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138 ~ TALIBANwho were using the Khost camps, created a dilemma for Sharif when hevisited Washington in December 1998. Sharif side-stepped the issue butother Pakistani officials were more brazen, reminding their Americancounterparts how they had both helped midwife Bin Laden in the 1980sand the Taliban in the 1990s. Bin Laden himself pointed to continuedsupport from some elements in the Pakistani intelligence services in aninterview. 'As for Pakistan there are some governmental departments,which, by the Grace of God, respond to the Islamic sentiments of themasses in Pakistan. This is reflected in sympathy and co-operation. However,some other governmental departments fell into the trap of the infidels.We pray to God to return them to the right path,' said Bin Laden. 22Support for Bin Laden by elements within the Pakistani establishmentwas another contradiction in Pakistan's Afghan policy, explored fully inChapter 14- The US was Pakistan's closest ally with deep links to themilitary and the ISI. But both the Taliban and Bin Laden provided sanctuaryand training facilities for Kashmiri militants who were backed byPakistan, and Islamabad had little interest in drying up that support. Eventhough the Americans repeatedly tried to persuade the ISI to co-operatein delivering Bin Laden, the ISI declined, although it did help the USarrest several of Bin Laden's supporters. Without Pakistan's support theUSA could not hope to launch a snatch by US commandos or moreaccurate bombing strikes because it needed Pakistani territory to launchsuch raids. At the same time the USA dared not expose Pakistan's supportfor the Taliban, because it still hoped for ISI co-operation in catchingBin Laden.The Saudi conundrum was even worse. In July 1998 Prince Turki hadvisited Kandahar and a few weeks later 400 new pick-up trucks arrived inKandahar for the Taliban, still bearing their Dubai license plates. TheSaudis also gave cash for the Taliban's cheque book conquest of the northin the autumn. Until the Africa bombings and despite US pressure to endtheir support for the Taliban, the Saudis continued funding the Talibanand were silent on the need to extradite Bin Laden. 23 The truth aboutthe Saudi silence was even more complicated. The Saudis preferred toleave Bin Laden alone in Afghanistan because his arrest and trial by theAmericans could expose the deep relationship that Bin Laden continuedto have with sympathetic members of the Royal Family and elementswithin Saudi intelligence, which could prove deeply embarrassing. TheSaudis wanted Bin Laden either dead or a captive of the Taliban - theydid not want him captured by the Americans.After the August 1998 Africa bombings, US pressure on the Saudisincreased. Prince Turki visited Kandahar again, this time to persuade theTaliban to hand over Bin Laden. In their meeting, Mullah Omar refusedto do so and then insulted Prince Turki by abusing the Saudi RoyalGLOBAL JIHAD: THE ARAB-AFGHANS AND OSAMA BIN LADEN ~ 139Family. Bin Laden himself described what took place. 'He [Prince Turki]asked Mullah Omar to surrender us home or to expel us from Afghanistan.It is none of the business of the Saudi regime to come and ask for thehanding over of Osama Bin Laden. It was as if Turki came as an envoyof the American government.' 24 Furious about the Taliban insults, theSaudis suspended diplomatic relations with the Taliban and ostensiblyceased all aid to them, although they did not withdraw recognition of theTaliban government.By now Bin Laden had developed considerable influence with the Taliban,but that had not always been the case. The Taliban's contact withthe Arab-Afghans and their Pan-Islamic ideology was non-existent untilthe Taliban captured Kabul in 1996. Pakistan was closely involved inintroducing Bin Laden to the Taliban leaders in Kandahar, because itwanted to retain the Khost training camps for Kashmiri militants, whichwere now in Taliban hands. Persuasion by Pakistan, the Taliban's bettereducatedcadres, who also had Pan-Islamic ideas, and the lure of financialbenefits from Bin Laden, encouraged the Taliban leaders to meet withBin Laden and hand him back the Khost camps.Partly for his own safety and partly to keep control over him, the Talibanshifted Bin Laden to Kandahar in 1997. At first he lived as a payingguest. He built a house for Mullah Omar's family and provided funds toother Taliban leaders. He promised to pave the road from Kandahar airportto the city and build mosques, schools and dams but his civic worksnever got started as his funds were frozen. While Bin Laden lived inenormous style in a huge mansion in Kandahar with his family, servantsand fellow militants, the arrogant behaviour of the Arab-Afghans whoarrived with him and their failure to fulfil any of their civic projects,antagonized the local population. The Kandaharis saw the Taliban leadersas beneficiaries of Arab largesse rather than the people.Bin Laden endeared himself further to the leadership by sending severalhundred Arab-Afghans to participate in the 1997 and 1998 Talibanoffensives in the north. These Wahabbi fighters helped the Taliban carryout the massacres of the Shia Hazaras in the north. Several hundred Arab-Afghans, based in the Rishkor army garrison outside Kabul, fought on theKabul front against Masud. Increasingly, Bin Laden's world view appearedto dominate the thinking of senior Taliban leaders. All-night conversationsbetween Bin Laden and the Taliban leaders paid off. Until hisarrival the Taliban leadership had not been particularly antagonistic tothe USA or the West but demanded recognition for their government.However, after the Africa bombings the Taliban became increasinglyvociferous against the Americans, the UN, the Saudis and Muslimregimes around the world. Their statements increasingly reflected the languageof defiance Bin Laden had adopted and which was not an original