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212 ~ TALIBANto build a civil society that is just and equitable in which rulers areresponsible for their citizens - is forgotten.The genius of early Muslim-Arab civilization was its multi-cultural,multi-religious and multi-ethnic diversity. The stunning and numerousstate failures that abound in the Muslim world today are because thatoriginal path, that intention and inspiration, has been abandoned eitherin favour of brute dictatorship or a narrow interpretation of theology.Muslim history has been a cycle of conquest, renewal and defeat. 'Perhapsit has been the destiny of Islam to attract and use the primitive peopleswho surround or cross its territory, but then to fall prey to their violentpower. Ultimately order is restored and wounds are healed. The successfulprimitive warrior is tamed by the all-powerful urban life of Islam,' wroteFerdinand Braudel. 8Following this Muslim tradition, could the Taliban also change or moderatetheir policies and absorb Afghanistan's rich ethnic and culturaldiversity to become the country's legitimate rulers? In their present formthat is unlikely. The Taliban are essentially caught between a tribal societywhich they try to ignore and the need for a state structure which theyrefuse to establish. Tribal fragmentation amongst the Pashtuns is alreadycoming back to haunt them as they fail to satisfy even the local demandsof power-sharing, while they ignore the non-Pashtuns. This was never thecase in the past. 'Despite the seeming dominance of the Pashtuns, theactual process of state-building entailed the participation of the elite ofall the ethnic groups and a prominent role played by non-Pastuns in boththe bureaucracy and the military,' writes Afghan scholar Ashraf Ghani. 9The Taliban are bucking the entire trend of Afghan history because theyhave no understanding of it.At the same time, the Taliban refuse to define the Afghan state theywant to constitute and rule over, largely because they have no idea whatthey want. The lack of a central authority, state organizations, a methodologyfor command and control and mechanisms which can reflect somelevel of popular participatation (Loya Jirga or Islamic Shura orparliament), make it impossible for many Afghans to accept the Talibanor for the outside world to recognize a Taliban government. There canbe no effective government unless there is a common, acceptable definitionof what kind of state is now required to heal the wounds of war. Butthe Kandahari group around Mullah Omar brooks no outsiders and noadvice. Divisions within the Taliban are multiplying fast and it is notunlikely that more moderate Taliban may mount a coup against MullahOmar and the Kandahari ukma.No warlord faction has ever felt itself responsible for the civilian population,but the Taliban are incapable of carrying out even the minimumof developmental work because they believe that Islam will take care ofCONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN ~ 213everyone. This has raised fundamental questions for the UN and theNGO community - that humanitarian aid is in fact prolonging the civilwar because foreign aid keeps the population alive, absolving the warlordsof the responsibility of having to provide for the people and allowingthem to channel all their resources into the war effort. This dilemma isnow common for the UN and aid agencies in other failed states such asSudan and Somalia and presents the greatest challenge to the internationalhumanitarian community in the future.It seems that the only effective Afghan NGO is based on organizedsmuggling and the drugs trade. Thus the limited reconstruction which theTaliban has undertaken so far is entirely related to improving the efficiencyof smuggling and drugs trafficking, such as repairing roads, settingup petrol pumps and inviting US businessmen to set up a mobile telephonenetwork which will qualitatively speed up the movement of drugsand illicit trade. The benefits of this reconstruction all accrue to the transportand drugs mafia. No warlord is building schools, hospitals, watersupply systems or anything remotely related to civic development.In their present form, the Taliban cannot hope to rule Afghanistanand be recognized by the international community. Even if they were toconquer the north, it would not bring stability, only continuing guerrillawar by the non-Pashtuns, but this time from bases in Central Asia andIran which would further destabilize the region. Yet in the Pashtun beltof Afghanistan, the only alternative to the Taliban is further disorder andchaos. 'The majority of Afghans south of Kabul would most probablyagree that the Taliban, although not as popular today as when they came,are better for the people, their security and welfare, compared to whatwas there before them and that there is no real alternative but anarchy.' 10The Taliban cannot be wished away, but a more likely scenario is thatthe Taliban will form factions with separate and rival Taliban fiefdoms inKabul, Kandahar and possibly Herat.The anti-Taliban alliance is incapable of conquering or ruling over thesouthern Pashtun region. So far Masud has proved unable to galvanizeenough Pashtuns who reject the Taliban and who would give him somenational legitimacy. The opposition's only chance for survival depends onwinning over sections of the Pashtuns, which will doubtless prolong thewar, but also weaken the Taliban and offer the possibility that both sidescould then negotiate. The anti-Taliban alliance has also failed to set upminimum state structures or a representative leadership which absorbseven all the non-Pashtuns. Their bickering, internal differences and leadershippower struggles have decimated them in the eyes of many Afghans,who may loathe the Taliban but have no faith in the anti-Taliban allianceeither.The fear of fragmentation is ever present and the lines have been well