Yale University Press NEW HAVEN & 9 780300"089028 - Sito Mistero
Yale University Press NEW HAVEN & 9 780300"089028 - Sito Mistero Yale University Press NEW HAVEN & 9 780300"089028 - Sito Mistero
64 ~ TALIBANout Tajik farmers from the Shomali valley. The Uzbeks and Hazaras hadmassacred hundreds of Taliban prisoners and killed Pashtun villagers inthe north and around Kabul. The Shia Hazaras had also forced out Pashtunson the basis of their Sunni beliefs. More than three-quarters of amillion people had been displaced by the recent fighting - in the northaround Mazar, on the Herat front and around Kabul - creating a newrefugee crisis at a time when UN agencies were trying to persuade refugeesstill living in Pakistan to return home. Moreover, the divisions insideAfghanistan were manipulated and exacerbated by its neighbours, ascountries stepped up aid to their various Afghan proxies. This onlworsened the ethnic and sectarian divide.Apart from the suffering civilians, the biggest casualty of the stepped-ifighting was the UN. The UN mediator Norbet Holl failed to persuadethe Taliban that the UN was a neutral peace broker or the opposition]that the UN would protect the interests of the ethnic minorities. NorHoll able to put pressure on regional countries to stop arming the factions.Nobody trusted the UN and everyone ignored it. Holl made a blunt state-iment blaming outside powers for continued interference and the inflexibilityof the belligerents. 'We have a standstill in the negotiating process,we just cannot continue business as usual. I do not see the Afghan leadersas puppets but they need to get ammunition from somewhere,' Holl said. 1 *A month later Holl had resigned.The Taliban leadership, unversed in UN procedures and even the UNCharter, proved to be the greatest obstacle. Mullah Omar refused to meetHoll, creating resentment within the UN team while other Talibanleaders publicly mocked UN efforts at promoting a cease-fire. Talibanresentment against the UN increased after the debacle in Mazar and moreso after the UN Security Council refused to take action against the Mazarmassacres or hand over Afghanistan's seat at the UN, which was stiljoccupied by President Rabbani.The Taliban harboured several unrealistic suspicions about the UNwhich no amount of diplomacy could dispel. They were convincedthe UN, in league with Western powers, was conspiring against Islamtheir imposition of Sharia law. They also accused the UN of being henced by regional countries in blocking recognition of their governmentThe crisis within the UN came at a time when it faced dwindlingfrom wealthy donor countries for aid programmes because of 'doifatigue' over the continuing war. Donations were decreasing furthbecause of the Taliban's discrimination against Afghan women,future survival of aid operations in Afghanistan depended on theagencies convincing the Taliban to moderate their gender policies, whiithe Taliban refused to do. Several Western non-governmental organisa-itions (NGOs) halted their programmes in Kabul because of the Taliban'SjMAZAR-E-SHARIF 1997: MASSACRE IN THE NORTH ~ 65refusal to let them continue helping women. In the north the fightinghad forced the NGOs to pull out twice and they did not return.Moreover, Taliban hardliners were doing their utmost to promote acrisis with UN humanitarian aid agencies so that they could kick themout of Taliban-held areas, under the pretext that the agencies wereimparting Western secular ideas to the population. At the end of September,heads of three UN agencies in Kandahar were ordered to leavethe country after they protested that a female lawyer for the UN HighCommissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was forced to talk to Taliban officialsfrom behind a curtain so her face would not be visible. In November,the UNHCR suspended all its programmes when the Taliban arrested fourUNHCR Afghan staff. Save the Children shut down several programmesbecause the Taliban refused to allow women to participate in mineawarenessclasses. It was becoming impossible to provide humanitarianaid to the population anywhere, even though winter was approaching andthere were growing food shortages.The Taliban's treatment of women drew enormous adverse publicityand international criticism when Emma Bonino, the European Commissionerfor Humanitarian Affairs and 19 Western journalists and aidworkers were arrested and held for three hours by the Taliban religiouspolice in Kabul on 28 September 1997. They had been touring a femalehospital ward funded by the European Union (EU), when journalistsaccompanying Bonino were arrested for taking photographs of womenpatients - all photography was banned by the Taliban.'This is an example of how people live here in a state of terror,' MsBonino told reporters in Kabul. 16 The Taliban apologized, but Westernenthusiasm for funding aid to Afghanistan was dealt another blow. TheTaliban then declared that they would segregate Kabul's hospitals and notallow women to be treated together with men - and there was only onewomen's hospital in the city.It was now becoming difficult for the Clinton administration to maintainits initial sympathy for the Taliban. Powerful US feminist groupslobbied Washington on behalf of Afghan women. In November Secretaryof State Madeleine Albright issued the harshest criticism of the Talibanever made by the US. 'We are opposed to the Taliban because of theiropposition to human rights and their despicable treatment of women andchildren and great lack of respect for human dignity,' Albright said on avisit to Islamabad on 18 November 1997. Her statement was seen as asignificant indicator of the US distancing itself both from the Talibanand Pakistan's support for them. Yet the Taliban appeared least concernedabout these international pressures and in fact generated greater anti-Western feeling. The ulema in Pakistan and Kandahar told Omar that he
66 TALIBANshould throw all aid agencies out of Afghanistan because they were spiesand the enemies of Islam. 17In a bid to energise UN mediation, Secretary - General Kofi Annanordered Lakhdar Brahimi, a former Algerian Foreign Minister to tour theregion and present a report to the UN Security Council. After visiting 13countries including Afghanistan between 14 August and 23 September,Brahimi's conclusions were to mobilize greater international pressure onAfghanistan's neighbours to stop aiding the belligerents. In OctoberAnnan had set up a Group of Concerned Countries at the UN. The groupnicknamed 'Six plus Two', included six of Afghanistan's neighbours,Russia and the United States. 18 Brahami hoped that this forum wouldencourage Iran to talk to Pakistan as well as re-engage Washington in asearch for peace. Another aim was to implement an arms embargo onAfghanistan and to start talks between the Afghan factions.Annan followed up these steps in mid-November with a blisteringreport on Afghanistan to the UN Security Council, in which for thefirst time he used uncompromisingly tough language accusing regionalcountries, especially Iran and Pakistan, of fomenting the conflict. He saidthese states were using the UN as a fig leaf to continue providing aid tothe factions. 19 'Foreign military material and financial support continuesunabated, fuelling this conflict and depriving the warring factions of agenuine interest in making peace,' Annan said. 'The continued supportby these outside forces, combined with the apathy of others not directlyinvolved, is rendering diplomatic initiatives almost irrelevant.' Neitherdid Annan spare the warlords. 'The Afghan leaders refuse to rise abovetheir factional interests and start working together for national reconciliation.Too many groups in Afghanistan, warlords, terrorists, drug dealersand others, appear to have too much to gain from war and too much tolose from peace.' 20Later in Tehran, Annan addressed the summit meeting of the Organizationof the Islamic Conference (OIC) and bluntly criticized their apathyin trying to resolve the conflict. After years of neglect, Afghanistan nowappeared to feature on the international diplomatic agenda, but that didlittle to satisfy the Taliban who were determined to conquer the northand their opponents who were equallly determined to resist them.5BAMIYAN 1998-2000:THE NEVER-ENDING WARIn the Hazarajat, the country of the Hazaras in central Afghanistan,the temperature was below freezing. Under the shadows of thetowering snow - covered peaks of the Hindu Kush mountains thatsurround Bamiyan, Hazara children with extended stomachs and rakethinfeatures played their version of a cops and robbers game they called'Taliban'. The Hazaras were starving and the game involved ambushing aTaliban convoy of wheat and bringing it home to their hungry families.The children were living on roots, berries and a few potatoes their parentsmanaged to grow in tiny, stony fields, dug out from the sides of the steepvalleys. Only 10 per cent of the Hazarajat is cultivable and that year'sharvests of wheat and maize had failed.But the Hazaras were also starving simply for who they were. SinceAugust 1997 in a bid to force them to surrender, the Taliban had closedall the roads from the south, west and east that entered their mountainfastness. There was no relief possible from the north, where the breakdownof law and order, the shortage of foodstuffs and the mountain passesclosed by winter snow made it impossible for food convoys to travel toBamiyan, which is situated at a height of 7,500 feet. Three hundred thousandHazaras in the province of Bamiyan were already hungry, whileanother 700,000 in the three neighbouring provinces of Ghor, Wardakand Ghazni were also suffering from shortages — one million people in all.For months the UN and its sister organization the World Food Programme(WFP) had been holding tortuous negotiations with the Talibanto allow relief convoys through, but the Taliban had refused. The UNwere even more frustrated with the fact that Pakistan had contractedto provide the Taliban with 600,000 tons of wheat, but had made no
- Page 1 and 2: YALE NOTA BENE"The broader storyher
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- Page 5 and 6: Vi ~ CONTENTSChapter 8A Vanished Ge
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- Page 15 and 16: Part 1History of theTaliban Movemen
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- Page 25 and 26: 34 TALIBANKabul- Hikmetyar had alli
- Page 27 and 28: 38 ~ TALIBANrHERAT 1995: GOD'S INVI
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- Page 31 and 32: J46 ~ TALIBANgreater weight to UN e
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- Page 37 and 38: 58 TALIBANGul Mohammed Pahlawan, Gh
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- Page 53 and 54: 90 TALIBANSharia was heavily influe
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66 TALIBANshould throw all aid agencies out of Afghanistan because they were spiesand the enemies of Islam. 17In a bid to energise UN mediation, Secretary - General Kofi Annanordered Lakhdar Brahimi, a former Algerian Foreign Minister to tour theregion and present a report to the UN Security Council. After visiting 13countries including Afghanistan between 14 August and 23 September,Brahimi's conclusions were to mobilize greater international pressure onAfghanistan's neighbours to stop aiding the belligerents. In OctoberAnnan had set up a Group of Concerned Countries at the UN. The groupnicknamed 'Six plus Two', included six of Afghanistan's neighbours,Russia and the United States. 18 Brahami hoped that this forum wouldencourage Iran to talk to Pakistan as well as re-engage Washington in asearch for peace. Another aim was to implement an arms embargo onAfghanistan and to start talks between the Afghan factions.Annan followed up these steps in mid-November with a blisteringreport on Afghanistan to the UN Security Council, in which for thefirst time he used uncompromisingly tough language accusing regionalcountries, especially Iran and Pakistan, of fomenting the conflict. He saidthese states were using the UN as a fig leaf to continue providing aid tothe factions. 19 'Foreign military material and financial support continuesunabated, fuelling this conflict and depriving the warring factions of agenuine interest in making peace,' Annan said. 'The continued supportby these outside forces, combined with the apathy of others not directlyinvolved, is rendering diplomatic initiatives almost irrelevant.' Neitherdid Annan spare the warlords. 'The Afghan leaders refuse to rise abovetheir factional interests and start working together for national reconciliation.Too many groups in Afghanistan, warlords, terrorists, drug dealersand others, appear to have too much to gain from war and too much tolose from peace.' 20Later in Tehran, Annan addressed the summit meeting of the Organizationof the Islamic Conference (OIC) and bluntly criticized their apathyin trying to resolve the conflict. After years of neglect, Afghanistan nowappeared to feature on the international diplomatic agenda, but that didlittle to satisfy the Taliban who were determined to conquer the northand their opponents who were equallly determined to resist them.5BAMIYAN 1998-2000:THE NEVER-ENDING WARIn the Hazarajat, the country of the Hazaras in central Afghanistan,the temperature was below freezing. Under the shadows of thetowering snow - covered peaks of the Hindu Kush mountains thatsurround Bamiyan, Hazara children with extended stomachs and rakethinfeatures played their version of a cops and robbers game they called'Taliban'. The Hazaras were starving and the game involved ambushing aTaliban convoy of wheat and bringing it home to their hungry families.The children were living on roots, berries and a few potatoes their parentsmanaged to grow in tiny, stony fields, dug out from the sides of the steepvalleys. Only 10 per cent of the Hazarajat is cultivable and that year'sharvests of wheat and maize had failed.But the Hazaras were also starving simply for who they were. SinceAugust 1997 in a bid to force them to surrender, the Taliban had closedall the roads from the south, west and east that entered their mountainfastness. There was no relief possible from the north, where the breakdownof law and order, the shortage of foodstuffs and the mountain passesclosed by winter snow made it impossible for food convoys to travel toBamiyan, which is situated at a height of 7,500 feet. Three hundred thousandHazaras in the province of Bamiyan were already hungry, whileanother 700,000 in the three neighbouring provinces of Ghor, Wardakand Ghazni were also suffering from shortages — one million people in all.For months the UN and its sister organization the World Food Programme(WFP) had been holding tortuous negotiations with the Talibanto allow relief convoys through, but the Taliban had refused. The UNwere even more frustrated with the fact that Pakistan had contractedto provide the Taliban with 600,000 tons of wheat, but had made no
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