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42 ~ TALIBANdo manage to take Kabul how will the rest of Afghanistan accept theirtype of Islamic system?' the UN mediator Mehmoud Mestiri told me. 1 Formore than two weeks the Shura continued with meetings lasting all dayand all night. Separate Shuras discussed issues such as the political andmilitary future, how best to impose Sharia law and the future of girls'education in Taliban-held areas. The discussions were all held in extremesecrecy and foreigners were banned from Kandahar for the duration. HoweverPakistani officials were there to monitor the Shura, including thePakistani Ambassador to Kabul Qazi Humayun and several ISI officerssuch as Colonel Imam, Pakistan's Consul General in Herat.To patch over their differences, the core group of Kandaharis aroundMullah Omar nominated him to become the 'Amir-ul Momineen' or'Commander of the Faithful', an Islamic title that made him the undisputedleader of the jihad and the Emir of Afghanistan. (The Taliban werelater to rename the country as the Emirate of Afghanistan). On 4 April1996, Omar appeared on the roof of a building in the centre of the city,wrapped in the Cloak of the Prophet Mohammed, which had been takenout of its shrine for the first time in 60 years. As Omar wrapped andunwrapped the Cloak around his body and allowed it to flap in the wind,he was rapturously applauded by the assembled throng of mullahs in thecourtyard below, as they shouted 'Amir-ul Momineen.'This oath of allegiance or 'baiat' was a procedure similar to whenCaliph Omar was confirmed as leader of the Muslim community in Arabiaafter the death of the Prophet Mohammed. It was a political masterstroke,for by cloaking himself with the Prophet's mantle, Mullah Omar hadassumed the right to lead not just all Afghans, but all Muslims. The meetingended with a declaration of jihad against the Rabbani regime. TheTaliban vowed not to open talks with any of their adversaries anddeclared that a final decision on allowing women to be educated couldonly be tackled 'when there was a legitimate government in Afghanistan'.The hard-liners and Mullah Omar had won. 2But for many Afghans and Muslims elsewhere it was a serious affrontto propriety that a poor village mullah with no scholarly learning, notribal pedigree or connections to the Prophet's family should presume somuch. No Afghan had adopted the title since 1834, when King DostMohammed Khan assumed the title before he declared jihad against theSikh kingdom in Peshawar. But Dost Mohammed was fighting foreigners,while Omar had declared jihad against his own people. Moreover, therewas no sanction for such a title in Islam, unless all of the country's ukmahad bestowed it upon a leader. The Taliban insisted that their meetingconstituted the Koranic requirement of 'ahl al-hal o aqd', literally 'thepeople who can loose and bind' or those empowered to take legitimatedecisions on behalf of the Islamic community.KABUL 1996: COMMANDER OF THE FAITHFUL ~ 43For Omar the title gave him badly needed legitimacy and a new mystiqueamongst the Pashtuns that no other Mujaheddin leader had acquiredduring the war. It would allow him to distance himself still further fromday-to-day politics, give him an additional excuse not to meet foreigndiplomats and allow him to be more inflexible in either broadening thebase of the Taliban leadership or in talking to the opposition. Omar couldnow always retreat behind his title and decline to meet opposition leaderson an equal footing.But the ukma meeting had deliberately not come to any decisions onthe much more sensitive questions on how the Taliban planned to ruleAfghanistan and what if anything they planned for the country's economicand social development. Such questions were to remain permanentlyunanswered, even after they captured Kabul. 'We have not gonepublic yet on our structure because we are not strong enough to decidewho will be the Prime Minister or the President,' said Mullah Wakil, theaide to Omar. 'The Sharia does not allow politics or political parties. Thatis why we give no salaries to officials or soldiers, just food, clothes, shoesand weapons. We want to live a life like the Prophet lived 1,400 yearsago and jihad is our right. We want to recreate the time of the Prophetand we are only carrying out what the Afghan people have wanted forthe past 14 years,' he added. 3 Another Taliban leader put it even moresuccinctly. 'We can love our enemies but only after we have defeatedthem.'Only a day earlier Taliban emissaries had told Mestiri in Islamabad thatthey were ready to talk to President Rabbani. 4 'If the Taliban are readyto talk and President Rabbani is ready to talk, then this is really something,'said Mestiri hopefully. The final result of the ukma meeting was ablow that neither Mestiri nor the UN peace effort was to recover fromand in May Mestiri resigned from his job.The ukma meeting had also been prompted by the regime's growingpolitical successes at wooing other opposition leaders and President Rabbani'sincreasing international standing. Kabul's military successes atseeing off Hikmetyar, the Hazaras and the Taliban attack had finally persuadedthe regime that this was an opportune moment to try and gaingreater political acceptability, by broadening the base of their support.President Rabbani began talks with other warlords, holding out the carrotthat he was prepared to set up a new government which could includethem. In January and February 1996, Rabbani's emissary Dr AbdurRehman met separately with Gulbuddin Hikmetyar at Sarobi, with GeneralRashid Dostum in Mazar-e-Sharif and the Hizb-e-Wahadat leadershipin Bamiyan. In February all the opposition groups except for the Talibanagreed to set up a ten-man council to negotiate peace terms with Kabul,even as the Taliban continued to demand the surrender of the regime. A