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J46 ~ TALIBANgreater weight to UN efforts to convene a conference of all the Afghan 1factions. 9The Clinton administration was clearly sympathetic to the Taliban, asthey were in line with Washington's anti-Iran policy and were important |for the success of any southern pipeline from Central Asia that wouldavoid Iran. The US Congress had authorised a covert US$20 millionbudget for the CIA to destabilize Iran, and Tehran had accused Washingtonof funnelling some of these funds to the Taliban - a charge thatwas always denied by Washington. Bhutto sent several emissaries toWashington to urge the US to intervene more publicly on the side ofPakistan and the Taliban, but despite a common antipathy to Iran, Washingtonresisted, refusing to take sides in the civil war. Raphel vehementlydenied that the US was aiding the Taliban. 'We do not favour one factionover another nor do we give any group or individual support,' she toldme Ṁoreover the US remained sceptical that the Taliban would conquerKabul in the near future. Raphel described the Taliban as highly fractionalized,inexperienced, lacking strong leadership and inept at administrationwhile their obstinacy had alienated other factions. 'These weaknessescombined with Masud's growing strength, appear to be shiftingthe balance against the Taliban somewhat, and will prevent them fromachieving their stated goal of taking Kabul. While the Taliban appears to.have reached the limit of its expansion, its position in the Pashtun southis solid,' she said. 10Washington also courted the other warlords. Several visited Washington,starting with General Dostum who met US officials in Washingtonon 11 April 1996. Afghan leaders or their representatives from'all factions participated in an unprecedented Congressional hearing injWashington held by Senator Hank Brown between 25 and 27 June. Howeverin an American election year and with little enthusiasm for renewedinvolvement in the quagmire of Afghanistan, Washington's aims couldonly be limited, even though the arms and drugs trade proliferating insideAfghanistan worried Washington.US reluctance to support the Taliban was also influenced by Pakistan'sfailure in creating an anti-Rabbani alliance. This proved even moreembarrassing for Islamabad when, in May, 1,000 of Hikmetyar's troopsarrived in Kabul to support the government and defend the front lineagainst the Taliban. On 26 June 1996 Hikmetyar himself entered Kabulfor the first time in 15 years, to take up the post of Prime Minister offeredby the regime, while his party accepted nine other cabinet posts in thegovernment. In retaliation, on the same day, the Taliban launched a massiverocket attack on Kabul in which 61 people were killed and over Iinjured.KABUL 1996: COMMANDER OF THE FAITHFUL ~ 47Rabbani followed up his political breakthrough with Hikmetyar with avisit to Jalalabad where he attempted to persuade the Jalalabad Shura tojoin his government. He said he was willing to step down in favour ofany Afghan leader and proposed an all-party conference in Jalalabad toelect a new head of state. By August Dostum had also agreed to a truceand he reopened the Salang Highway which connected Kabul with thenorth of the country for the first time in over a year. Rabbani's agreementshad finally got his 'intra-Afghan dialogue' off the ground. 'This alliancecan be consolidated by bringing in more opposition figures to create apeace axis and I call on others to join the process so that a formula foran interim government can be found,' Rabbani told me in Kabul. 11 It wasa significant achievement, which infuriated the Taliban who realized thatthey would have to move quickly against Rabbani before he consolidatedthese alliances.Camped outside the capital, the Taliban had been rocketing Kabulmercilessly throughout the year. In April 1996 alone, the Taliban fired866 rockets, killing 180 civilians, injuring 550 and destroying large tractsof the city - a repetition of Hikmetyar's attacks in 1993-95. In July 1996Taliban rockets fell close to the newly appointed UN mediator forAfghanistan, the German diplomat Norbert Holl who was visiting Kabul.Holl was furious. 'This is no way to treat a peace emissary, by shooting athim. If you receive a guest in your house you don't start spitting at him.It demonstrates a sort of contempt for my mission,' he told the Taliban. 12The Taliban's rocket attacks were punctuated by frequent groundassaults against Masud's front lines south and west of the city. At the endof May, I stood on a rain-swept hill with Masud's troops outside Kabuland watched through binoculars as dozens of Taliban in pick-ups tried topunch through Masud's lines along a road in the valley below under thecover of a Taliban artillery barrage. In return Masud's Russian-made D-30howitzers pounded the hidden Taliban artillery. The thud of shells shookthe mountains, deafening the ears and making me sway at the knees. Thegunners were stone-deaf due to the constant shelling and the lack of earprotectors.Behind Masud's lines, lorry-loads of fresh troops and ammunition groundtheir way up the hill through the mud to replenish supplies. 'The Talibanhave enormous supplies of ammunition and they shoot off thousands ofshells but their gunners are very inaccurate. However they are makingbetter use of their tanks and pick-ups than a year ago,' said a general fromMasud's army. 'Their tactics are still poor, relying more on frontal assaultsand there seems to be no effective chain of command,' he added. TheTaliban were unable to concentrate enough firepower and manpower onone front to achieve a breakthrough into the city and Masud was constantlybreaking up their formations. Although he could hold the line