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18 ~ ISLAM OIL AND THE NEW GREAT GAME IN CENTRAL ASIAAbdul Majid, has one leg and two fingers missing.. Other leaders, evemilitary commanders, have similar disabilities.The Taliban's wounds are a constant reminder of 20 years of war, which|has killed over 1.5 million people and devastated the country. The SovieUnion poured some US$5 billion a year into Afghanistan to subdue theMujaheddin or a total of US$45 billion - and they lost. The US commit-jted some four to five billion dollars between 1980 and 1992 in aid to theMujaheddin. US funds were matched by Saudi Arabia and together witsupport from other European and Islamic countries, the Mujaheddin]received a total of over US$10 billion. 1 Most of this aid was in the foof lethal modern weaponry given to a simple agricultural people who Iit with devastating results.The war wounds of the Taliban leaders also reflect the bloodybrutal style of war that took place in and around Kandahar in the 198The Durrani Pashtuns who inhabit the south and Kandahar receivedless aid through the CIA and Western aid pipeline which armed, firand provided logistics such as medical facilities to the Mujaheddin,compared to the Ghilzai Pashtuns in the east of the country and arouKabul. The aid was distributed by Pakistan's Interservices Intelligen(ISI), who tended to treat Kandahar as a backwater and the Durranis witsuspicion. As a consequence the nearest medical facilities for a woundeKandahari Mujaheddin was a bone-shaking two-day camel ride to Quetacross the border in Pakistan. Even today first-aid amongst the Taliban israre, doctors are all too few and surgeons on the front line non-existentVirtually the only medical practitioners in the country are the hospitof the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).By chance I was in Kandahar in December 1979 and watched the :Soviet tanks roll in. Teenage Soviet soldiers had driven for two days fronthe Soviet Republic of Turkmenistan in Central Asia to Herat and theon to Kandahar along a metalled highway that the Soviets had themselvejbuilt in the 1960s. Many of the soldiers were of Central Asian origitThey got out of their tanks, dusted off their uniforms and ambled acrto the nearest stall for a cup of sugarless green tea - a staple part of idiet in both Afghanistan and Central Asia. The Afghans in thejust stood and stared. On 27 December Soviet Spetsnatz or Special Forcehad stormed the palace of President Hafizullah Amin in Kabul, killehim, occupied Kabul and appointed Babrak Karmal as President.When the resistance began around Kandahar it was based on the tribal'network of the Durranis. In Kandahar the struggle against the Soviets waa tribal jihad led by clan chiefs and ulema (senior religious scholars) ratthan an ideological jihad led by Islamicists. In Peshawar there were sevMujaheddin parties which were recognised by Pakistan and receivedshare of aid from the CIA pipeline. Significantly none of the seven partiesKANDAHAR 1994: THE ORIGINS OF THE TALIBAN ~ 19were led by Durrani Pashtuns. In Kandahar all seven parties had a following,but the most popular parties in the south were those based on tribalties such as the Harakat-e-Inquilab Islami (Movement of the IslamicRevolution) led by Maulvi Mohammed Nabi Mohammedi and anotherHizb-e-Islami (Party of Islam) led by Maulvi Younis Khalis. Before thewar both leaders were well known in the Pashtun belt and ran their ownmadrassas or religious schools.For commanders in the south party loyalty depended on which Peshawarleader would provide money and arms. Mullah Omar joined Khalis'sHizb-e-Islami while Mullah Hassan joined Harakat. 'I knew Omarextremely well but we were fighting on different fronts and in differentgroups but sometimes we fought together,' said Hassan. 2 Also popular wasthe National Islamic Front led by Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani, who advocatedthe return of the Durrani ex-King Zahir Shah to lead the Afghanresistance - a move that was strongly opposed by Pakistan and the USA.The ex-King was living in Rome and continued to be a popular figureamongst the Kandaharis, who hoped that his return would reassert theleadership role of the Durrani tribes.The contradictions within the Pashtun Mujaheddin leadership were toweaken the Pashtuns as the war progressed. The ulema valued the historicalideals of early Islamic history and rarely challenged traditional Afghantribal structures like the Jirga. They were also much more accommodatingtowards the ethnic minorities. The Islamicists denigrated the tribal structureand pursued a radical political ideology in order to bring about anIslamic revolution in Afghanistan. They were exclusivists which madethe minorities suspicious of them.Thus Harakat had no coherent party structure and was just a loosealliance between commanders and tribal chiefs, many of whom had justa rudimentary madrassa education. On the other hand Gulbuddin Hikmetyar'sHizb-e-Islami built a secretive, highly centralized, political organizationwhose cadres were drawn from educated urban Pashtuns. Prior to thewar the Islamicists barely had a base in Afghan society, but with moneyand arms from the CIA pipeline and support from Pakistan, they builtone and wielded tremendous clout. The traditionalists and the Islamicistsfought each other mercilessly so that by 1994, the traditional leadershipin Kandahar had virtually been eliminated, leaving the field free for thenew wave of even more extreme Islamicists - the Taliban.The battle for Kandahar was also determined by its own particular history.Kandahar is Afghanistan's second largest city with a 1979 pre-warPopulation of about 250,000 and twice that today. The old city has beeninhabited since 500 BC, but just 35 miles away lies Mundigak, a Bronze-Age village settled around 3,000 BC, which was once part of the IndusValley civilization. Kandaharis have always been great traders as the city