The battle for Greece & Crete.pdf - Army Museum of South Australia

PrefaceIf one wishes to examine particular campaigns or battles a large amount of information can be found inthe histories of the various units involved or from the sanitised official war histories of the times.Unfortunately, but understandably the unit histories concentrate on the activities of that particular unitand therefore it can be difficult to obtain an overall view of a battle or campaign.In many instances the social aspects and impacts are not discussed, nor the interrelationships of thepersonalities and other units involved and the overall statistics of a campaign.It is also sometimes difficult to ascertain the initial reasons for the campaign as often this can go backin history and relate to a political or other event.The following is an attempt to bring together in one place some of the many facets of the battle forGreece and Crete and its impact on those involved and finally to hopefully encourage further researchand therefore an understanding of all the aspects of this campaign.BackgroundIn September 1940 Hitler achieved the bloodless seizure of Romania which gave him access to theoilfields at Ploesti. It was these oilfields which were to be part of the catalyst for the future invasion ofGreece and Crete.This success by Hitler encouraged his cohort Mussolini on the 28 October 1940 to order the invasion ofGreece he saw this action as a way of showing Hitler that he was an important part of the Axis Alliance.Fortunately for Greece they were able to defeat the Italians however the loss did not go well forMussolini as Hitler was not impressed with the Greek victory that as a result of the unsuccessful attackby Mussolini the Greeks had now entered into an agreement with the British to send troops to supportGreece particularly as they had rejected an earlier offer in January 1940 by the British to providesimilar support.The Greek approachIn early 1939 both Britain and France foresaw the possibility of Germany attacking Romania followedby Greece. If occurred then it was possible that Turkey would be next. To prevent this form occurringWinston Churchill in January 1940 offered to provide Greece with a small number of troops to bestationed in Greece to assist in the defence of the country should that become necessaryGeneral Metaxas (Greek Prime Minister) and General Papagos rejected the offer for two reasons.Firstly, it could provoke the Germans into an attack on Greece, secondly if an attack did occur the forcewould be too small to prevent or repel the attack. It is understood that General Mextaxas wassympathetic to the Germans.This decision was to change in 1941 and allied troops were sent to defend Greece.The British perspectiveChurchill in one of his many ‘flashes of brilliance’ saw the stationing of troops in Greece as a way ofcommencing a second front in Europe. Like many of his ideas, it had no substance and this can beseen by comparing what was originally agreed too and what was eventually sent. As was usual withChurchill his enthusiasm faded and he passed the buck to some one else.- 1 -