Medical Aspects of Chemical Warfare (2008) - The Black Vault

Medical Aspects of Chemical Warfareincapacitated rather than killed its targets. In 1951the Corps awarded a contract to the New York StatePsychiatric Institute to investigate the clinical effectsof mescaline and its derivatives. The contractor tested6 derivatives and the corps tested 35 derivatives. Theresults of the investigation indicated that mescalineand its derivatives would not be practical as agentsbecause the doses needed to bring about mental confusionwere too large. 137In 1955 the Chemical Corps formally established aproject called “psychochemical agents.” The next year,the program was redesignated “K-agents.” The objectivewas to develop a nonlethal but potent incapacitantthat could be disseminated from airplanes in all environments.The program was conducted at the ArmyChemical Center and examined nonmilitary drugs likelysergic acid (LSD) and tetrahydrocannabinol (relatedto marijuana). None of these drugs, however, werefound to be of military worth. 134,137–139The Growing Soviet ThreatWhile addressing the Communist Party Congressin Moscow in 1956, Soviet Defense Minister GeorgiZhukov warned, “[A]ny new war will be characterizedby mass use of air power, various types ofrocket, atomic, thermo-nuclear, chemical and biologicalweapons.” 140(p26) In 1959 Major General MarshallStubbs, the new chief chemical officer, assessed thegrowing Soviet chemical threat, saying:Soviet chemical weapons are modern and effectiveand probably include all types of chemical munitionsknown to the West, in addition to several disseminationdevices peculiar to the Russians. Theirground forces are equipped with a variety of protectivechemical equipment and they are preparedto participate in large scale gas warfare. They havea complete line of protective clothing which willprovide protection in any gas situation and a largevariety of decontaminating equipment. . . . I believethat I have given you enough to make you awarethat they pose a threat to the free nations of the141(pp 8–9)world.The next year Major General Stubbs talked tovarious groups around the country about the need forgreater urgency in attaining chemical preparedness.Contending that “to both military and civilian populations”the threat of chemical warfare was as greatas the threat of nuclear warfare, he reported that theSoviets had about one sixth of their total munitions inchemical weapons. 142The 1960s: Decade of TurmoilIn January 1961 Secretary of Defense Robert SMcNamara initiated about 150 projects to provide anappraisal of US military capabilities. Two of these,Project 112 and Project 80, had significant impacton the chemical and biological weapons program.Project 112’s objective was to evaluate chemical andbiological weapons for use as strategic weapons andfor limited war applications. The result of this studywas a recommendation to highlight chemical weaponsand particularly to increase long-term funding, whichwas approved for immediate action by the deputysecretary of defense. One of the responses was thecreation of Deseret Test Center, Utah, intended forextra-continental chemical and biological agent testing,including trials at sea, and arctic and tropical environmentaltesting. The new center was jointly staffed bythe Army, Navy, and Air Force, with testing scheduledto begin in 1962.Project 80 resulted in a committee to review theorganization of the Army. The project committeeeliminated the technical services and distributedtheir functions to various elements of the new Armyorganization. McNamara felt that the Chemical Corps’knowledge, experience, and training was not being“infused” into the rest of the Army because the combattroops were “structurally separated” from the corps,particularly in the areas of research, development,and training. 143Colonel John M Palmer, head of the Chemical CorpsTraining Command, reflected on the problem in 1960:The quickest way to reduce the effectiveness of a militarytraining program is to train without purpose orsense of urgency. Unfortunately, for 40 years an aimlessapproach has largely characterized unit chemicalwarfare training in the U.S. Army. . . . Much ofthe Army still appears to visualize chemical warfare. . . as an annoying distraction from normal combattraining. 144(p28)The 1962 Army ReorganizationBased on the problems associated with trainingcombat troops for chemical warfare, the DefenseDepartment ordered a far-reaching realignment offunctions in 1962. Most of the technical service headquartersestablishments, including that of the ChemicalCorps, were discontinued, and their functions mergedinto three field commands. The training mission of thechief chemical officer was assigned to the ContinentalArmy Command; the development of doctrine was56