Medical Aspects of Chemical Warfare (2008) - The Black Vault

History of the Chemical ThreatAmmunition. Although the conference was unsuccessfulin curbing the international arms trade, a subtextto these negotiations became the well-known GenevaProtocols. In addition to setting international rulesgoverning the protection of civilians and woundedand captured combatants, the Geneva conventionsincluded the first multinational agreement banningthe use of chemical weapons. 90During negotiations, efforts to implement a ban onthe export of chemical agents forwarded by the USdelegation were ultimately foundered by issues such asdifficulty of import and export verification, extensiveand dual use in the chemical industry, and the concernsof inequity raised by nonpossessor nations or thosewith a less-advanced chemical infrastructure. 90 Theseconcerns led to the adoption of compromise language,which limited chemical warfare agent use:Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonousor other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materialsor devices, has been justly condemned by thegeneral opinion of the civilized world; and Whereasthe prohibition of such use has been declared in Treatiesto which the majority of Powers of the World areParties; and To the end that this prohibition shall beuniversally accepted as a part of International Law,binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations.. . . 91Signed June 17, 1925, for implementation on February8, 1928, the Geneva prohibition was ultimatelysigned by 133 “states parties.” Many signatories,including the United States, ratified the treaty on a nofirst-usebasis. Other nations reserved for themselvesthe right of first use against a nonsigning nation.Finally a number of nations, including Iraq, a 1931signatory, limited their application of the protocolto international conflicts, retaining their internalsovereignty.An inevitable weakness of the Geneva Protocol asa ban is that multinational agreements are difficult toenforce. Chemical weapons use by a weaker nationmay elicit intervention by superior external forces, butresponding to militarily powerful offenders would bedifficult or impossible. Italy’s use of mustard gas in itsinvasion of Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935–1936 drew nosignificant repercussions from the League of Nationsnor from other signatories, even though both Ethiopiaand Italy had ratified the protocol prior to the invasion.The International Red Cross, wishing to retain neutralityduring the conflict, declined to testify on the issuebefore the League of Nations, 92 and sanctions from thelatter were ineffectual.Excepting the United States and Japan, mostmajor powers ratified the treaty soon after its development.Despite being favorably reviewed bythe Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1926, thetreaty was kept from reaching a vote by opposition,and it was withdrawn from consideration by PresidentHarry S Truman after World War II. However,like many unratified treaties, signatories generallyabide by them without ratification. Warned thatthe Axis powers might employ chemical weapons,President Franklin D Roosevelt reaffirmed the USno-first-use policy in June 1943. Subsequent USrejections of ratification were based on a stated preferencein favor of verifiable disarmament. 91 The USuse of defoliant herbicides and riot control agentsduring the Vietnam War led to further conflictsin interpretation of the protocol and a continuedreluctance to sign.In 1969 President Nixon resubmitted the protocol,affirming a no-first-use policy and offering to banincapacitating agents under the treaty. Ultimatelythe US Senate delayed ratification of the treaty untilJanuary 22, 1975, when the Ford administration proposeda version that retained a more limited use ofherbicides and riot control agents, promising neitherwould be employed in first use in war. 91 Herbicideapplication was limited to defensive perimetersaround military installations, and riot agents weregenerally limited to quelling prisoner disturbances,reducing civilian injuries, implementing rescues,and supporting rear echelon defensive responses bybesieged convoys.The United Nations Disarmament CommitteeNuclear, chemical, and biological stockpile accumulationin the context of the political and armedconflicts of the Cold War created momentum for thedevelopment of effective dialogue toward the eventualnegotiation of disarmament treaties. Although conventionalweapons issues and nuclear proliferation andtesting took precedent over chemical weapons armscontrol, the implementation of the Eighteen-NationDisarmament Committee by the UN General Assemblyin 1962 provided a forum for discussions addressingall aspects of disarmament, including chemical weapons.This body, initially composed of eight nonalignedand five aligned nations each from the Eastern Blocand Western sides, was renamed several times asmembership expanded, and became instrumental indeveloping workable positions in support of chemicaland biological arms control. 93The Biological Weapons ConventionBecause military biological capabilities were much137