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214 ~ TALIBANdrawn since 1996 - a Pashtun south under the Taliban and a non-Pashtunnorth divided by the Hindu Kush mountains, leaving Kabul contested bythe two sides. With the devastating massacres, sectarian pogroms andethnic cleansing in so many areas, the chances of fragmentation appearextremely high. Fortunately there is no Slobodan Milosevic or SaddamHussein amongst the warlords, who would be prepared to preserve powerand their fiefdoms at the expense of partition of the country. Despitetheir interference, fragmentation suits none of Afghanistan's neighboursbecause it would open a Pandora's box of ethnicity that would rapidlyspill across Afghanistan's borders, create massive refugee influxes and furtherspread the culture of drugs, weapons and Islamic fundamentalism intheir already fragile states. Formal fragamentation and even partition ofthe Afghan state is still possible, but so far none of the players desire it.That is the one positive hope for the future of the peace process.Peace-making by the UN has so far failed to yield any dividends, butnot for lack of trying. The reason is simply that as long as outside powersfuel the warlords with money and weapons, the civil war does not have alikelihood of winding down. A possible solution might lie in a processwhich would have to begin from outside Afghanistan. All the regionalstates would first have to agree to an arms embargo on Afghanistan,implement it sincerely and allow it to be monitored by the UN effectively.The regional states would have to accept limited areas of influence inAfghanistan rather than continuing to push for their proxies to rule theentire country. An Iran-Pakistan dialogue would be essential in whichPakistan would accept limiting its influence to the Pashtun belt, whileIran accept the same in western and central Afghanistan with guaranteesfor the Shia minority.In short, each neighbouring state would have to recognize not only itsown national security needs, but also those of its neighbours. Outsideinfluence cannot now be eliminated in Afghanistan, but it must be containedand limited with mutual agreement to acceptable levels. No neighbouringcountry can presume to undermine the acknowledged securityinterests of its neighbours. Negotiating such agreements would beextremely tricky because they would involve not just diplomats, but themilitary and intelligence officials of each state. The UN and the internationalcommunity would also have to guarantee that such agreementswould not be furthering the future disintegration of Afghanistan or interferingwith the process of government formation inside Afghanistan.Afghanistan's internal settlement can no longer be achieved by whatis euphemistically called 'a broad-based government.' There is no possibilitythat Mullah Omar and Masud are going to be able to agree to sit downin Kabul and rule together. Instead, what is needed is a cease-fire, a weakcentral government for an initial period, the agreed demilitarization ofCONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN ~ 215Kabul and a high degree of autonomy in the regions controlled by thefactions. All the factions would have to agree to build up a strengthenedcentral government in the long term, while maintaining their own autonomyin the short term. In this way, they would retain their independentmilitary units, but would also contribute to a central policing force inKabul.The factions would receive outside aid for reconstruction on an independentbasis, but work together through the central government torebuild the country's shattered infrastructure. This would in turn generategreater confidence and understanding between them. All the factionswould then have to agree to set in motion some form of legitimizingprocess through elected or chosen representative bodies in their regions,which ultimately could lead to a central Jirga or Shura in Kabul.It cannot be underestimated how difficult it would be to negotiate suchagreements, given that at present there is no will among the belligerentsto negotiate. One lure could be a substantial reconstruction package puttogether by international donors, the World Bank or large private charities,which would not be disbursed until there was a minimum agreement.This would essentially be a bribe for the warlords and an incentive forthe Afghan people to pressurize them to accept an agreement. Any seriouspeace process would need much greater commitment to peace-making inAfghanistan from the international community than it has shown so far.Peace in Afghanistan would pay enormous dividends across the entireregion. Pakistan would benefit economically from the reconstruction inAfghanistan and it could begin to tackle the leftovers of the Afghan waron its own soil - the proliferation of weapons, drugs, terrorism, sectarianismand the black economy. Pakistan's diplomatic isolation in the regionwould end and it could reintegrate itself into the Central Asian networkof communication links, offering as it does the shortest route to the sea.Iran would return to its position in the world community and its role asa great trading state at the centre of South Asia, Central Asia and theMiddle East. Turkey would have links and commercial ties to Turkicpeoples in Afghanistan with whom it has a historical connection.China would feel more secure and be able to carry out a more effectiveeconomic development programme in its deprived Muslim province ofXinjiang. Russia could build a more realistic relationship with Centraland South Asia based on economic realities rather than false hegemonicambitions, while laying its Afghan ghosts to rest. Oil and gas pipelinescrossing Afghanistan would link the country into the region and speedup foreign assistance for its reconstruction. The USA could evolve a morerealistic Central Asian policy, access the region's energy in a securerenvironment and deal with the threat of terrorism.But if the war in Afghanistan continues to be ignored we can only