The battle for Greece & Crete.pdf - Army Museum of South Australia
The battle for Greece & Crete.pdf - Army Museum of South Australia The battle for Greece & Crete.pdf - Army Museum of South Australia
The situation was not helped when it was estimated that it would need 650 tons of supplies each day tosupport the troops and only about 80 tons per day was being delivered. The fact that what supplieswere being delivered could not be unloaded during the day because of air attacks did not assist thesituation. To speed up the unloading in the short time available about 400 Australian and NewZealanders volunteered to form working gangs to unload the supplies under the difficult conditionwhich prevailed.By the 24 th May General Freyberg realised that Crete could not be saved and on the 26 th May headvised General Wavell that a decision should be made to immediately to evacuate if there was to beany chance of saving the bulk of the troops.On the 26 th May two British Commando Units were landed at night at Sunda Bay to support theexisting troops, unfortunately it was too late.On the 27 th May General Wavell decided to abandon Crete and to evacuate the troops over the nextfour days.Order for Capitulation of CreteSecond/7 th Infantry Battalion and Second /8 th Battalion31 st May, 1941Lieutenant Colonel Colvin,In view of the following facts, my orders direct me to give precedence in evacuation of fighting troops..This has reduced the active garrison below what is required for resistance for the possibility ofevacauation. I therefore direct you to collect such senior officers that are available in the early hours oftomorrow and transmit these orders to the senior of them. These orders are to make contact with theenemy and to capitulate.Evacuation“A copy of surrender Document at Spharkia Crete May 1941”It was decided that the evacuation would take place from two points. One would be Heraklion, withthe 2/4 Infantry Battalion the first to leave from this point on the 29 th May. The other being at Sfakia(Stakia) on the southern coast this required the troops to cross the White Mountains. It would appearthat this was another command blunder due to the height of the mountains and the narrow tracks thetroops would have to negotiate.During the period 28 th to 31 st May about 18,000 troops were evacuated. One of the last Australians tobe evacuated was (later Major General) Paul Cullen AC. OBE. DSO* ED and just as well as his birthname was Cohen and being Jewish he changed his named in June/July 1941in case he was caught bythe Germans. The change was promulgated in all unit routine Orders. Paul was part of the 16 thBrigade Composite Battalion which was made up of troops from 2/2 & 2/3 Battalions.Unfortunately, Retimo was over run following additional German troops being landed by sea. On the31 st May the 2/1 st Battalion surrendered.About 6,000 troops did not get off Crete including many of the 2/7 th Infantry Battalion who had beenacting as a rearguard with the Royal Marines. A number of those who were left behind fought withthe partisans in the hills, about 600 managed to escape to Egypt and unfortunately the rest werecaptured by the Germans and spent the rest of the war as POWs in Germany and other occupiedcountries.- 18 -
The evacuation Beachat Sfakia (Stakia)The British perspective for CreteChurchill advised General Wavell on the 28 th April that an attack on Crete would be made and that itwas to be held. It would appear that Churchill’s decision had been based on British Intelligence advicethat any attack on Crete would be by 5/6000 paratroopers. When in fact it was made by:• 750 Glider troops• 10,000 Paratroopers• 5,000 Troops delivered by transport aircraft.• 7,000 Troops by boatin total 22,000 German troops landed on Crete supported by 430 bombers and dive bombers and 230fighters.This underestimation and lack of truthfulness in respect to the campaign can be seen by Churchill’sstatement to the British House of Commons on day two of the attack, when he informed it that thegreater part of the Germans had been wiped out in the landing.This was another example of the incompetence of the British High Command, particularly when theBritish were in possession of the ULTRA system ‘the British had been provided with a the GermanCipher Machine ‘the Egnima” provided by the Polish which allow the British to decode information on“Operation Mercury.” On the 6 th May 1941 the British were in possession of the informationrelating to the invasion of Crete, this include the date and the exact time that the air attack on Crete wasto take place.Instructions were given to General Freyberg, to defend Maleme Airfield notwithstanding that theBritish High Command were aware that the Germans would use Paratroopers and failed to informFreyberg, who based his defence on the Germans landing by sea.It can easily be seen why the British incompetence of the Somme in World War I is compared to theirhandling of the Greek and Crete campaign in 1941.The NavyThe British Mediterranean Fleet was involved on two occasions during the Battle for Crete. Duringthe period 21 st – 23 rd May the Germans attempted to land reinforcements by sea, the British Fleetintercepted them about 30 miles from Crete and sunk all the ships with no survivors.It was again involved in the evacuation of the troops between, the 27 th and 31 st May whilst engaged inthe evacuation it lost 2,000 men, three cruisers, six destroyers and an Aircraft Carrier was badlydamaged.- 19 -
- Page 1 and 2: THE BATTLEFORGREECE AND CRETEMatt W
- Page 3 and 4: The German Invasion Force- Strength
- Page 5 and 6: PrefaceIf one wishes to examine par
- Page 7 and 8: Dissentions about the campaignMany
- Page 9 and 10: This bond which developed between t
- Page 11 and 12: Recollections of a Greek Youth a Pa
- Page 13 and 14: AthensApril20 th Nurses____________
- Page 15 and 16: The GreeksGeneral Alexander Papagos
- Page 17 and 18: The RAAF in GreeceVery little infor
- Page 19 and 20: Crete was considered to be of strat
- Page 21: Troops were to be dispersed to the
- Page 25 and 26: At 6.45 am on the 20 th May 1941 th
- Page 27 and 28: The PlayersAustraliaBrigadier Georg
- Page 29 and 30: On one occasion on the submarine HM
- Page 31 and 32: The march throughout was an exceedi
- Page 33 and 34: Extract from the War Diary of 7 th
- Page 35 and 36: April 25 1941: Fine. Remained hidde
- Page 37 and 38: On the 20 th the Hospital ship Oba
- Page 39 and 40: The route taken by Paul Cullen duri
- Page 41 and 42: 42 nd Street gained importance in t
- Page 43 and 44: Australian Units who served in Gree
- Page 45 and 46: List of some of the ships involved
- Page 47 and 48: CruiserHelle (sunk)SubmarinePapantk
- Page 49 and 50: Service details of some of the Mili
- Page 51 and 52: The grave of L/Cpl BarnesPlaques in
- Page 53 and 54: 7 th Division Provost CompanyPerson
- Page 55 and 56: BibliographyAustralian Corps of Sig
<strong>The</strong> evacuation Beachat Sfakia (Stakia)<strong>The</strong> British perspective <strong>for</strong> <strong>Crete</strong>Churchill advised General Wavell on the 28 th April that an attack on <strong>Crete</strong> would be made and that itwas to be held. It would appear that Churchill’s decision had been based on British Intelligence advicethat any attack on <strong>Crete</strong> would be by 5/6000 paratroopers. When in fact it was made by:• 750 Glider troops• 10,000 Paratroopers• 5,000 Troops delivered by transport aircraft.• 7,000 Troops by boatin total 22,000 German troops landed on <strong>Crete</strong> supported by 430 bombers and dive bombers and 230fighters.This underestimation and lack <strong>of</strong> truthfulness in respect to the campaign can be seen by Churchill’sstatement to the British House <strong>of</strong> Commons on day two <strong>of</strong> the attack, when he in<strong>for</strong>med it that thegreater part <strong>of</strong> the Germans had been wiped out in the landing.This was another example <strong>of</strong> the incompetence <strong>of</strong> the British High Command, particularly when theBritish were in possession <strong>of</strong> the ULTRA system ‘the British had been provided with a the GermanCipher Machine ‘the Egnima” provided by the Polish which allow the British to decode in<strong>for</strong>mation on“Operation Mercury.” On the 6 th May 1941 the British were in possession <strong>of</strong> the in<strong>for</strong>mationrelating to the invasion <strong>of</strong> <strong>Crete</strong>, this include the date and the exact time that the air attack on <strong>Crete</strong> wasto take place.Instructions were given to General Freyberg, to defend Maleme Airfield notwithstanding that theBritish High Command were aware that the Germans would use Paratroopers and failed to in<strong>for</strong>mFreyberg, who based his defence on the Germans landing by sea.It can easily be seen why the British incompetence <strong>of</strong> the Somme in World War I is compared to theirhandling <strong>of</strong> the Greek and <strong>Crete</strong> campaign in 1941.<strong>The</strong> Navy<strong>The</strong> British Mediterranean Fleet was involved on two occasions during the Battle <strong>for</strong> <strong>Crete</strong>. Duringthe period 21 st – 23 rd May the Germans attempted to land rein<strong>for</strong>cements by sea, the British Fleetintercepted them about 30 miles from <strong>Crete</strong> and sunk all the ships with no survivors.It was again involved in the evacuation <strong>of</strong> the troops between, the 27 th and 31 st May whilst engaged inthe evacuation it lost 2,000 men, three cruisers, six destroyers and an Aircraft Carrier was badlydamaged.- 19 -
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