Yale University Press NEW HAVEN & 9 780300"089028 - Sito Mistero
Yale University Press NEW HAVEN & 9 780300"089028 - Sito Mistero Yale University Press NEW HAVEN & 9 780300"089028 - Sito Mistero
92 ~ TALIBANrely upon, quite apart from the government and the intelligence agencies. IAnother JUI faction runs the Jamiat-ul Uloomi Islamiyyah in Binori jtown, a surburb of Karachi. It was established by the late MaulviMohammed Yousuf Binori and has 8,000 students including hundreds oflAfghans. Several Taliban ministers have studied there. It also operateswith the help of donations from Muslims in 45 countries. 'The fundingwe get is a blessing from Allah,' said Mufti Jamil, a teacher. 'We are proudthat we teach the Taliban and we always pray for their success as theyhave managed to implement strict Islamic laws,' he added. 17 Binori sent600 students to join the Taliban in 1997. In November 1997 studentsfrom Binori went on a rampage in Karachi after three of their teacherswere assasinated. They fought the police and smashed vehicles, videoshops and beat up photographers. It was the first time that Pakistan'slargest and most cosmopolitan city had experienced Taliban-style unrest.Another extreme splinter faction of the JUI is the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan(SSP), the most virulent anti-Shia group in Pakistan which is supportedby the Taliban. When the government launched a crackdownagainst the SSP in 1998 after hundreds of Shia had been massacred bythe SSP, their leaders fled to Kabul where they were offered sanctuary.Hundreds of SSP militants have trained at the Khost training camp runby the Taliban and Bin Laden, which the US hit with cruise missiles in|1998 and thousands of SSP members have fought alongside the Taliban.The JUI were to benefit immensely from their Taliban protege's. Forthe first time, the JUI developed international prestige and influence as amajor patron of Islamic radicalism. Pakistani governments and the ISIcould no longer ignore the party, nor could Saudi Arabia and the ArabGulf states. Camps inside Afghanistan which were used for military trainingand refuge for non-Afghan Mujaheddin, and which had earlier beenrun by Hikmetyar, were taken over by the Taliban and handed over toJUI groups such as the SSP. In 1996 the Tailiban handed over CampBadr near Khost on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border to the Harkat-ul-jAnsar led by Fazlur Rehman Khalil. This was another JUI splinter group,known for its extreme militancy which had sent members to fight inAfghanistan, Kashmir, Chechnya and Bosnia. 18 The camp was attackedby US cruise missile two years later.The links between the Taliban and some of the extreme Pakistani 1Deobandi groups are solid because of the common ground they share.Several Deobandi leaders from both sides of the border originate from theDurrani Pashtun tribes based around Kandahar and Chaman in Pakistan.The Deobandi tradition is opposed to tribal and feudal structures, fromwhich stems the Taliban's mistrust of the tribal structure and the clanchiefs and whom the Taliban have eliminated from any leadership roleJBoth are united in their vehement opposition to the Shia sect and Iran-NEW STYLE FUNDAMENTALISM OF THE TALIBAN ~ 93Now, Pakistani Deobandis want a Taliban-style Islamic revolution in Pakistan.The Taliban have clearly debased the Deobandi tradition of learningand reform, with their ridigity, accepting no concept of doubt except assin and considering debate as little more than heresy. But in doing sothey have advanced a new, radical and, to the governments of the regionextremely threatening, model for any forthcoming Islamic revolution.Hikmetyar and Masud are not opposed to modernism. In contrast, theTaliban are vehemently opposed to modernism and have no desire tounderstand or adopt modem ideas of progress or economic development.The Taliban are poorly tutored in Islamic and Afghan history, knowledgeof the Sharia and the Koran and the political and theoretical developmentsin the Muslim world during the twentieth century. While Islamicradicalism in the twentieth century has a long history of scholarly writingand debate, the Taliban have no such historical perspective or tradition.There is no Taliban Islamic manifesto or scholarly analysis of Islamic orAfghan history. Their exposure to the radical Islamic debate around theworld is minimal, their sense of their own history is even less. This hascreated an obscurantism which allows no room for debate even withfellow Muslims.The Taliban's new model for a purist Islamic revolution has createdimmense repercussions, in Pakistan and to a more limited extent in theCentral Asian Republics. Pakistan, an already fragile state beset by anidentity crisis, an economic meltdown, ethnic and sectarian divisions anda rapacious ruling elite that has been unable to provide good governance,now faces the spectre of a new Islamic wave, led not by the older, moremature and accommodating Islamic parties but by neo-Taliban groups.By 1998, Pakistani Taliban groups were banning TV and videos intowns along the Pashtun belt, imposing Sharia punishments such as stoningand amputation in defiance of the legal system, killing Pakistani Shiaand forcing people, particularly women to adapt to the Taliban dress codeand way of life. Pakistan's support for the Taliban is thus coming back tohaunt the country itself, even as Pakistani leaders appear to be obliviousof the challenge and continue to support the Taliban. In Central Asia,particularly Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, neo-Taliban militants are beinghunted by the police in the Ferghana valley, which borders both countries.The Taliban and their supporters present the Muslim world and theWest with a new style of Islamic extremism, which rejects all accommodationwith Muslim moderation and the West. The Taliban's refusal tocompromise with the UN humanitarian agencies or foreign donor countriesor to compromise their principles in exchange for internationalrecognition and their rejection of all Muslim ruling elites as corrupt, has
94 TALIBANinflamed the debate in the Muslim world and inspired a younger generationof Islamic militants. The Taliban have given Islamic fundamentalism Ia new face and a new identity for the next millenium - one that refuses ]to accept any compromise or political system except their own.7SECRET SOCIETY: THETALIBAN'S POLITICAL ANDMILITARY ORGANIZATIONIf there was a single inspiration and hope for peace amongst ordinaryAfghans after the Taliban emerged, it was the fact that they governedthrough a collective political leadership, which was consultative andconsensus-building, rather than dominated by one individual. The TalibanShura in Kandahar claimed it was following the early Islamic modelwhere discussion was followed by a consensus amongst 'the believers' andsensitivity and accessibility to the public were deemed important. TheShura model was also heavily based on the Pashtun tribal jirga or councilwhere all clan chiefs took part in deciding upon important issues whichthe tribe faced. On my early visits to Kandahar, I was impressed with thedebates, which sometimes went on all night as commanders, mullahs andordinary fighters were called in to give their views, before Mullah Omartook a decision.Many Afghans were also impressed by the fact that initially the Talibandid not demand power for themselves. Instead they insisted they wererestoring law and order, only to hand over power to a government whichwas made up of 'good Muslims'. However, between 1994 and the captureof Kabul in 1996, the Taliban's decision-making process was to changeand become highly centralized, secretive, dictatorial and inaccessible.As Mullah Omar became more powerful and introverted, declining totravel to see and understand the rest of the country and meet the peopleunder his control, the movement's power structure developed all the faultsof the Mujaheddin and communist predecessors. Moreover after 1996, theTaliban made known their desire to become the sole rulers of Afghanistanwithout the participation of other groups. They maintained that theethnic diversity of the country was sufficiently represented in the Taliban
- Page 3 and 4: TalibanMilitant Islam,Oil and Funda
- Page 5 and 6: Vi ~ CONTENTSChapter 8A Vanished Ge
- Page 7 and 8: AFGHANISTAN•^ UZBEKISTAN J TAJIKI
- Page 9 and 10: 2 ~ TALIBANaccounts for some 40 per
- Page 11 and 12: "6 ~ TALIBANgas riches of landlocke
- Page 13 and 14: 10 ~ TALIBANgious mix that was to m
- Page 15 and 16: Part 1History of theTaliban Movemen
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- Page 25 and 26: 34 TALIBANKabul- Hikmetyar had alli
- Page 27 and 28: 38 ~ TALIBANrHERAT 1995: GOD'S INVI
- Page 29 and 30: 42 ~ TALIBANdo manage to take Kabul
- Page 31 and 32: J46 ~ TALIBANgreater weight to UN e
- Page 33 and 34: 50 ~ TALIBANas they hung from steel
- Page 35 and 36: 54 ~ TALIBANthey would help rearm t
- Page 37 and 38: 58 TALIBANGul Mohammed Pahlawan, Gh
- Page 39 and 40: 62 TALIBAN2,500 Taliban, who had re
- Page 41 and 42: 66 TALIBANshould throw all aid agen
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- Page 47 and 48: 78 TALIBANhas become a plague,' sai
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- Page 51 and 52: 86 TALIBANsity students - Hikmetyar
- Page 53: 90 TALIBANSharia was heavily influe
- Page 57 and 58: 98 TALIBANizing factor of Islam, it
- Page 59 and 60: 102 TALIBANadministrations made the
- Page 61 and 62: 106 ~ TAUBANfrom working, but it no
- Page 63 and 64: TALIBANUniversity, she held down a
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- Page 67 and 68: 118 TALIBANUS$1,300 - a small fortu
- Page 69 and 70: 122 TALIBANper cent of the total Pa
- Page 71 and 72: 126 TALIBANequipment, no electricit
- Page 73 and 74: 130 ~ TALIBANfight with the Mujahed
- Page 75 and 76: 134TALIBANAugust 1996 noted that Bi
- Page 77 and 78: 138 ~ TALIBANwho were using the Kho
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- Page 83 and 84: 150 — TALIBANgrowth of beards and
- Page 85 and 86: 154TALIBAN1998 when international o
- Page 87 and 88: 158 ~ TALIBANaround Afghanistan? Af
- Page 89 and 90: 162 TALIBAN ROMANCING THE TALIBAN 1
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- Page 95 and 96: 174 — TALIBANnon-Russian pipeline
- Page 97 and 98: 178 — TALIBANROMANCING THE TALIBA
- Page 99 and 100: 182 ~ TALIBANApril 1999. 'The US ha
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94 TALIBANinflamed the debate in the Muslim world and inspired a younger generationof Islamic militants. The Taliban have given Islamic fundamentalism Ia new face and a new identity for the next millenium - one that refuses ]to accept any compromise or political system except their own.7SECRET SOCIETY: THETALIBAN'S POLITICAL ANDMILITARY ORGANIZATIONIf there was a single inspiration and hope for peace amongst ordinaryAfghans after the Taliban emerged, it was the fact that they governedthrough a collective political leadership, which was consultative andconsensus-building, rather than dominated by one individual. The TalibanShura in Kandahar claimed it was following the early Islamic modelwhere discussion was followed by a consensus amongst 'the believers' andsensitivity and accessibility to the public were deemed important. TheShura model was also heavily based on the Pashtun tribal jirga or councilwhere all clan chiefs took part in deciding upon important issues whichthe tribe faced. On my early visits to Kandahar, I was impressed with thedebates, which sometimes went on all night as commanders, mullahs andordinary fighters were called in to give their views, before Mullah Omartook a decision.Many Afghans were also impressed by the fact that initially the Talibandid not demand power for themselves. Instead they insisted they wererestoring law and order, only to hand over power to a government whichwas made up of 'good Muslims'. However, between 1994 and the captureof Kabul in 1996, the Taliban's decision-making process was to changeand become highly centralized, secretive, dictatorial and inaccessible.As Mullah Omar became more powerful and introverted, declining totravel to see and understand the rest of the country and meet the peopleunder his control, the movement's power structure developed all the faultsof the Mujaheddin and communist predecessors. Moreover after 1996, theTaliban made known their desire to become the sole rulers of Afghanistanwithout the participation of other groups. They maintained that theethnic diversity of the country was sufficiently represented in the Taliban
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