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144 ~ TALIBANing, as Niyazov put it to me as early as December 1991, 'the new Kuwait'. 1Since independence Turkmenistan, like other oil rich CARs, haswaited in vain for its oil and gas riches to reach outside markets. Landlockedand surrounded by potentially jealous and hostile powers - Russia,Iran, Afghanistan and Uzbekistan - the Central Asian states have manoeuveredrelentlessly for pipelines to be built that would end their isolation,free them from economic dependence on Russia and earn hard currencyto refloat their economies after the devastation wrought by thebreak-up of the Soviet Union. For 70 years all their communicationlinks — roads, railways and pipelines — were built heading east to Russia.Now they wanted to build links with the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean,the Mediterranean and China.The energy resources of the Caspian Sea and Central Asia, (which weshall now call the Caspian region and includes Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan,Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan), have been described with breathlesshyperbole over the past few years. In the early 1990s the USA estimatedthat Caspian oil reserves were between 100 to 150 billion barrels (bb).That figure was highly inflated and possible reserves are now estimated tobe less than half that or even as low as 50 bb. The Caspian region'sproven oil reserves are between 16 and 32 bb, which compares to 22 bbfor the USA and 17 bb for the North Sea, giving the Caspian 10-15times less than the total reserves of the Middle East.Nevertheless, the Caspian represented possibly the last unexplored andunexploited oil-bearing region in the world and its opening-up generatedhuge excitement amongst international oil companies. Western oil companieshave shifted their interest first to Western Siberia in 1991-92,then to Kazakhstan in 1993-94, Azerbaijan in 1995-97 and finally Turkmenistanin 1997-99. Between 1994-98, 24 companies from 13 countriessigned contracts in the Caspian region. Kazakhstan has the largest oilreserves with an estimated 85 bb, but only 10-16 bb proven reserves.Azerbaijan has possible oil reserves of 27 bb and only 4-11 bb provenreserves while Turkmenistan has 32 bb possible oil reserves, but only 1.5bb proven reserves. Uzbekistan's possible oil reserves are estimated at 1bb.Proven gas reserves in the Caspian region are estimated at 236-337trillion cubic feet (tcf), compared to reserves of 300 tcf in the USA.Turkmenistan has the 11th largest gas reserves in the world with 159tcf of possible gas reserves, Uzbekistan 110 tcf, Kazakhstan 88 tcf, whileAzerbaijan and Uzbekistan have 35 tcf each. 2Central Asian leaders became obsessed with projected pipelines, potentialroutes and the geo-politics that surrounded them. In 1996 the Caspianregion produced one million barrels per day (b/d) of oil of which only300,000 b/d was exported - mainly from Kazakhstan. However only halfDICTATORS AND OIL BARONS ~ H5that (140,000 b/d) was exported outside the former Soviet Union. Caspianproduction still represented only about 4 per cent of total world oilproduction. The region's natural gas production in 1996 totalled 3.3 tcf,but only 0.8 tcf was exported outside the former Soviet Union - mostlyfrom Turkmenistan. There was an urgent, almost desperate need for pipelines.The scramble for oil and influence by the big powers in the Caspianhas been likened to the Middle East in the 1920s. But Central Asia todayis an even larger complex quagmire of competing interests. Big powerssuch as Russia, China and the USA; the neighbours Iran, Pakistan,Afghanistan and Turkey; the Central Asian states themselves and themost powerful players of all, the oil companies, compete in what I calledin a 1997 seminal magazine article, 'The New Great Game'. The nameseemed to stick and was taken up by governments, experts and the oilcompanies. 3I had first visited Central Asia in 1989 during President Mikhail Gorbachov'sperestroika reform programme. Convinced that the ethnic issue inAfghanistan was going to become explosive after the withdrawal of Soviettroops, I wanted to understand the ethnic origins of the Afghan Uzbeks,Turkmens and Tajiks and see their original homelands. I returned to theregion frequently, exploring the vast vistas and the ethnic and politicalsoup in the region that became more complex and volatile as the SovietUnion fell apart. By chance I was in Ashkhabad where the Central Asianleaders gathered on 12 December 1991, to discuss the dismemberment ofthe Soviet Union and their independence.They were all reluctant nationalists, full of fear at the prospects oflosing the security and support of the Soviet state system and the prospectsof facing the outside world on their own. Within a few months, astheir economies crumbled, the importance of their oil resources and theneed for pipelines became evident. They began to hold talks with Westernoil companies, on the back of ongoing negotiations between Kazakhstanand the US company Chevron. My subsequent visits resulted in a bookon Central Asia but with Afghanistan disintegrating into civil war, I concludedthat its repercussions would rebound on Central Asia and the issueof pipelines would determine the future geo-politics of the region. 4The label - the new Great Game - resonated with history. In thelate nineteenth century the British in India and tsarist Russia fought anundeclared war of competition and influence to contain each other inCentral Asia and Afghanistan. 'Turkestan, Afghanistan, Transcaspia,Persia - to many these words breathe only a sense of utter remoteness, ora memory of strange vicissitudes and of moribund romance. To me, Iconfess they are pieces on a chessboard upon which is being played out agame for the domination of the world,' wrote Lord Curzon, before he