TRADOC Pam 525-3-7-01 - TRADOC - U.S. Army
TRADOC Pam 525-3-7-01 - TRADOC - U.S. Army TRADOC Pam 525-3-7-01 - TRADOC - U.S. Army
TRADOC Pam 525-3-7-01dilemma as it exists today can inform us on how better to cope with it as it increases in frequencyand amplitude in the future.Persistent ConflictPersistent conflict poses another leadership challenge. Humans respond relatively well toshort bursts of tension followed by periods of respite. During the bloody trench warfare of WorldWar I, commanders regularly rotated units from the front to rearward areas. This tempers theexperience of intense combat and unimaginable carnage by shortening the period of exposure.Today and tomorrow, there is no clear front from which to rotate. What may have been intensecombat for weeks or even months for World War II divisions has become a series of deploymentswith shorter reset times in between.Persistent conflict implies persistent presence, whether in intense combat or simply engagedin extended operations. Soldiers steeled for a 12 or 15 month deployment engaged in fullspectrum operations in an uncertain nonlinear environment expect to go home at the end of theirdeployment. Their focus is on survival and taking care of each other. Throwing them anunexpected challenge such as extending their tour or transferring them to another theater can bevery disruptive if not catastrophic. In the future, the model of deployment changes to reduce thisuncertainty, or some other adjustment may offer relief to units from prolonged periods away fromhome stations. Unpredictability taxes even the best of highly motivated units. Leaders mustlearn to cope with this, both in them and in their subordinates. It is certainly an issue of moraleor the sense of well-being in individuals, but it is also an issue of chronicity—the cumulativeeffects of repeated deployments.On the individual level, fatigue, and stress are cumulative. In larger organizations, the effectsof long commitment with little relief in sight can lead to anger, indifference, carelessness, andfailure to pay attention to details.Frequently, the stress that affectseveryone affects the leaders evenmore. Soldiers and some smallerunits can take breaks or naps whiletheir leaders dare not relax. Thisdanger of compounding stress andfatigue only increases with the levelof engagement and the duration ofcommitment. Good leaders willseek rest when required. A leadercan share responsibility with atrusted peer or subordinate leaderlong enough to ensure he is restedand fit for command. Add tofatigue the trauma of losing Soldiers to combat or accidents. Consistently, commanders reportthat the most difficult challenge they face is the loss of their Soldiers. They also report thatnothing can prepare someone for this. Perhaps the most cogent reason for discussing complexityand persistence is their additive nature. If we know these dimensions of the future will grow,186
TRADOC Pam 525-3-7-01then we must consider ways to mitigate their effects and ways to coach leaders in how toanticipate and recognize those effects. The machismo steely-eyed, tough as nails, never needs tosleep model may have its place in the future, but the understanding of human nature described inthis functional concept suggests otherwise.SelectionGiven the two challenges described above the Army needs to examine how it accessespotential leaders, selects those for leader development and increasing levels of responsibility.One aspect of selecting and developing future Army leaders that warrants close examination isthe one size fits all approach the Army tends to take in managing training and education. Whilenot truly that fixed, nearly all Army officers and NCOs undergo the same programs of instructionand education in leadership development. This cookie cutter approach supports the assumptionthat every officer and every NCO must be prepared to lead. The problem with this assumption isthat not every individual is suited to lead. However, it is a fact that some individuals are betterdisposed to perform leadership functions than others, a fact confirmed in the observedperformance of selected leaders in action. The Army should examine why in units with all otherconditions nearly equal (such as, organization, training, and operational situation), some units aremore cohesive and effective than others. The commander’s leadership abilities and his or herestablished climate is the answer.All newly commissioned officers are by definition leaders. That is what the Nation expectsof them. However, only some have the opportunity to command. Undisputedly, demonstratedcompetency at platoon level helps battalion commanders select potential company, battery, ortroop commanders. Successful command at this level is prerequisite for key positions leading tohigher level commands. So far, nothing is wrong with this process except that the Armyfunctions on an “up or out” personnel management paradigm. When promotions and selectionfor command link to successful command experience,what happens to those who either do not get the No man ever steps in the same riveropportunity to command, or who are excellent at the twice, for it’s not the same river andcompany, battery, or troop level but unable to adapt to he’s not the same man.the expanded demands at battalion? Similarly, thereHeraclitus of Ephesusare those “late bloomers” who may not have(535-475 BCE)performed as well at junior level command butlearned more from mistakes than other contemporaries learned from success. This is one of themore important considerations for the future of leadership development. A command trackingsystem may be a beneficial concept, and a component of that should include leadershipassessments by peers and subordinates—data that is available as a component of the evaluationprocess. A 360-degree leadership review may be the only valid means to assess thoseinterpersonal skills.In the ramp up from Desert Shield to Desert Storm, the Army anticipated experiencingextensive casualties, including unit leaders. To prepare for this possibility, personnel managersquietly identified officers on standing command lists alerting them for possible deployment. Noone anticipated a prolonged campaign along the lines of World War II where leaders took handsontraining seriously by pulling up and “growing” leaders on the job. While the shadow187
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<strong>TRADOC</strong> <strong>Pam</strong> <strong>525</strong>-3-7-<strong>01</strong>then we must consider ways to mitigate their effects and ways to coach leaders in how toanticipate and recognize those effects. The machismo steely-eyed, tough as nails, never needs tosleep model may have its place in the future, but the understanding of human nature described inthis functional concept suggests otherwise.SelectionGiven the two challenges described above the <strong>Army</strong> needs to examine how it accessespotential leaders, selects those for leader development and increasing levels of responsibility.One aspect of selecting and developing future <strong>Army</strong> leaders that warrants close examination isthe one size fits all approach the <strong>Army</strong> tends to take in managing training and education. Whilenot truly that fixed, nearly all <strong>Army</strong> officers and NCOs undergo the same programs of instructionand education in leadership development. This cookie cutter approach supports the assumptionthat every officer and every NCO must be prepared to lead. The problem with this assumption isthat not every individual is suited to lead. However, it is a fact that some individuals are betterdisposed to perform leadership functions than others, a fact confirmed in the observedperformance of selected leaders in action. The <strong>Army</strong> should examine why in units with all otherconditions nearly equal (such as, organization, training, and operational situation), some units aremore cohesive and effective than others. The commander’s leadership abilities and his or herestablished climate is the answer.All newly commissioned officers are by definition leaders. That is what the Nation expectsof them. However, only some have the opportunity to command. Undisputedly, demonstratedcompetency at platoon level helps battalion commanders select potential company, battery, ortroop commanders. Successful command at this level is prerequisite for key positions leading tohigher level commands. So far, nothing is wrong with this process except that the <strong>Army</strong>functions on an “up or out” personnel management paradigm. When promotions and selectionfor command link to successful command experience,what happens to those who either do not get the No man ever steps in the same riveropportunity to command, or who are excellent at the twice, for it’s not the same river andcompany, battery, or troop level but unable to adapt to he’s not the same man.the expanded demands at battalion? Similarly, thereHeraclitus of Ephesusare those “late bloomers” who may not have(535-475 BCE)performed as well at junior level command butlearned more from mistakes than other contemporaries learned from success. This is one of themore important considerations for the future of leadership development. A command trackingsystem may be a beneficial concept, and a component of that should include leadershipassessments by peers and subordinates—data that is available as a component of the evaluationprocess. A 360-degree leadership review may be the only valid means to assess thoseinterpersonal skills.In the ramp up from Desert Shield to Desert Storm, the <strong>Army</strong> anticipated experiencingextensive casualties, including unit leaders. To prepare for this possibility, personnel managersquietly identified officers on standing command lists alerting them for possible deployment. Noone anticipated a prolonged campaign along the lines of World War II where leaders took handsontraining seriously by pulling up and “growing” leaders on the job. While the shadow187