The battle for Greece & Crete.pdf - Army Museum of South Australia

Dissentions about the campaignMany of the Senior Officers involved, particularly the Australians thought the concept to be a ‘strategicblunder of the first magnitude’.This feeling can be seen from the actions of the British Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham theCommander of the Mediterranean Fleet, and General Blamey who was actually planning the evacuationof Greece even before the campaign had started. The arrival of the troops in Greece was directed by LtGen. Wilson from his HQ Jerusalem, Palestine and when thing started to go bad in Greece Blamey wasmade Field commander.Many of the Commanders involved thought that the concept was inviting disaster. They likened it toGallipoli- It appeared that Churchill had not learned his lesson at Gallipoli and he was trying to provethat his strategies were right by using them again in Greece.Prime Minister Menzies was always concerned about the operations and he was the only person toquestion Churchill- all the others (the British War Cabinet) simply agreed with him. (MenziesDiary 24 February 1941 P.66). Apparently Menzies believed that the concept only had a reasonablechance of success.One can only believe that this action by Menzies was only for show as he tended to go along with theBritish and later he was to describe himself as ‘British to the boot heels’. In his memoirs “AfternoonLight” he tries to justify his and his Government’s decision in respect to Greece, when he says “MyAustralian Colleagues still adhere to their (and my) belief that the decision to send our troops to Greecewas strategically correct”.Whilst it was apparent from the start that Blamey was opposed to the campaign, like any good soldierhe did what he was told by his superiors but took every opportunity to voice his opinions. Hebelieved that the allies should not have tried to defend Greece, but rather concentrated on defendingCrete and Rhodes.By March 5, Blamey had summed up the situation and advised Menzies that it was only the Australiansand New Zealanders who were supplying combat troops (infantry) and that the British were onlyproviding the Lines of Communication (L of C) roles. He informed Menzies that he had grave doubtsabout the whole venture. He was later to say “The Greek expedition hadn’t a dog’s chance from thestart. The Greek plan was a bad one and our plan to support them was equally bad.” This assessmentwas proved to be correct. Blamey was ordered to leave Greece against his wishes. However if heexpected his troops to obey orders then he must also do so. Blamey left Greece on the 23 rd April byflying-boat for Alexandria he also took with him his senior staff.Brig. S.I Rowell; Lt Col. Henry Wells; Lt Col. Eric Woodward; Lt Col. Cyril Elliot;Capt. N. D. Carlyon (Blamey’s ADC) and Major T.R. Blamey (Blamey’s son) this causedsome problems with other senior officers.The German reasoningThere are a number of reasons why Hitler decided to invade Greece and Crete. One was the defeat ofthe Italians by the Greeks this in conjunction with the advice of General von Greiffenberg that theBritish had used Salonika (Thessalonika) in 1915 to develop a strategic thrust against the Germans in1918. It was this fear that the British would send troops and set up a base in Greece, rather than hiswanting to occupy Greece caused Hitler to commence the invasion of Greece.If Britain was to establish bases in Greece it would make the German oilfields at Polesti in Romaniaopen to attack.- 3 -