The battle for Greece & Crete.pdf - Army Museum of South Australia

More documents

Recommendations

Info

What was originally plannedThe British War Cabinet and the Greek Government agreed that an ‘Expeditionary Force’ to be knownas ‘Lustre Force’ would be provided and would consist of:Three Infantry Divisions, one Armoured Division (maybe a second), a Polish Brigadea total of about 100,000 troops.The troops were to be supported by – 240 Field Guns – 32 Medium Guns –192 AA (anti-aircraft) Guns- 202 Anti- Tank Guns- 142 Tanks- 5 RAF SquadronsThese troops were to consist of:1 st Australian Corps HQ – 6 th & 7 th Australian Divisions – 2 nd New Zealand DivisionaBritish Armoured Brigade- a Polish Brigade.The force was to be under the command of General Sir (Jumbo) Maitland Wilson, who was GeneralWavell’s trusted ‘Right Hand Man.Wilson was known for his dislike of the Australians and they in turn were not impressed with him.General Blamey thought that he lacked ‘enough grey matter – unintelligent’ and Robert Menzies theAustralian Prime Minister described him as ‘tall, fat and cunning’.What was providedInitially on the 1 st November 1940 a British Battalion landed on Crete, this was followed on the 3 rdNovember by eight fighter bombers at Eleusis near Athens. By the 15 th November some 4,247 troopswere to be stationed in Greece, these numbers included three Air Squadrons. Some of these unitswere medical units – 26 th British General Hospital- 189 th Field Ambulance- 48 th Field Hygiene-168 th British Light Field Ambulance – 4 th British Light Field Ambulance.By the 11 th February 1941 “Lustre Force” consisted of1 st Australian Corps HQ- 6 th Australian Division – 2 nd New Zealand DivisionaBritish Armoured Brigade and A number of British Medical Units..The Polish Brigade remained in Egypt and the 7 th Australian Division in Africa as a result of Rommel’sinvasion of Cyrenaica. No one seems to know what happened to the five RAF Squadrons.The Australian ViewGeneral Wavell informed General Blamey of the raising of ‘Lustre Force’ on the 18 February 1941, theAustralian Government agreed to the concept on 26 February 1941. The first allied troops reachedGreece on the 7 th March.Blamey argued with Wavell that as the ‘Force’ consisted mainly of Dominion Troops (Australia andNew Zealand) the force should be commanded by a Dominion Officer. Wavell commented that only42,000 troops would be Australian and New Zealand. When ‘Lustre Force’ was actually raised andsent to Greece it consisted of:17,125 Australians and 16,700 New Zealanders, and they in fact made up theactual combat Infantry in ‘Lustre Force’yet he still persisted in appointing a British Officer to command the Force.- 2 -
Dissentions about the campaignMany of the Senior Officers involved, particularly the Australians thought the concept to be a ‘strategicblunder of the first magnitude’.This feeling can be seen from the actions of the British Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham theCommander of the Mediterranean Fleet, and General Blamey who was actually planning the evacuationof Greece even before the campaign had started. The arrival of the troops in Greece was directed by LtGen. Wilson from his HQ Jerusalem, Palestine and when thing started to go bad in Greece Blamey wasmade Field commander.Many of the Commanders involved thought that the concept was inviting disaster. They likened it toGallipoli- It appeared that Churchill had not learned his lesson at Gallipoli and he was trying to provethat his strategies were right by using them again in Greece.Prime Minister Menzies was always concerned about the operations and he was the only person toquestion Churchill- all the others (the British War Cabinet) simply agreed with him. (MenziesDiary 24 February 1941 P.66). Apparently Menzies believed that the concept only had a reasonablechance of success.One can only believe that this action by Menzies was only for show as he tended to go along with theBritish and later he was to describe himself as ‘British to the boot heels’. In his memoirs “AfternoonLight” he tries to justify his and his Government’s decision in respect to Greece, when he says “MyAustralian Colleagues still adhere to their (and my) belief that the decision to send our troops to Greecewas strategically correct”.Whilst it was apparent from the start that Blamey was opposed to the campaign, like any good soldierhe did what he was told by his superiors but took every opportunity to voice his opinions. Hebelieved that the allies should not have tried to defend Greece, but rather concentrated on defendingCrete and Rhodes.By March 5, Blamey had summed up the situation and advised Menzies that it was only the Australiansand New Zealanders who were supplying combat troops (infantry) and that the British were onlyproviding the Lines of Communication (L of C) roles. He informed Menzies that he had grave doubtsabout the whole venture. He was later to say “The Greek expedition hadn’t a dog’s chance from thestart. The Greek plan was a bad one and our plan to support them was equally bad.” This assessmentwas proved to be correct. Blamey was ordered to leave Greece against his wishes. However if heexpected his troops to obey orders then he must also do so. Blamey left Greece on the 23 rd April byflying-boat for Alexandria he also took with him his senior staff.Brig. S.I Rowell; Lt Col. Henry Wells; Lt Col. Eric Woodward; Lt Col. Cyril Elliot;Capt. N. D. Carlyon (Blamey’s ADC) and Major T.R. Blamey (Blamey’s son) this causedsome problems with other senior officers.The German reasoningThere are a number of reasons why Hitler decided to invade Greece and Crete. One was the defeat ofthe Italians by the Greeks this in conjunction with the advice of General von Greiffenberg that theBritish had used Salonika (Thessalonika) in 1915 to develop a strategic thrust against the Germans in1918. It was this fear that the British would send troops and set up a base in Greece, rather than hiswanting to occupy Greece caused Hitler to commence the invasion of Greece.If Britain was to establish bases in Greece it would make the German oilfields at Polesti in Romaniaopen to attack.- 3 -
Page 1 and 2: THE BATTLEFORGREECE AND CRETEMatt W
Page 3 and 4: The German Invasion Force- Strength
Page 5: PrefaceIf one wishes to examine par
Page 9 and 10: This bond which developed between t
Page 11 and 12: Recollections of a Greek Youth a Pa
Page 13 and 14: AthensApril20 th Nurses____________
Page 15 and 16: The GreeksGeneral Alexander Papagos
Page 17 and 18: The RAAF in GreeceVery little infor
Page 19 and 20: Crete was considered to be of strat
Page 21 and 22: Troops were to be dispersed to the
Page 23 and 24: The evacuation Beachat Sfakia (Stak
Page 25 and 26: At 6.45 am on the 20 th May 1941 th
Page 27 and 28: The PlayersAustraliaBrigadier Georg
Page 29 and 30: On one occasion on the submarine HM
Page 31 and 32: The march throughout was an exceedi
Page 33 and 34: Extract from the War Diary of 7 th
Page 35 and 36: April 25 1941: Fine. Remained hidde
Page 37 and 38: On the 20 th the Hospital ship Oba
Page 39 and 40: The route taken by Paul Cullen duri
Page 41 and 42: 42 nd Street gained importance in t
Page 43 and 44: Australian Units who served in Gree
Page 45 and 46: List of some of the ships involved
Page 47 and 48: CruiserHelle (sunk)SubmarinePapantk
Page 49 and 50: Service details of some of the Mili
Page 51 and 52: The grave of L/Cpl BarnesPlaques in
Page 53 and 54: 7 th Division Provost CompanyPerson
Page 55 and 56: BibliographyAustralian Corps of Sig

The battle for Greece & Crete.pdf - Army Museum of South Australia

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?