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58 TALIBANGul Mohammed Pahlawan, Ghafar Pahlawan and Majid Rouzi. Moreover,Dostum had not paid his troops for five months and there was unrest inthe ranks.The Taliban moved north swiftly from Herat and Kabul. As the northernprovinces fell one after another to this unlikely alliance of Pashtunsand Uzbeks from Malik's power base in Faryab province, Dostum fled with ;135 officers and men, first to Uzbekistan and then to Turkey. On the wayto Termez on the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan border, Dostum had to bribehis own soldiers with US dollars to let his convoy pass. For the Talibanit was a God-sent opportunity, but they had learnt little from their conquestof other cities, where they refused to share power, remained politicallyinflexible and would not relax Sharia law in the light of ethnic sensibilities.If Malik thought that the Taliban would give him the kind ofautonomy in the north enjoyed by Dostum since 1992, he was badly mistaken.It was a deal made in hell that unravelled by the hour.When 2,500 heavily armed Taliban troops rolled into Mazar in theirpick-ups under Mullah Abdul Razaq (the man who had ordered Najibullah'smurder), they declined to share power with Malik and offered him|the insignificant post of Deputy Foreign Minister in the Kabul govern-i?ment. The Taliban, the majority of whom had never been in the northbefore, arrogantly started disarming the fierce Uzbek and Hazara troops*took over the mosques from where they declared the imposition of Sharialaw, shut down schools and the university and drove women off thestreets. It was a recipe for disaster in a city where a complex mix of ethnicand religious groups lived and which had remained the most open andliberal in the country.Pakistani diplomats and ISI officers flew into the city in a bid to helpthe Taliban renegotiate the terms of the agreement, which was alreadyfalling apart. Islamabad then aggravated the situation further by prema-iturely recognizing the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanis-Btan and persuading Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to followsuit. 4 The Uzbeks had been led to believe that this was a power-shariragreement and now they realized it was a Taliban takeover. Malikcaught in the middle and his betrayal of Dostum was made worse whehe also handed over Ismael Khan to them, who had been fighting ithe Taliban in Faryab. 5On the afternoon of 28 May 1997, a squabble broke out as a group iHazaras resisted being disarmed. Then all hell broke loose. First Mazar'^Hazaras and then the rest of the population rose in revolt. Untrained illjstreet fighting and not knowing the maze of city alleyways, the Talibwere easy victims as they drove their pick-ups into dead ends, trying toescape the withering fire from houses and roof tops. In 15 hours of intensefighting some 600 Taliban were massacred in the streets and over 1,CMAZAR-E-SHARIF 1997: MASSACRE IN THE NORTH ~ 59were captured at the airport as they tried to flee. Ten top Taliban politicaland military leaders were either killed or captured. Those capturedincluded Foreign Minister Mullah Mohammed Ghaus, Mullah Razaq andCentral Bank Governor Mullah Ehsanullah. Malik's men promptly startedlooting the city, including the offices of UN agencies, and forced the UNto abandon the city. Dozens of Pakistani students were also killed.Malik's troops swiftly retook four northern provinces (Takhar, Faryab,Jowzjan and Sari Pul), which the Taliban had captured only five daysearlier and there was heavy fighting for control of three other northernprovinces (Balkh, Samangan and Kunduz). With their escape routesclosed, thousands of Taliban troops and hundreds of Pakistani studentswere captured and subsequently shot dead and buried in mass graves. Inthe south, Masud seized the opportunity to launch his own counter-attack,once again capturing Jabal ul Seraj at the southern entrance of the Salangtunnel. He blew up the entrance of the tunnel, trapping the Taliban whowere still in the north and were trying to escape down the road to Kabul.Masud recaptured more territory around Kabul and several towns innorth-eastern Afghanistan that had fallen to the Taliban just a weekearlier. Hundreds more Taliban were either killed or captured. Meanwhilethe Hazaras, spurred on by the Mazar victory also counter-attacked,breaking the nine-month Taliban siege of their homeland, the Hazarajat.Taliban forces at the entrance to the Bamiyan valley were pushed backand Khalili's forces moved south towards Kabul, forcing thousands ofPashtun villagers to flee to the capital.It was the worst ever Taliban defeat since they had emerged just 30months earlier to conquer the country. In ten weeks of fighting betweenMay and July the Taliban suffered over 3,000 casualties, killed orwounded, and some 3,600 men were taken prisoner. 6 More than 7,000troops and civilians were wounded on both sides according to the ICRC.Even more embarrassing for Islamabad, over 250 Pakistanis had beenkilled and 550 captured during the May-July period. Morale amongst theTaliban plummeted as they had also lost some of their best and mostexperienced front-line units.Mullah Omar gave an urgent call for students in Pakistan to come andhelp the Taliban. Once again Pakistani madrassas were closed down as5,000 new recruits - both Pakistani and Afghan - arrived to enlist withthe Taliban. The situation for the Taliban was deemed so serious thateven the reclusive Mullah Omar was forced to leave his sanctuary inKandahar and visit Kabul for the first time to meet his commanders andraise morale amongst his troops.The Taliban were also forced to recruit increasing manpower from theGhilzai Pashtun tribes of eastern Afghanistan and Pakistan. But theydemanded a political price which the Taliban were not prepared to pay.