Medical Aspects of Chemical Warfare (2008) - The Black Vault

Medical Aspects of Chemical Warfaretime, the corps concentrated on producing and fieldingnerve agent weapons and the assorted detection anddecontamination equipment required.Major General Alden H Waitt, who replaced Porterin November 1945, assessed the future of chemicalwarfare in 1946:The fact that toxic gas was not used in the late war[on the battlefield] does not justify a conclusion thatit will not be used in the future. Gas has not beenout-moded as a weapon. The Germans developednew gases during World War II. The magnitude oftheir preparedness for gas warfare is indicated bythe fact that they had amassed more than a quarterof a million tons of toxic gas; their failure to use thisgas against us is attributable largely to their fear ofour retaliatory power. We cannot count upon othernations refraining from the use of gas when it wouldserve their purpose. There were numerous instancesin the late war in which the use of gas might havehad far-reaching results. Thus, there is no good reasonfor assuming that the considerations which preventedthe employment of gas in World War II willprevail in the future. 126Demilitarization of Captured WeaponsAt the end of the war, the United States was activelyinvolved in the demilitarization of the thousands ofcaptured munitions from German stockpiles (Figure2-36). Following the occupation of Germany and Japan,the Allies initiated a sea-dumping and weaponsdisposal program to eliminate the large stockpiles ofcaptured chemical agents. Ships containing Germanweapons were sunk in the North Sea as part of OperationDavy Jones’ Locker, but not all the Germanweapons were destroyed. Between 1945 and 1947,some 40,000 of the 250-kg tabun bombs, 21,000 mustardbombs of various sizes, 2,700 nitrogen mustardrockets, and about 750 tabun artillery shells of varioussizes were shipped to the United States. In addition todisposing of the enemy stockpiles, the United Statesdumped the US lewisite stockpile into the sea duringOperation Geranium in 1948. 4,127the 1950sKorean WarWith the onset of the Korean War in June 1950,the Chemical Corps participated in its first militaryaction. The corps quickly implemented an increasedprocurement program to supply the Army with defensiveequipment and a retaliatory chemical capability.Within a short time, however, the Army’s policy onchemical warfare and the lessons learned from the pastwere disputed, particularly as the military situation inKorea changed. The action in Korea raised the questionof whether to initiate chemical warfare to save lives.Many of the Chemical Corps’ supporters favored theuse of chemical weapons as humane weapons of war,particularly to offset the enemy’s superior numbers.One officer stated bluntly that “the use of mustard,lewisite and phosgene in the vast quantities which weare capable of making and distributing offers the onlysure way of holding Korea at the present time. We arenot playing marbles. We are fighting for our lives. Let’suse the best means we have to overwhelm the enemyscientifically and intelligently.” 128(p3)Although the North Koreans and Chinese allegedthat US forces employed chemical weapons on thebattlefield, there is no evidence that the ChemicalCorps used them, although it did use smoke and flame,as well as riot control agents to quell riots by prisonersof war. In 1968 a Czech general who defected to theUnited States reported that US prisoners of war wereused for biological tests by the Russians in North Korea.These allegations have yet to be confirmed by theRussians and were vigorously denied by the NorthKoreans. 129 The United States did not change its policyabout no first use of chemical weapons.At the end of the Korean War, the Chemical Corpswas in a much stronger position than it had been atthe end of World War II. Although the corps slightlyreduced its units and personnel and terminated manyof its procurement contracts in the months followingthe 1953 armistice, Major General Egbert F Bullene, thenew chief chemical officer, summed up the feeling ofthe corps regarding the Korean War and the Cold Warin general: “Today, thanks to Joe Stalin, we are backin business.” 130(p8)Changes in the Chemical CorpsDuring the 1950s the concept of chemical warfarecontinued to change radically. The phrase that onecould “push a button” to start a war became popular.The lesson learned from the Korean War—thata limited war, fought without nuclear weapons andpossibly against satellite states, not the “real enemy”—determined much of the Army’s future planning. Thefact that two wars had come and gone without theemployment of chemical weapons made it necessaryfor successive chief chemical officers to continuallyremind the Army and the country that the capabilities54