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260 NOTES27 1996. Pakistani diplomats in Washington told me that the air tickets of someof the participating Afghans had been paid by Unocal. Brown was one of the fewUS legislators who took an interest in Afghanistan at the time, partly because hebacked the Unocal project.22. Reuters, 'US sending envoy to Taliban,' Washington, 1 October 1996.23. Interview with Nazdjanov, Ashkhabad, 22 January 1997.24. Interview with Bridas executive, Islamabad, June 1997. Bridas held talks withMobil, Amoco and Coastal oil companies in the USA in order to win backingfrom a major US oil company to offset Unocal's links with the US government.Bridas was also talking to British, French and Malaysian oil companies to join itsconsortium. It was ako talking to a Russian oil company about joining, m orderto offset Russian opposition to its pipeline project.25. Interview with Imle, Davos, Switzerland, 29 January 1999.26. Interview with Akashi, Ashkhabad, 22 January 1997-27. Ebel, Robert, 'Energy Choices in the Near Abroad. The Haves and Havenotsface the future,' Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, April1997.Chapter 131. Both companies had built up lobbies within the Taliban. 'We have still notdecided which company we will accept, but we prefer Bridas. They give us confidencebecause they are neutral,' Mullah Mohammed Sadeq, who had visitedBuenos Aires, told me on 27 February 1997.2. Interview with Bridas executive, Islamabad June 1997.3. Interview with John Imle, in Davos, Switzerland, 31 January 1999.4. Interview with President Niyazov, Ashkhabad, 22 January 1997- Turkmenistanhosted a meeting of the UN-sponsored 'International Forum of Assistance toAfghanistan' in a bid to play a larger role in Afghanistan.5. Three European companies were involved in the Turkey-Turkmenistan pipeline,Italy's Snamprogetti, Gas de France and Royal Dutch Shell.6. The breakdown of the deal gave Turkmenistan US$1 for supplying the gas,Unocal 65-85 cents for transport costs and the Taliban 15 cents as royalty. Thiswould have given the Taliban an estimated US$105 million dollars a year, butthe Taliban rejected it.7. The new CentGas consortium announced on 25 October 1997, includedUnocal 46.5 per cent, Delta Oil 15 per cent, Turkmenistan 7 per cent, Itochu(Japan) 6.5 per cent, Indonesia Petroleum (Japan) 6.5 per cent, Crescent Group(Pakistan) 3.5 per cent and Hyundai Engineering and Construction Co. (SouthKorea) 5 per cent. Ten per cent shares were reserved for Gazprom.8. After Gazprom's pullout, the CentGas shares were rearranged. Unocal 54-11per cent, Delta Oil 15 per cent, Turkmenistan 7 per cent, Indonesia Petroleum(Japan) 7.22 per cent, CIECO TransAsia Gas Ltd (Japan) 7.22 per cent, HyundaiLtd (South Korea) 5.56 per cent, Crescent Group (Pakistan) 3.89 per cent.NOTES ~ 2619. Reuters, 9 August 1997. Quoted in Dawn newspaper.10. Heslin, Sheila. Testimony at Senate hearings into illegal fund-raising activities,17 September 1997.11. Lees, Caroline, 'Oil barons court Taliban in Texas', Sunday Tefegrapfc, 14December 1997.12. Interview with Imle, 29 January 1999, Davos, Switzerland.13. Starobin, Paul, 'The New Great Game', the National Journal, 12 March 1999.The Kaplan quote is from his book. Kaplan, Robert, The Ends of The Earth, AJourney to the Frontiers of Anarchy, Vintage Books, 1997.14- Rubin, Barnett, 'US Policy in Afghanistan', Muslim Politics Report, Councilof Foreign Relations, New York January 1997.15. Interview with Iranian diplomat, Islamabad, January 1997.16. Although publicly Pakistan supported the arms embargo, the ISI warned theCIA privately that such a measure would complicate its arming of the Talibanand delay a Taliban victory and the Unocal project. The US still supports an armsembargo, but subsequently it has not been pushed by the Clinton administration.Pakistan diplomats told me that Unocal had paid for some air tickets for Afghanspeakers for the Hank Brown hearings.17. Raphel, Robin, Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee onthe Near East and South Asia, 11 May 1996.18. Raphel, Robin, text of speech at the closed door UN meeting on Afghanistan,obtained by the author, 18 November 1996.19. Rubin, Bamett, 'US Policy in Afghanistan', Muslim Politics Report, Councilof Foreign Relations, New York, January 1997.20. Interview with US diplomat, Islamabad, 20 January 1997. Aramco was theconsortium of US oil companies which controlled Saudi oil development until itwas nationalized by the Saudi government.21. 'While the CIA did not embark on a new Afghan operation of its own,Unocal officials were briefed extensively by US intelligence analysts. Unocal andDelta hired as consultants every available member of the inner circle of thoseAmericans involved in Afghan operations during the jihad years.' Mackenzie,Richard, 'The United States and the Taliban,' in Maley, William (ed.), FundamentalismReborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban, C. Hurst, London 1998.22. Interview with John Imle, 29 January 1999, Davos, Switzerland.23. Interview with US official, Islamabad, 27 January 1998.24. AFP, 'US wants puppet government in Afghanistan,' 11 March 1998. Ayub'sreference was to an abortive American attempt to talk to neutral Pashtun figures,who might play a role in diluting the Taliban's hardliners.25. Talbott, Strobe Speech at Stanford University, California, 23 January 1999,US Information Service.26. Rohrabacher, Dana, *US Policy towards Afghanistan', Senate Foreign RelationsSubcommittee on South Asia, Washington, 14 April 1999.27. Testimony of Mavis Leno to US Senate Foreign Relations Committee ongender apartheid in Afghanistan, 2 March 1998.