Medical Aspects of Chemical Warfare (2008) - The Black Vault

Medical Aspects of Chemical Warfarethe Soviets signed the Biological Weapons Convention,they added, “the Soviet Union does not possess anybacteriological agents and toxins, weapons, equipmentor means of delivery.” 182(p6) Other intelligence sourcesthought that the Soviets considered most toxins to bechemical agents, and therefore not subject to the BiologicalWeapons Convention. If toxins were consideredchemical agents, then the Soviets would be permittedunder the Geneva Protocol to use them in retaliation oragainst nonsignatories. 183 Their use of chemical weaponswas taken as an indication that the Soviets were continuingan active chemical program.The 1980s: Return of the Chemical CorpsThe Haig ReportDespite denials by the governments involved,the United States publicized charges that chemicalwarfare had been used in Southeast Asia and Afghanistanin 1980. Problems with the collection ofsamples and the remoteness of the sites, however,prevented definitive evidence from being obtained.Furthermore, the later identification, discussion, andmedia debate over the origin of possible trichothecenemycotoxins in Southeast Asia also distractedpublic interest from the alleged use of conventionalchemical munitions.In 1982 Secretary of State Alexander M Haig, Jr,presented a report titled “Chemical Warfare in SoutheastAsia and Afghanistan” to the US Congress. Afterdescribing the evidence, he concluded:Taken together, this evidence has led the U.S. Governmentto conclude that Laos and Vietnamese forces,operating under Soviet supervision, have, since1975, employed lethal chemical and toxin weaponsin Laos; that Vietnamese forces have, since 1978,used lethal chemical and toxin agents in Kampuchea;and that Soviet forces have used a variety of lethalchemical warfare agents, including nerve gases, inAfghanistan since the Soviet invasion of that countryin 1979. 182(p6)Based on this evidence, senior Defense Departmentpersonnel concluded that the Soviet Union“possesses a decisive military advantage becauseof its chemical capabilities.” 167(p3) The Haig report,however, was not able to galvanize world opinion.As in the Yemen civil war, the United States wasunable to prove that chemical agents and toxinshad been used in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan.Instead, the accusation became a political debatebetween the United States and the Soviet Unionduring President Ronald Reagan’s administration.Afghanistan and Iran-Iraq WarsAfghanistan WarThe US Army monitored the war in Afghanistanthroughout the 1980s, often thinking of it as “theSoviet’s Vietnam.” The lessons learned from this warabout chemical warfare provided extensive support tothe US chemical defense program. The Soviets tendedto use chemical weapons much like the Italians didin Ethiopia and like the US Army had used nonlethalagents in Vietnam. One military writer summed upthe general lesson learned:The use of chemical weapons by Soviet forces in Afghanistanis also significant. The use of these weaponsin Afghanistan confirms, not surprisingly, thatthe Soviets find them put to their best use against unprotectedsubjects incapable of retaliation. Afghanistanis proof positive that the Soviets do not considerthese devices as special weapons. Considerationsof utility and not morality will govern Soviet use ofthem in a future conflict. 184(p27)Despite the use of chemical weapons, the Sovietswere unable to “win” the war and, in December 1988,met with rebel forces to discuss a withdrawal of Soviettroops from Afghanistan. In January 1989 the Sovietsannounced the final withdrawal, which was completeda month later. 185Iran-Iraq WarThe United States continued to propose chemicaltreaties with the Soviet Union, its primary chemicalwarfare rival. However, the Iran-Iraq War beganchanging this situation. On September 22, 1980, Iraqlaunched an invasion against neighboring Iran. TheIraqi army, trained and influenced by Soviet advisors,had organic chemical warfare units and a wide varietyof delivery systems. Neither side achieved dominanceand the war quickly became a stalemate.To stop the human-wave–attack tactics of theIranians, the Iraqis employed their home-producedchemical agents as a defensive measure against themuch-less–prepared Iranian infantry. The first reporteduse of chemical weapons occurred in November 1980.Throughout the next several years, additional reportsof chemical attacks circulated, and by November 1983,Iran began complaining to the UN that Iraq was usingchemical weapons against its troops. 186–18962