Yale University Press NEW HAVEN & 9 780300"089028 - Sito Mistero
Yale University Press NEW HAVEN & 9 780300"089028 - Sito Mistero Yale University Press NEW HAVEN & 9 780300"089028 - Sito Mistero
88 ~ TALIBANlapse of legitimacy of all three trends (radical Islamicism, Sufism andtraditionalism) into a naked, rapacious power struggle created the ideologicalvacuum which the Taliban were to fill. The Taliban representednobody but themselves and they recognized no Islam except their own.But they did have an ideological base - an extreme form of Deobandism,which was being preached by Pakistani Islamic parties in Afghan refugeecamps in Pakistan. The Deobandis, a branch of Sunni Hanafi Islam hashad a history in Afghanistan, but the Taliban's interpretation of the creedhas no parallel anywhere in the Muslim world.The Deobandis arose in British India, not as a reactionary but a forward-lookingmovement that would reform and unite Muslim society asit struggled to live within the confines of a colonial state ruled by non-Muslims. Its main ideologues were Mohammed Qasim Nanautawi (1833—77) and Rashid Ahmed Gangohi (1829-1905), who founded the first •madrassa in Deoband near New Dehli. The Indian Mutiny of 1857 was a Iwatershed for Indian Muslims, who had led the anti-British revolt andhad been severely defeated. In the aftermath of the Mutiny several philosophicaland religious trends emerged amongst Indian Muslims in a bidto revive their standing. They ranged from the Deobandis to pro-Westernreformers who set up colleges such as the Aligarh Muslim Universitybased on the British model which would teach Islam and the liberal artsand sciences, so Muslim youth could catch up with their British rulersand compete with the growing Hindu elite.All these reformers saw education as the key to creating a new, modernMuslim. The Deobandis aimed to train a new generation of learned Muslimswho would revive Islamic values based on intellectual learning, spiritualexperience, Sharia law and Tariqah or the path. By teaching their studentshow to interprate Sharia, they aimed to harmonize the classicalSharia texts with current realities. The Deobandis took a restrictive viewof the role of women, opposed all forms of hierarchy in the Muslim communityand rejected the Shia - but the Taliban were to take these beliefsto an extreme which the original Deobandis would never have recognized.The Deobandis set up madrassas all over India and Afghan students, themselvessearching for a better understanding of how Islam could cope withcolonialism, arrived to study. By 1879 there were 12 Deobandi madrassasacross India and Afghan students were plentiful, although they weredescribed as 'rowdy and quick tempered'. 10 By 1967 when Deoband celebratedits first centenary, there were 9,000 Deobandi madrassas across SouthAsia.In the early twentieth century, the Afghan government sought cooperationwith Deoband to expand its own attempt to build modem, statecontrolled madrassas. Ulema from the Deoband madrassa visited Kabul in1933 for King Zahir Shah's coronation and said that Deoband would,NEW STYLE FUNDAMENTALISM OF THE TALIBAN 89'prepare such ulema in the changed circumstances of the period that theymay co-operate fully with the aim and purpose of the free governmentsin the world of Islam and prove sincere workers for the state'. 11 A fewDeobandi madrassas were established by the Afghan state, but they werenot hugely popular even in the Pashtun belt.Deobandi madrassas developed much faster in Pakistan after its creationin 1947- The Deobandis set up the JUI, a purely religious movementto propagate their beliefs and mobilize the community ofbelievers. In 1962 its leader in the North West Frontier ProvinceNWFP, Maulana Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi turned the JUI into a politicalparty, as a result of which it quickly split into several factions. MaulanaMufti Mehmood, a dynamic leader, took over the Pashtun faction ofthe JUI in the NWFP and remoulded it in a populist form. MuftiMehmood's JUI played a leading role in the 1970 elections mobilizingsupport against military rule. He propagated a 22-point Islamic agenda,which included a progressive social programme and a strong anti-American, anti-imperialist stance. The JUI campaign was marked by abitter feud with the Jamaat-e-Islami and the rift between the twolargest Islamic parties persists to this day. 12The history of the JUI in Pakistan is not relevant here, but the Deobandicreed was to become the primary religious and ideological influenceon the Taliban. During the 1980s Pakistan's Afghan policy was conductedwith the help of the Jamaat-e-Islami and Hikmetyar's Hizb-e-Islami, whowere also the main rivals of the JUI inside Pakistan. The ISPs connectionwith the Jamaat-e-Islami was an important policy instrument in the distributionof aid to the Mujaheddin. The JUI, which was now run by MuftiMehmood's son, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, was given no political role andthe small pro-Deobandi Afghan Mujaheddin groups were largely ignored.However, the JUI used this period to set up hundreds of madrassas alongthe Pashtun belt in the NWFP and Baluchistan where it offered youngPakistanis and Afghan refugees the chance of a free education, food, shelterand military training. These madrassas were to train a new generationof Afghans for the post-Soviet period. Even though the Deobandisreceived no political support, the military regime of President Zia ul Haqfunded madrassas of all sectarian persuasions. In 1971 there were only 900madrassas in Pakistan, but by the end of the Zia era in 1988 there were8,000 madrassas and 25,000 unregistered ones, educating over half a millionstudents. As Pakistan's state-run educational system steadily collapsed,these madrassas became the only avenue for boys from poor familiesto receive the semblance of an education. 13Most of these madrassas were in rural areas and Afghan refugee campsand were run by semi-educated mullahs who were far removed from theoriginal reformist agenda of the Deobandi school. Their interpretation of
90 TALIBANSharia was heavily influenced by Pashtunwali, the tribal code of the Pashtuns,while funds from Saudi Arabia to madrassas and parties which weresympathetic to the Wahabbi creed, as the Deobandis were, helped thesemadrassas turn out young militants who were deeply cynical of those whohad fought the jihad against the Soviets. After the 1992 capture of Kabulby the Mujaheddin, the ISI continued to ignore the JUI's growing influenceover the southern Pashtuns. The JUI was politically isolated atjhome, remaining in opposition to the first Benazir Bhutto government](1988-90) and the first Nawaz Sharif government (1990-93).However in the 1993 elections the JUI allied itself with the winningPakistan People's Party (PPP) led by Benazir Bhutto, thus becoming apart of the ruling coalition. 14 The JUI's access to the corridors of powerfor the first time allowed it to establish close links with the army, the ISIand the Interior Ministry under retired General Naseerullah Babar. Babarwas in search of a new Pashtun group which could revive Pashtun fortunesin Afghanistan and give access to Pakistani trade with Central Asiathrough southern Afghanistan and the JUI offered him that opportunity.The JUI leader Maulana Fazlur Rehman was made Chairman of theNational Assembly's Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs, a position!that enabled him to have influence on foreign policy for the first time.He was to use his position to visit Washington and European capitals tolobby for the Taliban and Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states to enlist theirfinancial support.With no centralized hierarchy nor the ability of any locally renownedor learned mullah to start a madrassa, the Deobandi tradition resulted indozens of breakaway, extremist factions emerging out of the mainstreamJUI. The most important breakaway faction of the JUI is led by MaulanaSamiul Haq, a religious and political leader who has been a Member of!the National Assembly and a Senator and whose madrassa became a majortraining ground for the Taliban leadership. In 1999 at least eight Talibancabinet ministers in Kabul were graduates of Haq's Dar-ul-UloomHaqqania and dozens more graduates served as Taliban governors in theprovinces, military commanders, judges and bureaucrats. 15 Younis Khalisand Mohammed Nabi Mohammedi, leaders of the traditional Mujaheddinparties, both studied at Haqqania.Haqqania is in Akhora Khatak, in the NWFP. It is a sprawling collectionof buildings on the main Islamabad-Peshawar highway. It has aboarding school for 1,500 students, a high school for 1,000 day studentsand 12 affiliated smaller madrassas. It was started in 1947 by Samiul Haq'sfather Maulana Abdul Haq who was a student and teacher at Deoband.Haqqania offers an eight-year Master of Arts course in Islamic studies anda PhD after an additional two years of study. Funded by public donationsit charges its students nothing.NEW STYLE FUNDAMENTALISM OF THE TALIBAN ~ 91In February 1999, the madrassa had a staggering 15,000 applicants forsome 400 new places making it the most popular madrassa in northernPakistan. Samiul Haq, a jovial but pious man with a tremendous sense ofhumour and a flowing red hennaed beard told me that his madrassa hasalways kept some 400 places for Afghan students. Since 1991 60 studentsare accepted from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan who tend tobelong to the Islamic opposition in these countries and enter Pakistanwithout passports or visas.Haq is still bitter about how he was ignored by the ISI for so long. 'TheISI always supported Hikmetyar and Qazi Hussain Ahmed [leader of theJamaat-e-Islami] while we were ignored, even though 80 per cent of thecommanders fighting the Russians in the Pashtun areas had studied atHaqqania,' he told me as we sat on a rough carpet in his office surroundedby bearded students holding application forms for the class of '99. 1S'Hikmetyar had 5 per cent of the popular support but 90 per cent of themilitary aid from the ISI. We were never recognized but, with the arrivalof the Taliban, the support of the people of Afghanistan fell into our lap,'he added with a big laugh.'Before 1994 I did not know Mullah Omar because he had not studiedin Pakistan, but those around him were all Haqqania students and cameto see me frequently to discuss what to do. I advised them not to set upa party because the ISI was still trying to play one Mujaheddin partyagainst the other in order to keep them divided. I told them to start astudent movement. When the Taliban movement began I told the ISI,"let the students take over Afghanistan," ' Haq said. Samiul Haq has deeprespect for Mullah Omar. 'I met Omar for the first time when I went toKandahar in 1996 and I was proud that he was chosen as Amir-ul Momineen.He has no money, tribe or pedigree but he is revered above allothers and so Allah chose him to be their leader. According to Islam theman who can bring peace can be elected the Amir. When the Islamicrevolution comes to Pakistan it will not be led by the old defunct leaderslike me, but by a similiar unknown man who will arise from the masses.'Samiul Haq is in constant touch with Omar, helps him deal with internationalrelations and offers advice on important Sharia decisions. He isalso the principle organizer for recruiting Pakistani students to fight forthe Taliban. After the Taliban defeat in Mazar in 1997 he received atelephone call from Omar asking for help. Haq shut down his madrassaand sent his entire student body to fight alongside the Taliban. And afterthe battle for Mazar in 1988, Haq organized a meeting between Talibanleaders and 12 madrassas in the NWFP to organize reinforcements for theTaliban army. All the madrassas agreed to shut down for one month andsend 8,000 students to Afghanistan. The help the Taliban receive fromPakistan's Deobandi madrassas is an important level of support they can
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90 TALIBANSharia was heavily influenced by Pashtunwali, the tribal code of the Pashtuns,while funds from Saudi Arabia to madrassas and parties which weresympathetic to the Wahabbi creed, as the Deobandis were, helped thesemadrassas turn out young militants who were deeply cynical of those whohad fought the jihad against the Soviets. After the 1992 capture of Kabulby the Mujaheddin, the ISI continued to ignore the JUI's growing influenceover the southern Pashtuns. The JUI was politically isolated atjhome, remaining in opposition to the first Benazir Bhutto government](1988-90) and the first Nawaz Sharif government (1990-93).However in the 1993 elections the JUI allied itself with the winningPakistan People's Party (PPP) led by Benazir Bhutto, thus becoming apart of the ruling coalition. 14 The JUI's access to the corridors of powerfor the first time allowed it to establish close links with the army, the ISIand the Interior Ministry under retired General Naseerullah Babar. Babarwas in search of a new Pashtun group which could revive Pashtun fortunesin Afghanistan and give access to Pakistani trade with Central Asiathrough southern Afghanistan and the JUI offered him that opportunity.The JUI leader Maulana Fazlur Rehman was made Chairman of theNational Assembly's Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs, a position!that enabled him to have influence on foreign policy for the first time.He was to use his position to visit Washington and European capitals tolobby for the Taliban and Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states to enlist theirfinancial support.With no centralized hierarchy nor the ability of any locally renownedor learned mullah to start a madrassa, the Deobandi tradition resulted indozens of breakaway, extremist factions emerging out of the mainstreamJUI. The most important breakaway faction of the JUI is led by MaulanaSamiul Haq, a religious and political leader who has been a Member of!the National Assembly and a Senator and whose madrassa became a majortraining ground for the Taliban leadership. In 1999 at least eight Talibancabinet ministers in Kabul were graduates of Haq's Dar-ul-UloomHaqqania and dozens more graduates served as Taliban governors in theprovinces, military commanders, judges and bureaucrats. 15 Younis Khalisand Mohammed Nabi Mohammedi, leaders of the traditional Mujaheddinparties, both studied at Haqqania.Haqqania is in Akhora Khatak, in the NWFP. It is a sprawling collectionof buildings on the main Islamabad-Peshawar highway. It has aboarding school for 1,500 students, a high school for 1,000 day studentsand 12 affiliated smaller madrassas. It was started in 1947 by Samiul Haq'sfather Maulana Abdul Haq who was a student and teacher at Deoband.Haqqania offers an eight-year Master of Arts course in Islamic studies anda PhD after an additional two years of study. Funded by public donationsit charges its students nothing.<strong>NEW</strong> STYLE FUNDAMENTALISM OF THE TALIBAN ~ 91In February 1999, the madrassa had a staggering 15,000 applicants forsome 400 new places making it the most popular madrassa in northernPakistan. Samiul Haq, a jovial but pious man with a tremendous sense ofhumour and a flowing red hennaed beard told me that his madrassa hasalways kept some 400 places for Afghan students. Since 1991 60 studentsare accepted from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan who tend tobelong to the Islamic opposition in these countries and enter Pakistanwithout passports or visas.Haq is still bitter about how he was ignored by the ISI for so long. 'TheISI always supported Hikmetyar and Qazi Hussain Ahmed [leader of theJamaat-e-Islami] while we were ignored, even though 80 per cent of thecommanders fighting the Russians in the Pashtun areas had studied atHaqqania,' he told me as we sat on a rough carpet in his office surroundedby bearded students holding application forms for the class of '99. 1S'Hikmetyar had 5 per cent of the popular support but 90 per cent of themilitary aid from the ISI. We were never recognized but, with the arrivalof the Taliban, the support of the people of Afghanistan fell into our lap,'he added with a big laugh.'Before 1994 I did not know Mullah Omar because he had not studiedin Pakistan, but those around him were all Haqqania students and cameto see me frequently to discuss what to do. I advised them not to set upa party because the ISI was still trying to play one Mujaheddin partyagainst the other in order to keep them divided. I told them to start astudent movement. When the Taliban movement began I told the ISI,"let the students take over Afghanistan," ' Haq said. Samiul Haq has deeprespect for Mullah Omar. 'I met Omar for the first time when I went toKandahar in 1996 and I was proud that he was chosen as Amir-ul Momineen.He has no money, tribe or pedigree but he is revered above allothers and so Allah chose him to be their leader. According to Islam theman who can bring peace can be elected the Amir. When the Islamicrevolution comes to Pakistan it will not be led by the old defunct leaderslike me, but by a similiar unknown man who will arise from the masses.'Samiul Haq is in constant touch with Omar, helps him deal with internationalrelations and offers advice on important Sharia decisions. He isalso the principle organizer for recruiting Pakistani students to fight forthe Taliban. After the Taliban defeat in Mazar in 1997 he received atelephone call from Omar asking for help. Haq shut down his madrassaand sent his entire student body to fight alongside the Taliban. And afterthe battle for Mazar in 1988, Haq organized a meeting between Talibanleaders and 12 madrassas in the NWFP to organize reinforcements for theTaliban army. All the madrassas agreed to shut down for one month andsend 8,000 students to Afghanistan. The help the Taliban receive fromPakistan's Deobandi madrassas is an important level of support they can