Chapter 10: Management and quality assurance - Antares - IN2P3
Chapter 10: Management and quality assurance - Antares - IN2P3 Chapter 10: Management and quality assurance - Antares - IN2P3
egular intervals to the spokesman, steering committee and collaboration.Resource ManagerA group of organisational tasks are linked under the responsibility of the Resource Manager (RM),a post analogous to that of sub-project coordinator. Among these tasks are the documentation,budget and planning aspects of the project. The RM will handle the Memoranda of Understandingbetween the Institutes and the ANTARES Finance Review Committee. Quality Control falls underthe responsibility of the RM.Steering CommitteeThe sub-project leaders plus the executive management form the project Steering Committee thatmeets, typically, once per month to follow the project progress in all aspects. The SteeringCommittee helps the Spokesman manage the project budget and maintain the schedule.Technical DecisionsIn general, technical decisions will be presented to and discussed by the full collaboration duringthe regular meetings. Only major aspects will be considered by the Steering Committee andInstitution Board. Most decisions will be made by the sub-project coordinators and members of theirteams. The Technical Coordinator has a control responsibility for all technical decisions of theproject.Publication CommitteeThe publication committee is chaired by the Deputy Spokesman and is described in a set ofregulations.Page 10-4
Operational ReliabilityThis chapter establishes the provisions for the programme regarding product- and qualityassurance of the ANTARES 0.1 km 2 detector. The product assurance programme described hereinwill apply to design, procurement, system integration and testing of sub systems.ObjectivesA key issue for the ANTARES detector is the level of reliability required to ensure optimalavailability for physics data taking and affordable maintenance cost. The latter condition is imposedbecause of the relatively large cost and effort involved in off-shore recovery and repair operations.The objective set for operational reliability of the entire instrument is the following:The planned operational lifetime of the detector is ten years. After three years of operation, withneither corrective nor preventive maintenance applied, on average not less than 85% of the OpticalModules will be operational. The systems that could be subject to single-point-failure (the JunctionBox and the Electro Optical Cable) should have a probability of failure smaller than 10% in tenyears.Note that the probability of failure of an OM equals the combined probability of failure at allrelevant functional levels in the chain from OM, LCM, SCM/SPM, JB, MEOC to the shore station.Product- and Quality AssuranceQuality-assurance tools will be applied in the three phases of implementation of the instrument:design, procurement, testing and system integration.Quality-assurance tools applied are the following● Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA).● Minimisation of Single Point Failures (SPF)● Logbooks, test reports and status documentation that will accompany all objects andsubsystems of the instrument with the objective to ensure traceability. Test reports areformally approved by the signature of the person responsible for the test.The objective of FMECA is to identify the effects of assumed failures and in particular to identifycritical failure effects, specifically all single point failures (SPF).A single point failure is a failure of a non-redundant item, component or part caused by a singlefailure mechanism, resulting in an irreversible failure of maximal criticality or having catastrophicor critically hazardous consequences.FMECA will initially start with assumed failure modes, proceed on assembly level and finalise oncomponent level, if necessary. The goal of FMECA is also to give the involved parties insight intothe analysis of any failure propagation over the interface. The following failure modes will beconsidered in the FMECA:● Severity of effect of a failure mode● Likelihood of a failure modePage 10-5
- Page 3: Resource ManagerP. de Witt-HubertsD
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Operational ReliabilityThis chapter establishes the provisions for the programme regarding product- <strong>and</strong> <strong>quality</strong><strong>assurance</strong> of the ANTARES 0.1 km 2 detector. The product <strong>assurance</strong> programme described hereinwill apply to design, procurement, system integration <strong>and</strong> testing of sub systems.ObjectivesA key issue for the ANTARES detector is the level of reliability required to ensure optimalavailability for physics data taking <strong>and</strong> affordable maintenance cost. The latter condition is imposedbecause of the relatively large cost <strong>and</strong> effort involved in off-shore recovery <strong>and</strong> repair operations.The objective set for operational reliability of the entire instrument is the following:The planned operational lifetime of the detector is ten years. After three years of operation, withneither corrective nor preventive maintenance applied, on average not less than 85% of the OpticalModules will be operational. The systems that could be subject to single-point-failure (the JunctionBox <strong>and</strong> the Electro Optical Cable) should have a probability of failure smaller than <strong>10</strong>% in tenyears.Note that the probability of failure of an OM equals the combined probability of failure at allrelevant functional levels in the chain from OM, LCM, SCM/SPM, JB, MEOC to the shore station.Product- <strong>and</strong> Quality AssuranceQuality-<strong>assurance</strong> tools will be applied in the three phases of implementation of the instrument:design, procurement, testing <strong>and</strong> system integration.Quality-<strong>assurance</strong> tools applied are the following● Failure Modes, Effects <strong>and</strong> Criticality Analysis (FMECA).● Minimisation of Single Point Failures (SPF)● Logbooks, test reports <strong>and</strong> status documentation that will accompany all objects <strong>and</strong>subsystems of the instrument with the objective to ensure traceability. Test reports areformally approved by the signature of the person responsible for the test.The objective of FMECA is to identify the effects of assumed failures <strong>and</strong> in particular to identifycritical failure effects, specifically all single point failures (SPF).A single point failure is a failure of a non-redundant item, component or part caused by a singlefailure mechanism, resulting in an irreversible failure of maximal criticality or having catastrophicor critically hazardous consequences.FMECA will initially start with assumed failure modes, proceed on assembly level <strong>and</strong> finalise oncomponent level, if necessary. The goal of FMECA is also to give the involved parties insight intothe analysis of any failure propagation over the interface. The following failure modes will beconsidered in the FMECA:● Severity of effect of a failure mode● Likelihood of a failure modePage <strong>10</strong>-5
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