National Mineral Policy 2006 - Department of Mines
National Mineral Policy 2006 - Department of Mines National Mineral Policy 2006 - Department of Mines
that a well-regulated and responsible mining operation can bring within the framework ofsustainable development are not available to the indigenous/local people, the region, and theeconomy. These delays are a disincentive to mining and must bear their share ofresponsibility for the failure of greenfield investment, especially FDI, to come into thissector. It was represented to the Committee that enormous difficulties were being faced bymine operators in getting the requisite clearances under the FCA and EPA. As mentionedearlier, the absence of a smooth and transparent process for granting these clearances has atwofold effect. First, it keeps genuine miners, capable of best practice and willing to acceptregulation and adhere to SDF, away from the industry and, secondly, it leaves the field opento unregulated, often illegal, mining operations, with all the attendant risks of damage toconservation, environment, and governance. What cannot be denied is that with a soft stateapparatus amounting to a virtual absence of mining policing currently being the reality inmost states the chances are that if an ore body is known to exist it will be exploited. If thelaws do not permit regulated exploitation, then unregulated exploitation will happen. Let usnow examine the specific issues relating to each of the two statutes.FOREST (CONSERVATION) ACT, 19803.20 The National Commission on Agriculture (NCA), in its report of 1976, came out withthe startling fact that between 1950 and 1976 about 43 lakh hectares of forest land wasdiverted for non-forestry use. The report also clearly indicated that more than half thediversion was for agricultural purposes pursuant to GOI’s policy to grow more food. TheCommission, in consonance with the international concern for loss of forest cover, suggestedvarious remedial measures. Till 1976, forestry as a subject was in the State List and stategovernments were responsible for the conservation and development of forests. Being a Statesubject, GOI had no statutory power to intervene. In 1976, the Central government firstissued guidelines to all the states to consult GOI before diverting more than 10 hectares offorest land to non-forest use. However, the guidelines, being non-statutory in nature, wereignored by the states, and diversion of forest lands continued at almost the same rate asbefore. Recognising the gravity of the situation, GOI brought about a constitutionalamendment and the subjects of forests and wildlife were brought under the ‘Concurrent List’.Immediately thereafter, in 1980, the FCA was enacted. The FCA prohibited the states fromde-reserving or diverting any forest area without prior approval of the Central government.The legislation was intended to stop indiscriminate diversion of forest lands into activities78
such as agriculture, housing, industry, mining, etc. In October 1992, guidelines were issuedunder the FCA, detailing the terms and conditions subject to which diversion could beallowed. One of the essential conditions was that the user agency would adequatelycompensate for forest loss by raising compensatory afforestation in non-forest land ofequivalent area.3.21 As per the FCA guidelines, all mining, including underground mining, requires priorapproval of the Central government (MOEF). The FCA applies not only to the surface areathat is used in mining but also to the underground mining area beneath the forest. Renewal ofan existing ML in a forest area also requires prior approval of the Central government. Theguidelines provide that prospecting of any mineral done under a PL granted under theMMDR Act, 1957 that requires collection/removal of samples from the forest land would betreated as a stage between survey and investigation (reconnaissance) and grant of ML and,therefore, permission under FCA would be required. However, test drilling upto 10 boreholes of maximum 4 inches diameter per 100 sq. km for prospecting, without felling of trees,did not attract the provisions of the FCA. In all other cases involving drilling of bore holes,prior permission of the Central government under the FCA would be required. It has beenclarified that the permission to survey, explore, or prospect would not ipso facto imply anycommitment on the part of the Central government for grant of a ML in forest land. However,such a stipulation militates against the seamless transfer dispensation that the Committeewould like to promote to attract investment into mining. The Committee would, therefore,propose that the conditionality for environmental clearance for eventual grant of ML may bespelt out in advance and a prospector who meets the conditionality may be assured of FCAclearance eventually. The essential difference between a mining intervention and otherinterventions is that the miner eventually leaves the land and can recreate or even improveupon the forest as it existed before commencement of operations. The guidelines also providethat:(i)Investigations and surveys carried out in connection with development projects such astransmission lines, hydro-electric projects, seismic surveys, exploration for oil drilling, min ing,etc. will not attract the provisions of the Act as long as these surveys do not involve any clearingof forest or cutting of trees, and operations are restricted to clearing of bushes and lopping of treebranches for purpose of sighting.(ii)If, however, investigations and surveys involve clearing of forest area or felling of trees, priorpermission of the Central Government is mandatory.79
- Page 38 and 39: permissible activities in order to
- Page 40 and 41: (i)(ii)(iii)(iv)The current two-tie
- Page 42 and 43: per plan should be significantly hi
- Page 44 and 45: Duration of Concessions1.48 In the
- Page 46 and 47: 10,000 sq. km in a state. This has
- Page 48 and 49: (ii)(iii)(iv)The maximum total area
- Page 50 and 51: e obviated if the lease deed is exh
- Page 52 and 53: elinquishment of areas by the lesse
- Page 54 and 55: to give priority to the prior appli
- Page 56 and 57: (v)(vi)(vii)Rules should be prescri
- Page 58 and 59: esponsible for all rights, liabilit
- Page 60 and 61: ut also the revenue generated from
- Page 62 and 63: government at the Secretariat. A le
- Page 64 and 65: Secretary. If the Directorate is in
- Page 66 and 67: (i) All applications for mineral co
- Page 68 and 69: application. A similar website shou
- Page 70 and 71: concerned State Government (or othe
- Page 72 and 73: Further, Rule 7D of the MCR specifi
- Page 74 and 75: mission mode through, inter alia, t
- Page 76 and 77: Chapter 3Forest Conservation and En
- Page 78 and 79: conservation. There are trade-offs
- Page 80 and 81: ICMM AND SDF3.8 The ICMM membership
- Page 82 and 83: higher level. The basic approach is
- Page 84 and 85: (i) To minimize displacement and to
- Page 86 and 87: affected PAPs in the mining operati
- Page 90 and 91: (iii)Notwithstanding the above, sur
- Page 92 and 93: egard, all ‘forest’ land must b
- Page 94 and 95: Figure 3.1: Procedure for Processin
- Page 96 and 97: should be authorised to grant or re
- Page 98 and 99: formulation and appraisal of the EI
- Page 100 and 101: 3.41 Recognising the need to make t
- Page 102 and 103: Figure 3.3: Public Hearing/NOC from
- Page 104 and 105: Chapter 4Infrastructure Needs and F
- Page 106 and 107: 4.5 Logistics is the key to access
- Page 108 and 109: Table 4.1: Mineral Production in In
- Page 110 and 111: necessary, therefore, that in infra
- Page 112 and 113: to the ports of Haldia and Paradip
- Page 114 and 115: Connectivity of Major Ports, brough
- Page 116 and 117: (iv)(v)(vi)(vii)At Visakhapatnam Po
- Page 118 and 119: was of the opinion that while the m
- Page 120 and 121: such an arrangement, the Ministry o
- Page 122 and 123: developed, controlled, and run by s
- Page 124 and 125: subject to overt and covert restric
- Page 126 and 127: consideration to the end use of the
- Page 128 and 129: (iii)parameters laid down in existi
- Page 130 and 131: Chapter 6Augmenting State Revenues(
- Page 132 and 133: the value addition question conside
- Page 134 and 135: In a system of ad valorem rates of
- Page 136 and 137: must provide revenues sufficient to
that a well-regulated and responsible mining operation can bring within the framework <strong>of</strong>sustainable development are not available to the indigenous/local people, the region, and theeconomy. These delays are a disincentive to mining and must bear their share <strong>of</strong>responsibility for the failure <strong>of</strong> greenfield investment, especially FDI, to come into thissector. It was represented to the Committee that enormous difficulties were being faced bymine operators in getting the requisite clearances under the FCA and EPA. As mentionedearlier, the absence <strong>of</strong> a smooth and transparent process for granting these clearances has atw<strong>of</strong>old effect. First, it keeps genuine miners, capable <strong>of</strong> best practice and willing to acceptregulation and adhere to SDF, away from the industry and, secondly, it leaves the field opento unregulated, <strong>of</strong>ten illegal, mining operations, with all the attendant risks <strong>of</strong> damage toconservation, environment, and governance. What cannot be denied is that with a s<strong>of</strong>t stateapparatus amounting to a virtual absence <strong>of</strong> mining policing currently being the reality inmost states the chances are that if an ore body is known to exist it will be exploited. If thelaws do not permit regulated exploitation, then unregulated exploitation will happen. Let usnow examine the specific issues relating to each <strong>of</strong> the two statutes.FOREST (CONSERVATION) ACT, 19803.20 The <strong>National</strong> Commission on Agriculture (NCA), in its report <strong>of</strong> 1976, came out withthe startling fact that between 1950 and 1976 about 43 lakh hectares <strong>of</strong> forest land wasdiverted for non-forestry use. The report also clearly indicated that more than half thediversion was for agricultural purposes pursuant to GOI’s policy to grow more food. TheCommission, in consonance with the international concern for loss <strong>of</strong> forest cover, suggestedvarious remedial measures. Till 1976, forestry as a subject was in the State List and stategovernments were responsible for the conservation and development <strong>of</strong> forests. Being a Statesubject, GOI had no statutory power to intervene. In 1976, the Central government firstissued guidelines to all the states to consult GOI before diverting more than 10 hectares <strong>of</strong>forest land to non-forest use. However, the guidelines, being non-statutory in nature, wereignored by the states, and diversion <strong>of</strong> forest lands continued at almost the same rate asbefore. Recognising the gravity <strong>of</strong> the situation, GOI brought about a constitutionalamendment and the subjects <strong>of</strong> forests and wildlife were brought under the ‘Concurrent List’.Immediately thereafter, in 1980, the FCA was enacted. The FCA prohibited the states fromde-reserving or diverting any forest area without prior approval <strong>of</strong> the Central government.The legislation was intended to stop indiscriminate diversion <strong>of</strong> forest lands into activities78