Medical Aspects of Chemical Warfare (2008) - The Black Vault

Medical Aspects of Chemical WarfareI was not able to make out from my own direct observationswhether gas warfare was to be started, butI knew from various associates of Ley’s and Goebbels’that they were discussing the question of usingour two new combat gases, Tabun and Sarin. Theybelieved that these gases would be of particular efficacy,and they did in fact produce the most frightfulresults. We made these observations as early as theautumn of 1944, when the situation had become critical,and many people were seriously worried aboutit. . . . All sensible army people turned gas warfaredown as being utterly insane, since, in view of their[the Allies] superiority in the air, it would not be longbefore it would bring the most terrible catastropheupon German cities. 108(pp527–528)Speer also cites his concerns about protecting theGerman soldiers from the effects of nerve agents. Onthe question of nerve agent production, effects, andpreparations made for use in the war, Speer shed lighton the implementation of possible German plans:I cannot tell you that in detail. I am not enough of anexpert. All I know is that these two gases both hada quite extraordinary effect, and that there was norespirator, and no protection against them that weknew of. So the soldiers would have been unable toprotect themselves against this gas in any way. Forthe manufacture of this gas we had about three factories,all of which were undamaged and which untilNovember 1944 were working at full speed. Whenrumors reached us that gas might be used, I stoppedits production in November 1944. I stopped it by thefollowing means. I blocked the so-called preliminaryproduction, that is, the chemical supplies for themaking of gas, so that the gas-production, as the Alliedauthorities themselves ascertained, after the endof December to the beginning of January, actuallyslowed down and finally came to a standstill. Beginningwith a letter which is still in existence and whichI wrote to Hitler in October 1944, I tried through legalmethods to obtain his permission to have these gasfactories stop their production. The reason I gave himwas that on account of air raids the preliminary products,primarily cyanide, were needed urgently forother purposes. Hitler informed me that the gas productionwould have to continue whatever happened,but I gave instructions for the preliminary productsnot to be supplied any more. 108(p527)3-fold. First, trench warfare necessitated the use of gasto break a stalemate, but gas led to only minimal gainsin territory. Second, gas was more advantageous to defensivepositions. Third, large advances were possiblewith lightning strikes using tanks and a highly mobilemilitary, and this strategy would allow fewer casualtiesby overwhelming the opponent at the point of attack.Advancing into an area covered with persistent agentswould hinder the mission. However, one could arguethat defensively drenching the beaches of Normandywith nerve agent might have slowed the Allied D-Dayinvasion until the arrival of reinforcements. After thewar, General Omar Bradley admitted his dread aboutsuch a defense, saying, “When D-Day finally endedwithout a whiff of gas, I was vastly relieved. For evena light sprinkling of persistent gas on Omaha Beachwould have cost us our footing there. [Gas wouldhave] forced a decision in one of history’s climacticbattles.” 110(p237)Capture of German Facilities and ScientistsUpon capture of a German ammunition dump inApril 1945 (Figures 2-34 and 2-35), Allied scientists atPorton Down became aware of German tabun gas andits physiological effects for the first time. 111 Only thendid the Allied command believe in the existence of Hitler’snew “war gas,” despite intelligence gathered froma captured German scientist on May 11, 1943, in Tunisia.The captured chemist worked at the nerve agentlaboratory at Spandau and provided valuable informa-Despite nerve agent testing, manufacture, and stockpilingby the German military during World War II,chemical weapons were never deployed. Many arguethat the Nazi philosophy of blitzkrieg accounted forthe reluctance to use nerve agents: 109 a quick strikingoffense with tanks would only be slowed by anengagement using poison gas. The lessons Germanylearned about chemical warfare from World War I wereFig. 2-34. Storage of approximately 2,000 German tabunbombs shipped into Schierling Chemical Depot after theoccupation of West Germany by American troops in the aftermathof World War II. Photograph: Courtesy of Chemicaland Biological Defense Command Historical Research andResponse Team, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.50