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34 TALIBANKabul- Hikmetyar had allied with the Uzbek warlord General Rash:Dostum in the north and the Hazaras of central Afghanistan who heldportion of Kabul. Pakistan had helped broker the new alliance as Hikmetyarwas still Islamabad's clear favourite and at the beginning of the yearhe had received large quantities of Pakistani-supplied rockets to bombardthe capital. But even Islamabad was surprised by the rapid Talibanadvance. Although the Bhutto government fully backed the Taliban, theISI remained sceptical of their abilities, convinced that they would remaina useful but peripheral force in the south.Hikmetyar was clearly worried by this rival Pashtun force sweeping upfrom the south and tried to halt the Taliban while at the same timelaunching massive rocket attacks against Kabul, which killed hundreds ofcivilians and destroyed large tracts of the city. On 2 February 1995, theTaliban captured Wardak, just 35 miles south of Kabul and Hikmetyar'sbases around Kabul came under threat for the first time. The Talibancontinued to advance in lightning moves, capturing Maidan Shahr on 10February 1995, after heavy fighting which left 200 dead, and MohammedAgha the next day. Hikmetyar was now trapped by government forcesto the north and the Taliban to the south; morale among his troopsplummeted.On 14 February 1995 the Taliban captured Hikmetyar's headquartersat Charasyab, creating panic among his troops and forcing them to fleeeastwards towards Jalalabad. President Rabbani's troops, under his swordarmAhmad Shah Masud, withdrew into Kabul city. The Taliban thenopened all the roads, allowing food convoys to reach Kabul after themonths of blockade imposed by Hikmetyar. It was a popular step, raisingthe Taliban's prestige amongst the sceptical citizens of Kabul and fulfilleda key demand of the transport mafia backing the Taliban. Appeals for acease-fire by the UN Special Representative for Afghanistan, the Tuniseandiplomat Mehmoud Mestiri, were ignored as Masud and the Talibannow confronted each other.Masud had another problem even closer to home. Although Hikmetyarhad been forced to flee, Masud still faced the forces of the Shia Hazarasunder the Hizb-e-Wahadat party, which held the southern suburbs of the |capital. Masud tried to buy time and met twice with the Taliban com-]manders, Mullahs Rabbani, Borjan and Ghaus at Charasayab. These meetingswere the first time that the Taliban were to meet with their greatestrival, who was to persist in punishing them for the next four years. TheTaliban demanded Rabbani's resignation as President and Masud's surrender— hardly a negotiating stance that would win them support. The Talibanalso began negotiating with the Hazaras.The Taliban also met with Mestiri, the UN mediator, setting downthree conditions for their participation in any UN-sponsored peace pro-HERAT 1995: GOD'S INVINCIBLE SOLDIERS ~ 35cess. They demanded that their units form a 'neutral force' in Kabul, thatonly 'good Muslims' form an interim administration in Kabul and thatrepresentation be given to all 30 provinces in the country. The Taliban'sinsistence that only their forces dominate any new government in Kabul,obliged the Rabbani government and the UN to reject their demands.Masud decided to deal with his enemies one at a time. On 6 March1995, he launched a blitzkrieg against the Hazaras, sending tanks intoKabul's southern suburbs, smashing the Hazaras and driving them out ofKabul. In desperation the Hazaras cut a deal with the advancing Taliban,yielding their heavy weapons and positions to them. But in the ensuinghandover and melee, the Hazara leader Abdul Ali Mazari was killed whilein Taliban custody. The Hazaras subsequently claimed that Mazari waspushed out of a helicopter to his death by the Taliban, because he triedto seize a rifle while he was being taken to Kandahar as a prisoner.The death of Mazari, accidental or intentional, was to forever condemnthe Taliban in the eyes of the Afghan Shias and their main patron Iran.The Hazaras were never to forgive the Taliban for Mazari's death andtook their revenge two years later, when the Hazaras massacred thousandsof Taliban in the north. A bloody ethnic and sectarian divide, betweenPashtun and Hazara, Sunni and Shia bubbling just below the surface nowcame into the open.In the meantime Masud was not going to allow the Taliban to replacethe Hazaras in southern Kabul. On 11 March 1995 he launched anotherpunishing attack, pushing the Taliban out of the city after bloody streetfighting that left hundreds of Taliban dead. It was the first major battlethat the Taliban had fought and lost. Their weak military structure andpoor tactics ensured their defeat at the hands of Masud's more experiencedfighters.The Taliban had won over the unruly Pashtun south because theexhausted, war-weary population saw them as saviours and peacemakers,if not as a potential force to revive Pashtun power which had been humiliatedby the Tajiks and Uzbeks. Many surrenders had been facilitated bypure cash, bribing commanders to switch sides - a tactic that the Talibanwere to turn into a fine art form in later years and which was sustainedby the growth in their income from the drugs trade, the transport businessand external aid from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. In their advance theyhad also captured massive quantities of small arms, tanks and even helicoptersenabling them to deploy more troops. In the areas under theirrule, they disarmed the population, enforced law and order, imposed strictSharia law and opened the roads to traffic which resulted in an immediatedrop in food prices. These measures were all extremely welcome to thelong-suffering population. The defeat in Kabul came as a major blow tothe Taliban's prestige, but not to their determination.