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48 ~ TALIBANaround Kabul, his forces, estimated at just 25,000 men, could not extendit and carry out offensives to push the Taliban further south.The Taliban's stubbornness in refusing to cut deals with other warlordsfrustrated the Pakistanis, but finally it appeared to pay off when the Talibanpersuaded Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to back another major bid tocapture Kabul before the winter. The Saudi Intelligence chief PrinceTurki al Faisal visited Islamabad and Kandahar in July 1996 to discusswith the ISI a new plan to take Kabul, and both countries stepped upsupplies to the Taliban. Within two months of Turki's visit, the Talibanwere on the move - not against Kabul but the eastern city of Jalalabad.Pakistan and Saudi Arabia helped engineer the surrender and eventualflight of the head of the Jalalabad Shura, Haji Abdul Qadeer. He wasgiven a large bribe, reported by some Afghans to be US$10 million incash, as well as guarantees that his assets and bank accounts in Pakistanwould not be frozen. 13The Taliban launched their surprise offensive on Jalalabad on 25August 1996. As the main Taliban force moved up on the city from thesouth, Pakistan allowed hundreds of armed Taliban supporters fromAfghan refugee camps in Pakistan to cross the border and move on Jalalabadfrom the east. There was panic in Jalalabad and the Shura fell apart.Haji Qadeer fled to Pakistan on 10 September and his replacement ActingGovernor Mehmoud was killed along with six bodyguards a day later,while also trying to escape to Pakistan. That same evening a Talibanmobile column of pick-ups led by Mullah Borjan drove into Jalalabadafter a brief firefight in which some 70 people were killed.Within the next few days mobile Taliban columns captured the threeeastern provinces of Nangarhar, Laghman and Kunar and on the night of24 September 1996 they moved on Sarobi, 45 miles from Kabul and thegateway to the capital. Their lightning attack, which came from severaldirections, took the government's troops by total surprise and they fledback to Kabul. The capital was now wide open from the east for the firsttime. The Taliban did not pause to regroup, but instead pursued Sarobi'sdefenders back to Kabul. Other Taliban columns moved on Kabul fromthe south, while another column drove north from Sarobi to captureBagram airport cutting off Masud's only air link.The speed of their offensive stunned the government. Taliban colurswept into Kabul on the evening of 26 September 1996, just a few heafter Masud had ordered a general withdrawal to evacuate the city. Smallunits stayed behind to delay the Taliban advance and blow up ammunitiondumps, while Masud escaped northwards with the bulk of his armourand artillery. Masud took the decision to abandon the city without a fightknowing he could not defend it from attacks coming from all four pointof the compass. Nor did he want to lose the support of Kabul's populaticKABUL 1996: COMMANDER OF THE FAITHFUL 49by fighting for the city and causing more bloodshed. The Taliban victorywas complete. 'No Afghan force, either government or opposition, hadever carried out such a swift and complex series of operations over sucha wide operation area. This was mobile warfare at its most effective.' 14The Taliban's first and bloodiest act was to hang former President Najibullah,then aged 50, who had ruled Afghanistan from 1986 to 1992.Najibullah had been staying in a UN diplomatic compound in centralKabul since 1992, when a UN peace plan to set up an interim governmentfell apart. Just before the Mujaheddin were to capture Kabul, Najibullahwas due to be taken out of Kabul by the UN mediator Benon Sevan, butthey were stopped at the last moment. All the warring Afghan factionshad respected the diplomatic immunity of the UN compound. Najibullah'swife Fatana and three daughters had lived in exile in New Delhisince 1992.Blunders by the UN were partly responsible for his death. On the daySarobi fell, Najibullah had sent a message to the UN headquarters inIslamabad asking Norbet Holl to arrange the evacuation of himself andhis three companions - his brother, Shahpur Ahmadzai, his personal secretaryand bodyguard. But there were no UN officials in Kabul to takeresponsibility for Najibullah. Only Masud offered him a lift out of thecity. On the afternoon of 26 September 1996, Masud sent one of hissenior Generals to ask Najibullah to leave with the retreating governmenttroops, promising him safe passage to the north, but Najibullah refused.A proud and stubborn man, he probably feared that if he fled with theTajiks, he would be for ever damned in the eyes of his fellow Pashtuns. 15There were only three frightened Afghan guards employed by the UNon duty inside the compound and they fled as they heard the guns of theTaliban on the outskirts of the city. Najibullah sent a last wireless messageto the UN in Islamabad in the early evening, again asking for help. Butby then it was too late. A special Taliban unit of five men designated forthe task and believed to be led by Mullah Abdul Razaq, the Governor ofHerat and now commander of the forces designated to capture Kabul,came for Najibullah at about 1.00 a.m., even before the Taliban hadentered central Kabul. Razaq later admitted that he had ordered Najibullah'smurder. 16The Taliban walked up to Najibullah's room, beat him and his brothersenseless and then bundled them into a pick-up and drove them to thedarkened Presidential Palace. There they castrated Najibullah, draggedhis body behind a jeep for several rounds of the Palace and then shot himdead. His brother was similarly tortured and then throttled to death. TheTaliban hanged the two dead men from a concrete traffic control postjust outside the Palace, only a few blocks from the UN compound.At dawn curious Kabulis came to view the two bloated, beaten bodies