TRADOC Pam 525-3-7-01 - TRADOC - U.S. Army
TRADOC Pam 525-3-7-01 - TRADOC - U.S. Army TRADOC Pam 525-3-7-01 - TRADOC - U.S. Army
TRADOC Pam 525-3-7-01Despite the numerous sources of stress they encounter, most Soldiers do not becomepsychological casualties. Stress is an integralpart of military service and leaders must assist You can reach into the well of courageSoldiers to develop mechanisms to cope with only so many times before the well runsstress in training and on operations. COSR dry.occur when intense or prolonged stressorsArdant du Picq, Battle Studies, 1870deplete the Soldier’s coping resources creating asense of helplessness, fear, and isolation. One of the greatest stressors is the fear of death orinjury, but the fear of letting fellow Soldiers down may be even greater. For leaders the merechance of sending subordinates to their deaths is an enormous stressor that may be more powerfulthan the fear of personal injury or death.Fear is a rational response to abnormal experiences and generates physiological reactions aswell as a psychological and emotional one. The immediate response to fear classified as “fight orflight” is instinctive and essential to survival. Normal stress reactions can have a positive impactand help Soldiers function better by increasing alertness, cognitive processing, strength, andendurance. In combat however, fear of death and serious injury is omnipresent and exhausting,constantly drawing on the Soldier’s ability to maintain the courage and the will to fight. Theeffects are cumulative and as Lord Moran asserts in his classic work, The Anatomy of Courage,on his experiences in World War I.Moran observed that psychological casualties occurred both from brief but intense combatand from prolonged exposure; findings confirmed by other armies and in subsequent conflicts.Adding even stronger emphasis, the Army’s report on combat exhaustion in World War IIconcluded:There is no such thing as “getting used to combat.” . . . Each moment of combatimposes a strain so great that men will break down in direct relation to theintensity and duration of their exposure . . . psychiatric casualties are as inevitableas gunshot and shrapnel wounds. Most men were ineffective after 180 or even140 days. The general consensus wasthat a man reached his peak ofeffectiveness in the first 90 days ofcombat, that after that his efficiencybegan to fall off, and that he becamesteadily less valuable after that until hewas completely useless . . . . 157Not all deployed Soldiers face the same riskof injury or death. Soldiers who spend asignificant amount of time in proximity to theenemy and populations are at the greatest risk.Being in mortal danger everyday, 10-12 hours aday for weeks and months on end is physicallyand mentally draining. Arguing that theintensity of combat in the current and future140
TRADOC Pam 525-3-7-01environment is unlike the intensity of earlier wars “demonstrates a lack of appreciation of whatconstitutes combat in general, and ignorance as to the level of combat Soldiers and Marines areexperiencing.” 158 Today’s junior leaders have spent two to three of their first years in the Armydeployed in a complex evolving environment for which there are no clear school solutions.Frequently, they must learn the lessons of complex warfare while fielding unfamiliar equipmentand bearing responsibility for what their subordinates do at all times.Consistent with rotation practices in World War II and Korea, the Mental Health AdvisoryTeam IV Operation Iraqi Freedom 05-07, Final Report strongly recommends establishing intheaterunit rotation policies. It supports a longer period of recovery rather than the in-countryrest and recreation (that few combat troops were allowed to take) or the two-week individualrotation policy currently in effect in OEF and OIF. 159 Steeling the Mind, a separate RANDCorporation study, examines the psychological implications of stress in future urban warfare andagrees with the recommendation adding, introduce, and integrate replacements into the unitduring in-theater rotations. 160 Allowing replacements to train with the veterans improvescohesion and unit effectiveness. Both of these recommendations are currently in place and willwarrant integration in future operations.Endorsing the findings of an earlier Walter Reed Army Institute of Research Land CombatStudy, the Mental Health Advisory Team IV report also recommends shorter deploymentsbecause deployment length relates to mental health. Earlier conflicts indicated that shorterdeployment periods provided greater hopeamong Soldiers that they might surviveunharmed. The Walter Reed study also foundthat the current dwell time between unitdeployments is insufficient for Soldiers toreset mentally. As a result, even thoughsecond time deployed Soldiers are generallyolder, more senior, better educated, married,and more experienced—factors thought to bementally protective or restorative—they aretwice as likely to screen for mental healthproblems as those deployed for the first time.It is simple human nature to breathe a sigh ofrelief at the end of a combat tour. It issimilarly natural for returnees to wonder if,having survived the first time, their numbermight come up the second or third time. Thepercentages of all Soldiers screening forpotential mental health problems is increasingas OEF and OIF continue. This finding hasmajor implications for the Army operating infuture environment characterized by near persistent conflict and an OPTEMPO that assumesmultiple operational deployments in a career of service for both active and reserve componentSoldiers. This finding also confirms the earlier World War II study that Soldiers do not “get usedto combat” and that previous experience does not “inoculate” Soldiers against COSR.141
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<strong>TRADOC</strong> <strong>Pam</strong> <strong>525</strong>-3-7-<strong>01</strong>environment is unlike the intensity of earlier wars “demonstrates a lack of appreciation of whatconstitutes combat in general, and ignorance as to the level of combat Soldiers and Marines areexperiencing.” 158 Today’s junior leaders have spent two to three of their first years in the <strong>Army</strong>deployed in a complex evolving environment for which there are no clear school solutions.Frequently, they must learn the lessons of complex warfare while fielding unfamiliar equipmentand bearing responsibility for what their subordinates do at all times.Consistent with rotation practices in World War II and Korea, the Mental Health AdvisoryTeam IV Operation Iraqi Freedom 05-07, Final Report strongly recommends establishing intheaterunit rotation policies. It supports a longer period of recovery rather than the in-countryrest and recreation (that few combat troops were allowed to take) or the two-week individualrotation policy currently in effect in OEF and OIF. 159 Steeling the Mind, a separate RANDCorporation study, examines the psychological implications of stress in future urban warfare andagrees with the recommendation adding, introduce, and integrate replacements into the unitduring in-theater rotations. 160 Allowing replacements to train with the veterans improvescohesion and unit effectiveness. Both of these recommendations are currently in place and willwarrant integration in future operations.Endorsing the findings of an earlier Walter Reed <strong>Army</strong> Institute of Research Land CombatStudy, the Mental Health Advisory Team IV report also recommends shorter deploymentsbecause deployment length relates to mental health. Earlier conflicts indicated that shorterdeployment periods provided greater hopeamong Soldiers that they might surviveunharmed. The Walter Reed study also foundthat the current dwell time between unitdeployments is insufficient for Soldiers toreset mentally. As a result, even thoughsecond time deployed Soldiers are generallyolder, more senior, better educated, married,and more experienced—factors thought to bementally protective or restorative—they aretwice as likely to screen for mental healthproblems as those deployed for the first time.It is simple human nature to breathe a sigh ofrelief at the end of a combat tour. It issimilarly natural for returnees to wonder if,having survived the first time, their numbermight come up the second or third time. Thepercentages of all Soldiers screening forpotential mental health problems is increasingas OEF and OIF continue. This finding hasmajor implications for the <strong>Army</strong> operating infuture environment characterized by near persistent conflict and an OPTEMPO that assumesmultiple operational deployments in a career of service for both active and reserve componentSoldiers. This finding also confirms the earlier World War II study that Soldiers do not “get usedto combat” and that previous experience does not “inoculate” Soldiers against COSR.141