60 ~ TALIBANThe Ghilzais, who had dominated the anti-Soviet war effort were notprepared to be used as cannon fodder by the Taliban without adequaterepresentation in the Durrani-dominated Taliban Shuras. They wouldcome if they were given a share of power. Ghilzai commanders with theTaliban were extremely critical of Taliban tactics in Mazar. 'There weretoo many mistakes made in Mazar. The initial agreement between Malikand the Taliban happened in too short a time. They should have discussedthe agreement for a longer time and built up a dialogue with each other.They also made many military mistakes,' Jalaluddin Haqqani, the leadingeastern Pashtun commander with the Taliban told me in Kabul in July1997.Haqqani, who commanded Taliban troops on the Kabul front, was aveteran Pashtun commander from Khost in Paktia province who had.jjoined the Taliban in 1995. He was one of the most celebrated commandersfrom the anti-Soviet war. Although Haqqani was made a ministerin Kabul, he and other non-Kandaharis remained extremely bitter thatthey were kept out of the decision-making process that took place inKandahar under Omar, rather than in Kabul. 7 After the Mazar defeatthe Taliban gave Haqqani a large sum of money to recruit 3,000 Ghilzaitribesmen. Haqqani arrived with his men on the Kabul front, but beingpowerless to make military decisions and the fact that they were led byKandahari officers at the front led to mass desertions. Within two monthsHaqqani had only 300 of his new recruits left. Even more disturbing wasthat villages around Kandahar were refusing to send their sons to enlistwith the Taliban. For the first time the Taliban had a recruitment problem and a manpower shortage.For the Central Asian states the bloodshed on their doorstep created aparanoid reaction as they considered the spectre of the war crossing intotheir territories and the thousands of Afghan refugees fleeing across theftporous borders. In an unprecedented move, military security washeightened throughout the region. Some 3,000 Russian troops on theUzbekistan-Afghanistan border, 25,000 Russian troops on the Tajikistan-?Afghanistan border, Russian border guards in Turkmenistan and localarmy divisions all went on a high state of alert. Uzbekistan and Tajikistanclosed their borders with northern Afghanistan. At Termez, Uzbek helicoptergunships flew patrol as troops laid tank traps and fortified the bridgethat crosses the Amu Darya river, which divides Afghanistan from Central Asia.Russia offered to send ten battalions of troops to Kyrgyzstan afterappeal by Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev, even though his country has noborder with Afghanistan. Russia and Kazakhstan organized an emergencymeeting of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to discithe crisis, where Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov promiMAZAR-E-SHARIF 1997: MASSACRE IN THE NORTH ~ 61'very tough and effective actions by Russia', if the Taliban advanced further.Turkmenistan, a self-declared neutral state which bordered westernAfghanistan, had developed working relations with the Taliban but theTurkmen were unnerved by the fighting around Mazar. For the first time9,000 Afghan Turkmen crossed the border into Turkmenistan seekingshelter from the fighting.Iran said it would continue to support the anti-Taliban alliance andappealed to Russia, India and the Central Asian states to help them also.Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayti urged the UN to intervene.The Taliban were furious with all of their neighbours. 'Iran and Russiaare interfering and supporting the opposition. They have given aircraft tothe opposition to carry out bombardments. Iran is flying up to 22 flights aday to Mazar carrying arms,' said Mullah Mohammed Abbas, the TalibanMinister of Health. 8Iranian and Central Asian diplomats bitterly accused Pakistan of notonly supporting the Taliban, but of lying and betraying a solemn commitmentmade by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif just a week before the Talibanoffensive. At a summit of regional heads of state in Ashkhabad, the capitalof Turkmenistan, Sharif had promised to reign in the Taliban andprevent the war spreading to the north. 'Pakistan's credibility in CentralAsia is zero right now,' a senior Uzbek diplomat told me. 9However, the arrival of the Taliban in the north did have a salutaryeffect on the four-year-old civil war in Tajikistan as it forced both sidesin the conflict to quicken the pace of negotiations out of fear of theTaliban. A peace settlement between the Tajik government and theIslamic opposition, brokered by Russia and the UN was finally reached inMoscow on 27 June 1997. The settlement provided a major boost toMasud as Russia could now re-supply him from bases inside Tajikistan.Masud was given the use of the airport in Kuliab in southern Tajikistanwhere he received Russian and Iranian supplies which he then flew intothe Panjshir valley.The anti-Taliban alliance now tried to cement their unity by reformulatinga new political alliance, which had to take into account Dostum'sdeparture from the scene. On 13 June 1997 they set up the 'UnitedIslamic and National Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan' and declaredMazar as their capital. They reappointed Burhanuddin Rabbani as Presidentand Masud as the new Defence Minister and promised to form a newgovernment which would include tribal and Islamic leaders as well astechnocrats. But the pact was doomed to failure as again differencesbetween Malik, Masud and Khalili prevented the Uzbeks, Tajiks and Hazarasfrom working together.At the root of the split was the other leaders' suspicions of Malik afterhis string of betrayals. Malik had been unable to prevent a force of some
62 TALIBAN2,500 Taliban, who had remained behind in the north, from capturingthe city of Kunduz which had an airport. The Taliban reinforced thisenclave with daily flights of men and materials from Kabul. While Malikcould not or would not drive the Taliban out of the north, Masud wasmoving closer to Kabul.In mid-July, Masud broke the military stalemate north of Kabul, byrecapturing Charikar and the Bagram airbase, killing hundreds more Talibantroops. By September, Masud's forces were once again positioned only20 miles from Kabul. Both sides traded artillery and rocket bombardments,which forced nearly 180,000 civilians to flee the lush Shomali valley justnorth of Kabul and now on the front line. As the Taliban retreated fronjthe Shomali, they poisoned water wells and blew up small irrigation channelsand dams in a bid to ensure that the local Tajik population wouldnot return in a hurry. The war was now not just uprooting and killingcivilians, but destroying their very means of livelihood and turningKabul's agricultural belt into a wasteland.The anti-Taliban alliance had now created a huge 180-degree arc thatsurrounded Kabul. To the west and north of the city were Masud's forceswhile to the east and south were Khalili's Hazaras. As speculationmounted that they may launch an attack on Kabul, the Taliban remainedconfident that the opposition was too divided to attack Kabul. 'We havedivided the opposition into two parts by putting our forces into Kunduz,The northern groups are disunited against each other. The other Uzbekgenerals cannot rely on Malik. He has already betrayed them once andnow he is just trying to save himself. No group has enough forces to fightthe Taliban on their own, so they have to try and unite but theynever unite,' said Haqqani. 10Doubts about Malik's loyalty to the alliance appeared to be justified,when in September the Taliban force in Kunduz took him by surprise^The Taliban broke out of their Kunduz enclave and with the help ofPashtun tribes in the area launched another attack on Mazar. On 7 September1997 they captured the town of Tashkhorgan, creating panic ir*Mazar. As the Taliban advanced on Mazar, heavy fighting broke outbetween Uzbek troops loyal to Malik and others loyal to Dostum. Malik'shouse was burnt down by Dostum's troops and he fled to his base in Faryabprovince and then escaped to Turkmenistan from where he went on toIran.In a dramatic turnaround, Dostum returned to Mazar from exileTurkey and rallied his troops to defeat Malik's supporters and pushTaliban out of the Mazar region. Mazar descended into chaos asUzbeks again looted parts of the city and the offices of UN aid agenciforcing humanitarian aid-workers to abandon Mazar for the second tiin a year. As the Taliban retreated they massacred at least 70 Shia HazaMAZAR-E^SHARIF 1997: MASSACRE IN THE NORTH ~ 63in Qazil Abad, a village south of Mazar, and perhaps hundreds more. 'TheTaliban swept through this village like storm. They killed about 70people, some had their throats slit, while others were skinned alive,' saidSohrab Rostam, a survivor of the massacre. 11With the Taliban retreating back to Kunduz, Dostum tried to consolidatehis position, but Mazar was now virtually taken over by Hazara groupsand Dostum was forced to abandon the Uzbek capital and set up hisbase in Shiberghan. Acute tensions between the Uzbeks and the Hazarasundermined the anti-Taliban alliance and Dostum still had to win overMalik's supporters. He did so by exposing the atrocities committed byMalik. Dostum's troops unearthed 20 mass graves near Shebarghan in theDash-te-Laili desert in Jowzjan province where more than 2,000 Talibanprisoners of war had been massacred and buried. Dostum accused Malikof the massacres, offered the Taliban help to retrieve the bodies and calledin the UN to investigate. He released some 200 Taliban prisoners as agesture of goodwill. 12Subsequent UN investigations revealed that the prisoners had beentortured and starved before dying. 'The manner of their death was horrendous.Prisoners were taken from detention, told they were going to beexchanged and then trucked to wells often used by shepherds, which heldabout 10 to 15 metres of water. They were thrown into the wells eitheralive or if they resisted, shot first and then tossed in. Shots were fired andhand grenades were exploded into the well before the top was bulldozedover.' said UN Special Rapporteur Paik Chong-Hyun who inspected thegraves. 13Later there were eye-witness reports which made it clear that viciousethnic cleansing had taken place, 'At night when it was quiet and dark,we took about 150 Taliban prisoners, blindfolded them, tied their handsbehind their backs and drove them in truck containers out to the desert.We lined them up, ten at a time, in front of holes in the ground andopened fire. It took about six nights,' said General Saleem Sahar, anofficer loyal to Malik, who had been arrested by Dostum. 14 The use ofcontainers was particularly horrific and they were to be used increasinglyas a method of killing by both sides. 'When we pulled the bodies out ofthe containers, their skin was burned black from the heat and the lack ofoxygen,' said another of Malik's generals, who added that 1,250 Talibanhad died a container death.The catastrophe in the north and the heavy fighting that followedthrough the summer only further widened the ethnic divide in Afghanistanbetween the Pashtun Taliban and the non-Pashtuns. The country wasnow virtually split along north-south lines and also along Pashtun andnon-Pashtun lines. All sides had carried out ethnic cleansing and religiousPersecution. The Taliban had massacred Shia Hazara villagers and forced
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APPENDIX 3 ~ 227Appendix 3A CHRONOL
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Abbas, Mulla Mohammed 22,61,100Abda
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INDEX - 270Hazaras (continued)burea
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INDEX ~ 274nF»r\/FaliViar» milita
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INDEX ~ 278Talibans (continued)Sunn