12.07.2015 Views

Full Report - National Audit Office

Full Report - National Audit Office

Full Report - National Audit Office

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

part two2.1 Rationalising estate holdings is very rarely easy:it is especially difficult in the defence estate given theneed to support a wide range of operational capabilitiesand the size and complexity of that estate. TheDepartment has established a process for identifying theDepartment’s estate needs and is now looking to developa coherent approach. The Department continues to takerationalisation forward, although the identification ofthe necessary funding, when judged against conflictingpriorities, remains a risk. The Department has identifiedsome funding for estate rationalisation as part of thecurrent planning round. This Part of the report considersthe Department’s progress towards rationalising thedefence estate.The Department has establisheda process for identifying itsestate requirementThe Department established a review of itsestate five years ago2.2 In March 1999, the Committee of Public Accountsnoted in their report on ‘Ministry of Defence: Identifyingand Selling Surplus Property’ 5 that the Department hadnot assessed its estate requirements based on operationalneeds. It considered that without such an assessment theDepartment did not have a firm basis for investment andrationalisation decisions. The Committee recommendedthat the Department should take urgent action tostrengthen its strategic planning for the estate as a whole,decide the optimum sized estate, and devise a clear planfor achieving it.2.3 In 2000, the Department began a “Core Sites” reviewto identify and categorise the bulk of its existing estate,including both the built and rural estate. In October 2003,the Defence Estate Committee approved the categorisationof sites into those with a long-term future and the potentialfor further development such as Portsmouth, SalisburyPlain Training Area and Catterick; those essential fordelivering defence outputs but without the potential forfurther development such as communications and trainingsites and others. The Committee identified a numberof other sites with the potential for rationalisation. Thisidentification of the sites available enabled an elementof the estate to be rationalised but consideration ofoperational and other needs for the estate was required tomake further progress.The Department set up reviews ofestate requirements2.4 Following consultation with those senior staff withbudgetary responsibilities, the Defence Estate Committeecommissioned reviews of those sites where rationalisationoffered the greatest potential for value for money,especially in terms of scale and timing of likely benefits,and ease of implementation. These reviews focused onthe operational requirements and the estate needs arisingfrom planned future force developments. The Departmentappointed the Chief Executive of Defence Estates as theSenior Responsible Owner for estate rationalisation to takeforward these reviews with relevant departmental staff.2.5 These reviews included options to draw togetherelements of the Defence Logistics Organisation into theSouth West; collocation of single Service headquarters;rationalisation of Army units, of the Chief of DefenceIntelligence’s estate and of the Royal Marines estate, thedefence airfields, and the Defence Training Estate. DefenceEstates has helped the respective teams take work forwardusing common techniques to ensure comparability betweenthe options. These reviews covered a sizeable potion of theavailable estate and addressed those areas where greatestbenefit could be delivered.A number of current programmes include anestate rationalisation component2.6 The Defence Training Review, which examinedall individual training and education, both Service andcivilian, was published in March 2001. The review,confirming much that had already been recognised bythe single Service training agencies, concluded that thetraining base was too large and unaffordable in the longerterm.The quality of some of the training infrastructure, inparticular domestic facilities, was sub-standard and estateutilisation was inefficient.5 ‘Ministry of Defence: Identifying and Selling Surplus Property’ (HC 104 1998-99).MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: MANAGING THE DEFENCE ESTATE11

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!