Medical Aspects of Chemical Warfare (2008) - The Black Vault

History of the Chemical Threatcapability were well-equipped for chemical warfareprotection; they had defined procedures on decontamination,individual and equipment protection, anddetection and surveillance. Because chemical warfareagents are dangerous for the user as well as the enemy,they required that offensive and defensive programsbe developed simultaneously. Special military teams(eg, logistical, medical, and chemical corps teamstrained to operate in a chemical environment) andthe ability to monitor meteorological conditions werecharacteristic of nations with offensive or defensiveprograms. In assessing enemy capability, chemicalstockpiles, production capacities, and the control ofuse are evaluated when an offensive or defensiveposture is being determined. Such assessments arecomplicated by the possibility that industrial plants,manufacturing products with peaceful applications,may be “dual use”; that is, their manufacturingprocesses may be redirected toward chemical agentproduction.Over recent decades, the chemical threat has shiftedappreciably, from fully structured military offensiveand defensive capabilities to more clandestine activitiesby rogue nations and terrorist elements. Today, thegreatest chemical threat comes from the accidental orintentional release of industrial toxicants, a lesson thatshould be learned from the catastrophe of Bhopal, 70 andaccidents involving extremely common toxicants, suchas those involving chlorine in Henderson, Nevada, in1991 71 and in Graniteville, South Carolina, in 2005. 72Although only 11 chorine railcars are known to havebeen breached between 1956 and 2006, these cars areextremely common and represent a particularly significanturban threat. 73 The widespread acceptance of theChemical Weapons Convention (CWC)—a near-globalchemical weapons ban—and promotion of laws governingchemical export controls 74 have substantiallyreduced the risk of national chemical weapon use,though likely possessor nations, such as North Korea,must continue to be monitored for potential clandestineweapons proliferation. Modern chemical threatsappear to originate most frequently from rogue groupswith little or no sophisticated chemical warfare capability;hence, chemical agent employment from terroristelements may present differently than they would fromnation states. Chemical toxicants can be applied unaltered,or chemical warfare agents can be manufacturedvirtually undetected in relatively crude laboratoriesand used to create disruption. Political instability andradicalism heighten these inherent dangers.National Chemical Warfare Capabilities of NationsSince World War I, the reluctance of possessor statesto employ chemical weapons has been relatively high.However, the Iraqi precedent, the ineffective worldresponse to Iraq’s use of chemical warfare, and theperceived effectiveness of this use all suggest that thechemical warfare threshold has been substantiallylowered. The growing list of states motivated, forreasons of offense or deterrence, to develop relativelylow-technology, low-cost weapons of mass destructiongreatly increases the likelihood that military personnelwill need to contend with casualties of chemicalwarfare.On March 15, 1991, an article in The WashingtonPost described the latest annual report of the Office ofNaval Intelligence, listing 14 nations with “an offensivechemical-warfare capability.” 75 The list includedEgypt, Israel, Pakistan, and South Korea, four nationsthat receive large quantities of military aid fromthe United States. 75 Four additional nations (SaudiArabia, Indonesia, South Africa, and Thailand) werepurported to possibly possess such a capability, andmore nations were believed to be in the process ofdeveloping or seeking to develop chemical weapons.In a 1993 US House of Representatives Committee onArmed Services report, 31 nations were mentioned aspossessing or having the ability to develop offensivechemical weapons. 76Because chemical weapons are less expensive andeasier to acquire than nuclear weapons, they are acredible threat from developing nations. The adaptationand incorporation of chemical-agent–containingmunitions to conventional or missile delivery systemscan give a weaker nation a military threat to counterbalanceneighbors with greater conventional capabilities.Nations may initially acquire a limited chemicalwarfare capability through the transfer or purchaseof bombs or artillery-compatible chemical weaponsshells. In some cases, unweaponized agent may betransferred. 77 Alternatively, nations may invest in thedevelopment of chemical industries that involve themanufacture or acquisition of chemical precursors orintermediates. In this way, wealthier nations or thoseunder a strong, perceived threat may increase theirchemical warfare potential by acquiring the technologyand facilities to synthesize agents and incorporatethem into munitions compatible with existing or newlyacquired delivery systems. Industrial compounds suchas organophosphates (pesticides), phosgene, chlorine,and cyanide are not difficult to obtain.Inevitably, a trickle-down effect occurs in the armsworld as aging munitions and weapons systems arereplaced and move from the major weapons producersto their client states in developing nations, and fromthere to other nations. For example, the Soviet Unionprobably supplied a chemical warfare capability to131