Medical Aspects of Chemical Warfare (2008) - The Black Vault

History of the Chemical Threatgate summaries and fails to inform both the public andstates parties of the extent of noncompliance. 105Krutzch went on to explain inspection and verificationas described to be unduly influenced through thestate parties’ control of the budget, greatly limiting theability of the technical secretariat to prioritize its missionactivities. By defining, in the budget, the numberof inspections to be held in each schedule category,the technical secretariat had to revisit a schedule 1 siteof minimal concern six times, while large numbers ofchemical production facilities were disproportionallyuninspected. 105Progress Made Toward ComplianceUnless a nation declares its own state of progress inimplementing the CWC, any effort to compile a listingof progress by state party is incomplete because theOPCW generally reports only numbers in aggregateform. Many nations, including smaller ones such asAlbania, have or had modest stockpiles and may dependon foreign assistance for their elimination. 106 TheOPCW scorecard shows the United States and RussianFederation declared an overall total of 64,260 metrictons of agent. The remaining 167 declarations total anadditional 7,055 metric tons of agent 99 (Table 4-6).Chemical DemilitarizationThe CWC does not specify how chemicals are tobe destroyed. 107 It provides language requiring thatdestruction be completed in a safe manner and in compliancewith a state party’s environmental regulations.Both incineration and various chemical eliminationmethods are employed. The CWC requires eliminationof the offending chemical; as long as the reaction productsare not CWC scheduled compounds, the agent isconsidered destroyed. Demilitarization is generally amultistep process. VX nerve agent hydrolysis, for example,yields a mixture of schedule 2 products basednot on toxicity but on the presence of residual phosphonatealkyl groups. Hence this product is subsequentlysubjected to further oxidation or biodegradation. ARussian plan incorporated the unwanted products intoasphalt. Concrete embedding can also be used.US ProgramTable 4-6Chemical Weapons ConventionProgress, FEBRUARY 2008Total weight of declared chemicalagentsTotal number of declared munitions/containersTotal destroyed agentTotal destroyed munitions/containersCWPFs certified as destroyed~ 71,315 metrictons~ 8,679,000 items~ 27,199 metrictons (38%)~ 2,930,000 items(34%)42 of 65 declaredCWPFs certified as converted 19Number of states parties (as of December2007)183Initial declarations received 169Implementing legislation submitted79enacted in all key areasCWPF: chemical weapons production facilityData source: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical WeaponsWeb site. Accessed: May 16, 2008. Available at: www.opcw.org/index.html.The Army has been responsible for destroyingleaking or obsolete chemical weapons since it begandeveloping them. In October 1972 Army Materiel Commandheadquarters formalized the mission throughthe creation of a Program Manager for Demilitarizationof Chemical Materiel, headed by Colonel SampsonBass. This office was to plan, direct, and controlthe chemical demilitarization program, includingthe design, development, and acquisition of specialequipment and facilities. Its initial projects includedaddressing leaking munitions and bulk agent at thenine chemical weapons stockpile sites and DugwayProving Ground, Utah, in addition to chemical remediationefforts at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Colorado,and finishing biological warfare agent disposal effortsat Fort Detrick, Maryland. Between 1969 and 1985 theArmy destroyed nearly 15 million lb of chemical agentsthrough neutralization and incineration technologiesat Rocky Mountain Arsenal alone.The duties and scope of disposal operations eventuallyprompted Army leadership to propose that aformal agency take responsibility for chemical demilitarization,which had grown to include developingdisposal technologies, building permanent facilities,coordinating with interagency government offices,and running disposal operations. The US Army Toxicand Hazardous Materials Agency began operationsin 1978. One of its first major efforts was to build theUS Army Chemical Agent Materiel Disposal Systemat Tooele Army Depot, Utah, as a test facility to developproven industrial and military processes andequipment and to demonstrate their applicability tolarge-scale demilitarization facilities. The test facility141