aimed once more to be presidential candidate in 2005, inwhich case Kwasniewski according to the constitution had to leave the post. That plan, however,was thwarted because of the defeat at the local election.in Warsaw. Instead, at the 2003 conventionthe party chairman Donald Tusk was put forward as the candidate for president. Thus muchindicated that the new party might tend to be divided in different veto-type factions just like thefomer AWS. At the party convent in June 2003 Plazynski informed about his decision to resignfrom the platform arguing that the new party had become too elite-driven and therefore not aspokesman for the ordinary citizen. Moreover, Plazynski argued that the leadership of the party hadnot been able to promote establishment of a broadly based centre-right alternative to the SLD-UPgovernment.At the party convention in June 2003 Donald Tusk became the new chairman of the party and thelikely future candidate for president. And Andrzej Olechowski became the chairman of theprogramme comimission of the party. The party programme aimed to combine liberal principles andthe minimal state with religious values according to the slogan about “freedom, tradition andchristianity”. Maybe the party had an eye to the Hungarian FIDESZ, that in the mid 1990’ssuccessfully transformed itself from a distinct liberal to a soft center-right traditionalist party. The75 See e.g. Mariusz Janicki, Wieslaw Wladyka, “Kto wpuscil Leppera?”, Polityka, no. 40 (2318), 6 October 2001:5.76 “Platforma Obywatelska Rzecczpospolita Polskei”.77 Mariusz Janicki, “Platforma Obywatelska: ledwie partia, juz rozlam, Dwoch bez atu”, Polityka no. 47 (2325) 24November 2001:30.84

critique of the SLD-UP government became sharper regardless the agreement with SLD about theEU policy. The aim was after next election to form a government with Jaroslaw Kaczynsky’s PiSdespite personal and policy disagreements, e.g. different attitudes to tax policies and the fortcomingEU constitution treaty. However, moving closer to next ordinary election in 2005 the policydifferences between PO and PiS became more striking. Maybe therefore, Civic Platform (PO)changed strategy toward constructive programmatic opposition (Fiala etc, 2003:15), in crucialpolicy questions even supporting Marek Belka’s transitory government in return for obtainingimportant appointments in the government. The EU policy gave rise to some debates in the CivicPlatform (PO). Jan Rokita preferred a tough line according to the slogan about “Nice or die” andformer forminister Andrzej Olechowski preferred a compromise with France and Germany on theEU consitution treaty. At the 2004 EP elections PO gained 24 pct. of the votes. Also FreedomUnion (UW) passed the treshold requirement, may be due to the candidacy of still popular formerparty chairman Bronislaw Gemerek.After some setbacks in electoral support, in autumn 2003 the prospects of electoral success seemedbrighter, in the opinion polls the Civic Platform (PO) passed the left wing SLD by gaining about 30pct. of the votes, moving close to a majority of seats in parliament. That positive trend wasconformed at the European Parliament election in June 2004, gaining 24 pct. of the votes. Thus, thefinal outcome of the next national election seemed be a new PO led minority government, maybewith the tacit support (a “secret power sharing agreement”) with at least one of the two socialdemocratic parties, i.e. SLD and SDPL. As noted above, an indication of that trend was the partialsupport of PO to the government of Marek Belka. Thus, in summer 2004 PO supported proposalsfrom this “transition government” when voting on changes in the health sector and public transferincome regulations, maybe in that way reprocitating the oppointment of people close to PO, e.g.minister of finance Miroslaw Gronicki and Andrzej Ananicz to leader of the intelligence service, toimportant posts in society. In other words, a a political “power triangle consisting of ” “Wiejska(parliament)- Rozbrat (SLD) and the presidential institution (Alexander Kwasniewski)” seemed toemerge.2.13. SLDAfter the demise of the old system and the defeat at the first semi-free election the Polish Left badlyneeded a new political vision, a new discource. SDL was founded in July 1990 as an electionalliance consisting of more than 20 different left wing groups. Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, the laterpremier and foreign minister, and Aleksander Kwasniewski, the later president, were among theinitiators. Thus SdRP and later SLD were established after a split inside the old communist party(PZPR) that took place after the round table negotiations in 1988-1989. The decision about thefoundation of SLD shall be seen in the context of preparations to the first free election in 1991. Inspite of the election defeat many Poles had a share in the old system. Therefore the rejection of realsocialism was not unconditional. In other words, SLD was established in an “exogen” wayconnected to those social groups with a share in the old system. The formation of SLD took place inthe “endogen” way as the foundation of SLD was caused by the split inside the then communistparty (PZPR).As noted in presious sections, the left wing parties in the CEEC’s can be divided into three parts,first authentic historical social democratic parties such as the Czech CSSD, second reformed postcommunist“successor” parties and, thirdly, non-reformed or partly reformed communist parties85

such as KSCM and KSS in The Czech Republic and Slovakia. SL and its political core SdRPbelonged to the second group.At the first congress about 1.000 of the PZPR delegates took the decision to join the new Republicof Poland’s Social Democratic Party (SdRP). In spite of loss of several members the new partySdRP emerged as rather strong institutionally. Three years after the foundation SLD had 6,000members, and 1,500 had joined the social democratic youth organization (“SocjaldemokratycznaFrakcja Mlodych”). Tadeusz Fiszbach, the then party secretary in Gdánsk, created his own party,Poland’s Social democratic Union (PUS). However, that party ceased to exist before the end ofexpiration of the contractual parliament and did not run for the election in 1991. Many from PUSlater joined the new party Union of Work (UP). The main problem was weak organization and lackof money.After the defeat at the election in 1989 nothing suggested that SLD should constitute a any strongfactor in Polish politics. However, the “wars in the top” inside Solidarity and the right camp, gaverise to new opportunities. At the 1990 presidential election the SLD’s candidate, WlodzimierzCimoszewicz, gained almost 10 pct. of the votes, at that time considered as a satisfactory result. Inthe long run SLD could not lean only on the support from the old power elite and socially deprived.SLD also had to gain votes from former Solidarity-voters and young people who resisted catholicfundamentalism, demanding freer access to abortion and equal opportunities for men and women.The economic policy was less significant, because the socio-economic problems seemed impossibleto solve and the differences between the political parties seemed insignificant in the eyes of mostpeople.At the time of the foundation SLD consisted of 33 different political groups. To the most importantbelonged The Republic of Poland’s Social Democracy (SdRP), among the other groupings we find• Piotr Ikonowicz’ Poland’s Socialist Party (PPS)• Women’s Democratic Union• Poland’s Green Party• The Association Wisla-Oder• New Democracy• The trade union OPZZ and some branch trade unionsAlso the Independent European Initiative (NIE) and the orthodox political association “Proletariat”joined the SLD. It was hoped that the ortodox “Proletaryat” would change profile and constitute amore politically liberal association and thus join the common party line. However, that did nothappen and in 1998 “Proletaryat” took the decision to leave the SLD. In order to broaden the voterappeal also individuals without formal belonging to SLD was “adopted” and somehow attached toparty.86

PPS was rooted in the old Polish Social Party (PPS), a patriotic socialist party established alreadybefore WWI. PPS joined SLD shortly before the 1993 election. Evidence showed that the PPS wasnot able to obtain parliamentary representation alone due to low voter support and high thresholdrequirement (five percent). PPS’ participation was important because SLD strived to loosen thebonds to the past and become a democratic and relevant political party. However, the decision tojoin SLD was not taken unanimously, e.g. it was resisted by Gregory Ilka London based wing of theparty. When SLD in the late 1990’s transformed into a “normal” standard party, PPS andEconomics left the new SLD.In the 1980’s the OPZZ, also a part of SLD, had been the only legal trade union in Poland. After1989 OPZZ tried to present itself as a trade union in the more classical social-democratic senseopposite the right wing Solidarity with the close links to the church and right wing groups. Since1989 OPZZ gained more members than Solidarity. Inside the SLD the trade union OPZZ just likePPS represented the more traditional trade union oriented line. Thus OPZZ criticized what it calledthe SLD-PSL-government’s “liberal” policy line. In some cases the party discipline was broken e.g.at voting on the budget for 1993, leading to the exclusion of the vice-chairman StanislawWisniewski from SLD. Roughly speaking OPZZ contained two different “factions”, one of themwanted to “politicize” the trade union according to the Solidarity model. After that OPZZ should beintegrated in the Left “milieu” in Poland and gain its own political representation (“Ruche LudziPracy”). Another “fraction” wanted to follow a stricter trade union line without too much“politization”. At the presidential election in 1990 OPZZ was divided in two different groups. Somefrom OPZZ supported UD’s candidate Tadeusz Mazowiecki, other groups SLDs candidateWlodzimierz Cimoszewicz.Before the 1991 election a political rapprochement with SdRP took place, so the trade union OPZZtook the decision to join SLD. At the 1991 election no less than 66 candidates from OPZZ wereelected to parliament. Contrary to Solidarity the trade union OPZZ usually behaved loyally to SLDand for that reason refused to take part in the many anti-government demonstrations organized bySolidarity. Thus the support to the more fundamentally trade union line was limited. WhileSolidarity alternately supported and criticized its “own” government, OPZZ acted as a politicallyloyal connection to the working class calling upon classical social democratic tradition. SLDleadership adopted a distinctly instrumental attitude to OPZZ. From the outset the bonds betweenAWS and Solidarity were stronger than between the trade union OPZZ and the party alliance SLD.As we have seen, the foundation of AWS in 1996 was primarily due to the work of the trade unionSolidarity (“S”) 78 .The differences between the two big trade unions, Solidarity and OPZZ, proved to be insuperable.Solidarity joined bilateral negotiations with the SLD led government only in case of the three partycommissions between the government, the employers and the trade unions without participation ofOPZZ. Thus, the prospects for establishing a functional social dialogue were not promising, bothbecause of lack of cooperation on the trade union side and weak organization on the employers side.Because of the cooperation with the post-communists Solidaritys accused OPZZ of being a nonauthenticspokesman of workers interests. For obvious reasons the willingness and possibilities tobe involved in corporative structures was more limited under Solidarity-led governments. Opposingthe governments led by Solidarity OPZZ sometimes cooperated with populist trade unions like“Solidarnosc 80” and “Samoobrona”.78 Underlined by e.g. Edmund Mokrzycki in an interview in Rzeczpospolita 25 February 2000, ”Oczu zamydlic sie juuznie da”, and confirmed in an interview with me (SR), Warsaw October 1999.87

The SLD leaders were mainly recruited from the reform-minded part of the old nomenklatura.Inside the old communist party (PZPR) a nomenklatura-capitalist milieu had come to the fore. Thelater president Aleksander Kwasniewski (and his wife) belonged to that milieu. Thanks tonomenklatura positions those people had a considerable political experience and close personalnetworks, also the financial basis was relatively strong. The support for market economy was alsowidespread among the party supporters and the party members. The voter support was broad, soSLD cannot be considered as a class party in the classical sense. Aiming to be recognized as arelevant party SLD strived to appeal to as many social groups as possible, i.e. constitute a broadcatch-all party.In the first semi-democratic contract parliament the communist obtained 171 members, elected dueto electoral rules governing the semi-free election in 1989. The then SLD parliamentary groupconsisted of 28 different groups, but opposite AWS the leadership of SLD was able to maintain ahigh party discipline at votings in parliament. In the first years after the foundation SLD waspolitically isolated, considered as a non-relevant anti-systemic political party. The bad result at theMay 1990 local elections indicated that the party might be wiped out. From almost two millionmembers the number of party members decreased to just 20,000. SLD’s leadership expected that theround table agreement would give SdRP and SLD three to four years’ breathing space, enough tocarry through the socio-economic reforms introduced by the late communist Messner and Rakowskigovernments. SLD needed more time to carry through its own internal transformation. According tothe plans the cooperation with Solidarity and the church that had started during the round tabletalks, should be maintained, also the broad political consensus about the complex transition tomarket economy. In other words, more time was needed to consolidate the new party, for thatreason the question about taking over the government responsibilities was not the decisive one, atleast not in the short run.At the beginning of the 1990’s the political isolation was at least partly broken as SLD becamerepresented in the Radio and TV council. After Aleksander Halls defection from Democratic Union(UD), SLD constituted the greatest single party in the Sejm. At voting in parliament SLD evensupported the Solidarity led Suchocka-government, e.g. on proposals about non-confidence to thegovernment. Some important law proposals were carried through the parliament due to the “silentacceptance” from SLD.Few months after the round table negotiations, at the time of changes in Soviet Union and the fallof the Berlin wall, many groups on the political Right put question marks at the value of the roundtable agreement. The need of a broad political consensus simply dissipated due to the waningstructural pressure. Soon SLD came under heavy pressure from extreme right wing groups, evengroups that had taken part in the round table discussions, therefore SLD had to change its strategy.The pressure from outside enhanced internal cohesion and discipline. Unlike in Solidarity the “warsin the top” on the Left had taken place already before 1989. With the transition to more normalpolitics, political experience, financial means, disciplined members and voters were more decisivethan attitudes to the communist past. SLD owned its own buildings and also ran their own partyoffices. However, some party buildings might be confiscated by the authorities. The situation forthe right wing parties and other political groupings on the Left was different, e.g. opposite SLDPoland’s Social democratic Union (PUS) and UP was weakly institutionalised. Those parties had to88

pay more than SLD for e.g. rent of offices and for that reason were in need of party members andmore financial means.At the 1993 election SLD gained many votes because of the”wars in the top” inside the Solidaritycamp. SLD also tried to avoid the abstract and destructive ideological debates that took placeamong right wing groups and in stead focused on concrete policy subjects and “better governance”.Thus, during the 1993 election campaign SLD underlined professionalism, experience and politicalpragmatism. The party still tried to appeal to so many groups in society as possible, talked about“serving the whole society” and in that way presenting itself as a professional catch-all partyfederation.Greater electoral support was also due to the disappointment because of the economic reform, e.g.ways and means of privatizations, the closing down of state owned enterprises, the too greatinfluence of the church, the behaviour of the president (Lech Walesa) and the advance of the newpost-Solidarity “nomenklatura”. Non-economic topics seemed to be significant also for the PolishLeft 79 .SLD passed its own internal transformation and appeared as an authentic social democratic party ofthe western type. The later president Aleksander Kwasniewski acted as the leading strategist behindthe transformation of “communists to Socialdemocrats”. Both as party leader and as PresidentAlexander Kwasniewski worked energetically for further modernization” and “europeization” of theLeft. Inside the SLD-PSL-government SLD acted as the most pro-European and pro-market party.Thus SLD’s participation in government was no obstacle for Polish membership of NATO and EU.After the 1993 election Aleksander Kwasniewski tried to include the Labour Union (UP) in theSLD led government by underlining the small policy and ideological differences between the twoparties. However, in the end UP took the decision to remain a party in opposition. At the 1993election the SLD-PSL-government’s majority in parliament was obtained because of the waste ofvotes on the Right due to the high tresholds requirements and the new electoral law that benefitedthe big parties.The cooperation between SLD and PSL in government was far from frictionless; in the late stagealmost dissolution took place. The peasant party (PSL) even put forward a proposal of nonconfidenceto the government which it was a part of itself! Nonetheless the cooperation between thetwo parties did last all time until the next ordinary election in 1997. SdRP and SLD appealed tomore social groups in society than PSL, was less market-sceptical and behaved less “secteric”.Working in government SLD did what was promised before the 1993 election. For that reason anew slogan “We kept what we promised” was launched during the 1997 election campaign. Theeconomic programme “A Strategy for Poland”, formulated by finance minister Grzegorz Kolodko,talked about more employment, social partnership and state regulation. The new social pact tookshape of a three party discussion forum consisting of representatives from employers, trade unionsand government. The first three-party Commission had been established already under Suchocka’sgovernment.As put by Lena Kolarska-Bobinska an inclination in the Polish population to swing to the left underright wing government can be observed, at the beginning of the 1990’s and in late 1999 reflected in79 Radoslaw Markowski, Gabor Toka, ”Left Turn in Poland and Hungary. Five Years After the Collapse ofCommunism”, Sisyphus, 1 (IX), 1993:85-86.89

the falling popular support for privatization of the state enterprises 80 . Many voters shared theopinion that “Poland does not have the type of market economy that we expected” (in 1989), andmainly for that reason many decided to vote “post-communist”. Opposite, the popular support forprivatisation and market economy has been greatest under “post-communist” led governments.Up to the 1997 election some observers talked about three currents inside SLD:• a social-liberal supported by Aleksander Kwasniewski• a centrist supported Josef Oleksy• finally a more dogmatic line supported by the trade union OPZZ and minister for labour, LeszekMiller 81 .The social-liberal group abandoned Marxist Leninist thinking; instead aiming to introduce marketeconomy and political capitalism on favourable conditions for “nomenklatura entrepreneurs”. The“social-liberal versus orthodox” divide, however, was never razor-sharp and changing over time.After the take over of the post as the chairman of the SLD Leszek Miller followed a pragmatic line,appealing to the new middle class and supporting market economy and Polish membership ofNATO and the EU. The left profile was mostly expressed in the attitudes to the church and thecommunist past. The majority of those who voted SLD have been critical to church leaders’demands about the restrictive abortion rules, the inequality between man and woman and theobligatory religious instruction in schools and other forms of church interference in political life.The social composition of SLD’s voters has changed over time. At the 1991 election SLD obtained13-14 pct. of the votes among the best educated, only surpassed by Democratic Union (UD), thelater Freedom Union (UD). The support among the students was lower (5.7 pct.) and SLD was alsoshort of votes among workers and women. At the 1993 election SLD gained 20 pct. of the welleducatedvoted SLD, 13 pct. among the lower educated and 20 pct. among the lowest educated.More interesting, at the 1997 election 23 pct. among the private entrepreneurs voted SLD, makingSLD the strongest party inside that social group. The liberal Democratic Union (UD) had to contentitself with 18 pct.That trend was confirmed at the 1997 election. Thus, measured by social support SLD cannot beconsidered as class party (Knuzewski, 1998:152), but SLD had many loyal voters, so the alternativefor many dissatisfied voters has been not to vote at all, what could be observed at the 2002 regionaland local elections. In step with the stronger voter support in the late 1990’s the social support basebecame broader. Before the 2001 election SLD had the greatest support in all bigger social groupsand succeeded to maintain a profile as a professionally led and well institutionalized catch-all typepolitical party.In spite of different factions SLD behaved as a disciplined alliance, in part because of the pressurefrom outside, e.g. the demands from the Right for increased de-communisation (“dekomunizacja”).The fact that SLD had a well-organized political core in the shape of the party SdRP, was also an80 Lena Kolarska-Bobinska, ”Kapitalizm nie taki, jaki mial byc”, Gazeta Wyborcza 6.-7.11., 1999, ”Swiateczna”:2.81 Rzeczpospolita 20.9., 1993:6.90

important. Thus, SLD could not have survived the defection of the faction the Republic of PolandsSocial Democratic Party (SdRP). Opposite, only a few noticed that the above mentioned“hardliner’s” Association of Polish Communists Proletariat (“Zwiazek Kommunistow PolskichProletariat”) left the SLD in 1998.Working as an opposition party after the 1997 election SLD primarily focused on single policyissues, furthermore SLD gained support because of the “wars in the top” inside AWS. Manywelcomed Leszek Miller’s appeal to stop what he called the Polish peoples’ too many “war amongthemselves”. According to Leszek Miller the electorate would reward those politicians and partiesthat at aim at concrete policy results and to obtain more political stability such as was the case underthe negotiations in the mid 1990’s between SLD and most other parties about the new Polishconstitution 82 .Edmund Wnuk Lipinski rightly characterized SLDs policy-line in opposition as meritocratic(“opposition merytoryczna”) 83 . The meritocratic policy differs from the traditional oppositionpolicy, in which case the goal is not so much to change the government proposals, but to obtainmore votes by persistently critisizing proposals from the part of the government. The meritocraticpolicy line was conducted in the case of the administrative reform, the health reform and thepension and education reforms; those reforms were prepared and later introduced by the AWS-UWgovernment.The first leader of the Labour Union (UP) Rychard Bugaj regarded SLD as a heterogeneouselectorate and a broad and vague political programme, which gives to the party more freedom ofmanoeuvre and make it possible for the party to change the attitude in many cases. No bigdifferences could be observed between the right wing parties and SLD as far as the economicprogrammes were concerned. Instead, the political battles moved to other arenas. Subjects such asfreedom of man and fight against nationalism seem to replace economic slogans as globalisationand adaption to the EU had curtailed freedom of maneuvres in the economic policy. In other words,also the Polish Left has been subject to “path-dependency”, which means that no realisticalternatives can be found to market economy, the membership of the EU and the ongoingglobalisation.2. 14. The foundation of the party SLDThe plans about converting SLD from a party federation to a unified “standard” party were not new,but the process was speeded up because of the adoption of the new 1996 constitution that stated thatonly parties and election committees could take part in elections, and candidates to the electionscould only be nominated by the political parties. Therefore, the “old” SLD, at least theoretically,might not take part in the 2001 election. So from autumn 1998 the party leader Leszek Miller talkedabout dissolving the old SLD party alliance and instead creating a standard political party in thenormal sense.The transformation of SLD took place without so much trouble as in case of AWS. 149 out of 164SLD-members of the Sejm and 25 out of 28 senators joined the new party. Trade union membersnow had to join SLD on an individual basis. Plans were circulating about electing the new partyleadership by a party referenda, but in the end that plan had to be abandoned. An organizational82 Interview with Miller in Rzeczpospolita 19 April, 1999, ”Lewica powinna miec jedna liste”.83 Rzeczpospolita, 2 April.91

innovation was formation of the political programme council (“rada polityczno-programowa”)consisting of party members as well as individuals representing different organizations that werecooperating somehow with SLD. Thus, some non-party candidates could be found on SLD’s list atthe elections, even representatives from religious organizations. The main task of the council was toput forward a new political programme and bring to the party federation a new broad “catch all”profile. Of the 32 groups in the “old” federation only five groups refused to join the new party SLD.However, the closing down of the election alliance SLD could not take place without critique,especially in the party daily “Trybuna”. The PPS-leader Piotr Ikonowicz did not want to join aunitary political party, arguing that SLD should remain a party federation. Some defectors eventook the decision to join the peasant movement party Samobrona. It seemed impossible to closedown a party like PPS that had existed in almost 100 years. However, PPS’ options outside SLDwere few. The prime motive to join the SLD was to be represented in parliament. The withdrawal ofPPS did not bring any negative consequences for SLD as a whole, but PPS’ views had some supportin some other political groups inside the alliance. However, many in SLD considered PPS and notleast the chairman Piotr Ikonowicz as an embarrassment because of his uncompromising politicalstyle. Before 1989 Piotr Ikonowicz had been political dissident, but since 1989 he has persistentlydefended classical trade union values and criticised SLD for the rapprochement to the FreedomUnion (UW), also the old “apparatchik” Leszek Miller was accused of “sabotage” because of theplans about etablishing a new unitary left wing party SLD. Opposite Ikonowicz, after thetransformation of SLD the former “party boss” Leszek Miller behaved much more centre-orientatedand pro-western.As said, much critique came from the party newspaper “Trybuna”, and especially directed againstLeszek Miller who according to the opponents behaved in dictatorial ways without being able topresent to the public any consistent and politically realizable political alternatives to the governmentpolicy. Thus SLD was in danger of constituting a non-ideological cartel party without presentingrealistic alternatives to the electorate. Former Prime Minister Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski argued theopinion that SLD have several intelligent leaders and many experienced administrators with aprofound knowledge about governmental and public affairs 84 . However, gradually SLD became a“party of social democrats in smoking” with a distinct market economic, technocratic and westernintegrationist profile. One of the main problems problem is that SLD seems to neglect those policyproblems that troubles Polish people in their every day life; instead the leaders of the party havebeen focusing too much on unimportant “apparatus talk”. The question of transforming SLD into aunitary standard political party should have belonged to the less important political options, but thesubject was given the highest priority. According to the critics the new unitary party tended to begoverned top-down, almost according to a new-old Leninist principle based on democraticcentralism.Also different views about the procedures connected with the foundation of the new SLD existed.One group expressed the opinion that a discussion about the party programme should take placebefore the formation of the new party organization. Another group used the argument thatfunctional organisation and a well-disciplined party apparatus should have the first priority. Formerpresidential candidate for SLD and former Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz kept a lowprofile, but indirectly he supported the first group. Interviewed in the Polish weekly “Polityka” hesaid that the new SLD under no circumstances should move towards a centralist governed unitary84 Anna Bogusz, Dorota Mecieja, Zofia Wojtkowska, ”Falszywa lewica”, Wprost, 18 May, 1999:22-23.92

party. The highest priority should be given the development of a democratic party culture anddebate 85 .Most difficult was to close down of The Republic of Poland’s Social Democratic Party (SdRP), theold SLDs strongest single political group. It has been argued that since 1989 SdRP had been SLDs“salvation”. In the first years after 1989 it had demanded much courage and willpower to join SLD.At that time SDL was exposed to several heavy attacks from right wing parties. Nonetheless, afterthe closing down of the old SLD people with a background in the old SdRP did not gain anyprivileges compared with those who joined the party after the crisis in Solidarity and demise ofAWS.The new SLD’s organizational structure and political programme was adopted at the first congressin December 1999. At the founding congress SdRP, the “core party”, was forced to take thedecision about dissolving itself. The party members and the members of parliament should decidefor themselves whether to join the new SLD on an individual basis or not. According to normalPolish standard women were well represented in the interim leadership of the party, 8 out of 27were women. Also representatives from the newly established coordinating groups on the voivodlevelwere included in the party leadership. Furthermore, some important posts were given toformer members of the Freedom Union (UW), e.g. Andrzej Celinski, a former member of UW andKOR, and later, in 2001 minister of culture, elected as chairman of the commission that preparedthe new SLDs first political programme. The election of Andrzej Celinski was a tactical move, asthe choice of Andrzej Celinski might remove what SLD called “the most irrational in Polishpolitics”, the division of the Polish population in “We” (i.e. Solidarity) versus “Them” (i.e. the“post-communists”) 86 .However, not all groups were represented in the leadership. Jerzy Urban’s organisation NIE(“Niezalezna Inicjatywa Eurpejska”) requested that, but the request was refused. The new SLDleadership hoped to obtain 100,000 party members, held up by the increase in electoral support.Already in October 1999 21,000 people had joined the new SLD on an individual basis. From thattime no legal connection existed between the old and new SLD. To the still unsolved problemsbelonged the party debt, so before closing down the old SLD the new SLD had to pay 2.5 mio. zlotyto the Polish state.At the first congress Leszek Miller was elected as the chairman of SLD by an almost unanimousvote. The choice of five vice-chairmen was met with more excitement. Here Leszek Miller had hisown way, as both one woman (Lybacka), a representative from OPZZ, and Andrzej Celinski, thedefector from UW, were elected. Also one of the vice-chairmen for the Sejm (Borowski) and JerzySzmajdzinski, a close friend of Miller, became one of the party vice-chairmen. Opposite, formerPremier Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz was not elected. The congress decided that womenshould constitute at least 30 pct. of the candidates to elections, increasing to 50 pct. in the year2007.The new party organization was divided in 160 local party units with 16 party coordinators on thevoivod-levelm thereby obtaining the best territorial coverage as possible. As noted above, collectivemembership of the party was replaced by individual membership, and also members of OPZZ hadto join the new SDL on an individual basis. The admission of new members in the new SLD took85 Polityka, no. 40 (2213), 2 October, 1999:30-31.86 Put forward e.g. by Cimoszewicz in Polityka no.40 (2213) 2 October, 1999:30-31.93

place after talks with each applicant. About one third were former members of PZPR, but amongthe new members, we also find many young people. Back in the 1980’s most former members ofPZPR and to day SLD-members had been reform-communists, at that time supporting politicalreforms and subsequently paving the way for the round table negotiations with the opposition in1988-1989.Wojciech Pielecki expressed the opinion that young people joined the party not because of theirattitudes to the past, but because of their personal conviction about Poland’s future. The past theyleft to the historians 87 . Therefore, he argued, SLD can no longer be considered as a party mostlyappealing to pensioners and former communists. 60 pct. of those voting on SLD in late 1990s, wereunder 40 years and therefore had no stake in the old system. A political learning process had takenplace since 1989. The choice of “new-old” party members were pragmatic, almost value free. Manywere engaged in the new private sector and had voted on Solidarity at the first elections, but theychanged opinion and left Solidarity disappointed because of the bad political style and policy-line.According to Pielecki, the fact that the communist past no longer played a big role was primarilydue to psychological factors. A more “cool” evaluation of the past, the period of real socialismincluded, was needed. People were almost overwhelmed by so many great changes in society thatinevitably the memories of the time before 1989 receded in the background. Therefore “a newauthentic thick line” towards the past had to be drawn like in the case in Spain after Franco. Thatwould open up for new more fruitful political alliances, maybe a historical compromise betweenSLD and the Freedom Union (UW). In principle SLD’s coalition potential was great as the barriersfor a historical compromise between SLD and UW were historical and only to a small extentpolicy-related.At the 2001 election no less than 3.5 mil. young Poles could vote for the first time. So the politicalparties tried to appeal to young voters who often did not move to the ballot box. According topublic opinion polls about 40 pct. of the first time voters would vote SLD. Thus SLD had alsobecome a “party of the youth”. SLD obtained the greatest support in all important social groupsirrespective of sex, age, education, means, working place and home place. At the earlier electionsthe majority of best educate had decided to vote the Freedom Union (UW), now the same majorityvoted SLD. Opposite SLD’s then strongest political rival, the right wing AWS, had the greatestelectoral support among older people, private entrepreneurs and people with short-term educationand training.The programme proposal put forward at the 1999 founding congress underlined that no “third way”existed between planned economy and market economy. As put by the chairman for the programmecommission, Andrzej Celinski, the pathway in the economic policy had been laid already in the“Balcerowicz plan I”, set in motion shortly just after the formation of the first Solidarity-ledgovernment in 1989. Only minor adjustments in that plan were possible. Thus, only smalldifferences existed between the policy of the neo-liberal Leszek Balcerowicz and the left wingeconomist and later prime minister Marek Belka. Nevertheless, Celinski argues, the Left is obligedto give the socially weakest in society a new chance and equalize the far too big regionaldifferences in social welfare.87 Rzeczpospolita 23 August, 1999:A2 and Wojciech Pielecki, ”Trup niezgody”, Gazeta Wyborcza, 15 November, 1999and my own interview with SLDs Tadeusz Iwinski, Warsaw 20 October 1999.94

The declarations stressed that SLD should link itself to the historical traditions in the Polish andEuropean socialist movement, thereby underlining the connections going back to the traditions andthe political thinking on the European Left. The day-to-day politics should be based on a fruitfulinteraction between patriotism, independence and protection of human and social rights. On thatbasis the party should make use of the principles about social justice, freedom and self-government.The attitudes to the past was much debated at the founding congress and therefore followed withgreat attention by the public. In the programme proposal the crimes of Stalinism were condemnedand the lack of democracy deplored referring to the “economic pathology” and the limitations in thecivil rights. Nevertheless, it was said, SLD appreciate those, who under the old system in honestways contributed to rising the material wealth through their hard work. In a resolution adopted atthe congress SLD dissociated itself from the communist totalitarianism and crimes that hadoffended the main ideals of the Left. The party was also ready to pay economic compensation tovictims of Stalinism. According the Leszek Miller the evaluation of the past should be “severe, butfair”.The exact formulations of the programme were discussed during the founding congress. Thoseformulations that were adopted, did not satisfy all, primarily because the political and economicconditions before 1989 were not mentioned directly in the resolutions adopted. Before the congressopened and, without the SLD-leaderships knowledge, Aleksander Kwasniewski had read outthrough a spokesman a letter to the delegates, in which he asked the party to break with the past notonly symbolically but radically and in-depth. The many questions about the reckoning with the pastwas reactivated as AWS presented a law proposal that tightened existing lustration-laws. Thatproposal was, however, rejected by the majority in the parliament, including the Freedom Union(UW). Had the proposal from AWS been adopted, it no doubt would have been met by a veto fromthe president primarily due to the legal problems connected to the proposal. Thus despite size,organisational strength and internal transformation SLD still constituted an axis of polarisation inPolish politics.Important was to limit the waste of votes. Therefore SLD encouraged the Labour Union (UP) tonominate candidates on the party’s lists at the election in autumn 2001. According to opinion pollsUP was in risk not to be represented in parliament obtaining only between four and five percent ofthe votes like at the 1997 election. Furthermore, as regards seats in parliament small parties wereunderrepresented due to the rules of the election law. So under all circumstances an electioncooperation with SLD would be beneficial to UP, at least as far as seats in parliament wasconcerned.There has been much talk about the need for more unification of the Left. Even a federation and acommon election block was proposed consisting of SLD, the Labour Union (UP), Polish SocialistParty (PPS) and some other minor left groups like “Ruch Ludzi Pracy” 88 . “Ruch Ludzi Pracy”worked together with the trade union OPZZ, but the political influence was modest. In spring 1999UP took initiative to set up new “round table discussions of the Left”, in which the different groupson the Left might discuss ideas and programme proposals put forward from different groups. In thatconnection former Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz raised two important questions: Howto combine higher economic growth with the demands on the Left about more social justice? And:88 “The Working Peoples Movement”.95

Has the Left any freedom of manoeuvre at all in the economic and social policy taking inconsideration the ongoing globalization and, not to forget, the adaptation to the European Union? 89The principial idea to create more unity on the Left was accepted by SLD. In 1993 SLD itself hadpresented the idea, inviting all important left parties and groups to a “big debate” about alternativesto the economic policy followed by the post-Solidarity governments. In addition, important for SLDwas to obtain the greatest as possible support for Aleksander Kwasniewski as president. Morecooperation among the different parties and groups on the Left might be helpful in order to achievethat goal.However, the plans about the formation of one single united Left platform could not be realized 90 .Instead Leszek Miller spoke about the need to establish an “opposition forum” (“ForumOpozycyjne”) that - with SLD as the leading force – would be able to unify the different parties andgroups in opposition to Jerzy Buzek’s government 91 . The discussions about more unity on the Leftwere not most important for SLD. Under all circumstances SLD remained the most important singlealmost hegemonic party on the Left. Thus, mainly for tactical reasons SLD took part in the “roundtable discussions” as UP might be decisive in the negotiations about constructing of a new left winggovernment. Only few meetings among the left parties took place, but the political rapprochementbetween SLD and the Works Union (UP) was deepened and resulting in an agreement about closecooperation at the 2001 election with common candidate lists and a common political programme.Important was not to repeat the mistakes of the former left wing government from 1993 to 1997.Evidence from SLD-PSL-government 1993-1997 suggest that a government led by SLD difficultiesmight come up when taking controversial but important policy decisions, e.g. concerning newpension schemes and reforms of the health sector. Under the previous SLD-PSL government alsoplans for administrative reforms had circulated, but the final decisions were never taken. The AWSled government took those controversial decisions, which were left over from the formergovernment, but it did not pay sufficient attention to the quality of the law making process and lawimplementation.The prospect of formation of a new centre-left government was facilitated by cooperation betweenSLD, UP and PSL at the local elections in 1998. After that election 9 of the 16 voivods were led bySLD, and 135 of the 235 powiatys had a mayor from SLD. In spite of favourable election polls SLDdid not show interest in a new parliamentary election before 2000 presidential election. The policyof the Buzek government was heavily criticized, but SLD distanced itself from strikes and protestdemonstrations organized by OPZZ and “Samoobrona”. At the 2001 election SLD-UP failed toobtain a majority in the Sejm alone, but SLD became the “hegemonic” party in the new coalitiongovernment. Furthermore, it had the control over the Senate, and close close links to the president(Kwasniewski). Like in 1993, SLD was forced to cooperate with the internally divided PolishPeasants’ Party (PSL), which after the 2001 election came under heavy fire from the populist“Selfdefence” (Samoobrona).At the 2001 election SLD was in the position to make profit from the AWS-UW government’mistakes implementing of the four big reforms, especially the health reform. Therefore, one of theslogans under the SLD 2001 election campaign sounded: “We (i.e. SLD) can do it (i.e. the same)89 Mentioned e.g. in Dominika Wielowieyska, ”Przez morze czerwone”, Gazeta Wyborcza, 9.3., 1999:16-17.90 About those plans, se also Eliza Olczyk, ”Socialdemokratyczna wydmuszka”, Rzeczpospolita 27.-28 March, 1999:3.91 Mariusz Janicki, ”Wylacznosc na lewice”, Polityka, no. 16 (2189), 17 April, 1999:26-28.96

etter”. That election slogan was clearly less radical than the slogan from 1993, “It can not go on inthat way”.Thus, in 2000 and 2001 the prospects for the future seemed to be bright. In 2001 more than half ofthe municipalities and regions were led by SLD or SLD-led coalitions. A “historical compromise”between SLD and Freedom Union (UW) seemed unrealistic, but, as we have seen, some “defectors”from UW took the decision to join the SLD. At the New Year 2000-2001 the majority of the Polishpeople considered SLD as a relevant party, to use Sartoris term, and a party ready to take overgovernmental responsibilities. All that signified that the past was no longer a barrier for theformation of a new centre-left government and a “post-communist” as president, but themacroeconomic problems were increasing and the room of maneuvres in the economic policyremained low.At the turn of the century SLD had emerged as Poland’s strongest political party with a professionalcatch-all profile. The party could lean on an extensive professionalism and political experience andan ability of strategic planning. SLD’s candidate Aleksander Kwasniewski had been re-elected atthe 2000 presidential election. SLD was no longer a party consisting of just veterans from thecommunist era, just opposite, it had liberated itself from extreme political groups such as“Proletaryat” and “PPS Ikonowicza”. SLD could also profit from the existence of a “hard core” ofactivists and supporters and personal networks (Miller, 1999:167-168). Before the 2001 election thepolitical profile had become technocratic and pragmatic. SLD behaved in a catch-all ways,appealing to broad section of the Polish population. Most Poles were “transformation-tired” and didshow almost no interest in the new “big reforms”. Also the electoral support from the trade unionOPZZ and many people from the new private sector played a crucial role. The external evaluationsof the party remained asymmetric as other parties did not recognize SLD as a relevant “standardpolitical party”.To conclude, the transition from an election alliance to a standard party took place relativelysmoothly and without negative consequences as far as electorate support was concerned, in fact justthe opposite was the case. However, the facade of unity could hardly be maintained after takingover government responsibilities.2.15. SLD after the 2002 electionOne of the most important tasks for a new “post-communist” government was to bring to themajority of the Polish people more realistic expectations concerning the future welfare, securePoland a place in the EU and, not least, raise the quality of the law making and law implementationprocess, i.e. the public governance taken as a whole. As a fragile coalition government ruling undereconomic recession the prospects for the future were hardly as bright as anticipated before theelection. Thus, before long a sharp decrease in voter support took place, clearly manifested at thelocal and regional elections in November 2002 and the opinion polls conducted from the first half of2003.The new SLD-UP government put in motion a new programme for more economic growth underthe slogan about “entrepreneurship”, “development” and “work”. The aim was to increase thegrowth of BNP to 5 pct. in 2004 by state support to new entrepreneurs, especially new educated,more employment by higher economic growth, infrastructure projects, lower interest level, andbetter use of the money from the EU-budget. Cuts in the state budget 2002, new rules of support for97

medicine, changes in the labour code, limitations on work of pensioners led to decrease the popularsupport. As regards the economic policy disagreements erupted between the two economicministers, Grzegorz Kolodko and Jerzy Hausner. Opposite Kolodko, Jerzy Hausner was willing toloosen the finance policy by increasing the deficit on the state budget, thereby neglecting theMaastricht criteria and maybe future Polish membership of the euro zone. The strategy ofnegotiating about EU membership became “softer” and at the same time also more realistic, thoughthere have been several disagreements inside the second SLD-PSL government about thenegotiating strategy, especially the chapters that were dealing with agriculture. In the end, thepeasants party (PSL) was forced to leave the government due to lack of voting discipline inparliament.In March 2003 Leszek Miller and Alexander Kwasniewski agreed to hold new election in June2004, at the same time as the first Polish election to the European Parliament. That decision,however, was revised after the victory for the government at the EU referendum and the vote ofconfidence to the SLD-UP government in the parliament just after the referendum. At the secondSLD party congress in July 2003 Leszek Miller was re-elected as chairman of SLD, but severaldeputies decided to abstain from voting. On the March 2003 congress Miller expressed at leastsome self-criticism. According to the opinion polls, the fall in confidence to the governmentcontinued after the congress and the EU referendum and the Polish veto in Rome on the new EUconstitution treaty and the fall in voter support was even reinforced due to the ongoing politicalscandals, the Rywin-affair (corruption in the media) and the involvement of SLD-deputy AndrzejJagiello, in a local affair concerning close links between local SLD-people and the mafia (the“Starachowice affair”). Aiming to bring to the public the impression that SLD tried its best toovercome corruption among its members a screening of the party members was introduced,however with a limited impact. The plan about reconstruction of state finances (“the Hausner-plan”)with cuts in social expenditures received broad support among economists and internationalfinancial institutions, but not in the Polish population and the plan was rejected also by the liberalparty Civic Forum (PO).Some observers shared the opinion that SLD might split up in more parties, one of them might beled by Alexander Kwasniewski or by the marshall of the Sejmen Marek Borowski, thereby SLDwould be sharing the fate of AWS and maybe disappear from the political scene. As noted byTomasz Zykowski at least two different left attitudes were represented in SLD, on the one sidecultural line that critisized the influence of the church on politics and demanding changes in therestrictive abortion laws, the other social arguing in favour of state regulation in the economicpolicy and upkeeping the existing social wellfare programmes 92 . Due to incessant fall in electoralsupport Leszek Miller (like Schröder in Germany) was forced to leave the post as the chairman ofthe SLD. At the party convention in March 2004 Krzystof Janik was elected as the new partychairman, but at least for some time Leszek Miller was still holdning the post as Prime Minister.But that was only the beginning. In spring 2004, due to the ongoing fall in electoral support, downto 10-13 pct., and loss of several voters to the liberal Civic Platform (PO) and the populist“Selfdefence” (Samoobrona) Leszek Miller was forced to resign as party chairman and later also aspremier. The main problem was not lack of leadership cohesion and loyalty such as had been thecase in the Solidarity Election Alliance (AWS), but bad governance and the incessant fall inelectoral support. At the 2001 election SLD had gained 42 of the votes, according to opinion pollsthat figure has barely 8 pct. after the party split in March 2004 and close to the treshold requirement92 Interview with Zykowski in Gazeta Wyborcza 26 February, 2004:3.98

of 5 pct. The fall in electoral support took place in spite of better macroeconomic performance with5 pct. growth in BNP and low inflation. A new “anti-Miller” successor social democratic party,Polands Social Democratic Party (SDPL) was established on the ruins of the old SLD. Also somepeople from the Labour Union (UP) decided to join the new party. At the outset, the FreedomUnion (UW) declared itself open to discuss electoral cooperation with the “new social democrats”.The aim of the new party was to capture at least some of the votes lost to the Civic Platform (PO)and “Selfdefence” (Samoobrona). After some negotiations SDLP supported the establishment ofMarek Belka’s “transition government”, in return obtaining some concessions on policy level, e.g.as regards de-politization of public administration and more beneficial social regulations and alsosome important posts in the new transitory government. Furthermore, as a weakly institutionalizednew party the SDLP was in need of time in order to consolidate itself. In the mid 2004 SDLP wasestimated to have only about 7.000 members and “sympathizers” 93 . At the EP parliament election inJune 2004 both SDLP and SLD passed the election treshold, both obtaining a modest 5-6 pct. of thevotes.2.16. The Labour Union (UP)From the outset the Labour Union (UP) claimed to present the non-communist, social democraticpart of the Left , a political association of “mixed” origin in both the old and the new system. UPaimed to present itself as a “clean hands party” without shares in the old system and the bad sides ofthe new post-communist. Despite offers from SLD the Labour Union (UP) refused to enter theSLD-led government after the 1993 election, arguing that the government followed a too liberaleconomic policy. However, the real explanation was historic, as the party leadership strived todistance itself from the “post-communists” and appear as an authentic non-communist left wingparty.UP was established in 1992 after the unification of Works Solidarity (LS) and The DemocraticSocial Movement (DMS), both had a historical background in Solidarity. The initiative to theformation of UP was taken by Aleksander Malachowski and Ryszard Bugaj, an economist and oneof former the experts of the Solidarity movement. Under the state of emergency in the 1980s Bugajhad been placed in internment camps. Also some members of the social liberal faction in Solidarityjoined UP.Thus the Labour Union (UP) especially appealed to reform minded members of the formercommunist party (PZPR) and Poland's Social Democratic Union (SUP). In most cases we weretalking about former members of PZPR who in the 1980’s had joined the trade union Solidarity(“S”). The faction Works Solidarity (LS) was most dismissive about accepting former communistsin the party.Soon after the establishment of UP disagreement erupted regarding future cooperation with the“post-communists”. The chairman of UP Ryszard Bugaj took a negative position, opposite thesuccessor on the post and the later minister Marek Pol took a more favourable one. However, theparty never refused to cooperate with SLD in more informal ways, and due to Marek Pol’s positionas the minister of trade and industry in the SLD-PSL government 1993-97 UP was indirectlyrepresented in the first “post-communist” government in spite of the fact that Marek Pol at leastformally left the UP.93 Trybuna 28 June 20004, “Teraz Belka”.99

The Labour Union (UP), Democratic Union (UD) and the left-wing SLD appealed to almost thesame social groups. At the 1993 election UP surprisingly gained 7,3 pct. of the votes and 41 seats inparliament, more than first expected. The party received some electoral support due to its oppositionto the restrictive abortion laws and the interference of the church in politics. UP mostly appealed toworkers and low educated groups, but obtaining considerable support also from better educated,similar to SLD, UD and KL-D. Surprisingly more farmers than workers voted on the party(Knuzewski:153).Later, at the 1997 election the Labour Union (UP) lost the representation in parliament. Thus UPdid not benefit from four years in opposition to the government. Before the election the party aimedto gain more electoral support by criticizing the privatization policy and SLDs generallytechnocratic and power-focusing line. According to Bugaj SLD did not express “authentic” leftvalues as SLD impeded the formation of a democratic, forward looking and authentic left policy.At the 1998 election to regions and municipalities the election result was better for UP. Before thatelection formed an election alliance (“Przymierze Spoleczne”) with the PSL that in the end showedto be most beneficial for the better organised Peasamts Party (PSL). At the beginning of 1998several from Bugajs faction left UP and joined the Freedom Union (UW), in some cases withoutformally leaving UP. Before the 1997 election the representation in parliament was reduced to 36seats, as former UP members joined the new political independent association “Nowa Demokracja”.As said, the crucial point of disagreement was the attitudes to the past. The principal aim of UP wasto appear to the electorate as an authentic left wing party without roots in the old system. Thatprofile, it was argued, might be lost by joining a SLD led government. As regards the attitudes tothe time before 1989 the party took a centrist position. On the one side the radical anticommunismon the Right was rejected, on the other side the party tried to move Polish society away from the oldsystem. The first party leader Ryszard Bugaj expressed the opinion that those who wanted decommunisation(“dekomunizacja”), had to prove that the new system that they aimed to build up,correspond with the aims of the majority of the people and besides that also enhanced consolidationof democracy. Those demands, he said, has clearly not been fulfilled in case of the right wingparties 94 .The disagreement about the right policy line resulted, as noted above, in several defections from theUP. December 1998 eight members from Bugajs group left the party aguing that the electionalliance “Przymierze Spoleczne” and the appointments that took place after the regional and localelections in October 1998 turned out to be most beneficial not to UP, but to the “post-communists”.They refused to support re-election of the president (Kwasniewski) and accused UP of reinforcingthe divide of the political scene in “post-Solidarity” and a “post-communist” groups. The leadershipof the Labour Union (UP) rejected accusations about being just an “appendage” to the much betterorganised peasant party (PSL). That PSL profited most from the cooperation could not be denied 95 .The policy differences became insurmountable. Rychard Bugaj was not even invited as a guest atthe UP congress in February 2000, at which several other guests from groupings on the Polish Leftwere invited.94 Rychard Bugaj, “Fundament niezupelnie etyczny”, Rzeczpospolita 12.11., 1999:A1.95 The struggle inside UP after the 1998 local elections is analysed e.g. in Gazeta Wyborcza 15.12. 1998 (“Partia Bugajabez Bugaja”).100

After the defection Bugaj formed a new political club 96 . Bugaj spoke about the need of a new Left,a “third way” without close cooperation with the “post-communists”. Furthermore, he argued thatPoland was in need of a new authentic left party being able to appeal to those voters that did notsupport SLD. Thus, Bugajs group mostly consisted of intellectuals in opposition to “postcommunists”.A “dismissive” policy line against SLD would inevitably lead to close cooperationwith the right-traditionalist AWS and the right-liberal Freedom Union (UW). According to Bugajcooperating with SLD might give more space for formation of a “fourth element” in Polish politics– outside the three existing ones, AWS, SLD and UP-PSL. Later Bugaj joined the Peasant Party(PSL) expressing distinct eurosceptical views as regards the negotiations with the EU and the futureof EU integration.Aleksander Malachowski, one of the other founders of the Labour Union (UP), did not share Bugajsrejection of cooperation with the “post-communists”. Also the majority in UP did not seem to rejectfurther cooperation with SLD and PSL, clearly manifested at the 1998 local election and theproposal about establishment of a Left “round table”. Marek Pol, the UPs leader in 1999, repeatedlyexpressed the opinion that the Polish Left needed only one single block and a common electionprogramme. Such a political block should be withou the “baggage of the past” and in the forefrontwhen fighting against political right and catholic fundamentalism 97 . Therefore the majority in theUP leadership accepted cooperation with SLD at the 2001 election with the aim to regainrepresentation in the parliament.Another dilemma was the choice of strategy leading to the presidential election year 2000. Theparty was not able to put forward its own presidential candidate, arguing that taking part inpresidential election was too expensive for the party. On the other hand it was not easy to supportSLDs Aleksander Kwasniewski unconditionally. The party leadership did not dare to take the finaldecision and let the members take the choice through a party referendum, which gave Kwasniewskia clear majority.As noted above, an election agreement between UP and SLD was established in October 2000, oneyear before next ordinary election. After the 2001 election SLD-UP established a majoritygovernment together with the peasant party (PSL). The electoral alliance with SLD secured someseats in parliament, but for the the heavy price of being dependent on Leszek Miller and SLD.According to the opinion polls carried out after the 2001 election, at a new election UP would notpass the threshold by “going alone”. The chairman Marek Pol did badly according to opinion pollsand later, in spring 2004 he had to resign as party chairman. For tactical reasons UP could not breakthe cooperation with SLD in spite of low electoral support and modest influence in the government,e.g. i the case of Polish participation in the war in Iraq, the economic policy and the “Hausner-plan”for restructuring public finances, that included several unpopular social cuts on the the state budget.Demands of reconstruction of the cabinet was put forward in March 2004 by some politicians fromthe Labour Union (UP), but those demands were rejected by Prime Minister Leszek Miller. Afterthe resignation of Leszek Miller and formation of a new transitory government led by Marek Belkaa fundamentally new situation emerged. Thus, the close bonds to SLD were broken and soon plansabout establishing a new more authetic left alliance without the participation of SLD and the newsocial democratic party (SDLP) including some small groups from the Left, e.g. Polish SocialistParty (PPS), the Greens and Polish Labour Part (PPP) and the anticlerical group (“Racja”) came up.96 “Stowarzyszenie Studiów i Inicjiatyw Spolecznych”.97 Eliza Olczyk, „Socjaldemokratyczna wydmuszka“, Rzeczpospolita 27-28 March, 1999:3.101

Nevertheless, before that had taken place the planned cooperation between SLD and the LabourUnion (UP) was carried through at the first Polish election to the European Parliament in June 2004.102