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40 TALIBANIsmael Khan abandoned Herat fleeing with his commanders and severalhundred men to Iran. The next day a pro-government mob in Kabul,incensed at the loss of Herat, attacked and sacked the Pakistan Embassy,wounding the Pakistani Ambassador as government soldiers looked on.Relations between Kabul and Islamabad sunk to an all-time low as PresidentRabbani openly accused Pakistan of trying to oust him from powerthrough the Taliban.The Taliban now controlled the entire west of the country, the sensitiveborder region with Iran and for the first time ruled an area which wasnot predominantly Pashtun. The Taliban treated Herat as an occupiedcity, arresting hundreds of Heratis, closing down all schools and forciblyimplementing their social bans and Sharia law, even more fiercely thanin Kandahar. The city was garrisoned not by local defectors, but hardcorePashtun Taliban from Kandahar and the administration was handed overto Durrani Pashtuns, many of whom could not even speak Persian andtherefore were incapable of communicating with the local population.Over the next few years not a single local Herati was to be inducted intothe administration. For the sophisticated population, who were now ruledby what they considered gross, uneducated Pashtuns who had no idea ofthe past magnificence or history of the city, the only thing left was to goto Jami's tomb and read his sad epitaph.When your face is hidden from me, like the moon hidden on a dark night,I shed stars of tears and yet my night remains dark in spite of all thoseshining stars. 9The fall of Herat was also the beginning of the end for the Rabbanigovernment. Bolstered by their victories, the Taliban launched anotherattack on Kabul during October and November, hoping to gain groundbefore the winter snows suspended further fighting. Masud counterattackedin late November and pushed them back, resulting in hundredsof dead. But the Taliban were to persist and were now to try other meansof conquering the city, weakening Masud's front lines by bribes ratherthan tank fire.3KABUL 1996:COMMANDER OF THEFAITHFULTsBy 20 March more than 1,200 Pashtun religious leaders from south,'ravelling by jeep, truck and horseback hundreds of Afghan mullahsbegan to descend on Kandahar in the cool spring weather of 1996.west and central Afghanistan had arrived in the city. They were housedand fed in government offices, the old fort and the covered bazaar, whichwere turned into enormous dormitories by the simple act of throwinghundreds of carpets on the floor so that the mullahs could sleep.It was the biggest gathering of mullahs and ukma that had ever takenplace in modern Afghan history. Significantly absent were local militarycommanders, traditional tribal and clan leaders, political figures from thewar against the Soviets and non-Pashtun representatives from northernAfghanistan. Only religious leaders had been summoned by Mullah Omarto debate a future plan of action, but more importantly to legitimize theTaliban leader as the all powerful leader in the country.The ten-month Taliban siege of Kabul had failed to crack the city andas Taliban casualties mounted, there was growing unrest in their ranks.During the long winter months, moderates in the movement openlytalked of the need for negotiations with the Kabul regime. Hardlinerswanted to continue the conquest of the entire country. There were alsobroad divisions within the Pashtuns. The Kandaharis grouped aroundOmar wanted the war to continue, while those representing Pashtun areasrecently conquered by the Taliban wanted peace and an end to the conflict.Everyone outside the country also realised that the Taliban were at acrossroads. 'The Taliban cannot take Kabul nor can Masud take Kandahar.How will the Taliban evolve if they fail to take Kabul? Even if they