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44 ~ TALIBANfew weeks later the council of the Hizb-e-Islami gave Hikmetyar thepower to negotiate a power-sharing agreement with Rabbani.Pakistan was worried by Rabbani's successes and attempted to woo thejsame warlords to join the Taliban and form an anti-Kabul alliance. TheISI summoned Hikmetyar, Dostum, the Pashtun leaders of the Jalalabad!Shura and some Hizb-e-Wahadat chiefs to Islamabad to persuade them tojally with the Taliban. These warlords met with President Farooq Leghari|and army chief General Jehangir Karamat as negotiations continued for sweek between 7 and 13 February. Pakistan proposed a political alliancand in private a joint attack on Kabul with the Taliban attacking froralthe south, Hikmetyar from the east and Dostum from the north. 5 Tosweeten the Taliban, Babar offered to spend US$3 million to repair theroad across southern Afghanistan from Chaman to Torgundi on the Turkmenistanborder. But the Taliban refused to turn up to the meeting,spuming their Pakistani mentors yet again, despite personal appeals byInterior Minister Naseerullah Babar, the JUI chief Fazlur Rehmanthe ISI. The Taliban declined to have anything to do with the othewarlords whom they condemned as communist infidels.Islamabad's failure to create a united front against Kabul, emboldeneRabbani further. In early March, along with a 60-man delegation, he ioff on an extensive tour of Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistto lobby for international support and increased military aid. Iran, Russi;and India, who backed the Kabul regime, calculated that the conflict Inow entered a crucial stage as another battle for Kabul could increpolitical instability and influence the spread of Islamic fundamentalism iCentral Asia. Iran was incensed by the fall of Herat to a Pashtun forithat was vehemently anti-Shia and was backed by its regional rivals Palstan and Saudi Arabia. Russia considered the Kabul regime as more moder*)ate and pliant than the Taliban, as it worried about the security of ICentral Asian Republics. Moscow also wanted an end to the four-year-olcivil war in Tajikistan between the neo-communist governmentIslamic rebels, which was being fuelled from Afghanistan. India backeKabul simply because of Pakistani support to the Taliban.All these countries stepped up military aid to the regime forces. Russiasent technical help to upgrade Bagram airport facilities for the reginwhile Russian transport planes from Russia, Tajikistan and Ukrairdelivered Russian arms, ammunition and fuel to Kabul. Iran developed iair bridge from Meshad in eastern Iran to Bagram, where it flew insupplies. Pakistani intelligence reported that on a single day, 13 Irflights landed at Bagram with supplies. The CIA suspected thatShia allies of the Rabbani regime had sold Iran five Stinger anti-airmissiles for US$1 million each. (The US provided the Mujaheddin wit!some 900 Stingers in 1986-87 and after 1992 the CIA had launchedKABUL 1996: COMMANDER OF THE FAITHFUL ~ 45clandestine but unsuccessful buy-back operation to try and retrieve thoseStingers not utilised.) 6 Iran had also set up five training camps nearMeshad for some 5,000 fighters led by the former Herat Governor IsmaelKhan. Iran's aid to the regime was significant because Tehran had toswallow its anger with Masud over the slaughter of the Shia Hazaras inKabul the previous year. India meanwhile helped refurbish Ariana - theAfghan national airline now based in New Delhi - to provide the regimewith a reliable arms carrier. India also provided aircraft parts, new groundradars and money.In turn, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia stepped up arms supplies to theTaliban. Pakistan provided a new telephone and wireless network for theTaliban, refurbished Kandahar airport and helped out with spare partsand armaments for the Taliban's airforce, while continuing to providefood, fuel and ammunition, including rockets. The Saudis provided fuel,money and hundreds of new pick-ups to the Taliban. Much of this aidwas flown into Kandahar airport from the Gulf port city of Dubai.The extent of outside interference worried the Americans: after a lapseof four years they were once again beginning to take an interest in tryingto resolve the Afghan conflict. In early March, Congressman HankBrown, a member of the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Relations forSouth Asia, became the first American elected representative in six yearsto visit Kabul and other power centres. He hoped to call a meeting of allthe Afghan factions in Washington. 7The US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Robin Raphelarrived in Islamabad to review US policy towards Afghanistan. Startingon 19 April 1996, Raphel visited the three power centres of Kabul, Kandaharand Mazar-e-Sharif and later three Central Asian capitals. 'We donot see ourselves inserting in the middle of Afghan affairs, but we considerourselves as a friend of Afghanistan which is why I am here to urge theAfghans themselves to get together and talk. We are also concerned thateconomic opportunities here will be missed, if political stability cannotbe restored,' said Raphel in Kabul. 8 Raphel was referring to a proposedgas pipeline to be built by the American oil giant Unocal to carry gasfrom Turkmenistan across Afghanistan to Pakistan. The US waited tomake the pipeline acceptable to all Afghan factions and urged Pakistanto make up with the Rabbani regime and bring the Taliban and the Rabbaniregime to the peace table.The US moved on other fronts. During a UN Security Council debateon Afghanistan on 10 April 1996, the first to be held in six years, itProposed an international arms embargo on Afghanistan. Raphel wantedto use this as a lever to persuade all the involved regional countries toa gree to non-interference in Afghanistan, while at the same time lending