an experimental investigation of the interactions ... - Vlerick Public

APPENDIX 1Panel A: Information systemTotal cost informationRevenu-generating possibilitiesTotal cost Change in total cost Revenues Change in revenuesCurrent supplier 60 000 EUR 70 000 EURNew supplier I 64 200 EUR + 4 200 EUR 77 200 EUR + 7 200 EURNew supplier II 61 200 EUR + 1 200 EUR 71 800 EUR + 1 800 EUR1 Shaded areas are condition specific. In the conditions in which the information system should lead tothe optimization of overall firm performance, subjects receive the information in the shaded areas. In theconditions in which the information system should lead to the optimization of departmental performance,subjects receive the information about revenue-generating possibilities as follows:Revenu-generating possibilitiesSupplier I Supplier II Current supplierDurability 1 2 3Strength 1 2 3Maintenance 2 1 3Panel B: Descriptive Social NormsLow intra-firm cooperation Informal element High intra-firm cooperationPurchasing and marketing arelocated in a different building.Material artefacts Purchasing and marketing are locatedin the same building.2 times a year, there is a meeting todiscuss problems. However,everyone considered the meetingsas boring.Coordination andCommunicationmechanismsThere is a weekly meeting to discussproblems and to search for solutions.There are less informal contactsbetween the purchasing andmarketing department.Cross-functional collaboration is notthe most important aspect in yourfirm. Everyone is convinced that afocus on the activities of the owndepartment will lead to goodresults.Your firm is founded by 1 man whowas convinced that specializationon the tasks of the own departmentis already difficult enough.Behavioral normsValuesFundamentalassumptionsThere are a lot of informal contactsbetween the purchasing andmarketing department.Cross-functional collaboration isconsidered as fundamental to obtaingood results.Your firm is founded by 2 brotherswho have always collaborated andhave stimulated cross-functionalintegrations.37