Medical Aspects of Chemical Warfare (2008) - The Black Vault

Medical Aspects of Chemical Warfarethe 29th Division and future major general and chiefof the CWS), and Colonel Amos Fries (wartime chiefof the overseas component of the CWS). Dr Gilchristserved as chief of the medical division of the CWSfrom 1922 to 1929. In 1925 Lieutenant Colonel Vedderpublished Medical Aspects of Chemical Warfare, a bookcontaining data on the pathology and physiology ofvarious chemical agents (particularly mustard). Muchof the text is still germane. In it and his memoirs, Vedderexpressed staunch support for chemical warfare:Gas did not maim as did missiles, the wounds ofwhich caused the loss of arms, legs, and the distressingdestruction of the jaws and other wounds of theface. Chemical Warfare therefore, appeared to do thework of dissipating the opposing Army better thandid firearms, and it was at the same time more humanor at least less barbarous, and more economical.It required many fewer troops and much less moneyto produce sufficient gas than to secure fire control. 74Leading into World War II, the organization formedically managing chemical casualties was basedupon the World War I schemas. Despite the generalexpectation that chemical weapons would be used inWorld War II, smoke and flame were the only chemicalagents used in the war (smoke was used for screeningtroops and movement, especially in Europe, andAmericans in the Pacific used flame weapons in Japanesecaves and bunkers). For reasons that historians arestill debating (see Chapter 2), gas itself was not used,though the United States was prepared for a gas attack.In an address to the students of the Industrial Collegeof the Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Alden Waitt,the CWS chief in 1946, commented on his discoveriesand impressions as he visited the German heartlandafter the end of World War II:The Germans had gases that were unknown in WorldWar I, gases which were much more potent thanWorld War I gases. They would have used them if wehad not had protection against them and had not beenable to retaliate in kind. I saw the tremendous preparationswhich the Germans had made for waging gaswarfare. . . . We in the Chemical Warfare Service whowere responsible for the program had been worriedbecause we had not turned up any German gas aswe moved through France and western Germany. Afew of us who were responsible for the planning andestablishing the requirements wondered if questionswould be raised after the war as to whether we hadbeen thoroughly justified in spending money of theGovernment and insisting that there be placed overin England quantities of gas for retaliation. No gasdepots showed up when we came into Normandy.No German gas appeared in France. No German gasappeared before we got to the Rhine. But after we gotacross the Rhine it began to show up in tremendousquantities, we discovered large stocks of gas in centralGermany, scattered all through the country. Thetremendous German effort and potential were apparent,once we had gotten into the central part of thecountry. After the surrender, when I saw these things,I realized that we had been well justified in all ourpreparations. As a matter of fact, we had won a gaswar without firing a shot, without dropping a bomb.I saw the tremendous installations at Raubkammer—tremendous proving grounds, pilot plants, and depots.This one proving ground at Raubkammer wasthe equivalent of our Edgewood Arsenal and DugwayProving Ground combined. It was equippedwith splendid facilities. . . . I do not have time to tellyou about them. I can only assure you that I wasamazed at what I saw there. Several bomb-storagedepots were located at Raubkammer. At Muna Ost, afew miles away, there was a storage depot for chemicalmines and artillery and mortar shells. There wasa tremendous quantity of munitions there. The Luftwaffegas storage depot was located at Oerrel. Here Isaw 175 beautifully camouflaged concrete bunkers allfilled with 250-kllo and 500-kllo bombs charged withphosgene, mustard, and the new German gas, greenring 3—thousands upon thousands of bombs and allof them invulnerable against attack. We might, if wecould have gotten a direct hit on one of these bunkerswith a thousand pound bomb have destroyed it; but,only by a direct hit. They were beautifully hidden.As a matter of fact, we did not know of any of theseinstallations until we got in there. They had not beenlocated by allied intelligence. The same thing was duplicatedall through central Germany. In all we locatedapproximately a quarter of a million tons of toxicgas-munitions and bulk agent. What do you supposethey figured on doing with those quarter of a milliontons–250 thousand tons, not pounds? What do yousuppose they had that for? Why did they not use it?The fact that we were prepared—that we had gasoverseas in England ready for instant retaliatory use,and finally, that we had the great potential of our arsenalsand industry, is why they did not use gas atNormandy when we landed. I am confident of this,and it is one of the best lessons in preparedness theAmerican people can have. We prevented a gas warby being ready!I am sure that a gas war would have set us back sixmonths if they had dropped large quantities of gason us when we were concentrated in small areas onthe beaches in Normandy. I am just as sure of that asI am sure of anything. Had the gas appeared at Normandy,it would have delayed us seriously. It mighthave given the Germans time to get ready their V-3or V-4 or whatever their next great technical developmentwas going to be. But they did not dare to useit, because they knew if they did, their cities wouldhave been drenched with gas.104