<strong>Innovation</strong> <strong>Canada</strong>: A <strong>Call</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Action</strong>stage <strong>to</strong> exit. As a result, foreign funds,particularly from the US, are often dominant inlater-stage financing in <strong>Canada</strong> — for example,over the 2004–09 period the average venturecapital investment by foreigners in Canadianfirms was $3.8 million, compared with$1.0 million on average by Canadian inves<strong>to</strong>rs. 9Although foreign partners invest in only about10 percent of Canadian venture capital deals,they account for about 30 percent of exits andalmost 45 percent of exit proceeds (BDC 2011).This situation appears <strong>to</strong> be hurting returns ofCanadian funds and is contributing <strong>to</strong> afinancing gap in later-stage investments.Interviews with managers of venture capital andgrowth equity funds indicate that access <strong>to</strong>financing for firms that have revenues but arenot yet profitable is particularly difficult. Thetypical deal size here is $10–20 million, withfewer than 10 percent of deals greater than$40 million. Canadian participation in thissegment is limited. From 2003 <strong>to</strong> 2011, privateventure capital funds disclosed 255 technologyrelateddeals over $10 million. 10 About a quarterof these deals were undertaken by purelyCanadian funds, and foreign participantsdominated all of the funding syndicates.Canadian-only funds accounted for about a thirdof the deals in the $10–20 million range andnone of the deals above $40 million. Fundmanagers indicated that, since there are very fewCanadian funds actively investing, there are manyexamples of good Canadian companiesstruggling <strong>to</strong> obtain financing.The relative lack of participation from Canadianfunds at the critical late stage of development ofa business can have a number of adverse effects.First, either <strong>to</strong>o many worthy firms are notgetting financing, or they are being financed byUS funds, which can affect where the intellectualproperty developed by the firm is ultimatelyexploited. While financing by US funds ispreferable <strong>to</strong> no financing, overcoming barriers<strong>to</strong> full participation by Canadian private equityfunds would result in greater benefits for<strong>Canada</strong>.Second, in downturns, US funds will tend <strong>to</strong>invest closer <strong>to</strong> home, which amplifies the declinein “peripheral” markets like <strong>Canada</strong>. Third, therequired return on a foreign investment may behigher than that on domestic investments,especially if the investment is not in a current“hot spot” and the company is further awayfrom breakeven. This increases the probabilitythat a good Canadian company will not beproperly financed.On the other hand, US funds bring not onlycapital but also expertise and networks, whichresult in higher exit values. Technologycompanies that obtain quick access <strong>to</strong> globalmarkets and meet international standards attractthe attention of global acquirers or are able <strong>to</strong>make an initial public offering on foreign s<strong>to</strong>ckexchanges. Foreign funds appear <strong>to</strong> prefer <strong>to</strong> coinvestwith a local inves<strong>to</strong>r but, given the smallsize of Canadian funds, this is not alwayspossible. This observation reinforces the pointmade earlier that small fund sizes are hurtingreturns in <strong>Canada</strong>.Such considerations were the motivation forfunding — with the support of BDC, TeralysCapital and others — the Tandem ExpansionFund, a $300-million private equity fundspecializing in late-stage investments over$10 million. This fund was established inrecognition of the fact that “many Canadianventure-backed companies are unable <strong>to</strong> accesslater-stage funding from any private source,which causes them <strong>to</strong> seek out foreign funds,strategic buyers or public market alternativesearlier than they should” (BDC 2009).9 The data in this paragraph and the following paragraph were compiled using the Thomson Reuters venture capital database(except as noted).10 There is no requirement <strong>to</strong> disclose deals.7-16
Filling the GapsWith the foregoing in mind, the Panel isrecommending programs <strong>to</strong> facilitate investmentin the two parts of the risk capital market wherethe most crucial gaps exist: angel investment andlate-stage venture capital and growth equity.Recommendation 5Help high-growth innovative firmsaccess the risk capital they needthrough the establishment of newfunds where gaps exist.The Vision of the PanelInnovative, growing firms require risk capital, yet<strong>to</strong>o many innovative Canadian firms that havethe potential for high growth are unable <strong>to</strong>access the funding needed <strong>to</strong> realize theirpotential. The Government of <strong>Canada</strong> can playan important role by facilitating access by suchfirms <strong>to</strong> an increased supply of risk capital.Getting ThereTo realize this vision, the Panel recommends thefollowing.5.1 Start-up stage — Direct the BusinessDevelopment Bank of <strong>Canada</strong> (BDC) <strong>to</strong>allocate a larger proportion of its portfolio<strong>to</strong> start-up stage financing, preferably inthe form of a “sidecar” fund with angelinves<strong>to</strong>r groups.5.2 Late stage — Provide the BDC with newcapital <strong>to</strong> support the development oflarger-scale, later-stage venture capitalfunds and growth equity funds in suppor<strong>to</strong>f the private venture capital and equityindustry. These funds would specialize indeal sizes of $10 million and above that aremanaged by the private sec<strong>to</strong>r and subject<strong>to</strong> appropriate governance practices.The foregoing recommendations, depicted inFigure 7.3, reflect the Panel’s views on wherethe weaknesses in the financing chain arefound. However, as pointed out by Josh Lerner,a respected US analyst of the venture capitalmarket, government intervention has <strong>to</strong> becarefully structured in order <strong>to</strong> be effective(Lerner 2009). 11 The recommendations aretherefore developed with the followingconsiderations in mind.Government intervention should bestructured <strong>to</strong> address market failures and<strong>to</strong> create a net benefit for society. Thepurpose of intervening in the venture capitalmarket is <strong>to</strong> improve rates of return onfinancial capital through a reallocation amongsec<strong>to</strong>rs. The purpose is not <strong>to</strong> subsidize theproduction of R&D — that is the role of R&Dsupport programs. As a result, if marketforces are appropriately harnessed <strong>to</strong> allocatefunding, successful intervention will notrequire a large subsidy. In mostcircumstances, the government will be able <strong>to</strong>make a positive return on its investment.Setting up appropriate governance structuresfor the funds is an important determinant oftheir effectiveness and will help ensure thatthe intervention generates a net economicbenefit. Governance structures have <strong>to</strong> becarefully developed <strong>to</strong> ensure that privateincentives are appropriately aligned with thepublic interest and that the scope for selfservingbehaviour is constrained.11 The title of Lerner’s recent book on venture capital is highly revealing — Boulevard of Broken Dreams — and the subtitleeven more so — Why Public Efforts <strong>to</strong> Boost Entrepreneurship and Venture Capital Have Failed and What <strong>to</strong> Do about It.7-17