an experimental investigation of the interactions ... - Vlerick Public

Hypothesis 1TABLE 3:Table 3 reports the results for Hypothesis 1 for the degree of firm-optimizing supplier selections. Panel A doesnot make a distinction between the two types of misaligned formal control mechanisms. In Panel B and PanelC, a distinction between the two types of misaligned formal control mechanisms is made. Misaligned 1 refers tothe combination of a department-based incentive system and a firm-based information system. Misaligned 2refers to the combination of a firm-based incentive system and a department-based information system.Aligned refers to the combination of a firm-based incentive system and a firm-based information system. Eachpanel contains overall results (i.e. no distinction between descriptive social norms – conditions), and results foreach descriptive social norm – condition separately.Panel A: Misaligned versus Aligned Formal Control MechanismsOverallDescriptive Social Normsthat Promote Intra-FirmCooperationDescriptive Social Normsthat Promote Intra-FirmCooperationMisaligned 47.70 55.89 39.42Aligned 87.13 86.40 87.90T-test 12.35 *** 7.32 *** 10.62 ***Panel B: Department-based Incentive System + Firm-based Information System Versus Aligned Formal ControlMechanismsOverallDescriptive Social Normsthat Promote Intra-FirmCooperationDescriptive Social Normsthat Promote Intra-FirmCooperationMisaligned 1 49.30 57.48 40.95Aligned 87.13 86.40 87.90T-test 10.27 *** 6.01 *** 8.90 ***Panel C: Firm-based Incentive System + Department-based Information System Versus Aligned Formal ControlMechanismsOverallDescriptive Social Normsthat Promote Intra-FirmCooperationDescriptive Social Normsthat Promote Intra-FirmCooperationMisaligned 2 46.08 54.26 37.91Aligned 87.13 86.40 87.90T-test 11.12 *** 6.64 *** 9.48 ***30