Medical Aspects of Chemical Warfare (2008) - The Black Vault

History of Chemical Warfaregases, or defensive gas material. No provision thatwould require the disposal or destruction of anyexisting installation of our Chemical Warfare Serviceor of any stocks of chemical warfare materialshould be incorporated in an agreement. Furthermore,the existence of a War Department agencyengaged in experimentation and manufacture ofchemical warfare materials, and in training for unforeseencontingencies is deemed essential to ournational defense. 59(p118)The 1930s: Growing Threat of Chemical WarfareThe use of chemical weapons in the name ofimperialist expansion awakened the internationalcommunity during the 1930s, when Italy and Japandeployed their offensive chemical stockpiles againstunprotected neighbors. In addition, a new chemicalthreat emerged with the discovery of nerve agents,poisons of extraordinary potency, by Dr GerhardSchrader in Germany. While some countries usedchemical weapons, others stockpiled them. No internationalattempts to ban chemical warfare occurredduring the 1930s.Italian-Ethiopian WarThe first major use of chemical weapons after WorldWar I came in 1935 during the Italian-Ethiopian War.Italy’s fascist dictator, Benito Mussolini, launched aninvasion of Ethiopia from its neighbors Eritrea, anItalian colony, and Italian Somaliland, that lasted approximately7 months starting October 3. Viewed asa prelude to World War II, the Italian-Ethiopian Warproved the effectiveness of chemical weapons and theineffectiveness of the League of Nations.Ethiopia protested the invasion to the League ofNations, which in turn imposed limited economicsanctions on Italy. These sanctions, although not crippling,put pressure on Italy to either win the war orwithdraw. The initial Italian offensive from Eritrea wasnot pursued with enough vigor in Mussolini’s opinion,and the Italian commander was replaced. The newcommander, Marshal Pietro Badoglio, was ordered tofinish the war quickly. He resorted to chemical weaponsto defeat the Ethiopian troops led by EmperorHaile Selassie. Despite the Geneva Protocol of 1925,which Italy had ratified in 1928 (followed by Ethiopiain 1935), the Italians dropped mustard bombs andoccasionally sprayed mustard from airplane tanks.They also used mustard agent in powder form as a“dusty agent” on the African desert sands to burn theunprotected feet of the Ethiopians. There were rumorsof phosgene and chloropicrin attacks, but these werenever verified. The Italians attempted to justify theiruse of chemical weapons by citing the exception to theGeneva Protocol restrictions that referred to acceptableuse for reprisal against illegal acts of war, stating thatthe Ethiopians had tortured or killed their prisonersand wounded soldiers. 67–79The chemical weapons devastated the unpreparedand unprotected Ethiopians, who had few antiaircraftguns and no air force. Selassie described the situationto the League of Nations:Special sprayers were installed on board aircraftso they could vaporize over vast areas of territorya fine, death-dealing rain. Groups of 9, 15, or 18aircraft followed one another so that the fog issuingfrom them formed a continuous sheet. It wasthus that, as from the end of January 1936, soldiers,women, children, cattle, rivers, lakes, and pastureswere drenched continually with this deadly rain. Inorder more surely to poison the waters and pastures,the Italian command made its aircraft pass over andover again. These fearful tactics succeeded. Menand animals succumbed. The deadly rain that fellfrom the aircraft made all those whom it touched flyshrieking with pain. All those who drank poisonedwater or ate infected food also succumbed in dreadfulsuffering. In tens of thousands the victims of Italianmustard gas fell. 72(pp151–152)By May 1936 Italy’s army had completely routedthe Ethiopian army. Italy controlled most of Ethiopiauntil 1941, when British and other allied troops reconqueredthe country. The US Army closely followed thewar and sent Major Norman E Fiske to observe withthe Italian army, and Captain John Meade to observewith the Ethiopian army. Their different conclusionsas to the role of chemical warfare in the conflict reflectedthe sides they observed. Major Fiske thoughtthe Italians were clearly superior and that victory forthem was assured. The use of chemical agents in thewar was nothing more than an experiment. “Frommy own observations and from talking with [Italian]junior officers and soldiers,” Fiske reported, “I haveconcluded that gas was not used extensively in theAfrican campaign and that its use had little if any effecton the outcome.” 77(p20) His opinion was supportedby others who felt that the Ethiopians had made aserious mistake in abandoning guerrilla operationsfor a conventional war.On the other hand, Captain Meade thought thatchemical weapons were a significant factor in winningthe war. They had been used to destroy the morale ofthe Ethiopian troops, who had little or no protection,45