Yale University Press NEW HAVEN & 9 780300"089028 - Sito Mistero
Yale University Press NEW HAVEN & 9 780300"089028 - Sito Mistero Yale University Press NEW HAVEN & 9 780300"089028 - Sito Mistero
24 ~ ISLAM OIL AND THE NEW GREAT GAME IN CENTRAL ASIAward and inaccessible regions of the country where Soviet troops rarelypenetrated. His father died while he was a young man and the task of Ifending for his mother and extended family fell upon him.Looking for a job, he moved to Singesar village in the Mewand district Iof Kandahar province, where he became the village mullah and opened a Ismall madrassa. His own studies in madrassas in Kandahar were interruptedtwice, first by the Soviet invasion and then by the creation of the Taliban.6 Omar joined Khalis's Hizb-e-Islami and fought under commanderNek Mohammed against the Najibullah regime between 1989 and 1992.He was wounded four times, once in the right eye which is now permanentlyblinded.Despite the success of the Taliban, Singesar is still like any other Pashtunvillage. Mud-brick homes plastered with more mud and straw are builtbehind high compound walls - a traditional defensive feature of Pashtunhomes. Narrow, dusty alleyways, which turn into mud baths when it rains,connect village homes. Omar's madrassa is still functioning — a small mudhut with a dirt floor and mattresses strewn across it for the boys to sleep fon. Omar has three wives, who continue living in the village and are!heavily veiled. While his first and third wives are from Urozgan, his teenagesecond wife Guljana, whom he married in 1995, is from Singesar. Hihas a total of five children who are studying in his madrassa. 1A tall, well-built man with a long, black beard and a black turban,!Omar has a dry sense of humour and a sarcastic wit. He remains extremebshy of outsiders, particularly foreigners, but he is accessible to the Taliban.When the movement started he would offer his Friday prayers at themosque in Kandahar and mix with the people, but subsequently hebecome much more of a recluse, rarely venturing outside Kandahar'sadministrativemansion where he lives. He now visits his village infrequentlyand when he does he is always accompanied by dozens of bodyguardsin a convoy of deluxe Japanese jeepsters with darkened windows.Omar speaks very little in Shura meetings, listening to other pointsview. His shyness makes him a poor public speaker and despite the mythlogy that now surrounds him, he has little charismatic appeal. All dayconducts business from a small office in the mansion. At first he used tdsit on the cement floor alongside visiting Taliban, but he now sits onbed while others sit on the floor - a move that emphasises his statusleader. He has several secretaries who take notes from his conversationswith commanders, ordinary soldiers, ukma and plaintiffs and there isalways the crackle of wireless sets as commanders around the coumcommunicate with him.Business consists of lengthy debate and discussions which end withissuing of 'chits' or scraps of paper on which are written instruction^allowing commanders to make an attack, ordering a Taliban governorKANDAHAR 1994: THE ORIGINS OF THE TALIBAN ~ 25help out a plaintiff or a message to UN mediators. Formal communicationsto foreign embassies in Islamabad were frequently dictated by Pakistaniadvisers.In the early days of the movement I collected numerous chits writtenon cigarette boxes or wrapping paper, allowing me to travel from city tocity. Now more regular paper pads are used. Beside Omar is a tin trunkfrom which he dishes out wads of Afghani notes to commanders andplaintiffs in need. As success came, another tin trunk was added - this onecontaining US dollars. These tin trunks are the treasury of the Talibanmovement.In important meetings, Mullah Wakil Ahmad, Omar's trusted confidantand official spokesman is usually beside him. Wakil, a young madrassastudent from the Kakar tribe who studied under Omar, started out ashis companion, driver, food taster, translator and note-taker. He quicklyprogressed to higher things such as communicating with visiting foreigndiplomats and aid agency officials, travelling to meet Taliban commandersand meeting with Pakistani officials. As Omar's spokesman he is the Taliban'smain contact with the foreign press as well as its chastizer, when hefeels that journalists have criticized the Taliban too harshly. Wakil actsas Omar's ears and eyes and is also his doorkeeper. No important Afghancan reach Omar without first going through Wakil.There is now an entire factory of myths and stories to explain howOmar mobilized a small group of Taliban against the rapacious Kandaharwarlords. The most credible story, told repeatedly, is that in the spring of1994 Singesar neighbours came to tell him that a commander hadabducted two teenage girls, their heads had been shaved and they hadbeen taken to a military camp and repeatedly raped. Omar enlisted some30 Talibs who had only 16 rifles between them and attacked the base,freeing the girls and hanging the commander from the barrel of a tank.They captured quantities of arms and ammunition. 'We were fightingagainst Muslims who had gone wrong. How could we remain quiet whenwe could see crimes being committed against women and the poor?' Omarsaid later. 8A few months later two commanders confronted each other in Kandahar,in a dispute over a young boy whom both men wanted to sodomise.In the fight that followed civilians were killed. Omar's group freed theboy and public appeals started coming in for the Taliban to help out inother local disputes. Omar had emerged as a Robin Hood figure, helpingthe poor against the rapacious commanders. His prestige grew because heasked for no reward or credit from those he helped, only demanding thatthey follow him to set up a just Islamic system.At the same time Omar's emissaries were gauging the mood of otherc onimanders. His colleagues visited Herat to meet with Ismael Khan and
26 ~ ISLAM OIL AND THE NEW GREAT GAME IN CENTRAL ASIAin September Mulla Mohammed Rabbani, a founding member of the Taliban,visited Kabul and held talks with President Rabbani. The isolatedKabul government wished to support any new Pashtun force that wouldoppose Hikmetyar, who was still shelling Kabul, and Rabbani promised tohelp the Taliban with funds if they opposed Hikmetyar.However the Taliban's closest links were with Pakistan where many ofthem had grown up and studied in madrassas run by the mercurial MaulanaFazlur Rehman and his Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI), a fundamentalistparty which had considerable support amongst the Pashtuns in Baluchistanand the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). More significantlyMaulana Rehman was now a political ally of Prime Minister BenazirBhutto and he had access to the government, the army and the ISI towhom he described this newly emerging force.Pakistan's Afghan policy was in the doldrums. After the collapse of theSoviet Union in 1991, successive Pakistani governments were desperatelykeen to open up direct land routes for trade with the Central AsianRepublics (CARs). The major hindrance was the continuing civil war inAfghanistan, through which any route passed. Pakistan's policy-makerswere thus faced with a strategic dilemma. Either Pakistan could carry onbacking Hikmetyar in a bid to bring a Pashtun group to power in Kabul]which would be Pakistan-friendly, or it could change direction and urgefor a power-sharing agreement between all the Afghan factions at whateverthe price for the Pashtuns, so that a stable government could openthe roads to Central Asia.The Pakistani military was convinced that other ethnic groups wouldnot do their bidding and continued to back Hikmetyar. Some 20 per centof the Pakistan army was made up of Pakistani Pashtuns and the pro-Pashtun and Islamic fundamentalist lobby within the ISI and the militaryremained determined to achieve a Pashtun victory in Afghanistan. However,by 1994 Hikmetyar had clearly failed, losing ground militarily whilehis extremism divided the Pashtuns, the majority of whom loathed hinMPakistan was getting tired of backing a loser and was looking around forother potential Pashtun proxies.When Benazir Bhutto was elected as Prime Minister in 1993, she waskeen to open a route to Central Asia. The shortest route was from Pesh
- Page 1 and 2: YALE NOTA BENE"The broader storyher
- Page 3 and 4: TalibanMilitant Islam,Oil and Funda
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24 ~ ISLAM OIL AND THE <strong>NEW</strong> GREAT GAME IN CENTRAL ASIAward and inaccessible regions of the country where Soviet troops rarelypenetrated. His father died while he was a young man and the task of Ifending for his mother and extended family fell upon him.Looking for a job, he moved to Singesar village in the Mewand district Iof Kandahar province, where he became the village mullah and opened a Ismall madrassa. His own studies in madrassas in Kandahar were interruptedtwice, first by the Soviet invasion and then by the creation of the Taliban.6 Omar joined Khalis's Hizb-e-Islami and fought under commanderNek Mohammed against the Najibullah regime between 1989 and 1992.He was wounded four times, once in the right eye which is now permanentlyblinded.Despite the success of the Taliban, Singesar is still like any other Pashtunvillage. Mud-brick homes plastered with more mud and straw are builtbehind high compound walls - a traditional defensive feature of Pashtunhomes. Narrow, dusty alleyways, which turn into mud baths when it rains,connect village homes. Omar's madrassa is still functioning — a small mudhut with a dirt floor and mattresses strewn across it for the boys to sleep fon. Omar has three wives, who continue living in the village and are!heavily veiled. While his first and third wives are from Urozgan, his teenagesecond wife Guljana, whom he married in 1995, is from Singesar. Hihas a total of five children who are studying in his madrassa. 1A tall, well-built man with a long, black beard and a black turban,!Omar has a dry sense of humour and a sarcastic wit. He remains extremebshy of outsiders, particularly foreigners, but he is accessible to the Taliban.When the movement started he would offer his Friday prayers at themosque in Kandahar and mix with the people, but subsequently hebecome much more of a recluse, rarely venturing outside Kandahar'sadministrativemansion where he lives. He now visits his village infrequentlyand when he does he is always accompanied by dozens of bodyguardsin a convoy of deluxe Japanese jeepsters with darkened windows.Omar speaks very little in Shura meetings, listening to other pointsview. His shyness makes him a poor public speaker and despite the mythlogy that now surrounds him, he has little charismatic appeal. All dayconducts business from a small office in the mansion. At first he used tdsit on the cement floor alongside visiting Taliban, but he now sits onbed while others sit on the floor - a move that emphasises his statusleader. He has several secretaries who take notes from his conversationswith commanders, ordinary soldiers, ukma and plaintiffs and there isalways the crackle of wireless sets as commanders around the coumcommunicate with him.Business consists of lengthy debate and discussions which end withissuing of 'chits' or scraps of paper on which are written instruction^allowing commanders to make an attack, ordering a Taliban governorKANDAHAR 1994: THE ORIGINS OF THE TALIBAN ~ 25help out a plaintiff or a message to UN mediators. Formal communicationsto foreign embassies in Islamabad were frequently dictated by Pakistaniadvisers.In the early days of the movement I collected numerous chits writtenon cigarette boxes or wrapping paper, allowing me to travel from city tocity. Now more regular paper pads are used. Beside Omar is a tin trunkfrom which he dishes out wads of Afghani notes to commanders andplaintiffs in need. As success came, another tin trunk was added - this onecontaining US dollars. These tin trunks are the treasury of the Talibanmovement.In important meetings, Mullah Wakil Ahmad, Omar's trusted confidantand official spokesman is usually beside him. Wakil, a young madrassastudent from the Kakar tribe who studied under Omar, started out ashis companion, driver, food taster, translator and note-taker. He quicklyprogressed to higher things such as communicating with visiting foreigndiplomats and aid agency officials, travelling to meet Taliban commandersand meeting with Pakistani officials. As Omar's spokesman he is the Taliban'smain contact with the foreign press as well as its chastizer, when hefeels that journalists have criticized the Taliban too harshly. Wakil actsas Omar's ears and eyes and is also his doorkeeper. No important Afghancan reach Omar without first going through Wakil.There is now an entire factory of myths and stories to explain howOmar mobilized a small group of Taliban against the rapacious Kandaharwarlords. The most credible story, told repeatedly, is that in the spring of1994 Singesar neighbours came to tell him that a commander hadabducted two teenage girls, their heads had been shaved and they hadbeen taken to a military camp and repeatedly raped. Omar enlisted some30 Talibs who had only 16 rifles between them and attacked the base,freeing the girls and hanging the commander from the barrel of a tank.They captured quantities of arms and ammunition. 'We were fightingagainst Muslims who had gone wrong. How could we remain quiet whenwe could see crimes being committed against women and the poor?' Omarsaid later. 8A few months later two commanders confronted each other in Kandahar,in a dispute over a young boy whom both men wanted to sodomise.In the fight that followed civilians were killed. Omar's group freed theboy and public appeals started coming in for the Taliban to help out inother local disputes. Omar had emerged as a Robin Hood figure, helpingthe poor against the rapacious commanders. His prestige grew because heasked for no reward or credit from those he helped, only demanding thatthey follow him to set up a just Islamic system.At the same time Omar's emissaries were gauging the mood of otherc onimanders. His colleagues visited Herat to meet with Ismael Khan and