144 ~ TALIBANing, as Niyazov put it to me as early as December 1991, 'the new Kuwait'. 1Since independence Turkmenistan, like other oil rich CARs, haswaited in vain for its oil and gas riches to reach outside markets. Landlockedand surrounded by potentially jealous and hostile powers - Russia,Iran, Afghanistan and Uzbekistan - the Central Asian states have manoeuveredrelentlessly for pipelines to be built that would end their isolation,free them from economic dependence on Russia and earn hard currencyto refloat their economies after the devastation wrought by thebreak-up of the Soviet Union. For 70 years all their communicationlinks — roads, railways and pipelines — were built heading east to Russia.Now they wanted to build links with the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean,the Mediterranean and China.The energy resources of the Caspian Sea and Central Asia, (which weshall now call the Caspian region and includes Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan,Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan), have been described with breathlesshyperbole over the past few years. In the early 1990s the USA estimatedthat Caspian oil reserves were between 100 to 150 billion barrels (bb).That figure was highly inflated and possible reserves are now estimated tobe less than half that or even as low as 50 bb. The Caspian region'sproven oil reserves are between 16 and 32 bb, which compares to 22 bbfor the USA and 17 bb for the North Sea, giving the Caspian 10-15times less than the total reserves of the Middle East.Nevertheless, the Caspian represented possibly the last unexplored andunexploited oil-bearing region in the world and its opening-up generatedhuge excitement amongst international oil companies. Western oil companieshave shifted their interest first to Western Siberia in 1991-92,then to Kazakhstan in 1993-94, Azerbaijan in 1995-97 and finally Turkmenistanin 1997-99. Between 1994-98, 24 companies from 13 countriessigned contracts in the Caspian region. Kazakhstan has the largest oilreserves with an estimated 85 bb, but only 10-16 bb proven reserves.Azerbaijan has possible oil reserves of 27 bb and only 4-11 bb provenreserves while Turkmenistan has 32 bb possible oil reserves, but only 1.5bb proven reserves. Uzbekistan's possible oil reserves are estimated at 1bb.Proven gas reserves in the Caspian region are estimated at 236-337trillion cubic feet (tcf), compared to reserves of 300 tcf in the USA.Turkmenistan has the 11th largest gas reserves in the world with 159tcf of possible gas reserves, Uzbekistan 110 tcf, Kazakhstan 88 tcf, whileAzerbaijan and Uzbekistan have 35 tcf each. 2Central Asian leaders became obsessed with projected pipelines, potentialroutes and the geo-politics that surrounded them. In 1996 the Caspianregion produced one million barrels per day (b/d) of oil of which only300,000 b/d was exported - mainly from Kazakhstan. However only halfDICTATORS AND OIL BARONS ~ H5that (140,000 b/d) was exported outside the former Soviet Union. Caspianproduction still represented only about 4 per cent of total world oilproduction. The region's natural gas production in 1996 totalled 3.3 tcf,but only 0.8 tcf was exported outside the former Soviet Union - mostlyfrom Turkmenistan. There was an urgent, almost desperate need for pipelines.The scramble for oil and influence by the big powers in the Caspianhas been likened to the Middle East in the 1920s. But Central Asia todayis an even larger complex quagmire of competing interests. Big powerssuch as Russia, China and the USA; the neighbours Iran, Pakistan,Afghanistan and Turkey; the Central Asian states themselves and themost powerful players of all, the oil companies, compete in what I calledin a 1997 seminal magazine article, 'The New Great Game'. The nameseemed to stick and was taken up by governments, experts and the oilcompanies. 3I had first visited Central Asia in 1989 during President Mikhail Gorbachov'sperestroika reform programme. Convinced that the ethnic issue inAfghanistan was going to become explosive after the withdrawal of Soviettroops, I wanted to understand the ethnic origins of the Afghan Uzbeks,Turkmens and Tajiks and see their original homelands. I returned to theregion frequently, exploring the vast vistas and the ethnic and politicalsoup in the region that became more complex and volatile as the SovietUnion fell apart. By chance I was in Ashkhabad where the Central Asianleaders gathered on 12 December 1991, to discuss the dismemberment ofthe Soviet Union and their independence.They were all reluctant nationalists, full of fear at the prospects oflosing the security and support of the Soviet state system and the prospectsof facing the outside world on their own. Within a few months, astheir economies crumbled, the importance of their oil resources and theneed for pipelines became evident. They began to hold talks with Westernoil companies, on the back of ongoing negotiations between Kazakhstanand the US company Chevron. My subsequent visits resulted in a bookon Central Asia but with Afghanistan disintegrating into civil war, I concludedthat its repercussions would rebound on Central Asia and the issueof pipelines would determine the future geo-politics of the region. 4The label - the new Great Game - resonated with history. In thelate nineteenth century the British in India and tsarist Russia fought anundeclared war of competition and influence to contain each other inCentral Asia and Afghanistan. 'Turkestan, Afghanistan, Transcaspia,Persia - to many these words breathe only a sense of utter remoteness, ora memory of strange vicissitudes and of moribund romance. To me, Iconfess they are pieces on a chessboard upon which is being played out agame for the domination of the world,' wrote Lord Curzon, before he
146 TALIBAN DICTATORS AND OIL BARONS 147became the Viceroy of India in 1898. 5 These were expanding empires -the British pushing across India into Afghanistan and the Tsar's armiesconquering Central Asia.The centre of gravity for both powers was Afghanistan. The Britishfeared that a Russian thrust on Herat from the Turkmen region couldthreaten British Baluchistan, while Moscow gold could turn Kabul's rulersagainst the British. The Russians feared that the British would underminethem in Central Asia by supporting revolts by the Muslim tribes and therulers of Bukhara and Kokand. As it is today, the real battle was overcommunication links as both empires indulged in massive railway projects.The Russians built railway lines across Central Asia to their borderswith Afghanistan, Persia and China, while the British built railway linesacross India to their border with Afghanistan.Today's Great Game is also between expanding and contractingempires. As a weakened and bankrupt Russia attempts to keep a grip onwhat it still views as its frontiers in Central Asia and control the flow ofCaspian oil through pipelines that traverse Russia, the USA is thrustingitself into the region on the back of proposed oil pipelines which wouldbypass Russia. Iran, Turkey and Pakistan are building their own communicationlinks with the region and want to be the preferred route of choicefor future pipelines heading east, west or south. China wants to securestability for its restive Xinjiang region populated by the same Muslimethnic groups that inhabit Central Asia, secure the necessary energy tofuel its rapid economic growth and expand its political influence in acritical border region. The Central Asian states have their own rivalries,preferences and strategic imperatives. Looming above this is the fiercecompetition between American, European and Asian oil companies.But as in the nineteenth century, Afghanistan's instability and theadvancing Taliban were creating a new dimension to this global rivalryand becoming a significant fulcrum for the new Great Game. The statesand the companies had to decide whether to confront or woo the Talibanand whether the Taliban would impede or help pipelines from CentralAsia to new markets in South Asia.Afghanistan had held Central Asia in a tight embrace for centuries.The territory comprising modern day Tajikistan, southern Uzbekistan andnorthern Afghanistan was one contiguous territory for centuries, ruledintermittently by amirs or kings in Bukhara or Kabul. The Amir of Bukharadepended on Afghan mercenaries for his army. Persecuted tribalchiefs, bandits and mullahs sought sanctuary in each other's territories,crossing a non-existent border. (Thus Tajikistan's decision in 1997 tohand over the Kuliab airbase in southern Tajikistan to Ahmad ShahMasud so he could receive military supplies from Iran and Russia, wasbut a continuation of these past linkages.) Afghanistan's contiguity withCentral Asia came to an end after the 1917 Russian Revolution, whenthe Soviet Union sealed its borders with its southern Muslim neighbours.The reopening of these borders in 1991 heralded the start of the newGreat Game.Afghanistan today borders Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistanbut only Turkmenistan has large energy resources. Along the Pamirmountains Tajikistan's five million people share a rugged 640-mile borderwith Afghanistan, which is divided by the Amu Darya river. A quarter ofAfghanistan's population is Tajik. More Tajiks are scattered throughoutthe other CARs and another 200,000 live in China's Xinjiang province.The only major ethnic group in Central Asia which is not of Turkicorigin, the Tajiks are descended from the first Persian tribes who inhabitedCentral Asia between 1500 and 1000 BC, but were later pushed to theperipheries by a series of Turkic invasions from Mongolia.In ancient times, Tajikistan was the military and economic centre ofthe region. It acted as a gateway for the Silk Route and for Turkic invaderswho rode west into Iran, Russia and Europe and south into Afghanistanand India. Russia annexed the northern part of present day Tajikistan in1868 and it became a part of the province of Russia-controlled Turkestan.As the Great Game intensified, the British and Russians demarcated theborder between Afghanistan and Central Asia in 1884, when Russiaannexed southern Tajikistan.After Stalin created the five CARs in 1924-25 by arbitrarily drawinglines on a map, he handed over Bukhara and Samarkand, the two majorcentres of Tajik culture and history to Uzbekistan, creating a rivalrybetween the two Republics which has simmered ever since. Modern dayTajikistan represents none of the population or economic centres ofancient Tajik glories. Stalin also created the Autonomous Region ofGorno-Badakhshan in the Pamir mountains, which contains 44 per centof the land area of Tajikistan but only 3 per cent of the population.While the Tajiks are Sunni Muslims, Gorno-Badakhshan contains variousPamiri ethnic groups many of whom are Shia Muslims. They include theIsmaelis, a Shia sect and followers of the Agha Khan, who also inhabitthe contiguous Badakhshan region of Afghanistan.A few months after the 1917 Revolution, Muslim guerrilla groupssprang up across Central Asia to resist the Bolsheviks. These rebels werecalled Basmachis by the Bolsheviks, a derogative term meaning bandit.The movement stood for Islam, nationalism and anti-communism. Sixtyyears later the same inspiration motivated the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan.Determined to undermine Soviet power, the British helped the Basmachisin 1919, by paying Kabul's rulers to send camel caravans of armsand ammunition to the Basmachis. Thousands of Tajik Basmachis tookrefuge in northern Afghanistan as their struggle continued until 1929,
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Abbas, Mulla Mohammed 22,61,100Abda
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INDEX - 270Hazaras (continued)burea
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INDEX ~ 274nF»r\/FaliViar» milita
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INDEX ~ 278Talibans (continued)Sunn