164 TALIBANwith the Taliban. Bridas was a small family company whose executives,brought up in the European tradition, were interested in the politics,culture, history and the personal relations of where and with whom theywere dealing. Bridas executives were knowledgeable about all the convolutionsof the Game and they took the trouble to explore the ethnic,tribal and family linkages of the leaders they were meeting.Unocal was a huge corporation which hired executives to run its globaloil business. Those sent out to the region were, with a few exceptions,interested in the job rather than the political environment they wereliving in. While Bridas engineers would spend hours sipping tea withAfghan tribesmen in the desert as they explored routes, Unocal would flyin and out and take for granted what they were told by the notoriouslyfickle Afghan warlords. Afghans had long ago mastered the art of tellingan interlocuter what he wanted to hear and then saying exactly the oppositeto their next guest. Unocal was also at a disadvantage because itspolicy towards the Taliban did not deviate from the US line and consequentlyUnocal lectured the Taliban on what they should be doing.Bridas had no such compunctions and was ready to sign a deal with theTaliban, even though they were not recognized as the legitimate governmentby any state.Unocal tended to depend more on the US Embassy in Islamabad, andPakistani and Turkmen intelligence for information on what was happeningor about to happen, rather than gathering their own information. Asmy stories were published on the Bridas-Unocal rivalry and the twistsand turns of the new Great Game, both companies at first thought I wasa spy, secretly working for the other company. Unocal persisted in thisbelief even after Bridas had realized that I was just a very curious journalistwho had covered Afghanistan far too long to be satisfied with bland statements.It took me seven months of travelling, over one hundred interviewsand total immersion in the literature of the oil business — of which1 knew nothing - to eventually write the cover story for the Far EasternEconomic Review which appeared in April 1997.In July 1997 Strobe Talbott gave a speech that was to become thebenchmark for US policy in the region. 'It has been fashionable to proclaim,or at least to predict, a replay of the "Great Game" in the Caucasusand Central Asia. The implication, of course, is that the driving dynamicof the region, fuelled and lubricated by oil, will be the competition of thegreat powers. Our goal is to avoid, and actively to discourage, that atavisticoutcome. Let's leave Rudyard Kipling and George McDonald Fraserwhere they belong - on the shelves of history. The Great Game whichstarred Kipling's Kim and Fraser's Flashman was very much of the zerosumvariety.'But Talbott also knew the Game was on and issued a grim warning toROMANCING THE TALIBAN 1 ~ 165its players, even as he declared that Washington's top priority was conflictresolution. 'If internal and cross-border conflicts simmer and flare, theregion could become a breeding ground of terrorism, a hotbed of religiousand political extremism and a battleground for outright war.' 16On the ground, Niyazov's decision to sign with Unocal infuriatedBulgheroni. In February 1996 he moved to the courts, filing a case againstUnocal and Delta in Fort Bend County, near Houston Texas. Bridasdemanded US$15 billion in damages alleging 'tortuous interference withprospective business relations' and that 'Unocal, Delta and [Unocal Vice-President Marty] Miller and possibly others engaged in a civil conspiracyagaint Bridas.' In its court deposition, Bridas said it had 'disclosed toMiller its strategic planning for the pipeline construction and operation.Bridas invited Unocal to consider joining a joint venture arrangement'. 17In short, Bridas charged Unocal with stealing its idea.Later, Bulgheroni explained how he felt. 'Unocal came to this regionbecause we invited them. There was no reason why we and Unocal couldnot get together. We wanted them in and took them with us to Turkmenistan,'he told me. 'In the beginning the US considered this pipeline aridiculous idea and they were not interested in either Afghanistan orTurkmenistan,' he added. Bridas also began arbitration against Turkmenistanwith the International Chamber of Commerce for breach of contractin three separate cases regarding Turkmenistan's blockade of its Yashlarand Keimir fields.Unocal maintained that its proposal was different because it involvedDaulatabad rather than Yashlar gas field. In a letter, later submitted tocourt, John Imle, President of Unocal, had written to Bulgheroni sayingthat Turkmenistan had told him that the government had no agreementswith Bridas, so Unocal was free to do what it liked. 18 'We maintainedthat the CentGas project was separate and unique from Bridas. We wereproposing to purchase gas from existing natural gas reserves and to transportthe gas through an export gas pipeline. Bridas was proposing to transportgas from their Yashlar field ... the CentGas project does not preventBridas from developing a pipeline to transport and market its own gas,'said Imle. 19The Clinton administration now weighed in on behalf of Unocal. InMarch 1996 the US Ambassador to Pakistan Tom Simmons had a majorrow with Bhutto when he asked her to switch Pakistan's support fromBridas to Unocal. 'Bhutto supported Bridas and Simmons accused Bhuttoof extortion when she defended Bridas. She was furious with Simmons,'said a senior aide to Bhutto present in the meeting. 'Bhutto demanded awritten apology from Simmons, which she got,' added a cabinet minister. 20During two trips to Pakistan and Afghanistan in April and August1996, the US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Robin Raphel
166 TALIBAN ROMANCING THE TALIBAN 1 167also spoke in favour of the Unocal project. 'We have an American companywhich is interested in building a pipeline from Turkmenistanthrough to Pakistan,' said Raphel at a press conference in Islamabad on21 April 1996. 'This pipeline project will be very good for Turkmenistan,for Pakistan and for Afghanistan as it will not only offer job opportunitiesbut also energy in Afghanistan,' she added. In August, Raphel visitedCentral Asian capitals and Moscow where she pitched the same message.Open US support for the Unocal project aroused an already suspiciousRussia and Iran, which became even more convinced that the CIA wasbacking the Taliban. In December 1996, a senior Iranian diplomat toldme in hushed tones that the Saudis and the CIA had channelled US$2million dollars to the Taliban - even though there was no evidence forsuch suspicions. But accusations multiplied on all fronts after the USAand Unocal committed several blunders.When the Taliban captured Kabul in September 1996, Chris Taggert,a Unocal executive, told wire agencies that the pipeline project would beeasier to implement now that the Taliban had captured Kabul - a statementthat Unocal quickly retracted because it implied that Unocalfavoured a Taliban conquest. Just a few weeks earlier Unocalannounced it would give humanitarian aid as 'bonuses' to the Afghanwarlords, once they agreed to form a joint council to supervise the pipelineproject. Again the implication was that Unocal was ready to dish outmoney to the warlords.Then, within hours of Kabul's capture by the Taliban, the US StateDepartment announced it would establish diplomatic relations with theTaliban by sending an official to Kabul - an announcement it also quicklyretracted. State Department spokesman Glyn Davies said the US found'nothing objectionable' in the steps taken by the Taliban to imposeIslamic law. He described the Taliban as anti-modem rather than anti-Western. US Congressmen weighed in on the side of the Taliban. 'Thegood part of what has happened is that one of the factions at last seemscapable of developing a government in Afghanistan,' said Senator HankBrown, a supporter of the Unocal project. 21 Embarrassed US diplomatslater explained to me that the over-hasty US statement was made withoutconsulting the US Embassy in Islamabad.But the damage done was enormous. UnocaPs gaffes and the confusionin the State Department only further convinced Iran, Russia, the CARs,the anti-Taliban alliance and most Pakistanis and Afghans that the US-Unocal partnership was backing the Taliban and wanted an all-out Talibanvictory - even as the US and Unocal claimed they had no favouritesin Afghanistan. Some Pakistani cabinet ministers, anxious to show thatthe USA supported the Taliban and Pakistan's stance, leaked to Pakistanijournalists that Washington backed the Taliban.The entire region was full of rumours and speculation. Even the everneutralwire agencies weighed in with their suspicions. 'Certainly the Talibanappear to serve the US policy of isolating Iran by creating a firmlySunni buffer on Iran's border and potentially providing security for traderoutes and pipelines that would break Iran's monopoly on Central Asia'ssouthern trade routes,' wrote Reuters. 22Bridas still faced an uphill climb to ensure that they were still in therace. Its gas and oil fields in Turkmenistan were blocked. It had no agreementwith Turkmenistan to buy gas for a pipeline and none with Pakistanto sell gas. With US and Pakistani support, the Taliban were now beingcourted by Unocal. Nevertheless Bridas continued to maintain its officesin Ashkhabad and Kabul, even though Niyazov was trying to force themout. 'Bridas is out, we have given the Afghan pipeline to Unocal. Ourgovernment does not work with Bridas anymore,' Murad Nazdjanov,Turkmen Minister for Oil and Gas told me in Ashkhabad. 23Bridas had one advantage with the Taliban. Bridas told them it didnot need to raise finances for the project through international lendinginstitutions, which would first demand an internationally recognized governmentin Kabul. Instead Bridas had set up TAP Pipelines, a 50-50partnership with the Saudi company Ningarcho, which was extremelyclose to Prince Turki, the Saudi intelligence chief. Bridas said it couldraise 50 per cent of the funding from the Saudis to build the Afghanportion of the pipeline and the rest from an international consortium itwould put together, which would build the less risky Pakistan and Turkmenistanends of the pipeline. 'We will do a complete separation betweenour problems with the Turkmenistan government and the Afghan pipelinecontract. We will make two consortiums, one to build the Afghanline and one to build the Pakistan and Turkmenistan ends of the line,'said a Bridas executive. 24 Bridas was thus offering to start work on thepipeline immediately, without preconditions. It only needed some agreementbetween the Afghan factions, but even that was to remain unobtainable.On the other hand, Unocal's position was closely linked to US policyon Afghanistan - that it would not construct the pipeline or discuss commercialterms with the Taliban, until there was a recognized governmentin Kabul so that the World Bank and others could lend money for theproject. 'We made it clear to all parties from the beginning that the abilityto obtain financing for the project was critical, that the Afghan factionswould have to get together and develop a functioning government thatwas recognized by lending institutions before the project could succeed,'said John Imle. 25 Unocal's real influence with the Taliban was that theirproject carried the possibility of US recognition which the Taliban weredesperately anxious to secure.
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34 TALIBANKabul- Hikmetyar had alli
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58 TALIBANGul Mohammed Pahlawan, Gh
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- Page 123 and 124: 230 ~ TALIBANgraves near Shebarghan
- Page 125 and 126: 234 ~ TALIBAN8 June. US FBI places
- Page 127 and 128: 238 ~ TALIBAN1995 January16 MarchAp
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- Page 131 and 132: 246 ~ TALIBANDupree, Nancy Hatch, A
- Page 133 and 134: 250 ~ NOTESChapter 31 Interview wit
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- Page 137 and 138: 258 NOTES13. The Japanese company M
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Abbas, Mulla Mohammed 22,61,100Abda
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INDEX - 270Hazaras (continued)burea
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INDEX ~ 274nF»r\/FaliViar» milita
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INDEX ~ 278Talibans (continued)Sunn